

THE
PROBLEMS AND LESSONS
OF
THE WAR

CLARK UNIVERSITY ADDRESSES

DECEMBER 16, 17, AND 18, 1915

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G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1916

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
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FOREWORD

WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE PRESENT WAR

IT was not without some natural hesitation that the authorities of the university approved the bold and brilliant plan of my colleague, Professor Blakeslee, to hold a conference here, at Clark University, upon a topic that has aroused throughout the world an intensity of feeling and a diversity of opinion which is without precedent in history. It should be clearly understood at the outset that the university has simply offered a free platform, and invited the frankest expression of opinion, but has assumed responsibility for no man's views. All of the speakers on the program whose addresses follow in this volume, were here as our guests; they came not without effort and even expense, on their part, to contribute to the symposium, and entered heartily into its spirit; each is a widely recognized authority on the topic on which he speaks.

To my mind there is no more splendid illustration of the spirit of fair play, of toleration, of true neutrality, in a word, of Americanism, than the spectacle, all over the country, of our schools coolly utilizing this war to teach its geography, history, economics, on a basis of facts that all admit but without bias toward or offense to any class of our citizens of whatever nationality; and also of our college youth debating

everywhere with fervor and conviction the merits of both sides of this conflict, singing alternately *Die Wacht am Rhein*, *Rule Britannia*, *Heil Dir im Siegerkranz*, and the *Marseillaise*, and in the end all joining hands and voices in *The Star Spangled Banner* as a Doxology. Such spectacles are possible only in a land measurably free from the awful handicap of ancient racial animosities and national antagonisms, some of them in Europe as old as the crusades. The spirit that hears all sides with malice toward none and charity for all is not only American, but it is peculiarly academic, for that culture is a very spurious one that does not make man more tolerant toward honest views the opposite of his own. We not only permit but wish all who come to our shores from different lands to remain loyal to the spirit, traditions and ideals of their fatherland, whatever it is. We not only wish but help them to perpetuate and study its language, its literature, and to maintain its customs. We believe that such variety enriches our national life and prevents stagnation and uniformity. We insist only that they must be Americans first and not disloyal to the spirit or interests of the country in which they have elected to live and by which their interests and their citizenship are protected. Every white citizen of this country is an immigrant or descended from immigrants, and our people are made up of representatives of every race, creed, and nation of the earth. All we require is a gentleman's agreement that although they may differ ever so widely, they must differ amicably, or at least without open strife. This is the very corner-stone of such a republic. A nation so unprecedentedly composite as ours must regard a true impartial neutrality that hears and weighs all sides as part of its manifest destiny, and this gives us

in some sense a judicial position above that of the warring nations of Europe, so that the verdict of this country about the war, if it ever reaches any degree of unanimity, ought to be the verdict of history. This, then, is the spirit with which this conference was planned and with which it has been carried out.

As one of the thousands of American teachers who have been more or less "made in Germany," I will venture to illustrate the above academic freedom by a few opinions of my own. Like so many of my class, I have felt my soul almost torn in two between a sense of loyalty to and admiration of civic and cultural Germany, from whom we have yet so much to learn, and German militarism. Not only by colonization and trade, but by the fact that Germany has set the world its highest standards in education, she was advancing her influence in peaceful ways by leaps and bounds in almost every civilized country. Her school system, from the kindergarten to the university, her marvelous illustrations of efficiency in business and municipal organization, her great thinkers and writers, were silently leavening the world; but now that she has elected to grasp the sword to enlarge her borders and increase her influence by force, she seems in a sense turning her back upon the spiritual kingdom and reversing the great choice that Jesus made between material and political rule, and that of the spirit of truth, for it must be that the pervasion of much of the rest of the world by her philosophy, culture, and science generally will be checked. Our library has collected some two thousand books and pamphlets and two hundred and fifty cartoons on the present war, and we know not how many more are to come, to which the attention of those interested is invited. It will take years

and perhaps generations before we obtain a competent consensus of opinion in regard to the causes and effects of this war, and, for one, I believe that the key to understanding it is to be found in Germany, which is far too little understood by any of its enemies. The Teutons have had an almost unbroken development since the days of Tacitus. They were strong, frugal, simple in life, as valiant warriors as the world has ever seen from the Viking days of the *furor Teutonicus*. It is very significant that they never had a political revolution like that of France or our own, so that the feudal spirit and autocracy have persisted unbroken. They were not converted till the thirteenth century, and in a few generations thereafter Luther began to throw off the yoke of the Church so that Christianity has never effaced the indigenous culture, as it has done among the Latin races. Their language has isolated them, and there has been and still is a strange ignorance of both the best and the worst things in Germany by her enemies, especially by the English. When for the first time Germany felt a foreign heel upon her neck, in the days of Napoleon, Fichte began the work of giving Germany a new soul by his famous addresses in which he said: "We have little left but strong bodies, an indigenous language of our own, not composed of the debris of other tongues, an independence that has achieved the Reformation. Although our history is more marked by strife than unity, we have an inflexible will and there is only one possibility, which should be our destiny, and that is to recreate ourselves by education." So the military, financial, and educational system was radically reconstructed, and Germany began the regeneration which surprised the world in 1870. No other country in Europe, also, has succeeded in uniting the old landed

aristocracy with its strong conservative and military spirit and the new rich, and to these the professors and the intellectuals generally have been added since 1870, so that all these support the Crown. Society was never so stratified into many classes, each domineering over that below and a little inclined to servility toward that above, these classes being practically all measured in army rank as by a yardstick. Hegel made the State the supreme embodiment of the absolute reason, and the theologian Richard Rothe declared that it should take the place of the Church and be the object of the same reverence and devotion that had hitherto been paid to it. There is therefore great centralization of power. The Prussian Diet, essentially the creature of the Kaiser, controls about sixty-five per cent. of the population of the empire, and the *Bundesrat*, which represents the seventeen states that compose the empire, can alone declare war.

The keynote of Prussianized Germany is, discipline, organization, system, method. Everything must be done in the sharpest focus of consciousness. Attention must revise and improve upon everything in the social, financial, educational system. The school is primarily a creator of loyal German subjects, and in the last data available to me illiteracy had been reduced to sixteen hundredths of one per cent. Bergson comments upon this by dubbing Germany a machine, which in his philosophy means a soulless and lifeless, made thing or a Frankenstein, and says that new Germany is without a soul.

But if she has lately been turning her back upon the old German spirit and been remaking herself, hardly less radically than Japan has done, so that instead of being a land of dreamers she is now a land in which

efficiency celebrates its highest triumphs, she has one psychic element, the extraordinary development of which I do not believe is realized, and that is will power. Kant made will the very apex of the human soul. According to his pragmatism, reason can never prove or disprove even such things as God, soul, freedom, or immortality. Nevertheless, they are truer than anything else because as postulates they work best. Man attains his highest end by acting as if they were true.¹ Duty Kant made the sublimest word in the whole vocabulary. It must be done in the face of every natural inclination, in order to be pure, so that the moral rigorism of the categorical imperative filtered down through Schiller and many others into the folk-consciousness as a potent influence for culture, both expressing and moulding the national consciousness. Fichte, too, fired the German soul with the idea of duty, while Schopenhauer even identified will with the force and energy of the natural world, and their idealistic successors might almost have said instead of, with Louis XIV., "The state it is I," "The universe it is I, for its energy has its supreme expression in my will." Thus the German philosophy was focussing down toward the point which is well expressed in the cry of the German soldiers, "*Immer darauf und durch.*" But this focalization on will went much further in Nietzsche. He interpreted Darwinism and the survival of the fittest in the most literal and practical way. As in nature the best have survived and the worst have perished, and as evolution is going on without end, we must regard man as he is to-day as simply a link between the ape from which he descended and the superman that is to be. Man is a bridge. Perhaps

¹ Vaihinger's *Philosophie des Als Ob*.

he will be sometime a missing link. Therefore our effort must focus upon the highest possible development of the best and highest men. It is vicious to serve the meanest, the humblest. All effort must be focussed on the *élite*, so that we shall in the end develop a species as much superior to modern man as he is to the troglodytes. Since Christ commended the poor and the weak he was the great enemy of the real interests of man and made for degeneration. What is needed is to develop the higher individualities to their very uttermost. Strength, energy, ruthlessness, are typical of the great man. This hypertrophied egoism made a new appeal to the ambitions of youth with its horror of inferiority, of *Minderwertigkeit*, and its instinctive excelsior striving to the summits. Hence in the wake of Nietzsche we have a flood of literature developing superhumanity in different walks of life, and dramas and novels galore are inspired by this gospel. One writer declares that the supermen in the world are related to the vulgar masses or to the average man, whose verdict we here regard as the voice of God, as Prospero was to Caliban. Unfortunately, the type of men oftenest selected as illustrating superhumanity are men like Napoleon, Borgia, Stendhal, and perhaps Goethe and Faust. Many of the literary and dramatic supermen are almost monsters of egoism, ruthlessness, and perhaps self-indulgence.¹ I think we might say that for many German authors there are two opposite ideals: first, on one hand, that of Jesus,

¹ See Wilbrandt's *The New Humanity or Easter Island*, the chief character of which, Dr. Adler, is Nietzsche; Hoffmann's *Der eiserne Rittmeister*, Widmann's *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*; and one hesitates to mention Wedekind's trilogy on the superwoman, Lulu, who allows herself everything and storms her way through life desiring to have every possible experience.

often almost parodied, as in Hauptmann's *The Fool in Christ*, who seems to me meant to represent a kind of generic, totemized man, who embodies many racial traits but has evolved no or a contemptible individuality; and on the other, the ideal of an almost demonic being who lets himself go with abandon, and has, gets, and makes of himself the very most possible, regardless of others. It is impossible to estimate the influence of this movement, which seems to have gone over from philosophy to literature.

Along with this movement, a few other significant books might be mentioned, beginning with Gobineau's *Die Ungleichheit der Menschenrassen*. The author was a Frenchman, who, as Bergson says, has always been almost unknown in France; a man of wealth, who traveled widely. His main thesis is that the Aryan race is vastly superior to all others, as much above other white races as the latter in general are above the blacks, that it should be given special privileges and made responsible for the rest of the world. As he was unrecognized, he died in proud seclusion, as a critic suggests, worshiping himself in a kind of ingrowing religion. After his death his work, however, was translated into German by a devoted disciple, Schemann, and made a veritable cult. It was this trend that Houston Chamberlain's book developed still further, urging that the Renaissance, which began in Northern Italy, was mainly inspired by those who were real Teutons, and that the Catholic Church, which represented the Latin races, by its persecutions crushed out the movement. The best things in Spain in the sixteenth century and before were Teutonic, and the old Romans must have had in their blood Teutonic ancestors because true Teutons combine the intellect of the ancient Greeks, the organ-

izing power of the Romans, and the persistency of the Jews. He admits that this fusion cannot yet be proven to be one of blood, but intimates that this will eventually come. For him all history so far is prolegomena. True history will begin when Germany realizes her superiority as she does not now. J. S. Reimers and even the anthropologist Ludwig Volkmann go further yet in insisting that most of the great men in other nations were really Teutons.

A very significant paragraph from Mommsen, written in 1858, has lately been quoted by Charles Francis Adams to the effect that as Germany is superior to other races, she has responsibility for the higher development of other countries, and must do more than apply a merely negative Monroe Doctrine to them. Concentrating the good traits of so many nations in herself, she must give their benefits by force, if necessary, to others.

The official head of this great race, which is also a nation, with all these new strong aspirations, prospects, achievements,—the Kaiser, who has been so much discussed of late, may and may not have said all the things ascribed to him, but we should not forget that he is not only probably the ablest man in Europe but has by far the most exalted place, and has wielded the greatest influence. Perhaps he did compare himself to Joshua, desiring to lead his people out into a larger promised land; perhaps he did say that there was only one will in Germany and that was his. He is really not very responsible to either people or parliament, and he is a kind of human deity for his people. It is hard for us to understand the normal state of mind of an able man in his position. It is inevitable that he should believe in his destiny and perhaps it is necessary for

him to be no less violently antagonistic to the social democrats, who seem to be his *bête noire*. Perhaps he did tell the Potsdam recruits in 1905, that they might be called upon to shoot even their parents or brothers, referring to the social democrats, that they were the only foe he knew, etc. But it seems to me our function as neutrals is to try to understand the attitude of such a man in such a position before we pronounce him insane or the mad dog of Europe, etc. We really have a great task before us to comprehend a type of race and nationality which is so different from our own, and which can so readily be made to seem both outrageous and absurd.

There are many psychological aspects of this war that are interesting, whatever our point of view, and one pertains to the policy of frightfulness. Clausewitz's three volumes long ago advocated what he called absolute war, and his successor, Hartmann, both heads of the great military training-school, believed that military necessity justified everything, long before Bernhardi advocated a Machiavellian diplomacy. War, these men tell us, must not be limited by humanity. Every passion is and should be let loose. There is no such thing possible as civilized warfare. Military necessity can brook no opposing right or duty, and may justify every means. It can see no difference between public and private property. Brutality, even if carried to the very uttermost, may be on the whole the best policy by making war so terrible that their enemies will supremely shun it. Nothing that can help the enemy, even the civic population, should be left behind by an advancing army. One general declares that the army snaps its fingers at all critics and defies all restraints when war is on. It cannot be

limited by humanity. I think there can be little doubt that Germany's conception of war differs from that of France and England, but how shall we reconcile her terrorization in Belgium with her regulations as to what must be done if German territory is invaded, in which case even the *Landsturm*, including the old men, must be ruthless; they must wear no uniform and everybody able must do everything to kill the enemy, by whatever means. One German general is reported to have said, "We are not barbarians yet," intimating that if the tide of war went against them, they might become so.

As to the religious effects of the war, the literature we have here seems to indicate that as war tends to bring a reversion in other respects, it is bringing more or less in all the countries involved a reversion toward the religion of youth or childhood. Baumann, a German professor, tells us that there is a great trend among the educated soldiers from Nietzsche to the New Testament, and perhaps quite as much to the Old; and Kähler says that the army feels it has four fronts, three toward the enemy and one toward heaven. Another writer describes Jesus as standing before the door of the heart of the German people as he did before the tomb of Lazarus, about to awaken it. We are told of the eagerness of soldiers for simple religious services and their consumption of religious tracts and books. In France there has also undoubtedly been a movement in the same direction, to instance only Psichari's *Le voyage du centurion*, which seems to have had immense vogue not only among soldiers but among civilians. France, of course, since the end of the Concordat, has been becoming more indifferent to religion; and the state, and especially the educational department, had

made prodigious efforts to substitute the worship of France itself for loyalty to the Church, somewhat as Japan had done; for as there is little Protestantism or few half-way stations along the grammar of assent, the problem here is peculiar. The centurion of the New Testament was a military man having soldiers under him, who believed Jesus could heal his servant at a distance. This he did with evident great surprise and hearty commendation that a soldier and a Gentile should have such faith. So Psichari's assumption is that no man can be a soldier without being a Christian, and *vice versa*, because the Christian must be ready to lay down his life for something dearer than it. As his hero, who is himself, leaves Paris, he feels the artificiality of civilization there, and as he advances through successive degradations into Mauretania, he finds himself as never before, because he has found something larger than self, namely the love and service of Christ, which he identifies as the love and service of man. The final moral is that just as the hero was really converted in his campaign against the disciples of Mahomet, so French soldiers are being slowly converted to a larger, higher life in their advance against the great anti-Christ devotees of Thor, the Germans. This is the work that has made its appeal.

Very interesting to the psychologist, too, are the striking illustrations of credulity, as instance the angels at Mons, who were said by so many to have actually appeared and turned the Germans eastward when they had their enemy in their power, stories which the Psychical Research Society has rather elaborately studied and which Machen has embodied in *The Bowmen*; the false story of the Russian bells, of which *L'Illustration* printed a full account, that scores if not

hundreds of them, to which the Russians attach an almost superstitious reverence, were taken from the churches overrun by the Germans and deposited in the public square of Moscow; the credulity with regard to the Russian army going from Vladivostock through England to Flanders; the persistent myth of a yellow French auto carrying a prodigious sum of money secretly and by night through Germany to Russia, which caused watches to be set in many cities and caused the deaths of a number of men; the rumor that the Crown Prince had committed suicide; that the Kaiser was dying; that a great earthquake had overthrown the lions in Trafalgar Square in London; the Wolfe Agency's report that King George had been captured; that England had sought to buy with numberless donkey-loads of gold the allegiance of the Sultan; the stories of spies, fliers, of wounded soldiers who lived supernaturally with their limbs and in one case the head shot away.

Lahy has given a very interesting story of life in the cantonments or training camps, and how, despite the hardships, the old life seems to be more or less forgotten and left behind; how men are absorbed in the present and their sphere of thought limited; their amusements, etc. When they change to the trenches there is still more narrowing of psychic life, to almost the level of sensuous response to the here and now, with the prodigious din, the constant danger, the very difficult conditions of life; and finally the third stage in the charge itself, where the instinct to kill is prompted solely by the impulse of self-preservation, which excludes everything else from consciousness, so that if soldiers are taken right from the charge they almost forget that they have home, family, and all the other relations of their life, and gradually emerge into their normal con-

sciousness almost as from a dream. So, too, the accounts of Joly and Kurt Dix of the excitement when the declaration of war was made, of the senseless runs on banks and on markets, that sometimes had to be closed; the tendency of all citizens to get acquainted on the street, obliterating all class distinctions; the trend to bunch in the open as if the herding instinct reasserted itself; the flocking in from the country on the first of August of those who for every reason should have stayed, which crowded the trains, which were soon after crowded again by citizens fleeing to the mountains as if for greater security, even in the heart of the country where there was little danger of attack, sometimes because they wished to get away from the war and hear nothing of it; the general nervous tension and anxiety as described by Weygert, often culminating in hysteria; the strange mental contagion, so characteristic of crowds and mobs. The war has been very hard on the nerves for those who have stayed at home, and quite often those thought phlegmatic before have seemed to find their ideal medium for efficient action in the excitement of the war. Several agencies have been developed for eliminating the unfit because those prone to panic are extremely dangerous, and in Germany three stations of examination for incipient nervous troubles have been developed at home, and supplementary agencies in the field. Panics of horses constitute another rather interesting chapter. So does the increase of the population of asylums. No war was ever so hard on the nerves of those who participated as this, with its trench life, terrific explosions, and so on. It is in a semi-unconscious state and purely impulsively that most of the great acts of heroism are performed, so that people become heroes without knowing it.

Freud and many others have shown how regressive war is, how it plunges man back into his basal nature, how it may perhaps in a sense be a psychological necessity occasionally, because it relieves both the tension of progress, which is hard, and the monotony and specialization of life. It immerses man in the rank primitive emotions. Some of these genetic psychologists believe that it is almost regenerative of energy, and some are pessimistic, holding that the basal instinct of mankind is to kill in the sense of Hobbes, that the murder lust is the deepest thing in man, and that such a war as this shows how very superficial and ineffective are all the restraints that culture has imposed, how the hundreds and thousands, perhaps millions, of years in which man's basal nature has been developed, are still incomparably stronger than the superficial veneer of culture of the last two or three millennia. Man longs for things racially old. He lives on an evolutionary ladder. Retrogression is a means of regeneration.

From a eugenic point of view the war is unspeakably horrible. We have various estimates as to the number of thousands of babies per month that would have been born had the twenty million men in the field stayed at home, and already we have a number of appalling statistics as to the unprecedented drop of the baby crop. Now heredity is the most ancient and precious wealth and worth, and if it is impaired in quality or quantity, disaster must follow, for only the young, the old, and the feeble are left at home to propagate the race. Of the schemes that this situation has suggested this is not the place to speak. There can be no doubt that a war involving such terrific and unprecedented strain upon the nervous system will vastly impair the quality of parenthood, not only for years but for gene-

rations, because we now know something of the very close connection between the nervous and the reproductive system. Again, if Europe is set back, does it not follow that the fecund east, *e. g.*, China, which has already begun its regeneration, will at least greatly lessen the culture interval that separates the yellow from the white race? It seems to me that the main thing in view of all these stupendous problems in this country is for us to keep our poise and make real neutrality our religion; to insist upon a judicial attitude; to always hear the other side; to be ready not only to learn of the side to which our sympathies run counter, but to study, to appreciate this point of view. The glory of this country is that those who come here do make a *tabula rasa* of all these ghastly inherited prejudices and animosities and rancors, and that toleration here means that people must agree to differ. That we have none of these old chimneys to burn but that we can develop the philosophic temper to keep questions on which men differ wide open, is the glory of the country and gives us cause to love it more than ever.

G. STANLEY HALL.

CLARK UNIVERSITY, WORCESTER, MASS.,
April 24, 1916.

THE WAR PROBLEM AND ITS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

BY GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE

IN looking back over the past thousand years of European civilization, we must often be struck by the fact that much of Europe's most intense and longest continued suffering has been caused by a failure not so much of character as of intellect, not so much by wrong-meaning as by wrong-thinking. The centuries of religious wars were due not to the fact that the men of those ages were worse in character than those of the present, but to their failure to see that armed force is not the appropriate method for extending spiritual truth. The long-continued religious persecution, the inquisition, and the martyr's stake existed because the men of the past had not come to the belief or conviction that toleration in religious matters is correct state policy. The hundreds of thousands of executions for witchcraft were not due to the wickedness of past generations. In fact, the court which met at Salem was probably composed of better men, by any reasonable standard which we could apply, than any court which has been held anywhere in the United States within recent decades; yet it condemned to death many perfectly innocent men and women. The failure was an intellectual one, caused by the belief that witches could possess and control human beings.

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In each of these cases what was needed, above everything else, was correct judgment and accurate thinking.

In the world's tragic suffering of to-day we have a similar situation. The failure to find some means of regulating the intercourse of states without recurring war has been due, in the recent past, not so much to wrong-meaning as to wrong-thinking. The vast majority of mankind are anxious to avoid the necessity of war; but the best thought of the world does not know how this may be done. At bottom the problem is primarily an intellectual one, perhaps the greatest civilization has ever had to solve. It deals, to be sure, with elements now charged with passion, hate, selfish idealism, and national egoism, but it is nevertheless essentially an intellectual problem.

It may be well, in the first place, to consider the general thought of the world in regard to war, the possibility of making the present "the last war," and the means by which this may be brought about.

It must be admitted, at the start, that there are some who believe in occasional war as a good national tonic. We all remember Von Moltke's famous expression: "Permanent peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream at that—no nation ever yet enjoyed a protracted peace without sowing the seeds of ineradicable decline." According to this school of thought, war is needed now and then to develop national hardihood and self-sacrifice. Closely allied to this extreme militaristic view, is that which holds that the state should make war, cold-bloodedly, as a matter of policy, whenever it may secure any national advantage by it. We instinctively turn to Bernhardt, as the great exponent of this creed. But Bernhardt is not limited to Germany, although they exist there in far too

great numbers. They are found in Great Britain, as present-day Teutonic apologists prove by quotations from their writings, while there are at least some of them here in our own midst. Two or three recent quotations well express their militaristic philosophy: "Every nation to be respected must have an imperial ambition"; "world empire is the only logical and natural aim for a nation"; and "it is the absolute right of a nation to live to its full intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means such as armed conquest." All three of these statements are from recent issues of *The Seven Seas*, the official publication of the Navy League of the United States. The last quotation continues, "Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right and in the case of the United States it is a particular duty." What is our "particular duty"? Expansion by armed conquest—according to the journal of our Navy League.

Men with these views we find in some proportion in every country. But fortunately they are in the minority; even in militaristic Germany they are in the minority, however influential we may regard them. Bernhardt himself admits that he wrote his famous book in order to turn the mass of the German nation from peaceful to militaristic ideals. He says: "They [the German people] have to-day become a peace-loving—an almost too peace-loving nation. A rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike instincts"; and farther on he speaks of "the aspirations for peace which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul of the German people." This idea, that the majority of the Germans are peace-loving and not militaristic, is endorsed by the British writer, Norman Angell, who says:

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When the German Government desired to get its budgets voted in the Reichstag, it was obliged to disavow any intention of aggression and to base its appeal on the danger that Germany was exposed to.

From a French source evidence of the non-aggressive character of the mass of the German people may be found in the secret report on public opinion in Germany, which was prepared by the French Embassy in Berlin in 1913, and recently published in the French collection of diplomatic war correspondence.

The great majority in every civilized nation do not wish war, and do not believe in it either as a good in itself or as a policy of calculated aggression; but they do propose to defend their country as well as its policies, and to fulfill their national obligations.

A large proportion of those who hold these views believe in the policy of adequate national preparedness. Their motto is: "Peace by Preparedness." This idea that international peace is to be secured by national preparedness seems to be the popular one in each great country to-day. It shows the loose thinking so characteristic of this field. Of course, if there is danger of war, no nation, without great risk, can be without reasonable preparation for the defense of its territory and its national policies. It is obvious that a nation which can probably win any war waged against it, is reasonably, although not certainly, safe from attack. As Winston Churchill, formerly First Lord of the British Admiralty, once said: "The way to secure peace is to be so strong that victory in the event of war is certain." This same idea was recently expressed by one of our own Rear-Admirals, A. M. Knight, when testifying before the House Committee on Naval Affairs. "Isn't this true," he was asked,

"that if we are going to have a naval defense that is a sure defense, we must have the biggest navy afloat?"

"It is," answered the Admiral.

Let us cease, however, to be merely nationalistic and take a world view. Each nation cannot be stronger than every other, but only on such a basis may we have world peace by world preparedness. Each nation cannot maintain the two-power standard against all the others. Each international alliance cannot be stronger than every other. One may sooner raise one's self by one's boot straps than maintain world peace by world preparedness. A similar idea that money which the world spends on armies and navies is an insurance against war, is also due to a lack of clear thinking. The world as a whole never spent so much in insurance against war as in the years immediately before 1914. This supposed insurance not only did not prevent the worst war in history, but it was itself a very large factor in causing the war.

We may see the fallacy of world peace by world preparedness by examining the doctrine from the standpoint of our own country. We need to be better prepared, it is claimed. Agreed. Under present conditions we do need to be better prepared. But what is necessary preparation? The Administration urges a certain increase in our army and navy which is obviously a compromise proposal. The General Board of the Navy, however, has come out for a navy equal to the strongest in the world, that is, equal to that of Great Britain. But even should we have such a navy, we would not be quite secure; for if we had war with Great Britain we would very probably have to fight the combined navies of the British allies, Japan, France, Russia, and Italy. Perhaps it is in view of this possibil-

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ity that the organ of our Navy League, in three recent articles, demands a United States navy twice the size of the British. It adds that the necessary initial expenditure of two thousand millions of dollars should not be permitted to stand in the way of the plan. Suppose we adopt this perfectly logical national program and attempt to build a navy twice that of the British. The British will then say, and, as a fact are already saying, that the United States has no real need of a great navy, for it has no important oversea possessions, but that the very existence of their empire depends upon their keeping control of the ocean. Great Britain therefore will do its very utmost to maintain a navy much larger than that of the United States—Lord Rosebery so stated only a few weeks ago—and substantially half again as large as that of Germany. This attitude is perfectly correct from a British national viewpoint. As for Germany, it believes that it has failed to win the present war because inadequately prepared on the ocean. Germany will then also struggle to build a fleet fully equal to the strongest in the world. This too is perfectly logical from a German national point of view. But from a world view—from the view of those who wish to regulate the international life of the world without recourse to war—the whole thing is both impossible and ridiculous. Each navy cannot be the strongest.

This attempt to have the largest navy in the world or one equal to the largest, so clearly desirable from each national viewpoint, will, from a world view, simply lead to a wild competitive race in navy building. No nation can have any absolute standard for its navy; it aims merely to be stronger on the water than any other nation. Our Naval Board sometime ago recom-

mended forty-eight battleships; but there is nothing sacred about the number forty-eight, nothing in the length of our coastline, the provisions of our Federal Constitution, or the moral nature of our citizens which makes it necessary to have just forty-eight battleships. It all depends on how many battleships the other nation has. On this point we may agree with the journal of our Navy League, when it says:

It would seem that anyone who has the least notion of international or foreign affairs must perceive at once that the size of a nation's navy or army is not, after all, determined by the will of its citizens or even by its own federal government. The size of a nation's navy is determined by the will of foreign nations.

Then it adds:

If a foreign nation wills to have a 100 navy, it wills that we should have a 200 navy.

What is going to come of this attempt of each nation to be twice as well prepared as any other? Logically it will lead to this: when each nation has spent the proverbial "last dollar," and trained the proverbial "last man," and every military and naval force is developed to the last degree of efficiency—then we shall have no insurance against war at all, for each nation will be in exactly the same relative position as if armies and navies did not exist. The actual and practical result of competitive preparedness is well illustrated by the situation in Europe to-day.

There is then no such thing as world peace by world preparedness. It is an illogical system by which the world uses up its best resources in trying to secure a desirable end by impossible means.

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An idea somewhat similar to that of peace by preparedness is expressed by the slogan, "Peace by Righteousness." The Godly nations are to be ready to fight, at the drop of the hat, for righteousness; the evil-doers in the family of nations will thus be terrified into keeping the peace and, as a result, the world will enjoy the double blessing of righteousness and abiding peace. But the whole thing simmers down to the question, who is to determine what is righteousness? To our administration, a few years ago, it was righteousness to insist upon building the Panama Canal, "for the benefit of humanity." But to Colombia it was righteous to take no step toward this until she had agreed to sell the privilege at a figure which she regarded as satisfactory. Even among our own citizens to-day there is a marked difference of opinion as to which of these views of righteousness was correct. Take up recent international problems. Japan has argued with our State Department that the Anti-Japanese land legislation of California is palpably unrighteous. Our State Department insists that it is quite righteous, but leaves Japan's last emphatic protest unanswered. We state to Great Britain that its so-called blockade is unrighteous; Great Britain answers that it is highly righteous, and that she is going to maintain it. Righteousness, used in this sense, is practically synonymous with national policy. We all regard the Monroe Doctrine as highly righteous; but this view of the Monroe Doctrine would amuse an intelligent German, if it did not make him mad. To fight for our national policy is perfectly intelligible; if necessary, in most cases, we all intend to do it. But when every nation fights for its national policy, this will hardly lead to permanent international peace. In fact, this world war is largely due to the

fact that each nation is fighting for its own national policy. The idea that permanent international peace may be secured by each nation fighting for "righteousness," as it regards "righteousness," is a curious specimen of intellectual sophistry and intellectual humbug.

If the world can find little hope in the doctrine of "peace by preparedness" and "peace by righteousness," possibly it may have better success if it turns to the recognized peace societies and their leaders. A difficulty at once arises: Who is a peace man? A mollicoddle? But what is the name of that strenuous Ex-President whom the judges of the Nobel Fund picked out as the prize peace man of all America? Is this prize peace man a mollicoddle? A peace man is supposed to be against preparedness, but, as a matter of fact, preparedness is not at all an issue between peace people, as a whole, and militarists as a whole. The Massachusetts Peace Society has recently finished a referendum vote on this question, and finds that its members, by more than two to one, definitely favor an increase in our army and navy. The New York and Massachusetts Peace Societies, the World Peace Foundation, and the New York Federation of Churches have officially endorsed the League to Enforce Peace, which necessarily stands for an efficient army and navy. Further, there are many men who are not only members, but even officers, both in societies for increasing the army and navy, such as the National Security League, and, also, at the same time, in such peace organizations as the New York Peace Society, the International Peace Forum, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the League to Enforce Peace. A large proportion, if not a majority of the

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officers of the National Security League are either members of, or endorse the principles of, the League to Enforce Peace.

What then is the difference between a militarist and a peace man? The difference is fundamentally again merely a question of thinking, of belief. To give a working definition, leaving the dictionary out of account, and marking the actual dividing line between them, a militarist is one who believes that there is no reasonable hope of abolishing the war system within any reasonable time, while a peace man is one who believes that there is a reasonable hope of abolishing the war system within some reasonable time. A militarist may be one of the sweetest dispositioned men in the world. As a most kindly friend recently wrote, maintaining that world peace can never be secured, "The world is full of villains and victims. It ever was; is now; and ever shall be." Such a person is a militarist; it is impossible for him to work for the overthrow of the present war system since he is convinced that it is permanent. His influence and his vote must count for its continuation and perpetuation. A peace man, on the other hand, may be either against vigorous preparedness, because he believes that it leads to militarism, or he may favor it because he considers that it is needed under present, and he trusts temporary, conditions.

What of those who have been working for international peace or, better, for the regulation of international life by other means than that by war? We find that they too, taking them as a class, show the same lack of agreement among themselves, the same lack of clear-cut ideas, which is noticed among others. Before the war, the peace campaign was a many-sided one; it attempted to arouse and organize public senti-

ment by pointing out the horror, the economic waste, and the frequent injustice of war; to bring about a better understanding among the nations; to prevent excessive expenditures for military purposes, and to develop international law and extend the jurisdiction of international courts of justice. It must be admitted that at no time in the world's history were there so many diverse agencies working for international peace as in the couple of years just before the war. Increased efforts for permanent international peace and increased rivalry in competitive preparedness went on at the same time. Then the war came. It proved one thing clearly—that "peace by preparedness" is a complete failure. A great world trumpet blast from the peace forces should then have rallied all peace organizations to united action. But there was no trumpet blast—merely a chorus of cracked and discordant peace bugles. The peace forces as a whole had not thought through the war problem; they had no general plan on which they could unite. Three of the most prominent of the American peace organizations refused for a year to issue any statement or declaration of principles of any kind. The peace forces simply did not know how they should go to work to attack the war system. This fact shows once more, even on the part of those who are supposed to have studied the problem most seriously, a confusion of thought, a failure to master the problem intellectually.

This intellectual failure still continues. Even today there is no union in plan among peace organizations. *The Advocate of Peace*, the official organ of the large American Peace Society, is vigorously opposing any increase in our army and navy while, as has been pointed out, a considerable proportion of its members are

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favoring some increase. The *Advocate of Peace* also opposes the newly organized League to Enforce Peace, but, on the other hand, this League has been officially endorsed by a number of leading peace societies, and probably has the support of a majority of peace people throughout the country. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the richest peace foundation in the world, is stated to be so divided in opinion, in its Board of Trustees, that it must confine its work to advocating Pan-Americanism, aiding the extension of International Polity Clubs in American universities, and urging the inviolability of international law. The leading peace societies in this country, furthermore, are not affiliated with the foremost peace societies abroad; and so far as our organizations have definite programs, they do not coincide exactly with those in Europe. All are agreed that war is not the proper means of regulating the intercourse of states, but the mere intellectual problem of knowing how war may be done away with is too difficult. From a broader view, the majority of the world wishes to abolish war: the continuance of war is evidence of the world's intellectual bankruptcy.

Aside from the fact that peace beliefs, principles, and platforms show marked divergence there is yet another difficulty to be met. Practically all the peace organizations before the war, and a large proportion of them at present, are based upon the maintenance of the international *status quo*. They rest upon the supposition that the world has been permanently partitioned, and that the territories and possessions of the various states and nations are to remain forever substantially as they are to-day. This is a very questionable supposition. Are the present divisions in

Africa to remain forever? And in the Balkans? And in the Far East? In the latter region it is most unlikely that Europe will continue to hold ports and islands and slices of China, after the 450 to 500 millions of Japanese and Chinese have all become efficiently organized on a military basis. If war is abolished, how are we to settle the problems which arise from the unsatisfactory division of the world? Some international legislative agency or agencies might be gradually developed; or we might all agree that although the existing division of the world is, or may become, unsatisfactory, it is much preferable to war. Mr. Roosevelt has seen this difficulty very clearly; since the war began, he has stated that, at some time or other, the international *status quo* must be recognized as permanent. Suppose the nations do agree to regard the existing territorial arrangements, even in Africa and the Far East, as final and to maintain them by force. This would be a perfectly logical and reasonable policy. It must be conceded, however, that if it had been put into operation ten years ago, it would have given an international guarantee to the existence of European Turkey.

There are those, however, who are opposed to the maintenance of the *status quo*. Professor Muensterberg recently wrote of the peace advocates, that they

have not succeeded as yet in proposing a single plan by which war would be abolished and yet at the same time possibilities be given for the healthy growth of progressive peoples and for the historically necessary reduction of decadent nations.

In the sentiment here expressed we find one of the greatest obstacles to a system of international peace.

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Notice the last part of the quotation: "for the healthy growth of progressive peoples and for the historically necessary reduction of decadent nations." This breathes the spirit of extreme present-day nationalism. It is the spirit which makes one's nation the center of the most intense devotion and regards it as a rival and possible enemy of every other nation. It must gain at the loss of others, especially of dependent peoples and of its "decadent neighbors."

Each people has or has recently had its "historic mission," its "manifest destiny," its "white man's burden." Russia's mission led her to China; so did Japan's; they fought. In the Balkans, the Russian and Teutonic "historic missions" both point to-day towards Constantinople; while among the little Balkan countries themselves, the "historic mission" of no single state can be satisfied without conflicting with that of one or more of the other states. An important cause of the present war was the intense desire of Serbia to fulfill its "historic mission" by including within its territory the Serbs in the adjoining provinces of Austria-Hungary. Going further back into the causes of the war, we see the "historic mission" of France in Morocco conflicting with the colonial ambitions of Germany. The territory of the world is limited and if each nationalism is watchful to push its selfish advantage and, even in extreme instances, is on the lookout for "decadent nations which need to be reduced," how can we well avoid the likelihood of war? This nationalism is dangerous not only because it naturally leads states which have not yet fulfilled their manifest destiny, and which are still unsatisfied with the extent of their home land or colonial possessions, to covet other territory for the sake of the

territory; but also because it frequently gives to great peoples a passionate longing to extend their language, their system of government, and their culture to other parts of the world. Of course, the surest way to extend the language and culture of a nation is to secure some relatively unoccupied part of the world, and there develop a new England, or new France, or new Germany.

The world has stopped fighting wars of religion; it has stopped fighting wars of dynasties; but it is fighting wars of nationalism. When the world is divided among nations, each with a national spirit unrestrained, unlimited, mutually hostile, suspicious, covetous, and passionate—how may we permanently escape war? To quote part of a sentence from the Presidential address of Professor H. Morse Stephens, before the American Historical Association at Washington a few weeks ago:

Woe unto us . . . professional teachers of history, if we cannot see, written in blood, in the dying civilization of Europe, the dreadful result of exaggerated nationalism.

Is it possible to modify such a force as nationalism, and, at the same time, devise some agency other than war to serve as the final regulator of international life? What scheme may be devised?

The object of this paper is not to present any scheme—there are hundreds of schemes already. The aim is an attempt to state the problem. It would be unfair, however, not to point out the general evolution of history in its bearing upon this issue. This extreme nationalism, which so many thoughtful writers are just beginning to criticize as one of the chief roots of the present-day evil, is regarded by most of us as about as natural and necessary, politically, as the air we breathe

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or the city pavements we walk upon. But in fact, present-day nationalism is a new thing historically; it arose with the French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon. So it is possible, even probable, that it may be at least greatly modified.

The trend of history through the centuries has been towards ever larger political units. At the very beginning of history, the political unit was the family; but the family was absorbed by the tribe and the tribe by the city state. Later the unit was the feudal castle on the hill; then the feudal county and duchy; then the kingdom and the absolutistic state; and finally the nation of to-day. Adams, in his *History of Civilization*, written before the war, says:

If we could venture to put any trust in the apparently regular and natural character of this progress, the next step logically would seem to be the formation of some kind of an international federation or possibly world state.

It should be noted that devotion or loyalty or patriotism to family, city, district, and state, has not been destroyed in this development; each patriotism has been constantly absorbed into an ever wider loyalty. Like the chambered nautilus patriotism has ever been building for itself a larger and statelier mansion.

Notice the way this development has actually been working out in the recent past. Not a long time ago, as we count time in history, Scotland and England were bitter enemies: Scotland, Celtic and Presbyterian; England, Anglo-Saxon and Episcopal. For centuries the unending border warfare lasted on. But finally without conquest, these two old enemies were united. While each retained its local patriotism, together they joined in a new and larger British loyalty. Germany

was divided, not a century ago, by a deep and long-standing hostility between the Protestant states of the north and the Catholic states of the south. But they finally formed a union which they later cemented, by mutual consent, into the present German Empire. Loyalty to the Empire, however, developed more slowly. Americans who speak of their German university days, tell of hearing famous professors of south and central Germany exclaim in private conversation, "How we hate the Prussians!" To-day, however, no one would deny that the local devotion to Bavaria, to Saxony, to Würtemberg has been expanded into a glowing patriotism for this historically new political organization—the German Empire. A similar evolution took place in Italy. What was fiercer than the patriotism of the Italian city states? Nothing except their hatred of each other. But they all united, for the most part by voluntary action, and the little patriotisms of Venice, Milan, Genoa, and Florence took on the larger patriotism of Italy.

Finally there are our own thirteen States. We forget to-day the vitally Critical Period when it was yet an open question whether they would or would not form one single nation. Soon after the coercive hand of the Revolutionary War relaxed, there arose the same kind of disputes and the same spirit of mutual suspicion which we know too well in Europe. New York State ordered its troops to march to the Vermont border. Connecticut felt that it had ample justification for war with Pennsylvania because of the inhuman treatment of the Connecticut settlers in the Wyoming Valley. Tariff squabbles, of much bitterness, arose between New Jersey and Connecticut, on the one hand, and New York on the other. Our States were

rapidly going the way of the states of the old world. But they created a federal government. Even then our patriotism was first of all State patriotism. When Washington visited Boston, John Hancock wished that as Governor of Massachusetts he should be given official precedence over George Washington, who was only President of the United States. At that time a good and loyal citizen could openly favor or oppose the new Union, much as one to-day favors or opposes a new tariff bill before Congress. But a short century passed, and in thousands of the towns and cities of our Northern States, there arose monuments to the memory of those who fell in the Civil War—monuments bearing the inscription: "These men died that the Union might live." A new, vital patriotism has been born. Our devotion to our States has not been lost; it has expanded to be a part of a new and larger loyalty.

These facts are all in line with the natural evolution of nationalism, the expansion of patriotism from smaller to ever larger units. But, it may be objected, there seem to be exceptions to this rule. To be sure, there are occasional exceptions, and we think at once of Finland and Poland; but these and other instances are, as a rule, due to the refusal of the larger federation to allow the unit sufficient autonomy. Finland, before its privileges of local government were taken away, was frequently called the most loyal part of the Russian Empire. Poland has remained unreconciled because denied the free use of its native language and old religion and the right of regulating its strictly local affairs.

The development of nationalism does not naturally stop when it has reached the limitations of any particular unit. Nationalism does not depend upon unity of

race, religion, language, geographical proximity, or of all of these factors combined. Switzerland and the United States are both intensely patriotic, yet Switzerland is composed of three different racial groups, German, French, and Italian, each dominant in part of the country and each using its own distinct language, with Catholics and Protestants dividing the country religiously; while the United States is a mixture of every race and every creed. Above all, there is the British Empire. In the trenches in the north of France there are to-day, nearly side by side, regiments of French and Anglo-Canadians from America; Indian Hindus from Asia; Australians and New Zealanders from the South Seas; and Irish, Scotch, and English from the United Kingdom in Europe—all doing their “bit,” with loyalty and devotion, for the British Empire.

It is especially instructive to notice the process by which this development has been brought about. In each of these four recent and notable cases of political consolidation, England and Scotland, Italy, Germany, and the United States, mutually suspicious and often mutually hostile states have first of all created the form of a greater state. This new union has been a common guarantee to each of the small political units against attack from any other member of the new federation. It has also done away, at once, with the chief causes of war, such as rivalry for colonies and for preferential privileges in foreign markets. Only after this, have the old local patriotisms gradually adjusted themselves to the new larger government.

Already the next logical step in world federation is now taking place before our very eyes. Excluding China, about nine tenths of the world's territory, the world's population, and the world's wealth is now

grouped into only three great new units, the Entente—Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, Servia, and Portugal, with their dependencies and colonies; the Central Powers—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, with their dependencies; and the Pan-American Union, which is binding the United States and the Latin American countries by growingly strong ties of political interest. Only recently the President of the United States has proposed that the twenty-one American republics should form a League to Enforce Peace by giving to each of the American states a mutual and several guarantee of its political independence and its territorial integrity.

It is possible that this process may be still further developed. Propositions are very frequently made nowadays that the United States should join the Entente Powers, after the war, in a great world league of mutual defense.

Loyalty to the idea of a new and larger union is already developing, especially between Germany and Austria, and between those old hereditary enemies, Great Britain and France. This fact is sometimes shown in even an amusing way. When the British military authorities found themselves in sore need of transportation facilities in France, they commandeered a large number of London busses. At that time these all carried conspicuously, as an advertisement, the name in huge letters of a theatrical play then running in London, *Polash and Perlmutter*. It is related that when these busses drove through one of the cities of northern France, the French crowds, fired with new enthusiasm for the joint cause of the Allies, and thinking that the sign was the name of the local commanding British General, shouted lustily, "Vive le Général

Potash et Perlmutter." This touch of humor in the grim tragedy of war shows at least that patriotic fervor may easily be extended to a new alliance of nations.

In the study then of the problem of developing some agency other than war for regulating the intercourse of states, the teaching of historical evolution points to a limiting of present-day national sovereignty by some form of international federation. This fact is coming to be realized, in a degree, by the peace forces of the world. A very large majority of the thirty most prominent and recent peace plans in this and other countries propose some form of international federation. Upon the details of the plan, there is, as yet, no general agreement; but if we know the general aim towards which we should work a great advance has already been made.

In reading of the present world tragedy the deepest pathos lies in the oft-repeated cry of the soldiers of Great Britain and of France, that they will stand the misery, the suffering, and the death, so that their children and their grandchildren may never have to endure this horror; and in the determination of the soldiers of Germany—no matter how we may judge their leaders—grimly fighting on with the resolution that they will secure some guarantee that this kind of a thing may never happen again.

But the infinite pity of it all is that this present method, mere victory, mere crushing of the enemy, no matter how complete, will of itself alone never bring about freedom from future war. Some change must be made in the present international system. If this struggle ends with a no more fundamental change than a victory of the old type—as former

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world wars ended by the treaties of Westphalia in 1648; Utrecht in 1713; and Vienna in 1815—if it leaves merely more intense nationalism and more bitter international hates, then it will give to the children and grandchildren of the present generation, no matter who wins, a guarantee not of peace, but a guarantee of another world war.

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AMERICA'S NEED FOR PREPAREDNESS IN POLICY

BY NORMAN ANGELL

ARMS are for the defense of a policy rather than for the defense of a territory. That is a conception to which this people—like most other peoples—are very rebellious. I suppose if you were to ask one hundred Americans for what purpose the proposed increase of armaments was to be employed, what policy it stood behind, ninety-nine out of the hundred would probably reply: "No policy at all save that of the defense of this soil. Arms are simply to repel the invader and nothing else."

I want to suggest to you that this is a very incomplete conception, one which may lead us astray. No great power can limit the use of its arms for that purpose; it may be compelled to resent the policy of some other nation, a policy which may fall a long way short of sheer invasion of territory. Take this present war. It is a war of policy. It began in Southeastern Europe out of a conflict which arose from Austria's conception of her interests with reference to the southern Slavs. The position thus taken by Austria involved virtually

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all the great powers of Europe. But Russia, France, England, Japan, Portugal did not fear invasion from Austria, and if they had given Austria a free hand would have been left alone. They are defending what is in my view a perfectly just policy: the rights of small nations, and resistance to aggression.

You can illustrate the same fact—that arms defend a policy rather than a country—from your own history. This country has had several wars, has been near to several more wars. Not one of those has been for the purpose of repelling an invader. Your first war as an independent state, that against the Barbary States, was in defense of an American policy which differed considerably from the policy of the rest of the world. The other states were ready to accept the Barbary interpretation of their "rights," but Americans did not; they refused to pay tribute—a very excellent divergence from the accepted policy of other nations, which led to a war on the other side of the world. It was not for the purpose of repelling an invasion.

The War of 1812 arose out of the problem of sea rights, a problem still unsolved to-day. The North and South War obviously was a war of conflicting internal policies. The Mexican War, if concerned with territory, was rather for the purpose of taking it. Your war with Spain: no American pretends you were in great danger from an invasion of the troops of the Spanish boy King, Alfonso. The war in the Philippines: surely, no one contends that you were in any great danger from the troops of Aguinaldo. Take your near-war with Mexico. If you had gone into Mexico after Vera Cruz (as you may still be compelled to go), it would not be because you thought the safety of your country threatened by Huerta or Carranza, or

any of the other interesting presidents whose names I happen to have forgotten.

I am not trying to make out a case that all these conflicts imply a provocative or aggressive attitude on the part of the United States. I do not believe that for a moment. Those foreign policies, in regard to Spain, to Mexico, may be good policies. Some I would support to the uttermost. My whole point is, the trouble did not arise out of an invasion, it arose out of a conflict of your policy with certain other peoples' policies. The difference is important because, while there can be no real difference of opinion as to your right to resist an invasion, there can be and often is an honest difference of opinion as to policies, to avoid which calls for clear formulation.

In 1895, an American President astonished the world by virtually threatening Great Britain with war over a certain interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which had arisen over a dispute concerning the frontier of a very disorderly Spanish-American republic, several thousand miles from our shores. And we know that the country stood as one man behind the President, prepared to fight on behalf of this vindication of the Monroe Doctrine. And yet it was never even pretended that England was contemplating an invasion of the soil; it was not even pretended that, if the distant and obscure settlement known as British Guiana were enlarged by a few hundred miles of swamp, it could make any possible difference to the relative power of defense in this country. For the United States has three thousand miles of its frontier running cheek by jowl with a vigorous and growing British colony. And in the one hundred years or more that that has existed, Americans have felt no particular menace

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therefrom. The American people felt that a principle of foreign policy—and a somewhat abstract principle, at that—was involved, and that rather than suffer any whittling-down of this principle of policy (which incidentally is based upon the theory of the balance of power and grew out of the desire of an English Minister to preserve that balance in Europe) they would defend it to the uttermost with their national forces. And if war had come—and there were very many who felt we were very near to it—it would not have been to repel an invasion; it would have arisen, as the war in Europe has arisen, over a conflict of two rival policies, and it would have come, much as the war in Europe has come, with the combatants, it may be, not realizing very clearly just what those policies were. You know of course the story of a very patriotic American of that time who, meeting his friend Brown, said, in tones that were pained and shocked:

“What’s this I hear, Brown, about your not believing in the Monroe Doctrine?”

“It is a wicked libel,” replied Brown. “I never said any such thing. I do believe in the Monroe Doctrine. I would die for it. I would gladly lay down my life for it. What I *did* say was that I didn’t know what it meant.”

Wars mainly arise from the refusal of a people, a nation, sufficiently to consider how their policies may be brought into conflict with others, and the failure of the two parties to adjust those policies so as to avoid conflict.

I think this country is heading for war. I think you will have a war. But it is very unlikely to be for the purpose of repelling an invasion. I am not positive about it, of course, but it is one of the probabilities

of the future. It will arise in some such way as this: When you have created your great army and your great navy, you may find, under some future administration less long-suffering than the present, that, after all, the Mexican problem is insoluble unless you go and "clear up that mess," as Mr. Roosevelt would say. Well, you go in there and clear it up after a long war, and establish your government therein: that means you will go clear to the Panama Canal. And having established your sovereignty in those countries the American administration may have urged upon it that Americans are fairly entitled to some favored treatment in the matter of trade in those Central American countries. Some American "interests" will demand, perhaps, cancellation of those rather dubious concessions granted to Europeans by the governments of Central America. When the European concessions are canceled in favor of American concessionaires, the expansive European nations—Germany or some new nation that will arise from this present struggle, or Japan, or the two in combination—will naturally say, "What are the Americans going to use their great power for—canceling concessions which have been granted to us? Obviously, the object of increasing American military power is to secure such a position on the Western Hemisphere as to exclude the European countries." That will be their interpretation, unless you define clearly what your position is. Unless you do this when the conflict comes, complicated, say, by the Japanese question in California, you won't discuss policy; you will try to make yourselves more powerful. The dispute will center not so much upon the policy itself as upon the method of executing it; that is to say, upon arms, just as discussion between

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England and Germany mainly centered upon the question of naval rivalry. We will all lose our tempers and call it patriotism, and there's your war. You will be victorious, and when it is all over you will ask what it was all about. You will then find that you cannot take, with reference to civilization at large, the attitude that foreigners have no rights in the Western world at all; and you will be offended when it is suggested that this was a possible interpretation of your attitude. You will realize you could not enforce such a policy if you would, and would not if you could.

My whole plea is that you should formulate this policy before the war takes place instead of after. As you increase your power and as your influence extends (as it will) upon this hemisphere, you must make clear to yourselves and to the world at large just what policy you intend to enforce; what the Monroe Doctrine means; how far you are prepared to go in recognizing the claims of foreigners upon this hemisphere. Are you prepared to give equality of commercial treatment, say, in Mexico; come to a joint arrangement with the nations as to policy and purpose? That is what I mean by formulating your policy and letting it be known what your policy stands for. If you do not, you cannot enforce your rights, however great your power may be.

I have said that military power of itself, however great, is ineffective, in the absence of an international policy, to vindicate even a country's elementary rights. One need not go very far historically or geographically to realize that. Take the problems arising out of the sinking of the *Lusitania*. That issue in its large conception was the defense of neutral right in war time. Innocent people had been ruthlessly slain in a war that did not concern them. Very good. Suppose that

America, in possession of great military and naval forces, had gone to war over that matter; had joined the Allies, beaten Germany, and taken her place at the table of the Peace Conference after the war. She would then, of course, find this very suggestive difference between what she was demanding and what her allies were demanding: with them their demands could be satisfied on the spot; the goods could be delivered; in the case of the American demands they could not.

The Allies are demanding either the transfer of territory—Alsace-Lorraine, in the case of France; Trentino, etc., in the case of Italy; Constantinople, say, in the case of Russia, and so on—or the evacuation of occupied territory, like Belgium or Northern France, which Britain is demanding because she believes that its permanent German occupation might menace her. The execution of these demands can precede the signature of the peace treaty. But what would America be asking? That in future wars combatants do not sink ships with American passengers on board. Well, how do you propose to assure yourselves that you have got what you would have been fighting for? And suppose that your own allies demanded—as some of them have always demanded in the past—the right to use floating mines in future wars? You would have fought a great war to exact a *promise* that in future, ships with Americans on board should not be sunk by submarine torpedoes, but leaving it open to sink them by floating mines. I may remark that the passengers would be just as dead. And then, what of your very serious claims in the matter of sea right as against England? Are you going to accept as a precedent for future wars that any combatant that happens to command the sea

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may, for instance, seize and confiscate a ship flying the American flag, carrying American goods between American ports? And if you do accept that, is it not time that some of the political philosophers furnished us with a new definition of a "sovereign and independent state," which America is supposed to be? Is this the degree of sovereignty and independence which your might has assured to you? (Incidentally, I do not blame England in the least. Any other power would have done the same. When we deliberately choose to live in anarchy, no one can be blamed for not observing a non-existent law.)

But I put it to you: How, when both sides violate what you regard as your most primary rights, are you going to vindicate those rights by military power? Do you propose to fight both? And, if on joining one side you come to a bargain with him about those rights, you are creating an international policy; you are putting your force behind a policy of some kind, which is precisely what I am pleading for. But I submit that this policy should not wait the occasion of war; it should be general, should precede war, and then the war may not be necessary.

If you are serious at all about the demands you are making now at this moment, if you mean business, you will in the future have to decide whether you will place your power behind some general rule for the enforcement of some international arrangement. This is very revolutionary, so far as American public opinion is concerned. You are not prepared for it. Now I know that it is fashionable just now to disparage international treaties. You are told that the wise nation will not rely in any way upon treaties, but simply upon its own power. If it were true that treaties cannot

be relied upon, the doom of Western Democracy would have been sounded.

Let us assume that in this war Germany represents an autocratic government threatening Western Democracy, and that if the Prussian government can be successful, free government in Europe will be at an end. If that is true (and personally I don't entirely accept it, though it is a very common thesis), the only hope of Western Democracy lies in the durability of the treaty between the eight or nine powers fighting Germany. If it is not any good, if this treaty does not endure, Germany knows perfectly well she has only to bide her time and she can destroy Western Democracy in detail. The only hope of nations is that the treaty which now binds them together will continue.

Don't you realize that force is not a thing which acts of itself? Its direction is determined by a human will behind it. We say that Belgium depends for her rights upon force—the force of England, the force of France, of Russia—but what induced the force of England to be put in motion in that direction, if it was not some moral thing, the respect for a treaty? Why is England in Belgium at all save by virtue of her treaty? If Belgium could not depend upon a treaty, Belgium's cause to-day would be hopeless, just as the cause of the western Allies would be hopeless.

The warning for us is precisely that these treaties do not endure after the war which provoked them comes to an end. The prevailing impression seems to be that when the militarist menace represented by Germany is disposed of, and the element in Europe that has been most hostile heretofore to international arrangements removed, it will not be difficult to secure radical reform of international law and some assurance of its

future observance. But though the defeat of Germany may be a necessary preliminary to a more secure condition for us all in the world—I think it is—that defeat of itself, unaccompanied by an international policy in which this country must coöperate, will accomplish nothing. If Europe has no clearer idea of what its respective armies are for after this war than it had before; if, in other words, the various nations cannot form a common policy of intercourse, cannot agree as to what kind of act the community will tolerate and what it won't, what the obligations of one nation are to another, then the defeat of Germany will merely mean a re-grouping of the nations for future wars.

This notion that the mere defeat of Germany will of itself settle anything implies at least three things: First, that destruction of German military power can be made permanent; secondly, that the military alliance now existing between Germany's enemies will also be permanent; and thirdly, that a means of enforcing international law that depends upon military combinations of the great powers will be dependable and efficient.

None of these assumptions can be accepted. The destruction of the German state is a mere phase; nothing in history is more mutable than military alliances like those framed for the prosecution of this war, and the very incidents that have created our issues with Germany are themselves proof of how inefficient is military and naval power, even when predominant, for the protection of life and the enforcement of law.

If it is deemed that the mere destruction of the German army or navy would have any permanent effect, Germany herself has supplied a dramatic answer within the memory of fathers of men still living. In the early

years of the nineteenth century Prussia was annihilated as a military power—at Jena and Auerstadt. The whole country was overrun by the French. The German states were weakened and divided by all the statecraft that Napoleon could employ. Within a little more than five years of the humiliation of the Peace of Tilsit, the last French army in Germany was destroyed, and it was thanks to the very condition imposed by Napoleon—with the object of limiting her forces—that Prussia was able finally to take the major part in the destruction of the Napoleonic, and in the restoration of the German, Empire. It was from the crushing of Prussia, after Jena, that dates the revival of German national consciousness and the desire for German unity, even at the cost of Prussian predominance therein.

So with France in 1870. The German armies, drawn from states that within the memory of men then living had been mere appanages of Napoleon and had, as a matter of fact, furnished some of the soldiers of his armies, had destroyed the armies of Louis Napoleon. Not merely was France prostrate, her territory in the occupation of German soldiers, the French Empire overthrown, and replaced by an unstable republic, but frightful civil conflicts like the Commune had divided France against herself. So distraught, indeed, was she that Bismarck had almost to create a French government with which to treat at all. An indemnity—at the time immense—had been imposed upon her, and it was generally believed that not for generations could she again become a considerable military or political factor in Europe.

Her increase of population was feeble, tending to stagnation; her political institutions were unstable;

she was torn by internal dissensions; and yet, as we know, within five years of the conclusion of peace France had already sufficiently recuperated to become a cause of anxiety to Bismarck, who believed that the work of "destruction" would have to be begun all over again. And if one goes back to earlier centuries, to the France of Louis XIV., and to her recovery after her defeat in the War of the Austrian Succession, to the incredible exhaustion of Prussia in wars like the Thirty Years' War, when her population was cut in half, or to the Seven Years' War, it is the same story—a virile people cannot be wiped from the map.

Moreover, so long as the world as a whole does not know the policy which the forces of the respective nations defend, military alliances are forever subject to rearrangements which may nullify the relative strength of any one nation. A year ago Italy was in formal alliance with the powers that she is now fighting. Japan, a decade since, was fighting with a power of which she is now the ally. The position of Russia shows never-ending changes. In the struggles of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries England was always on the side of Russia; then after two generations Englishmen were taught to believe that any increase in the power of Russia was absolutely fatal to the continued existence of the British Empire—that statement was made by a British publicist less than ten years ago. Britain is now fighting to increase, both relatively and absolutely, the power of a country which, in her last war upon the Continent, she fought to check. In the war before that one, also fought upon the Continent, England was in alliance with Germany against France. As to the Austrians whom England is now fighting, they were for many years her faithful

allies. So it is very nearly the truth to say of all the combatants respectively that they have no enemy to-day who was not, historically speaking, quite recently an ally, and not an ally to-day who was not in the recent past an enemy.

However, it may be said that Europe did at least deal successfully with the French military menace that arose at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and that the problem of France in 1815—successfully dealt with by Europe—resembles in its essentials the problem of Germany, with which Europe has now to deal a hundred years later. To which it is unhappily necessary to reply that the German problem of 1915 does not resemble the French problem of 1815, and that Europe did not successfully settle this latter problem a hundred years ago.

First, as to the difference between the two cases. What the Allies were trying to do in 1815 and did—very temporarily—was to restore to France the old government that had been usurped by a non-French soldier, for Napoleon was not a Frenchman. The Allies of that day, were, in fact, in alliance with the legitimate ruler of France, and were supported by a powerful French party and by the entire French provinces.

The Allies of our day, should they come to their Vienna Congress, will not be dealing with a usurper alien to the German people, nor one that is opposed by Germans, as Napoleon was opposed by certain of the French. There are no powerful and influential German classes in exile and at home, ready to restore a government desired by the Allies. The historic government of Germany does not happen to represent the political and dynastic preferences of the Europe that may have the task of reconstructing the German Empire.

So much for the resemblance. Now as to the success of Europe, in 1815, in exorcising the Napoleonic danger. The victory of the European Allies of 1815 was presumed to have restored permanently the old French dynasty that had disappeared and to have overthrown the Napoleonic usurpation. Yet, within four decades of the Congress of Vienna, it was the old French dynasty that had disappeared and the Napoleonic dynasty that was once more installed. And so little did the victories of the Allies exorcise the danger of Napoleonic military ambitions, that, within a generation after the death of the first Napoleon, another Napoleon had entered into alliance with England—the jailer of the first—and with her was busy fighting wars the result of which England and Europe are now attempting to undo—that is, fighting to keep Russia from the Dardanelles and to “secure the permanent integrity of the Turkish Empire”! For, while the Crimean War was fought for the purpose of preventing Russia from reaching Constantinople and for fortifying Turkish power, the present war is being fought, of course, among other things, for the purpose of achieving the exactly contrary purpose. The grim horror of the thing is complete when we remember that the very object accomplished by the last war in which France and England fought together is in no small part the cause of the present war. For the result of the Crimean War was to make large Balkan populations subservient to Turkish rule, and the present war began in an incident to which the intrigues and struggles of that situation gave rise: it was a part of the unrest which the Crimean War made inevitable.

It was not, therefore, the Allies of 1815 who got rid either of the Napoleonic dynasty or of the tradition and evil fermentation that it represented. What

finally liberated France and Europe from the particular menace of French imperialism was the German victory of 1870.

The lesson of 1815, of 1870, and the four or five similar situations that have preceded it in Europe at intervals of a century or so, is that the menace that the two Napoleons represented was not in a person, or even in a dynasty, but in a wrong ideal. For modern Germany has produced no Napoleon though it has produced Napoleonism.

Just as military power is finally nullified or ill-used when we do not know the definite purpose it represents, so is a nation's economic power wasted as a deterrent. At this present moment, for instance, you are using your material resources, your money, credit, supplies, ammunition, etc., in behalf of the better cause in the European War; throwing your national resources against a policy of aggression. Yet the value of this as a deterrent of aggression is entirely sacrificed because it is not linked to a predetermined and definitely announced policy.

Let me make this clear. If we go below diplomatic fictions to positive realities, America is decisively intervening in the war. She is perhaps settling its issue by throwing the weight of her resources in money, supplies, and ammunition on the side of one combatant as against the other. The American government has without doubt scrupulously respected all the rules of neutrality. But it would have been equally neutral for America to have decided that her national interests compelled her to exercise her sovereign rights in keeping her resources at home at this juncture and to treat combatants exactly alike by exporting to neither. This form of neutrality—just as legally defensible in

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the opinion of many competent American judges as the present one—would have perhaps altered the whole later history of the war. I am not giving you my own opinion, but that of very responsible independent American authorities—by independent I mean non-governmental—when I say that had American opinion been as hostile to the Allies as on the whole it is to Germany the campaign for an embargo on the export of arms or the raising of a loan would have been irresistible. You see I am speaking with undiplomatic freedom: saying out loud what everybody thinks.

But the value of this decision of the American people as a factor making for a better code of conduct as between nations is nearly altogether lost precisely because of this diplomatic fiction we are compelled to maintain about it. The American government in effect tells Germany that she would be quite prepared to sell arms to her if she could fetch them. So Germans legitimately argue: "It is not because America or the world disapproves of our policy that we are unable to get American economic assistance in our war, but simply because Germany has not a large enough navy to command the sea. If we had we could use American arms as readily as does England."

Whereas, suppose America were in a position to say to Germany: "Your enemies get our money and supplies and munitions because your policy is a menace to the society of nations. If your conduct had been other than it has been they would not get them." Do you not see that then America would be using her great resources to penalize a policy of aggression among the nations and to encourage fair dealing? Her good will would be a military asset that the strongest military

nation could not well despise. And it would operate as much with the nations that do not control the sea as with those that do. Those that don't would desire to see supplies withheld from their enemies; those that do would want to have free access to them. I am perfectly aware of course that this would not be neutrality as now understood; or permissible under international law. It would involve a new conception of international relationship. But it is precisely that for which I am pleading.

But these great forces are wasted in so far as contributing to a better international order is concerned because this country has no international policy. For the mere defeat of Germany will virtually have served no purpose if there is to be no common policy of the nations afterwards. It will no more render the nations more secure than the defeat of Napoleon a hundred years ago and the Vienna Congress which followed it gave us a stable Europe.

All the preparedness of the European nations was ineffective in the stopping of war because no one really knew what all the arming was for. The English feared the invasion of England—the very last thing probably which the military caste in Germany was contemplating. That caste may have had their eyes on Asia Minor, possibly Egypt, possibly India, but certainly not Middlesex or Kent. And just why they had their eye on the tropical Empire of Great Britain—if they had—whether to ensure equal commercial treatment, or merely to find administrative jobs for Prussian bureaucrats, no German and no Englishman can tell you. Whether Germany was really asking something which it would have been impossible for England to accord, equally no one knows. They will perhaps discuss these

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things after the war. They might just as well have discussed them before and fought afterwards, if it seemed that the fighting was necessary.

Do you know that the members of the British ministry and great English newspapers are still discussing why England went into the war? Mr. Lloyd George tells a newspaper man that but for the invasion of Belgium, England would never have gone into the war, and is next day flatly contradicted by the organ of the Foreign Office which tells him that he does not know what he is talking about; that England would have had to come to the defense of France and to oppose the occupation of Channel ports and maintain the balance of power on the Continent, Belgium or no Belgium; that the most elementary considerations of self-protection on England's part compelled her to oppose the imposition of a German hegemony on Europe. Which is true? Nobody knows.

Was Germany really "encircled"? Could Europe have arranged for Germany's legitimate commercial expansion without yielding anything vital to itself? All these are things which will have to be discussed after the war. Would it not have been as well to have discussed them before?

And through none of this period would greater preparedness on anyone's part have given a sensibly different result. It is said that if England had only taken Lord Roberts's advice and adopted conscription years ago, Germany would not have made war, or would quickly have been beaten. But you know, of course, that when the National Service League began operations, some seventeen or eighteen years ago in England, the compulsory service which it advocated was not aimed at Germany at all, but at France.

France was then the enemy, and Mr. Chamberlain was very menacing towards her and publicly advocated an alliance with Germany against her. Over the Fashoda business the two countries came very close to war and if both had had greater military establishments and had been very confident of their efficiency, and if there had not been a strong anti-military party in both countries, you would in all human probability have had an Anglo-German combination against France. Where then to-day would be the German military menace? I know whereof I speak, because I happen to be one of those who at the time of the Fashoda crisis and in the earlier stages of the Boer War tried to stem the anti-French current in England, and found that it cost a journalist his reputation as a true patriot to say a good word for France or a bad one of Germany. And as to the preparedness of the other nations, would greater preparedness on the part of Germany or Austria or Turkey or Bulgaria or even Italy or Japan have altered the case? Or, for that matter, on the part of Servia or Belgium? If Belgium had put under arms every man she possessed, she could not have defended herself against Germany. And if you say that it might have held up the German forces until Belgium's allies came to her aid, you are only admitting what I am trying to show, that military force must be backed by an international policy. Indeed, does not this war show that war itself has become internationalized and that you cannot even fight wars without treaties and engagements of some kind between nations? Any European nation which had said: "We can depend on our own force alone; we do not need to bother about arrangements with foreigners," would have been lost. France and England are both to-day de-

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fended in part by treaty, and without those treaties would both be overpowered.

Now this principle has to be pushed further. It is not enough, when war threatens, over some dispute of policy, suddenly to improvise a treaty with other nations and patch up a common policy which is so hurriedly conceived that, as all history shows, it hardly outlasts the military need of the moment. So long as that is the case, so long as a power whom we deem neutral—whose demands we have not troubled to understand—can suddenly join our enemies, no nation, however great, is safe.

Neither military nor economic strength can of themselves either protect your rights or insure your security. They can only do that if they are linked to a defined international policy known to yourselves, to the world at large, and to your prospective enemies. For, as I have said, in the last resort armies and navies are not for the protection of a country, but a policy.

What this country needs as well as armaments is a formulation of policy which the world cannot mistake, as to what the armaments are for; with reference to South America, Sea Law, Japan and the Open Door in Asia, and the support of some international code for the prevention of crude aggression by any nations.

These are not simple questions. They will need a great deal of discussion on the part of the American people. They are not getting it. But a decision concerning them is as necessary for security as battleships; and without decision America will get into the same kind of muddle that Europe gets into, however many battleships we have. Again, that is *not* an argument against battleships; it is an argument for something else as well.

Unless your power, whether military or economic,

does so stand visibly and definitely linked to your policy, it will fail, however great, to vindicate your rights, protect your interests, or freedom, or your form of society.

THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

BY GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM

THE nations of the world find themselves to-day confronted with a series of world's problems. The United States, one of the most powerful members of this community of nations, cannot, if it would, shirk its responsibilities in regard to the part that it should take in the adjustment of these problems. It is not possible as the world is now constituted for any state, and particularly for a state with the history, the population, and the resources of the United States, to attempt an isolated existence. We Americans cannot say that we have no concern with the affairs of the rest of the world. Our national relations are too widespread, too complex, and too important. We have American interests to consider and American citizens to protect. Further, we have obligations to maintain, first, those which have been deliberately assumed, such as the control of affairs in the Western Hemisphere under the policy announced in the Monroe Doctrine and repeated from decade to decade during the past ninety-five years; and, secondly, those that belong to all civilized states, to all men of the twentieth century, which are based upon the ordinary claims of humanity and the standards of civilization. The United States has a part to

play in using its influence to further throughout the world the cause of representative government; of the rights of peoples to select their own rulers and to direct the policy of those rulers; for the preservation of the independence and of the liberties of the smaller states; for the maintenance throughout the world of justice and fair dealing; and for bringing to a "strict accountability" any state which, in defiance of the accepted standards of civilization, plays the part of the bully, and acts as an oppressor in appropriating the goods and the liberties of its neighbors.

Even if it might be possible for the United States to continue to exist in peaceful and safe isolation, sitting back and growing rich without care for the troubles of other peoples, the Americans would be ashamed to accept such a rôle, to play the part of shirkers and of selfish cowards; but there is no such possibility. The attempt at isolation on the part of a rich people that is not prepared to make the sacrifices required to organize its resources and to maintain a standard of dignity and of national honor, would bring such misfortune and indignities upon the United States as have been the lot of China. The way to avoid the repetition of war is not to fold one's hands and shriek that war is horrible, that war is wicked, but to do what is essential for the adjustment of the problems and issues arising from decade to decade which, when left unsettled, bring about war. The United States has two great sets of responsibilities:

- A. To its own citizens.
- B. To the world at large.

The responsibilities to the outer world are themselves of two classes:

- a. Those which arise from the definite obligations

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assumed by the Republic, such, for instance, as those involved in the Monroe Doctrine, or those resulting from our being a party to the Treaty of Paris or to the Hague Convention; and

b. Those based upon what may be called the ethics of the world, the universal obligations of humanity.

The elementary duty to its citizens on the part of the successive administrations of the Republic calls for such organization of the resources of the nation as shall ensure the maintenance of peace and justice within its borders, and as shall make substantially secure the defense of the Republic against aggression from without. The preservation of its own existence is the first, the elementary duty of every organized state. It is the policy that has been recognized from the beginning of the Republic, although the application has naturally varied from administration to administration, according to the conditions and the risks of the time and according also to the personality of the men entrusted with the direction of the government. In 1789, Washington writes to Congress:

"If we are to avoid insult and to fulfill our national obligations, we must organize our resources and prepare against the risk of war."

It was because this wise counsel had been forgotten by President Madison and the Bryans of the day whose counsel he was prepared to accept, that the United States, having maintained contentions and taken steps that were likely to lead to issues with other nations, found itself confronted with war, and at a time when there was absolutely no preparation for national defense. As a result of this foolish combination of large utterances and of lack of organization of resources for the maintenance of its contention, the nation suffered

a series of humiliating defeats. It escaped being entirely crushed only because its opponent, Great Britain, was at that time largely occupied with a great conflict in Europe.

The orators in the Congress of 1812-13 who were inveighing against the expenditure required for the organization of a defensive force, pointed out that the Atlantic was wide, and that it was impossible to bring over sufficient troops to make possible an attack on our coasts. The statement was made one hundred years ago, as it is made to-day, that "the citizens of the Republic would spring to its defense." With the hysterical methods of preparation which are inevitable when the work has been delayed until the peril is immediately at hand, two or three hundred thousand patriotic citizens were brought under arms, with the result that, with the single exception of the battle of New Orleans, these citizens' armies opposed to small groups of trained soldiers were at one point or another on our continent brought to disgraceful defeat. The armies that invaded Canada were thrown back in confusion. General Hull surrendered Detroit to a force one quarter of his own, and two or three thousand British troops, after defeating at the battle of Bladensburg three times their number, marched into Washington and, to the disgrace of the British commander, burnt the capitol. This is the risk that the pacifists of to-day, at a time when the Atlantic is for practical purposes one tenth the width that it was a century ago, are prepared to take so jauntily. The pacifists who criticize our attempts at national organization as new and hysterical plans for wasteful expenditure are themselves upholding a policy that is absolutely novel, a policy never attempted by any nation in the history of the world, with the single exception of China.

If the advocates of "peace at any price" are to be consistent, they should contend for the absolute abolition of the present defensive system. The forts should be dismantled and the guns thrown into the Atlantic. The fleet should be put upon the scrap heap and the few thousand men that constitute the so-called army for the defense of the wealth and the independence of our hundred millions of people should be sent back to civil life. There is no sense in making expenditures, in themselves considerable, for defensive measures which from the "peace at any price" point of view are indefensible in character, and which on the authority of the naval and military experts are absolutely inadequate in themselves.

Provision for the defense of our territory and our coast cities is to be considered a matter of "insurance," and in this sense it may properly be described as a business necessity. The defense of our national obligations is a matter of honor. A nation without ideals cannot look forward to continued existence, and is in any case not worth preserving. This insurance of the wealth and the independence of the nation is a costly matter, but the cost is trifling as compared with the enormous losses simply in material resources that would be caused by a successful invasion of our coasts with the appropriation of two or three of our great coast cities.

The merchant who is willing to "take the chances" in regard to the safety of his warehouses against the risk of loss by fire may be within his individual rights, unless in so doing he is risking property that is only in part his own. His children or other heirs may have rightful claims for a wiser system of business management. His creditors will in any case be watching very closely the balance sheet of the man who handles under

the methods of a gambler his business responsibilities. The risk of the destruction of a warehouse in New York City, for instance, is something less than one per cent. I find that the amount paid for the insurance of my own warehouses averages one per cent., which means (with the necessary allowance of the cost of maintaining the insurance companies) an absolute risk of perhaps three quarters of one per cent. The merchant who might be willing, for the sake of saving the expense of the annual premiums, to abandon this precaution would find it difficult to secure credit from the banks or to maintain his business relations with creditors.

Our citizens will in any case, irrespective of this matter of protecting their property, refuse to accept the teachings of the Bryanites who call upon us to shirk our national responsibilities. Sitting back and keeping out of danger is in itself impossible. It can only be described as cowardly, futile, the talk of babies. Such counsel would be laughable if it did not involve grave perils and the risk of national dishonor.

Assuming that the organization of our resources in men and in material for national defense is essential, there are two methods to be pursued. The necessary measures can be undertaken soberly, quietly, under an intelligent and developing system which will save waste, or they can be taken up hysterically at a time when some great international issue has arisen, or when the enemy is in sight.

The teachers of the Oswald Villard class are apparently in favor of delaying all measures of defense until the enemy is in sight. History shows us the wicked wastefulness of this kind of a national policy. The present European war is the text which has made it possible to bring this matter effectively to the attention

of our public; but the policy of an effective national defense system has for years been urged by the skilled officials of the government and has been particularly emphasized by the veterans of my generation. We have before us to-day the example of a nation which in its ambition for imperial domination has shown itself ready to carry through its schemes of aggression without regard for treaty obligations, for the rights of neutrals, for the precedents of international relations, or for the accepted methods of warfare. While it is the action of Germany that gives the immediate text for our preaching, it is proper to remember that there may arise in the future, as there have arisen in the past, other states equally aggressive, equally forgetful of national responsibilities, equally ready to trample upon the rights of other peoples and the precedents accepted by civilization.

The imperial aggression of Germany, the state which is to-day, with the aid of its allies, or rather its dependents, Austria and Turkey, acting as the bully in the civilized world, goes back to the close of the Prussian War of 1871. It was then that arose the dream of a German Empire controlling Europe and dominating the civilized world.

As far back as 1872, the Prussian Minister of War, Bronsart von Schellendorf, makes this statement of policy and of the scheme of imperial development:

Do not let us forget the civilizing task which has been assigned to us by the decrees of Providence. Just as Prussia was destined to be the nucleus of Germany, so the regenerated Germany shall become the nucleus of a future Empire of the West, and in order that no one may be left in doubt, we here proclaim that from henceforth our continental nation has a right to the sea, not only to the

North Sea, but to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Hence we intend to absorb one after another all the provinces that neighbor on Prussia. We shall successively annex Denmark, Holland, Belgium, northern Switzerland; then Trieste and Venice; and finally northern France from the Sambre to the Loire. This is the program which we fearlessly announce. It is not the scheme of a madman. The Empire that we shall found will be a Utopia. We have ready in our hands the means for bringing this Empire into existence and no coalition in the world can stop us.

This utterance of von Schellendorf has during the past forty-five years been repeated in many forms. The theories for the institution and world-wide development of the German Empire have been emphasized by a series of writers such as Treitschke, Bernhardi, and Reventlow. Germany has from an early date recognized that it is the power of Great Britain that stands in the way of such a world Empire as now constitutes Germany's aim. France stands between Germany and Britain and (in the utterance of more than one recent German writer) "France must be crushed a second time and so thoroughly that never again will she stand in the way of Germany."

The destruction of Belgium initiated by the destruction of the honor of the German word in the cancellation of its treaty obligations, is looked upon as a mere incident, something of no essential importance. A recent utterance of the *Lokal Anzeiger* of Berlin makes specific expression of the Prussian theory in regard to the smaller states:

"No small state has any right to stand in the way of the development of an Empire like that of Germany."

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Reventlow speaks of the attempt of England to retain the command of the sea as an example of "constant egoism." The Emperor William says:

"Sea power is world power. The future of Germany is on the sea. The trident is to pass into our hands."

I have myself in annual sojourns in England, extending over a period of more than fifty years, come to possess some personal knowledge of English opinion, English aims, and English policies. I have during that period heard many expressions of doubt, not to say dread, as to the imperial plans of Germany. I have heard expressions of annoyance,—mingled, it is fair to remember, with appreciation of the enterprise and capacity for using skilled service and of the genius for organization—at the development of Germany's manufacturing, its world-wide trade, its commercial marine, its financial relations. Never in that time have I heard or read a single British utterance expressing a desire to possess anything that belonged to Germany. During that same period, in frequent visits to Germany, I have heard repeatedly the assertion that "the British Empire must be broken up and that we, the Germans, are the natural inheritors."

I remember a statement made by a University Professor who was presenting a survey of the centuries.

During the eighteenth century [said the Professor] Europe was largely under the domination of France; during the nineteenth century, mainly owing to the superiority of its fleet, the influence of Great Britain was paramount; the twentieth century must belong to Germany. We have made the sacrifices required to bring to the highest point the organization of the wealth and the strength of our people. . . .

Back of this organization stands the national will, and the belief that the enforcement and extension of German *kultur* will be for the good of the peoples ruled over and of the world at large.

It is for the Germans to show how an Empire should be constituted and administered so that instead of being but a passing phase, like that of Napoleon, it shall endure during the centuries to come.

Is it natural that with these frank utterances on the part of leaders of thought throughout Germany, utterances which have been, so to speak, confirmed by political action and by military and naval preparation, Europe should have continued in a state of apprehension in regard to the threatened aggression from Germany? Germans have from time to time indulged in naïve complaint that they are "not loved" by their neighbors; that there was being constituted around them an iron ring of antagonistic peoples, and that the purpose of these peoples was to choke off the natural and legitimate development of Germany. "The peoples of Europe do not like us," say these writers. Well, when a man complains that those with whom he has to do are in substantial accord in expressing dislike, we have some doubt as to the sweetness of nature, or the equity of dealing, of such individual. The same thing is true with nations. Every state is in contact with neighbors with whom it must, of necessity, carry on relations, commercial, political, etc., and the nation which comes under general dislike has, as history shows, only itself to thank for the result. Suppose, for instance, that Germany should carry to a successful conclusion this war of aggression, and should complete its annexation of Belgium, how many generations of

Belgian mothers and fathers must come and go before the history of German misdeeds in the Belgian territory can be forgotten? The first act of infamy in the tearing up of the guaranty treaty (the "scrap of paper"); the burning of the cities; the shooting of hostages; the mistreatment of women; the imposing upon communities, already ruined by German occupation, crushing indemnities; the carrying from Belgium to Germany of the selected cattle and of a large part of the resources by which the little kingdom had made itself financially independent; the enforcement of orders under which Belgian laborers were obliged to work in the munition factories to produce shells and cartridges for the killing of their own countrymen; the long series of crimes set forth in well-authenticated documents, will for generations to come remain stamped not only in the memories of Belgians, but in those of all civilized peoples. Back of the present war, we have had from time to time in such an incident as that which occurred at Zabern an example of German methods of rule. Germany is not popular in Holstein, is dreaded in Holland (a future province of Germany according to the present plan); is hated in Poland; has in fact never been able to maintain satisfactory, decent, or civilized relations with any communities or peoples over which it had secured control. Think of the message given by Emperor William some years back to the German army that was invading China:

"You will behave like Huns, so that in the years to come the name of Germans may be dreaded throughout China."

And those troops behaved like Huns. Reaching Peking too late for the fighting, which had been successfully carried on under the direction of the American

General Chaffee by the contingents from the United States, from France, and from Japan, the German troops began, immediately after they had reached Pekin, a disgraceful series of looting escapades called by von Waldersee "punitive expeditions." There was no one to punish. The Chinese at that time were quiet enough; the escapades had no other result than to incense and arouse the populace with a natural scorn against the débris from Europe. The German troops staggered back to their section in Pekin loaded with ill-won booty. Complaints came to the generals of severe mistreatment of women,—including some of high rank. General Chaffee finally brought together his associates, the representatives of the armies of France and Japan, and the diplomatic representative of Italy, and waited upon von Waldersee. Chaffee was the spokesman. When his protest had been delivered, Count von Waldersee replied with cool insolence that he had no intention of changing his policy. The "German troops must be allowed some offsets for the hardships of the campaign." Chaffee's retort was prompt. "We have not come here to ask you to change your policy. We are here in the name of the states that we represent to say that this thing must be stopped," and stopped it was. Germany was not at that time ready to antagonize the whole of the civilized world. And yet the poor Germans complain that they are not liked.

The Germans contend that the Monroe Doctrine has been nothing but a "gigantic bluff," made possible by the fact that Europe was too busy to take time to make war with us. Bear in mind what this so-called Doctrine or policy involves on the part of the United States.

We have since 1823 taken the ground that Europe

must not consider any territory in the Western Hemisphere as available for colonization. We have gone further. We have forbidden the governments of European states to attempt to secure by force the redress of grievances, whether real or alleged, suffered by their citizens in South America, in Mexico, in Central America, or in the West Indies. The implication is clear. When we forbid Great Britain or Germany to secure redress with its own forces for the appropriation of British or German property, or for injury to British or German citizens, we assume for ourselves the responsibility of seeing that redress is secured. This Western Hemisphere constitutes a pretty large Belgium for the safety of which we have assumed the guaranty, and for the fulfillment of this vast and ill-defined obligation we have a movable army of thirty thousand men. The thing is, on the face of it, ridiculous. We should either throw over the obligation, or we should recognize it in such fashion that we can maintain it with force and with dignity.

Says a recent writer: "A territory becomes a diplomatic problem when it presents natural resources, tempting markets, and a defenseless and inefficient government." Is the United States to remain in the class of nations such as China and Mexico, which do present "diplomatic problems"? For these nations whose national resources are not organized, the only question has been who should act as the successful aggressor. If we fail to do our duty,—and this duty can be done only by the proper organization of our resources,—we not only incur grave risk for our own independence—such risk as has been incurred by China and by Mexico—but we abandon our legitimate influence upon the rest of the world. If, as the pacifists

insist, only the bullies are to remain armed and organized, the control of the world's policies is to be given up by the humane and enlightened people. Peace comes as the result of wise organization. It does not prevail where men have failed to act, but where they have had the sense and the power to act wisely.

States which are the least inclined to impose upon or to attempt to subjugate their neighbors, which have the highest regard for the rights of defenseless people, will lose their prestige and their influence in the adjustment of the world's problems if they commit themselves to the dogma that force is evil, even when exerted in support of righteousness and justice. If the "peace at any price" propaganda could secure success, it would not mean the abandonment of force in the control of the business of the world, but the concentration of this force within the empire which had the least respect for democratic principles, for representative government, or for the rights of the people.

The issue that is now being fought out, an issue in which the United States cannot escape taking its part, is whether the nations of the world shall be controlled by imperial militarism, or by democratic representative government. The upholders of German imperialism recognize that the United States is an assured opponent of the Hohenzollern theories of government and of world domination. Successive German writers have taken the ground that as soon as the British Empire had been brought to submission, and had been compelled to transfer to Germany the colonies on this side required to fill out the schemes for a world-wide imperial domination, the United States would have to be taken in hand. A recent utterance in the *Kölnische Zeitung* warns Americans that they are not to be too

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self-asserting. The German submarines, says the German writer, "now have a range of four thousand miles."

It is the general belief among recent German military and naval authorities that as soon as the British fleet has been shattered, there would be no difficulty, even with operations conducted entirely from the other side of the Atlantic, in securing a domination over the United States. Late writers, however, such, for instance, as von Edelsheim, whose book, *Operations on the Sea*, was published some four or five years before the outbreak of the present war, take the ground that it will be best, first, to secure through the appropriation of British colonies on this side, harbors suitable for coaling stations and as bases for supplies. When this has been done, says von Edelsheim, there will be no difficulty in getting possession of two or three of the great coast cities, for instance, Boston, New York, and (not because it has any real importance, but as a matter of sentiment) Washington. Von Edelsheim's volume, which is the précis or report of a staff officer, shows that with the transportation that was available six years ago, there would be no difficulty in making shipment from the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems of two hundred and fifty thousand men a week for three weeks. The first two shipments, or even the first shipment, would, in the writer's opinion, probably be sufficient for the purpose. "It is not necessary to attack the fortifications of these cities in front, although the guns that are now being prepared (he was writing about 1910) will doubtless be adequate for the purpose." With a proper selection of weather there is, of course, no difficulty in landing troops at various points from which they could get possession

of the coast forts from behind and then they have the cities at their mercy. For New York, for instance, the troops could either be landed on the north shore of Long Island (there would in his calculation be no difficulty in forcing the eastern entrance of the Sound) or say at Southampton. "If necessary, the water supply could be cut off, but, as the Americans have no army, the city would doubtless surrender promptly." New Yorkers would then have to decide whether they would prefer to pay a substantial indemnity (say one thousand millions of dollars), or would prefer to leave their city to be battered down or burned down. In reading such an utterance in 1910, Americans would have been unwilling to believe that in this twentieth century any civilized power would be willing to destroy a city irrespective of any military requirement or advantage. With the history before us of Louvain and Aerschot and with the record of instructions under which the German commanders have acted, we now know that they would have been ready, if only for the purpose of inspiring terror throughout the country, to burn or to batter down New York.

We contend that to-day the safety of the United States depends upon the British fleet. This is probably for the time at least a sufficient barrier, but it is impossible to forecast with any certainty the chances of naval warfare when any week may produce some new destructive mechanism. Why, also, even supposing that the British fleet should remain in being, should Americans be willing to leave their safety and their liberty dependent upon the use of the men and the resources of another state? Leaving out the question of national pride, is it good business, as a matter of risk to be taken, to allow our national independence

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to be left subject to the chance that Britain will not be defeated?

Pacifists like the Rev. John Haynes Holmes are willing to go so far with their counsel for peace as to advise young men to refuse to accept suggestions for enlistment or for military training. They tell their fellow-citizens to remain deaf to the demand of the Republic for service. In 1861, when the Republic was fighting for its life, we had a very simple name to apply to the "peace at any price" men who tried to influence their fellow-citizens with this kind of counsel. The men who have acted as representatives in the United States of German policy and of German propaganda have been quick to utilize for their purposes the service of these "peace at any price" men. We have seen in New York City leaders like Mr. Bryan and his lieutenant, John Brisben Walker, on peace platforms surrounded by Germans who had recently taken part in meetings glorifying the German navy for triumphs like the sinking of the *Lusitania*. These German representatives are in full unison with Bryan and his associates in demanding the prohibition on the part of the United States government of the export of munitions. Such prohibition in the name of peace would fit in well with the propaganda of the nation which for the development of its own imperial ambitions has thrown the world into devastating warfare. The men who are authorities on international law have made clear that to make changes during the continuance of war in the regulations controlling the actions of neutrals in regard to the production and the sale of munitions, would in itself be an unneutral act. American munitions are available for purchase by any nation that can pay for them and can take them away. It

is not the responsibility of the United States that the British fleet has been successful in sweeping German vessels from the seas, nor is it the duty of the United States to take any action that would help to offset British naval success. It should further be made clear to the peace men that a prohibition upon neutral nations to sell munitions to nations at war would increase instead of lessening the amount of expenditure (an awful waste in itself) for preparation for war. If it were understood that no nation going to war could purchase munitions, each nation with any risk or dread of war would be under the necessity of instituting plants for the production of munitions and of keeping available for future wars stores of munitions. This is in fact exactly the course taken by Germany, which at the beginning of this war had great supplies available. England, desiring and expecting no war, was short of munitions.

The organization of our national resources is demanded by our citizens not only for the defense of our coast cities and of our national liberties, but for the maintenance of our national obligations, and for the adequate performance of our part in the adjustment of world issues. Mr. Bryan, who first came into notoriety though the advocacy of a policy for the payment of debits fifty cents on the dollar, is perfectly ready to advise the discharge of any national obligations on the same basis. He takes the ground that in case the country were assailed, a "million of men would spring at once for its defense from the streets and from the fields." We could, of course, depend upon the patriotism of the country for a prompt response on the part of its citizens, but men of the Bryan type are apparently too ignorant to understand that the million of

men would be of no possible use when they had responded to the call of the government. They would be without arms, without leaders, and without training. The plans proposed for the organization of our national resources will involve heavy expenditure, but the money required is very much less than what would be called for as the result of a very short war if our resources were left in their present condition. The indemnity that we should have to pay to prevent our coast cities from being destroyed would in itself be more than sufficient to maintain measures of defense for years to come.

It is in any case simply a question of insurance. These pacifists tell us that military preparations lead of necessity to war. The taking out of an insurance policy against fire is not usually understood to increase the chance of fire (although we may admit that this has been occasionally the result in certain commercial circles), but in any case the cost of defense may, as before said, be described as the cost of insurance.

What we have in view in order to avoid the requirement for hysterical preparation practically useless when attempted too late, is the shaping of a system under which in the years to come, with the most moderate expenditure required for effective results, we can put into proper shape our resources of men and of material. There is, of course, need for the checking of useless expense. The expenditure now made from year to year under the heading of army and navy includes not a few unnecessary outlays but for these the authorities of the army and the navy are not responsible. Year after year, the experts in both branches of the service have, for instance, recommended the closing up of dead army posts and of useless navy yards. Army posts which were established a century

back for the protection of the frontier against Indians are to-day of no possible service from the military point of view. These posts are retained through political influence and because the Congressmen desire to secure the advantage for their local districts of the post expenditures. The same thing is true of a number of the navy yards. The first duty of the Congressman who is interested in the matter of national defense is to give heed to the reports of the experts in regard to the cutting off of useless expenditures.

National expenditure should always, of course, be considered comparatively. Our trouble is with the Congressman who prefers to secure an appropriation for the dredging at national expense of Swamp Creek in his district or for the construction of a two hundred and fifty thousand dollar post office at Podunk rather than to apply the money to the training of our young men.

The cost of a reserve army is not to be considered as entirely a charge against the productive capacity of the country. We must bear in mind the value for our younger citizens of training and of discipline. We are told that if we bring into existence a well-organized and properly trained army of citizens, there will be risk of the country becoming dominated by a military spirit. Such an army might take possession of the government, and bring the nation into a widespread military policy. Such a dread in regard to action by the American people is on the face of it an absurdity. We are not, and never could become, militarists. The whole national ideal and character is opposed to what is known as a military policy.

At the close of our Civil War in 1865, we had under arms five hundred thousand men. The German writers

of that day were prophesying that this army would, like the Prætorian Guard in old Rome, take possession of the government and the country and administer the national resources to meet the army requirements. We all remember, however, that these men were soldiers only for the purpose of saving the Republic in the emergency of the Civil War. They were citizens first and last. They went promptly back to their homes to continue their work as citizens.

We do not contend, as the pacifists so often assert, that organization for defense will prevent war; but it is absolutely sure that such organization will remove a frequent incentive to war, namely the temptation to an easy booty. If a householder should leave through the night his full purse on the outer edge of the window of his house, the purse would probably, in a city like New York at least, disappear before the morning. If the citizen should then carry his grievance to the station house, he would be likely to have a pretty sharp reception from the police captain. The captain would undoubtedly take the ground that the citizen had no right to give unnecessary temptation to the passer-by, the errand boy, the milkman, or the patrolman himself. The captain would make clear to this muddle-headed citizen that his action constituted in fact an incitement to crime. The typical pacifist says that the risk of war is so slight that he "is willing to take the chance." Our retort is that the chance is not his to take. The resources of our country and the liberties of our country are not the property of any one generation. They are a sacred trust handed to us by our fathers, some of whom did their share in fighting to preserve them, and to be passed on by us to the men of the next generation. Americans of to-day are not going to permit,

under the influence of the fads of the preachers of peace at any price, their country, their homes, and their liberties to be exposed to the treatment that has crushed the life out of poor little Belgium.

There will be at the end of the present war a temptation for the victors to go on with their imperial development, or for the vanquished to secure on this side of the Atlantic the moneys required for the war indemnities. The Peace Associations, such a society, for instance, as the League to Enforce Peace, headed by men like ex-President Taft and President Eliot, are looking forward to the establishment in the nearest possible future of a world's court, developed possibly from the present Hague Tribunal. This court will have the responsibility of adjusting the issues arising between nations. It is a part of the scheme that has been worked out in the League to Enforce Peace that the court shall have available a world's police strong enough to enforce its decisions against any recalcitrant state. This world's police, naval and military, will be made up by the different nations in contributions of men and material proportioned to the population and the resources of these nations. The proportion that will be due from the United States, a nation of one hundred millions of people, a nation whose wealth as compared with that of the other peoples of the world will be greater than ever at the close of the present struggle, must be considerable. We should be called upon for a fleet and for an army very much larger than the fleet and the army that are now recommended by our naval and military experts. It is essential that the court should have the power to enforce decisions against any nation that acts as a bully. There must be no possibility of the recurrence of such a war as was in 1914 initiated by

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Germany, and which has been carried on with unprecedented and barbarous methods. The principles upon which Germany conducts war are indicated, for instance, in the words of Bethmann-Hollweg:

"We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law."

This is simply a statement that might makes right. It shows the condition into which the German mind has fallen under the influence of the Prussic acid fumes that have undermined the moral sense of the nation. The United States must do its part to prevent such contentions from becoming precedents for the future. We Americans propose to do our part in securing peace with justice. Peace without justice is a rotten peace. Ideas that are sound and high can alone preserve the community wholesome. The pacifists are taking the chances of war; they are gambling with the future of the Republic. A supreme effort, even a supreme agony may have in it more real living than is found in years of normal existence. Men may be consecrated and sanctified by devotion to a cause. It is only the weakling that finds nothing worth fighting for. Whoever cares greatly, whoever cares sufficiently, will give all, even life. It is with a continuance of a policy for peace and for the maintenance of its obligations to its own citizens and to the world at large that the great Republic must be passed on for the direction of the coming generation, and with its influence for good assured and extended.

THE LESSONS TO THE NAVY IN THE EUROPEAN WAR¹

BY IRA N. HOLLIS

THIS paper is prepared at the request of Clark University and it contains little that may not be found in public documents. While I have had the advantage of conversation with officers of all grades in the Navy, I have used only that which any other civilian is entitled to. The only advantage I have had, therefore, is the interpretation of official documents and officers' views in the light of long experience with the service. It is not intended here in any way to advocate war against other nations, or the use of the Navy as a threat. In spite of the insinuations of a few peace talkers, we know that no good citizen, either in the Navy or out of it, wants war for the purpose of trying out in actual practice the instruments we have created against it, for stimulating the sale of ships and munitions, or for any other reason whatever. Such imaginings proceed from a want of balance and perspective in a brain that has thought too intensely on one subject. The American people have been aroused as not since April, 1861, and the President's message will be supported in the prayerful hope that our improved navy may be used only in the cause of righteousness for the support of the principles to which we are committed by the long inheritance and traditions of our race.

¹ Written November, 1915.

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The title announced would be misleading, if it were taken in the sense of something entirely new to be learned from the naval war, whereas the contrary is true. There is nothing that has not been predicted or feared. It is only that the public of all nations have been shocked and horrified by certain striking and unusual events. The submarine, the *aéroplane*, and the siege gun have developed rapidly under the pressure of necessity and, in the naval service, the activities of types of ships have been more clearly defined, but no single thing stands out as the unanticipated discovery of this war except the fact that a highly civilized, generous, efficient nation can in this century make brutality and frightfulness the ethics of its conduct against its enemies and alike against its friends, if they seem to stand in the way.

It is easy to understand the state of mind of those good men and women who believe that any military or naval preparedness is wrong, excepting only so far as the country must be armed against domestic violence. History demonstrates that they are dwelling in the clouds, nevertheless one cannot help sharing with them the hope that, in the not too distant future, war may cease to be the method of adjusting international differences and interests. Even so grotesque a perversion of American common sense as the voyage of the self-appointed peace commission to neutral countries for the purpose of bringing influence to bear upon the war ministers of belligerent countries receives a kind of sympathy. We all wish they might somehow succeed. Our doubt, however, is based upon the habit of exaggerated and combative statement in the speech of all peace-at-any-price people. They are anything but peaceful and kindly

in regard to the motives of those who do not agree with them.

One of the fatal misunderstandings in the minds of pacifists is indicated by their erroneous use of the word "militarist" and by their entire inability to get at the point of view of the officers of the Navy, who are regarded as eternally concocting schemes to promote war. There is not one word of truth or justice in this thought of the men who are studying their profession to serve the country in an emergency that they hope may never arise. It is a great tribute to their conscience and faithfulness, to find them struggling under discouraging conditions, to be well ready to do what their country expects them to do; namely, to defend the coast against invasion. Not one of them wants war; on the other hand, not one of them wants to fail in his profession lest his country suffer. The sentiment that places them, the capitalists, and the manufacturers in a conspiracy to promote war for selfish ends, is the fruit of ill-regulated or intemperate reasoning.

It is also simple to comprehend the point of view of those who would have the preparedness against war adequate to accomplish the end in view. While there may be differences of opinion upon what constitutes adequateness, these men and women have the logic of history with them, and they should not be flouted as unchristian for believing that, given an overflowing population and a conflict of interests among nations, some wars are inevitable. To them it is the age-long struggle for existence, that organic law of nature, which the centuries may teach us to control at least for man and his domestic animals, but which is not yet greatly modified after nineteen hundred years of Christianity and material progress.

The war burst like a forest fire upon mankind and is likely to continue more or less spasmodically until the combustible is all burnt out. Will it end with a lasting peace? or will it end with a greater armament than ever? These are vital questions to us and to this continent. Every American hopes that this is the last war, in that nations will be so convinced of war's futility, that they will disarm. This hope has been in the minds of good men after every war, and this confident belief has formed part of the doctrine of every dreamer since the world began. We may wish for more dreamers and we may share in that happy utopian outlook on life which is often theirs, but the difficulty is that all history is so clearly against them, that no reasonable person can for an instant believe that war will cease when the Allies and the Central Powers sign a treaty of peace. Only that type of idealists who had war a thing of the past eighteen months ago can now imagine the reign of perpetual peace. The history of mankind demonstrates far more than the necessity of preparedness against attack, it proves the inevitableness of it for a nation situated as we are. This is one of the greatest lessons of the present war. We have no choice but to learn it well, and we, as a people, ought to understand the need of making our preparedness ample, thorough, and efficient, or nothing.

But those trimmers who are neither one thing nor the other are incomprehensible. A compromise in Congress that provides one battleship when two are necessary contemplates war as entirely possible and prepares for disaster. Only the timid belong to this class of people. If, in Congress, they are afraid of their constituents; if only voters, they are fearful of expense and of a growing militarism.

I hope here to place before the conference so far as I can the lessons of this war and the light shed upon our own state of preparedness on the sea, in the belief that we are at one of the great crises of our existence as a democracy, and that we have no escape from arming for our rights and policies. Incidentally this kind of militarism may teach our people the value of organization in all the industries and in the business of government.

The first and most serious lesson relates to that form of government censorship and secrecy that deprives a people of full information about their affairs. It may be that excitable nations have been at times held back from war by the discretion of a few strong men, but the reverse is more likely to be true. The public may be denied much to which it is entitled by a narrow-minded interpretation of regulations forbidding officers to talk or write on naval subjects. These regulations provide five articles on the subject of "Activities of Officers in Connection with Publicity." The first article relates to "oral or written communications, information that might be of possible assistance to a foreign power in time of peace, or to an enemy in time of war." The second article prohibits any communication in regard to the foreign policies of the United States, or concerning the acts or measures of any department of the government, or of any officer acting thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon. The third gives to officers and other persons in the naval service permission to publish papers on professional subjects after having submitted the manuscript to the Department for scrutiny. These papers may or may not be authorized. The fourth article is a concession to officers that they may submit

through official channels well-considered comments and suggestions with a view to promoting the efficiency of the service. The last article prohibits any person belonging to the Navy, or employed under the Navy Department, from acting as correspondent of a newspaper or any other periodical, without express permission.

All of these regulations seem natural and wise, and yet when we come to their enforcement, the Secretary thereby empowers himself to prohibit any officer from writing anything that he does not consider it expedient for the public to know. Ordinarily there will be no abuse, but nevertheless, in plain terms, we get back to one-man power, and that too under a civilian politician, whose interest it is to remain in office. There is absolutely no reason why officers should be restrained, except as to certain plans and devices that must be kept secret. Their own good sense and the power of the President to send before a court any officer who oversteps the boundary for conduct prejudicial to the interests of the country, or the Navy, are sufficient check upon indiscreet writing and speaking. The working of military law is illustrated by the right of any officer to refuse obedience to his commanding officer, in case of an illegal order. He must, however, be prepared to show that the order was illegal, or to take the consequences. In exactly the same way an officer should be judged, not by the fact of having addressed the public, but by what he communicates to the public. Doubtless some disagreeable incidents would spring out of so democratic an organization, but the navy would at once be relieved of a regulation as autocratic as anything to be found in Germany or Russia, and also as foolish a bar between it and the people who own it. This regulation if strictly carried

out has within it the germs of autocracy fatal in the end to a republic, inasmuch as it places within the functions of the executive the power to censor every paper or report prepared by an officer, or a board of officers. It denies the country first-hand knowledge of everything, except what the Secretary permits it to know, and it denies the officers that freedom to which they are entitled as good American citizens. If they were allowed to talk, much of the misunderstanding in regard to militarism would disappear.

One of the reasons why the people generally are not well informed on the navy, lies in the failure of the press to report even with approximate accuracy things concerning the technical side of the service. Newspaper men are almost invariably uninformed technically and they are usually more interested in a sensational story than they are in the cold facts. In this regard the taste of our people is being degraded. We have various lurid accounts of the naval actions of this war, and yet when the official reports appeared in the last number of *Brassey's Annual*, few of the daily papers paid the slightest attention. The battle off the Falkland Islands is one of the most thrilling incidents of the century. It is well reported in official documents, but no newspaper seems to take any interest in it, because it is no longer news. This habitual tendency toward the sensation of the moment, added to the navy regulation forbidding officers to write anything except under censorship, sets up an effective screen between the people and their navy. No wonder they know more about the baseball records and the football games, than they do about their own property. Often misled by ignorant reporters, sometimes deprived of adequate information by stupid naval regulation, and occasionally

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jockeyed by shrewd politicians, they are driven from one hysterical extreme to another, until democracy seems hopelessly inefficient as compared with a strong autocratic government; and yet the good underlying common sense of the American people would be applied effectively to the problems involved in national defense if only the matter could be taken up without partisanship, and without that kind of secrecy which naturally flourishes in a bureaucratic department.

The second lesson that we ought to learn thoroughly by a study of all contestants in this war is that we want neither an autocrat nor a blunderer at the head of our Navy Department. Our form of government is more likely to yield the latter because high office is so often given for party service. Then, too, we have not yet acquired a respect for training and experience in the appointments under the government. The present system has given us some good secretaries, some of mediocre ability, and some who would appear to have been taken from a two horse power mowing machine and set to driving our five hundred thousand horse power steam turbine of a navy. A Secretary of limited experience in large business and of no knowledge of the sea may in spite of his good intentions do a great deal of harm by losing sight of the fact that an armed navy is created for one purpose alone: namely, the preparation for war and against it.

We have a signal illustration of this fact in the present administration, during which the fleet has lost in efficiency while the Secretary has been paying careful attention to the instruction of enlisted men in grammar and arithmetic. The order establishing schools on board ship is intended to "supply deficiencies in academic education and also to provide systematic

means by which all enlisted men and warrant officers may receive the assistance and encouragement in technical branches which may be necessary to fit them for promotion in the navy, or which will better prepare them for civil trades at the end of their period of service afloat."

So far as this order makes men more efficient on board ship, by giving them the required technical training, so far as it makes them content in service, it is good; but so far as it proposes to fit them for trades in civil life, thereby encouraging them to get out, and so far as it raises hopes that are to be disappointed, it is unmitigatedly bad. In the first place, it imposes upon officers duties with which they should not be saddled, and in the second place, it forces on the men preparation that does not form a natural part of their service on board ship. I have no doubt that good gun pointers can be found amongst men who cannot even read, and it is the good gun pointer that the Navy is looking for.

Some of the great manufacturing companies have organized apprenticeship courses for boys coming from high schools and colleges. These are not for the purpose of educating them, but to prepare them to do the technical work in the service which they have entered. It would be ridiculous for any company to train and educate men to facilitate their finding positions in other trades. Of course, no man who passes through the course of the General Electric Company binds himself to remain any definite length of time. Some men remain with the company and become very useful in the manufacture of electrical machinery. Some men leave and go into other companies, and finally a large group either go into business for themselves,

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or enter other occupations. The company is, however, the gainer. Does this apply to the Navy? The sole measure of its application is the success of our sailors at sea. We must never forget that their organization is for possible war, and not for peace. No battleship will ever be built, except to defend this country and to surround it with what might be called an iron wall against invasion and war on our soil. It is well to remark here that the Navy has for years possessed on shore at Coaster's Island an excellent apprenticeship school for enlisted men, and that it has always paid great attention to the training of men for their special duties without the new order establishing what has been called the largest university in the country with the Secretary as Professor and President.

One of the chief difficulties with any system of education, such as the present administration has proposed, lies in the daily routine of the ship, especially in port where repairs are being made. The routine should be primarily arranged to promote efficiency in seamanship, gunnery, and engineering, for the single purpose of maximum effectiveness in war. There is the thought in most American minds that we are never going to have a war and that war is a poor settlement of disputes between nations. Nevertheless, the Navy exists for that one thing, and for no other. Almost all those fads that are conceived in the hope of getting service out of men in time of peace, different from what would be required in time of war, are based on a hopeless attitude of mind. A school for "reading, writing, arithmetic, spelling, geography, and history" is simply fooling with the problem.

One aspect of this school on board ship may relate to the possibility of reducing desertion from the Navy

in time of peace. It would be indeed strange to find men deserting in time of war. Every ship is subject to conditions that cause men to be dissatisfied at times. However sympathetic and kindly the officers may be, men become restless especially when the service is not very active. The enlisted force of the United States is as fine a body of men as any country can supply for the same purpose, but life at sea is confining. If the school prevents the men from leaving without discharge, it may justify itself, even though there be a risk of some loss in realities on the battleship. Still this subject is so complicated that the evidence is not satisfying. Desertions began to decrease in the last administration and they have continued to be less than they ever were in the old navy. There has been for the past ten years a gradual change in the privileges and mode of life of the crews on shipboard. Many improvements designed into the newer ships have tended to the content of men who are quite different in type from the old sea dog who manned the sailing navy.

By just so much as officers and men are worried with unnecessary regulation, by just so much as they are diverted from the essentials of their profession into side issues, they lose interest and effectiveness. That is perhaps one reason why the efficiency of the navy has not continued to improve under this administration, that is why one finds now a certain sense of resentment and disgust in the minds of so many officers. Under a high sense of duty, they will obey orders and silently accept the fate that our political system may offer them, but nevertheless they will find it hard to face issues that ought never to be put before them. One consolation we have in what seems a dismal picture is

that Americans are generally willing to learn and most secretaries know more in the second half of their administration than they did in the first half.

This is not intended to signify that I think the head of the Navy ought to be a naval officer. He should be a civilian of wide experience in large affairs, and his office should be absolutely divorced from politics. He should know how to assimilate and apply the advice of naval men under his command, and in most cases their advice and opinions should be known to the public directly through Congress. One instance of the fatal rut into which the Navy has descended is its organization solely for the conduct of business during the time of peace, whereas its real function is the protection of the coast in time of war. We have within the memory of most people now living the scandal at the outbreak of the Spanish War. Nothing was ready in the Army and many volunteer soldiers needlessly lost their lives through inattention to sanitary measures. The Navy was well enough prepared as to the capital ships, but so unprepared in the other units necessary to support them, that millions of dollars were wasted in worthless ferryboats and other poor substitutes for effective auxiliaries. We were fortunate for the time being in having against us a poverty-stricken, unready enemy, but we were exceedingly unfortunate in supplying to politicians a text on the readiness of this country to meet any enemy without adequate preparation. The rising overnight class to sweep the invader into the sea are commanded chiefly by an uninformed demagogue who quit his job at the time of grave emergency.

The third lesson of the war reveals a curious twist in the American mind. We are generally considered

a very practical people with a habit of going straight to the essentials of any matter. Yet here is our Navy Department organized to do business only in time of peace. The bureau chiefs are well qualified to carry on the work of their departments and usually they do it admirably, but the sole centralizing influence is the Secretary of the Navy who is not by training or experience capable of reconciling the numerous conflicting differences in his own staff. He does not even know the vocabulary of their profession. Furthermore, there is no legalized board, or committee of officers, authorized to safeguard him against mistakes in what relates to the military side of the Navy, and he is almost certain to fall under the influence of one clique or another. A worse phase of this matter is the lack of a staff legally constituted to coördinate ships, men, and materials into effective units or groups for the one thing that justifies the support of a great naval establishment, viz., efficiency in war. Two reasons seem to have retarded the growth of a good organization for war.

The first is the fear of many secretaries that a Naval General Staff will lessen their real power and in some way set up a military control superior to their own. We must take that risk. After all, the country is far less interested in the dignity and prerogatives of a secretary than it is in the complete success of its fleet; and so long as Congress is on the job there is little to be feared from a military staff. The second reason seems to be a shivering hesitation to take the final plunge into an organization that will get our ships ready for war and keep them ready. It is impossible to imagine what might have happened to England in the fall of 1914 if her fleet had not been ready and

if its use had not been definitely planned beforehand by naval experts.

The sharpening of instruments for war is a shock to our peace-loving people, but it is in reality no worse than the preparation of the surgeon's knife. Both are for the same purpose, the conservation of health and strength, one in the nation and the other in the individual. This subject contains, perhaps, the lesson we should take most to heart, viz., study, organization, and preparation of what we have now, whether we build any more ships or not. It is only through some centralizing staff backed up by the Naval War College that adequate use of our resources can ever be made. A similar statement applies equally well to all the arts of peace. We want more careful study of everything.

Science has revolutionized the whole method of carrying on war. This is so intimately connected with the attitude of the country towards expert management, that is, management of naval matters, by the officers of the Navy, and relates so closely to the effectiveness of our form of government, that a few words will be useful in clearing away certain misconceptions. One hears so often that the officers of the Navy must not be trusted with the decision of preparation for fear of militarism, for fear of extravagant expense; but as a matter of fact, they have never been trusted. They have invariably been met at the doors of Congress with a certain attitude of suspicion. There is a perfectly definite field for the activities of officers and I venture to say they prefer to live within it. The people through Congress must always decide questions of policy and the amount of money they are willing to expend on the naval

establishment. The Navy should always be allowed to decide the most effective organizations and equipment for carrying out the wishes of the people. If we have naval or army officers deciding the policy of this government, or if we have them even too influential in its councils, we may be drifting away from the republic. If, on the other hand, we have Congressmen meddling too much with the details of either service, we have chaos. The two fields between Congressional action and actual execution on the part of the Navy are well marked out. Between them, there is a well-defined area of mutual discussion and co-operation.

It is clearly the fault of Congress, if the whole truth does not come out in regard to the efficiency and sufficiency of the Navy. The committees have the legal right to call before them any officer for consultation and advice. The Secretary is at the head, but Congress holds the final power. It is easy to escape responsibility by telling the country that naval officers do not agree and, therefore, do not know what they want. That is a mere crawl. Year after year, they have urged the appointment of an authoritative board, call it what you may, "A Naval General Staff," or a "Strategy Board," and Congress has refused to approve. As already stated, such a board is a necessity in times of war,—witness the "Strategy Board" during the war with Spain—and it would be most useful during peace to produce what, in the language of sport, is team play. As Admiral Knight has well said,

There is much about the Navy which is splendidly efficient. But as a whole it is far less efficient than it can and ought

to be. Our ships are fine. Our officers are capable, industrious, and ambitious. Our enlisted men are the equals of those in other navies. But efficient ships and officers and men do not alone make an efficient Navy. They must be welded into an efficient whole by a unity of organization and administration and purpose which coördinates their capabilities and directs their efforts toward a common end wisely selected and very clearly seen. Here is the first point in which we are lacking. We are lacking, also, in that harmonious composition of the fleet which is needed to give to every element of it the support that it needs from other elements, to make up a symmetrical and well-balanced whole. And we are lacking to a marked degree in absolutely essential facilities for the care and preservation of our ships, especially in the matter of dry-docks.

The duties of a General Staff cover all that is suggested in this quotation under two heads: first, to see that ships and fleets are properly manned, equipped, and ready at the appointed place and time; second, to supply authoritative and definite information on the needs of the Navy. The first involves a study of strategy, naval bases, and the kinds of units that go to make up a superior fleet, and the work of the board should be done in close consultation with the Naval War College. The second would put an end to the half-baked programs that sometimes go before Congress. No doubt would be left in the public mind about the elements of a well-rounded Navy.

The Naval Board as at present organized is not authorized by Act of Congress and it has no definite responsibility, except as questions are referred to it by the Secretary. This is fatal to a consistent, construc-

tive policy. The last session of Congress approved the appointment of a Chief of Operations and it may well be that the present excellent selection to that office, Rear-Admiral Benson, will draw about him the elements of a staff. If so, the present serious flaw in our naval organization may disappear in course of time. Even under the present unsatisfactory system, the Navy has gradually improved in material. It is not true that officers disagree on important general questions. They may differ as to the relative number of types in a fleet or even as to the conduct and result of maneuvers for practice; but no naval officer would ever advise building a battleship without at the same time providing for the crew and the small units necessary to safeguard her against surprise attack from guns and torpedoes, and to supply her with fuel and all other stores, without which she cannot keep the sea. What would be thought of a railroad company that provided a fine track and splendid locomotives without any water tanks or coal supply? The spectacle of a line of men filling the locomotive tender with buckets of water from the farmer's well would be no more ludicrous than the voyage of a fleet of battleships without a supply of fuel and stores. It has been the most difficult thing in the world to persuade Congress even to think of the auxiliaries needed for effective management of the fleet. Once they provide two battleships, they rest from their labors, until it appears that battleships cannot be run without men, and then they provide the men or permit the Secretary to lay up some ship to get them. After the battleships are in commission they discover that a fleet cannot be made effective without auxiliaries, and then they provide some of the auxiliaries.

The fourth lesson of this great tragedy concerns the Navy in its daily work during war. The popular conception of naval warfare as two fleets seeking each other on the high sea to fight a great decisive battle is a mistaken one. As the man in the street asks of the present conflict, Why don't they come into the North Sea and fight it out? That is exactly what they will not do under present conditions. The war may even end without a single conflict between battleships. The purpose of a fleet, or Navy, is to protect the sea routes, not to fight duels unless they are necessary to that end. When Admiral Sturdee went to the South Pacific with his cruisers, he was not spoiling for a fight; he had the definite purpose of clearing the ocean of German commerce destroyers.

Another popular misconception is that a battleship is complete in itself. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Alone it is a very nearsighted man who cannot see from what point he is going to be hit. As a warrior without support and without supplies he would be a perfect example of the battleship without auxiliaries. A fleet when formed should be well rounded in all respects and this is what seems so hard to make Congress understand. Still more it must have the necessary docks and bases for repairs and shelter.

The cost always seems to stand in the way of proper consideration, whereas cost should not weigh at all as between a wholly equipped unit and one that is crippled because incomplete. We want four legs under the table or none. For years, the General Board of the Navy has supplied the Secretary with full information

on what is required to keep our Navy up to full fighting efficiency in any probable contingency, and its advice has generally been disregarded by the Secretary and Congress. It is the old suspicion that the Navy wants the earth, and there is a habit of giving them only just enough to keep them quiet. A definite building plan was favored in 1903 to provide an adequate fleet but it has never been carried out. It is doubtful if any building policy can be adopted and followed unless the whole necessary sum is made available by loan or appropriation at one session of Congress.

It will be instructive here to answer the question, What is a well-rounded fleet? In general terms, it is one accompanied by the auxiliaries necessary to accomplish a given task. The number and nature of the auxiliaries will then depend upon the distance of the naval base from the point where they are to be used. If in the Philippines, the colliers, supply ships, and other types some of which might be drawn from the merchant fleet would predominate. On the coast, few of these would be needed, especially in the neighborhood of the navy yards. To make the matter concrete, let us suppose that a fleet of sixteen battleships is to be located at Guantanamo, Key West, or near some other good coaling base convenient to the Panama Canal, and suppose it is to be kept ready for use anywhere on our Atlantic Coast; also suppose that only the ships ordinarily manned by the Navy are included. Others could be recruited from the merchant service as required. Then, giving also the cost of construction and equipment, the fleet would be as follows:

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16 Battleships.....	\$304,000,000
4 Battle Cruisers.....	68,000,000
16 Scout Cruisers.....	64,000,000
64 Sea-going Destroyers.....	89,000,000
16 Submarines.....	24,000,000
2 Destroyers' Tenders.....	4,000,000
4 Supply Ships.....	6,000,000
2 Ammunition Ships.....	3,000,000
4 Fuel Ships.....	5,000,000
2 Repair Ships.....	4,000,000
2 Transports.....	4,000,000
2 Hospital Ships.....	5,000,000
20 Aëroplanes.....	300,000
Motor Boats and other small craft.....	700,000
Total.....	\$581,000,000

This list has no reference to the cost of naval bases, reserve of guns, ammunition, and supplies, or to the strictly coast defense vessels not adapted to deep sea service. Furthermore, there will be found differences of opinion on the number and types of ships. One year ago the value of submarines was probably overrated and there was a tendency to call for a very large number. It is after all a question of intelligent guesswork. The commander who guesses best will, of course, stand the best chance. I claim nothing, therefore, for this list except that it is not unreasonable. The actual cost of the ships cannot be exactly determined without bids, but the above figures will not be exceeded unless the qualities and specifications are beyond anything the department is now considering.

The Navy list contains to-day the following vessels in commission, in reserve, in process of construction, and laid up:

Ira N. Hollis

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Battleships	{ in commission	23
	{ in reserve	7
	{ out of commission	3
	{ under construction	9
Armored Cruisers	{ in commission	6
	{ in reserve	4
1st, 2d, 3d Class Cruisers	{ in commission	13
	{ in reserve	9
	{ out of commission	.3
Destroyers	{ in commission	37
	{ in reserve	18
	{ out of commission	2
	{ under construction	17
Submarines	{ in commission	37
	{ under construction	38
Torpedo Boat Tenders	{ in commission	7
	{ in reserve	1
	{ under construction	2
Gunboats	{ in commission	21
	{ in reserve	1
	{ out of commission	7
Supply Ships	{ in commission	4
	{ under construction	1
Fuel Ships	{ in commission	22
	{ out of commission	1
	{ under construction	2
Transports	{ in commission	2
	{ out of commission	3
	{ under construction	1
Ammunition Ships		1
Repair Ships		2
Mine Layers		3
Hospital Ships		1

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There are a number of tugs, converted yachts, monitors, and torpedo boats of no military value. In this list, very few ships not in commission would be of consequence in time of war. Most of them are out of date, or well on the way to the scrap heap. The ships marked under construction are all the way from 98% complete down to the plans on paper. By the time they are all completed some of the older ships will be out of date.

When we stop a moment to consider that the *Oregon* and all of Sampson's ships before Santiago would have been driven off the sea by one dreadnought like the *Nevada*, just about to go into commission, we can well understand the estimate that places our Navy in 1921 at seventeen dreadnoughts and a very mixed lot of auxiliaries. The constant complaint that our ships become worthless in so short a time might be applied to many other things in modern life as a reason for doing nothing. Every great power station for supplying the electric current to a city is subject to exactly the same changes, only more quickly. Many of them have found their machinery antiquated within five years after its installation.

One of the large Edison stations installed a number of steam engines in 1902. Each unit was for 5000 horsepower and cost, including auxiliaries and erection, about \$225,000. They were superseded, and kept on account of their value as a reserve, in 1907 by 8000 h.-p. steam turbines at a unit cost of \$280,000 which now are so antiquated that they must give way to units of 30,000, 50,000, and even 100,000 horse-power. This change is just as it is with the battleship a question of efficiency; besides, naval construction was revolutionized by the dreadnought in 1908.

Experience with the different types of ships during the progress of this war has not brought out much that is new. It has thrown certain facts and theories into bolder relief and it has quickened invention against perfectly well-known dangers. For instance, all naval officers knew that a torpedo would sink a ship, but nothing was done about it until the spur of necessity came. Now, the minds of experts are turned in that direction and it would not be surprising if something practically unsinkable were devised. The English are said to have built such a ship during the past year. Speed has long been considered equivalent to the weather gauge of the old sailing navies, and this is confirmed in the few battles that have taken place. When the German squadron appeared off the Falkland Islands, it was overwhelmed by ships superior in speed and gunfire. The only one to escape was the *Dresden* which had greater speed than any ship in either squadron. The lesson is perfectly plain, as it was in the battle when the *Blücher* was overhauled and sunk by Admiral Beatty in the North Sea.

A non-technical audience will understand the case better by a brief description of types of ships and of their success in this war.

BATTLESHIPS

A battleship is a combination of the old side-armored English ship with the American *Monitor*. It has steadily grown in size until our own plans call for a displacement of 32,000 to 36,000 tons. The *Oregon* carried four 13-inch guns in two turrets and made a speed of 16 knots per hour, but she has long been a thing of the past. In 1906, the English brought out

the *Dreadnought* which gave her name to a class of ships carrying a large battery of heavy guns and making high speed. The *Queen Elizabeth*, one of the latest, has a battery of eight 15-inch and twelve 6-inch guns with side armor 13 inches thick, speed of 25 knots, and a displacement of 27,500 tons. The war has made no change whatever in the reliance on these ships for a nation's chief defense. Those writers whose enthusiasm for the submarine misled them put all battleships in the scrap heap a few months ago, but they were wrong, at least so far as the past eighteen months have shown. It may be said that her battleships have kept Great Britain's dominion of the sea without firing a shot. The type will doubtless be changed to get more speed and greater protection from torpedoes, but it will persist.

BATTLE CRUISERS

This ship is simply a compromise in which armor is sacrificed to machinery in order to get high speed. The first step in this direction was the armored cruiser, of which our *New York* was the type and the English *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue* and the German *Blücher*, *Gneisenau*, and *Scharnhorst* were like her. The British ships were completed in 1902 and their displacement was 12,000 tons with a speed of 21 to 22 knots. The final development of the type dates from 1908 in the battle cruiser of the English *Invincible* class. The latest examples are found in the *Lion* and *Princess Royal*, completed in 1912, and the *Tiger* and *Queen Mary*, completed during the present war. The last named has a displacement of 27,000 tons, a speed of 28 knots, armor of 9 inches on the side belt, eight 13.5-inch

guns, sixteen 4-inch guns, and some rapid firers. The armor has been sacrificed to what is characteristic of these ships, speed, sea endurance and large guns. They can under some conditions be used against battleships without being considered completely outclassed. Their speed would keep them out of range of a battleship's guns, and at the great distance at which firing begins, 17,000 yards, the angle of fire would be so great as to make the deck the principal target, instead of the side. Inasmuch as the deck can never be heavily armored, a fourteen-inch shell would thus at great range be as dangerous to the battleship as to the battle cruiser. Their chief value is found in clearing the seas of an enemy's commerce destroyers and in scouting before a fleet. The battle off the Falkland Islands was decided by them, and their speed fits them for all kinds of dangerous patrol duty. The American Navy has much to learn from them. In the study of strategy at the Naval War College, they have proven themselves indispensable to a fleet of battleships.

CRUISERS

The cruiser type presents rather a wide range and may be divided into three classes, in accordance with the service required of them and the armament needed: the armored cruiser, the scout cruiser, and the light cruiser. All of these ships have for their main purpose scouting to discover the presence and power of an enemy, and scouting to act as a screen against an enemy, so that their own fleet may be an unknown quantity, until it actually comes into battle. A secondary use of such ships is for sweeping the sea of an enemy's commerce, and in time of peace, for

general patrol duty in remote regions. In every case this class of ships must be of high speed, not less than twenty-five knots and preferably thirty. The light cruisers would be more generally useful in time of peace. Gunboats can be replaced entirely by them. They may carry some armor on the side or on a turtle-back deck near the water line.

DESTROYERS

These enlarged torpedo boats vary greatly in size and may be separated into two classes, the sea-going and the harbor defense types. As scouts in the North Sea and the Channel, they have proven very effective against submarines. Their high speed and gunfire give them an advantage, but against well-armed fighting ships they depend for success so much on the element of surprise that they are of doubtful value. In course of time they may be replaced by a high-speed submersible.

SUBMARINES

These might be called submersibles, as they ordinarily live on the surface and dive only to hide their movements. They have developed from small size for harbor defense into formidable destroyers having a radius of several thousand miles. Their classification into the coast defense and sea-going types, dependent upon the stores they can carry, is natural. The latter can be built to replace the destroyer, if a suitable engine can be found. Steam is not well adapted to the purpose and it has been little used, but, on the other hand, the internal combustion engine for surface

propulsion and the storage batteries for submarine use leave much to be desired.

Mr. Churchill said at the outbreak of the war:

Submarines introduced entirely novel conditions into naval warfare. The old freedom of movement which belonged to the stronger power is affected and restricted in narrow waters by the development of this new and formidable arm. A division of soldiers cannot be annihilated by a cavalry patrol. But at any moment a great ship equal in power as a war unit to a division of an army may be destroyed without a single opportunity of its fighting strength being realized or a man on board having a chance to strike a blow in self-defense.

Another writer on this subject stated that battleships would all be destroyed by the submarines and led us to think that if we only built enough of them we should be safe against attack from the sea.

The submarine has proven a disappointment in actual warfare and its employment in a blockade against merchant ships seems too inhuman to become established practice, because the lives of non-combatants cannot be safeguarded. The means of defense against it have demonstrated that its success is restricted only to cases of false security or carelessness on the part of an enemy. The sinking of the *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue* on September 22, 1914, is an example in point. These ships were steaming slowly on patrol duty in the North Sea when one of them was struck by a torpedo. Instead of leaving boats to rescue drowning men and steaming away rapidly, the other two stopped and permitted themselves to be struck by torpedoes, probably from the same submarine. Nevertheless, so far as we know at this time, these boats have not

accomplished one thing of first magnitude against a war fleet and the expectation of wearing down the English battleships has been a woeful disappointment to the Germans. It is fortunate that our naval officers have been conservative and have not committed us to a huge expenditure for submarines to be scattered all along the coast as a first line of defense. They have steadily held to the capital ships as our dependence in time of war. The submarine is like a whale which can be attacked when it comes to the surface by a small boatload of men, and that idea has given its enemies their protection from it. Every motor boat, trawler, yacht, destroyer, and aëroplane can be sent out for patrol duty. Such craft with marine nets have given the English transport system and the battle fleet complete immunity up to this time. The war is not yet over and unexpected qualities may yet appear, but it seems doubtful.

AËROPLANES

These may be classed as air ships and thus become a natural part of the fleet. Their highest value at sea is for scouting, although circumstances might arise where they would become useful as despatch bearers or as weapons of offense against armed ships. Up to this stage of the war, they have been most numerous on land, developing a technique of their own on scout duty, on raids, and even in attack. It has been said that either side in possession of twenty-five thousand large armed aëroplanes could end the war in a month. This may or may not be true but we know they are constantly being improved. Their possibilities are almost beyond the imagination. The United

States is practically without them. Even with the skill to build the fixed parts and the planes, we have not yet found a good reliable engine. Foreign nations are so far ahead of us that we should be hopelessly outclassed if we came to a struggle. A large amount of experiment will be necessary to develop a first-rate machine; and then we should have one on every fast cruiser. An interesting lesson of the war is that there will be no more surprise attacks, if both sides are well provided with *aéroplanes*, and this applies to the navy as well as the army. The dropping of bombs on the defenseless part of a city even though there may be outlying fortifications, or on merchant ships, is fundamentally as wrong as the attack of submarines on commerce. That is another principle we should take to heart. The plea of necessity claims the right of existence only for the most brutal and would destroy all the advance that humanity has made since the first sword was forged.

OTHER SHIPS

The unarmed, or only partly armed vessels, required for service with a fleet, to carry fuel, ammunition, and supplies, have been brought very forcibly to our attention by the conviction of certain men for conspiracy against our clearance laws. The war has emphasized their value. They can to some extent be taken from the merchant service, and added to the nucleus which must be with the fleet in time of peace. Two different theories exist with regard to them. One is that they should be managed and owned by private corporations, built under government specifications and subsidized during peace, with easy transfer to the government in

time of war. The other is that they should be built, owned, and operated by the government during peace in the freight and passenger business, so that they can be readily available for war. In the first case, the government pays out money to a losing private enterprise and in the second it pays an equal or greater amount to run ships at a loss. The best course is not plain, but it is a curious psychological process that places men who are in favor of individual freedom and initiative on the side of government ownership. We may well take a lesson from England and Germany in the building of their merchant marine and the preparation preceding this war.

A number of smaller vessels deserve study by the United States. The mine sweeper has become highly important through the use of mines in lanes of travel and for closing the outlet from an enemy's harbor. Thus our own fleet might find it very dangerous to leave the Chesapeake or Delaware Bay, if an enemy's mine layers had one night to close the entrance.

The motor boats of America would be immensely valuable, if well organized for war. We ought to have a large reserve of motor boats and their owners properly registered in the Navy Department. Furthermore every sound ship and boat in the United States should be examined and listed for use in emergency, so that we may always be ready.

One lesson to our Navy may be taken from the experience with the English army. The government had little or nothing in reserve, neither men nor munitions, and the consequences were well-nigh fatal to France. They might possibly have been fatal to England if Germany had been ready to strike with her whole fleet and an army on the English coast

while the English army was engaged in France and Belgium.

We have a shortage of nearly everything. The powder and other munitions are in a fair way to be available through the great increase of machinery for manufacture, and the United States can easily increase its reserves or its power of producing quickly what is needed in war by taking over all machinery after the present emergency is past. The men cannot be obtained so quickly. Training and understanding of the service are absolutely necessary on the part of the enlisted force and of the reserve. A full year is required to bring a crew to the maximum of power. Every individual may be splendidly efficient and yet the ship as a whole may be badly managed, because coöperation and instinctive comprehension by every man in the crew of what the others are doing are needed to make a first-class fighting machine. One of the finest examples of what coöperation means in a battleship occurred at Santiago when the chief engineer of the *Oregon* asked the captain to fire a shot from the forward turret by way of heartening up the firemen. The long voyage around South America had welded the crew, gunners, seamen, firemen, and coal passers, into a united whole under Charles Clark's splendid command. The time element is essential in teaching men the sea. Crews cannot be improvised over night. Hence the great importance of having enough men to man our Navy in peace and a considerable reserve for war. At present the number of enlisted men authorized by law is 51,500 and on December 10th of this year there were 51,576 actually under the flag, but this is about 25,000 short of the number necessary to keep our ships fully manned. A new ship put into commission now

simply means another in reserve unless the crews of all are depleted. No navy can ever reach its highest efficiency under such a system, and the sooner Congress understands this the better. A reserve should be provided by the enrollment of every man who has ever served in the Navy or in the naval militia of the States. Still more, this should be supplemented by giving members of colleges and technical schools opportunity for summer training on board ship. An arrangement to this end was completed by Secretary Meyer, but it was held up or disapproved by his successor. Our industries would be the gainer by the drill and training of a reserve in time of peace by getting the men out of a mental and physical slouch.

It has been said that this is an engineers' war in the sense that machinery, machine guns, and automobiles have played a far more important part in it than ever before. But to call it an engineers' war in the sense that men are less important would be a serious mistake. Never have preparation and skill been so in demand, especially on board ship where even the guns are huge power machines capable of doing effective work only with well-trained men behind them. For this reason the Secretary's Naval Consulting Board may be a great disappointment by diverting the public mind from the real facts of the case, thus giving a false sense of security. A war is not terminated by some lucky invention on the eve of the first battle; it cannot be invented out of defeat in war. The individual members of such a board even though of high attainment in their specialties cannot replace the commissioned officers of the Navy who must take the ultimate responsibility of decision and action. Their function then will be most valuable, if defined strictly

as of an advisory character in regard only to questions referred to them.

One of the serious lessons learned from the war is that every officer should know thoroughly some specialty or have high qualities for command. The need for trained men in aviation, submarines, wireless, gunnery, and machinery of all kinds was never more strongly felt. Yet our own Navy is almost hopelessly muddled in that respect.

In the early months of 1899 a new personnel bill passed Congress, intended to reorganize the Navy to fit modern conditions; namely, the complete disappearance of sails and the use of power machinery for practically everything. Outside of some changes in the pay and the retirement of officers, the great feature of the bill was an amalgamation of the commission deck officers and engineers, thus turning every officer into what Mr. Roosevelt at that time called "a fighting engineer." This term is a correct one, as proven by the war, even on land, a struggle between great machines in the hands of skilled men. Of course, these machines are not automatic and men are just as essential as they ever were. The two elements in the Navy to-day relating to education are the command of men and the application of science. It was fully recognized when the personnel bill was introduced that few men are fitted by nature for high command, and few for great technical knowledge of material. The theory of the bill was clearly to give all officers the same education at the Naval Academy in applied and naval science, and then to permit them to determine their own fields of activity, drawing upon the whole Navy for officers particularly gifted in science. This necessarily contemplated a certain number of officers set apart per-

manently for design, construction, maintenance, and operation of machinery and all kinds of apparatus. The first bill proposed had a clause in it fixing the status of officers for technical duty, but the clause was cut out as being an administrative matter. This omission was not sound, because no administration has the power to set aside a line officer for technical duty without the prospect of command at some later time in his life. The consequence is that the personnel has never been sufficiently developed for technical purposes, and too much of the amateur will be found, especially after the older engineers have retired. There are plenty of first-rate officers available and the education in engineering at the Naval Academy is equal to anything in the United States, but except in rare instances they are not allowed to remain long enough in one place to learn it well. The attempt to make every officer equally good in all branches is a violation of fundamental principles. Furthermore, it is a marked violation of the intention of the personnel bill, to give the Navy a wider range of choice for men of special attainment.

The officers of the Navy as a whole do their work with admirable fidelity and conscience, but the intensive training stops when the Naval Academy leaves off. Every encouragement should be given to specialties, with a reliance for the gunnery, the routine, and the command upon the great body of men who have no great technical leanings.

While the personnel bill was under discussion in Washington, it was suggested that some increase in pay should be allowed to officers who qualified in gunnery and engineering. Admiral Sampson was on the Board and his reply to this suggestion was char-

acteristic. He said that a special allowance was not necessary to induce officers to qualify in anything that was in the line of duty. Their sense of duty was superior to any other inducement for the interest and service of their country. This sentiment was what anyone might have expected from a man of his noble qualities and high position. Unfortunately, it does not always hold good in this world.

A few years ago the Navy Department established a graduate school for engineering at the Naval Academy. So far as it interested young officers in technical matters connected with their profession it was a very good thing, but the difficulty that has always faced the school is the matter of subsequent duties. There is small good to the service if an officer spends two or three years studying marine engineering, and then goes to sea as the navigator of a ship. His attainments do not come into proper use. It is very important to the naval service that the present condition be remedied without delay.

One of the long debated questions of the Navy relates to the flow of promotion. The English officers in active command at sea are much younger than ours. They come to responsible duties earlier and they learn their profession through a better rounded experience. American legislation is spasmodic and unintelligent in this matter.

During the years succeeding the Civil War, there was a group of officers who came to command rank early and remained there for a whole generation while those below them were fretting out their lives in subordinate duties. They were known as the hump. I was on board a cruiser in the Pacific with a lieutenant who had been twenty-two years in that one grade and

was promoted to lieutenant-commander at somewhat over fifty. He finally rushed through the command ranks without getting time actually to command, and finally retired a Rear-Admiral who had always done subordinate work. The situation would be laughable if it did not have a tragic side for the Navy; for there is another hump now and young officers who graduated last June can hardly hope even to get into the lieutenant's grade short of twenty years. If one of them marries, it will be entirely possible for himself and his son to serve as watch officers on the same ship. This is another lesson in preparedness and Congress should find some good solution for so deadening a condition. Various remedies have been suggested, such, for example, as promotion by selection. This may be a way out, if it can be kept free from social or political influence in Washington, but it does not provide for the aged who are not selected and who remain at the base of the pyramid. Reserve lists on graded pay might be established for those who would go into civil life. It is not intended to propose the remedy here, but the Navy and Congress must do something about it.

The report of the Secretary covers many of the points referred to here and it should be read by every citizen who has an interest in the Navy as a defense against invasion. The recommendation for increase in ships of all classes is moderate and should be approved by Congress either as the Secretary requests or better still as outlined by the General Board, in its first report. Five years seems too long for the program as it really means eight years, if we hope to be prepared for contingencies that may arise after this war is over.

To those who are against preparation, the declaration of the English Articles of War should be quoted: "It is upon the Navy that, under the good providence of God, the wealth, safety, and strength of the Kingdom chiefly depend." This is nearly as true of our Republic, as it is of Great Britain. Our coast line is immensely greater and the Caribbean is an American sea controlling the Panama Canal. Only by means of the Navy can we find time on shore to get ready against attack. At the outbreak of the European War the Germans were fully prepared with soldiers and munitions for land service. The English were not prepared at all, but their fleet, which had never been more ready, saved them. Even a few days' delay might have been fatal. *That is our great lesson.* Let us learn it as our only escape from war and the rule of brute force.

A volume would be needed for a complete exposition of our naval problems as revealed by the war. They all come under the head of study and preparation and the Naval War College with its fine staff forms a natural source of instruction to our people. The officers should be encouraged to make their views public except where international questions are involved. It is not necessary that they should write on the plans and strategy of possible future campaigns but they should work them out for use when the need arises. There is no possible doubt that at least one nation, if not two, will have everything ready, as Louis Napoleon said, "to the last button of the uniform," for use against us. Our Navy should be large enough and ready to defend the Atlantic and Pacific as well as our base in the Caribbean. Half-way measures are useless.

It is conceivable that we might lessen our risk by withdrawing within a continental area containing Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Panama, Porto Rico, and our own United States, leaving the Philippine Islands to their own devices and the Monroe Doctrine to the scrap heap of moral failures. Are we prepared to do that? I think not.

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Even though we are reaping while others are fighting the battle of democracy, even though we failed in our great opportunity when little Belgium was trampled under foot, a certain sense of humiliation will make this country all the more determined to fulfill its duties and its obligations. Our lesson is learned. We shall build our Navy that we may face the world a free nation.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES

BY ARTHUR GORDON WEBSTER

THE recent announcement by Secretary Daniels of the appointment of a board of engineering and scientific experts to serve as a consulting board for the Navy with respect to inventions and applications of science has been received by the public with marked interest, but with expressions of opinion varying from extreme enthusiasm through faint praise to decided condemnation. Inasmuch as many of the reactions of the press and of publicists seem based upon misapprehensions of the purpose and functions of this board it seems of interest to present a short explanation of the results that it may possibly achieve. On the one hand the appointment of Mr. Edison, undoubtedly one of our most fertile inventors, as the chairman, has led to the hasty conclusion that the members of the board would immediately throw themselves into such an ardor of inventive effort that new devices would be brought to birth from their fertile brains that would make our Navy invulnerable and relieve the country from fear of attack. At the other extreme from this preposterous view is the statement of an ex-President of the United States that the Navy needs no civilian board, but only naval experts, and also the sometimes thinly disguised view that it is an

insult to the officers of the Navy to suggest that any advice may be offered to them. The truth undoubtedly lies between the extremes here indicated. The first view is easily disposed of when we point out that all persons having any knowledge of invention know that it can no more be compelled than can poetry or other creative art, and that people cannot, and do not, make great inventions to order. The sudden creation of marvelous and unexpected inventions cannot then be the function of this board.

A second view is that this board shall serve as a mediator between the thousands of inventors who have, as they believe, made inventions of great importance, but cannot obtain the ear of the authorities of the Navy in order to have their inventions tried. Such a board might, they suppose, examine without prejudice inventions submitted to it, and advise the Navy with regard to such of them as seem promising. Such a function might be delegated to this board, but is not at present contemplated. In fact the idea of offering or of forcing advice upon the Navy is especially disavowed, and in order to make this particularly plain the name originally proposed of Naval Advisory Board has been given up for the explicitly descriptive title of Naval Consulting Board. It is meant that the officers of the Navy shall have the services of this board for consultation upon such technical matters of a scientific, in contradistinction to a military, nature as they shall deem needful or expedient.

With regard to the view that only a board of naval experts could be of service to the Navy, and that it would be improper for civilians to offer any assistance, let us take a brief survey of some of the problems of the Navy. The Navy consists of ships, provided

with guns for offense and armor for defense. In addition it uses mines for defense, and of late years submarines and automobile torpedoes under water, and aëroplanes and dirigible balloons for scouting overhead. With regard to ships we have the problems of construction, stability, propulsion, and resistance. Under propulsion we have the matter of the generation of power, and its transmission to the organs of propulsion. In connection with guns we have the question of construction and mounting, and the questions of interior ballistics, concerning the motion of the projectile inside the gun, and exterior ballistics, or the motion of the projectile from the gun to the target. All of these problems are problems of physics, and are to be dealt with by engineers and theoretical and applied physicists, chemists, and metallurgists. It is obvious that most of them may be contributed to in a high degree by persons who have the required special scientific knowledge even if they have never seen or smelled salt water. It is of course possible that the persons in a country who know the most about such problems are to be found in the Navy, but it is also possible that they are to be found outside. The day is evidently long since past when the *amour propre* of any set of officials should stand in the way of the development of the efficiency of either of the military arms by any means in the power of the state. Nor is this in the least to be expected. The high quality of the personnel of the United States Navy and its great traditions make it unnecessary to impugn either its ability or its disinterestedness.

If the facts be admitted to be as I have stated, and if it be found that questions arise which require more attention and research than can be given to them in the

regular routine of the duties of the officers of the Navy, does it not seem an extremely natural idea that the attempt should be made to aggregate to the special technical knowledge of the naval officers the combined powers of the organized scientific brains of the country for the improvement of the material side of the Navy? In order to do this Secretary Daniels proceeded in the only possible way. As the judgment of any individual in so many various subjects must be fallible, it was necessary to appeal to the organized societies having to do with the various branches in question, to which was delegated the task of selecting their most fitting representatives. Thus the national societies of civil, mechanical, electrical, and mining engineers were naturally chosen, as well as two aëronautical societies and one of automobile engineers. The appropriateness of the last choice is seen when we think of the enormous changes already wrought in all questions of propulsion by the introduction of the gas engine in its many forms. For more abstract and purely scientific questions there were called the American Chemical Society, the American Electrochemical Society, and the American Mathematical Society, the latter for assistance in the many questions of mathematical physics likely to arise. Finally the Inventors Guild completes the eleven societies already invited. It can hardly be denied that such a selection is likely to furnish as competent a board to deal with the questions proposed as could be secured in this country. The absolute disregard of individual interests or of political considerations is immediately obvious. Let me add to this the statement that each member of the board considers himself the intermediary between the Navy and the combined talent of his scientific colleagues, of whom

he is the representative on the board. Was it not then proper for the Secretary of the Navy to state that he had thus mobilized the talent and genius of the country for the service of the Navy?

What now are to be the methods of operation of this board, and in what way can civilians be of use when the technically instructed minds of the Navy need assistance? It will readily be admitted that the chief characteristic of modern navies is their rapid change and the ever-present tendency to become obsolete. With the continual development of science there come applications that to a previous generation were unheard of or chimerical. When we consider that it was only eleven years ago that the Wright brothers were making their first flight with a motor-propelled glider at Kittyhawk, N. C., and that to-day battles are being waged above the clouds and military tactics are being forever altered because of the new mode of aërial scouting, we get a vivid idea of this truth. When we remember that it is but eighteen years ago that we first heard of the experiments of Marconi on Salisbury plain, applying the electrical waves discovered eight years previously by Hertz to the transmission of intelligence across empty space, and that now we have had conversation from Washington to Hawaii and Paris by the same astonishing means, we have a further example of the same thing. Let me also call your attention to the fact that none of the persons named in this connection were members of any army or navy. In fact it is noteworthy that the chief new scientific contributions to the art of war do not come from military men. I need mention only a few examples, such as the *Monitor* of John Ericsson, a highly educated engineer born in Sweden, the steam

turbine of the Englishman the Hon. Charles Parsons, the gas engine developed in Germany and France, and the gyrostatic compass simultaneously developed by Anschütz in Germany and by Sperry in this country. It is evident that the discipline of armies and navies does not encourage that free play of imagination, experiment, and research that is essential for the development of original ideas. This is not to say anything against these military departments, but merely to call attention to a well-recognized fact.

We come now to the most important method pertaining to the successful performance of investigation, and the characteristic that most differentiates it from military activity. I mean the method of scientific research. It would seem scarcely necessary to explain here in Worcester the nature and purposes of research, for since the foundation of Clark University twenty-six years ago the performance of scientific research has been considered its chief function and *raison d'être*. And yet it has sometimes been carelessly assumed that discoveries are born fully armed from the brain of the thinker like Pallas from the head of Zeus, and that nothing more than a drawing-board is necessary for their creation. How different is the actual course of procedure! Consider, for example, the development of wireless communication. First came the magnificent experimental investigations of Faraday and Henry, eighty years ago, then the great mathematical investigation of Maxwell in 1864, culminating in the announcement of the existence of electromagnetic waves, then the long and painstaking experiments of Hertz in the laboratory twenty-four years later, culminating in the actual production of the waves, and finally the out-of-door experiments of Marconi which resulted in ever

increasing their field of action, followed by the work of thousands of experimenters and theorists from that day to this. In the case of the steam turbine laboratory experiment and mathematical development went hand in hand, until we have the huge turbines of the *Mauretania* of to-day. In the case of the aëroplane the process was somewhat different, beginning with the development of a sport, and then the art of gliding by power, and out-of-door experiment, resulting eventually in the loss of hundreds of lives for want of more perfect experimental and theoretical data. Here the mathematical theory and the laboratory development followed later, at great cost, but now every country has its aëronautic indoor laboratory, supplemented by an out-of-door proving-ground. In the case of ordnance, mathematical theories of stress and of thermodynamics go hand in hand with experimental assembling of data, while in the production of explosives the chemical laboratory is the battle-ground. The production of armor involves problems not only of the rolling-mill but of metallurgy and of the chemistry of alloys and pure metals. And so I might go on. It seems therefore obvious that if a navy is to be in the van in the application of science it should have not only a large staff of persons skilled in the methods of scientific research, but also suitable laboratory facilities for the performance of all the many complicated researches that may be necessary. It is true that some of these researches could be carried out in private or university laboratories now existing, but it will be immediately obvious that it would be impracticable to at once concentrate the activities of such institutions on problems whose immediate solution may be matters of life or death for the navy. The facilities of which I speak exist at

present only in small degree in the United States Navy. The first act of the Naval Consulting Board has therefore been to recommend the building of a large station for research in all branches of engineering, physics, and chemistry connected with naval application, comprising laboratories of various sorts, with shops for the production of the experimental machines and apparatus to be tested. Such a station will eventually cost several millions of dollars, a sum hardly to be wondered at in comparison with the cost of similar laboratories here or abroad, or with the cost of a single battleship which may be saved by the results of the researches here to be performed. Such a laboratory would demand a large staff of skilled research scientists and artisans, many of which would have to be drawn from civil life. It is hardly to be characterized as an inventions mill but rather as a place where the scientific questions involved in invention may be tested, data obtained, and in due time the resulting invention submitted to practical test.

Finally a few words may be said about the manner in which the board is already proceeding, before it has in fact been recognized by law, and while it is merely an association of friendly advisers of the Secretary of the Navy. Following the methods of business which are thoroughly familiar to most of its members, it has been divided up into sixteen subcommittees, dealing with the various most important questions which it may have to consider. No member belongs to more than five such subcommittees. Various questions already submitted to the board by chiefs of bureau have been communicated to the members of the appropriate committees, who have engaged in an active series of suggestions and experiments in their private labora-

tories or studies. Some of these questions are very difficult of solution, and may require years of study. Others are such as are bound to yield to the serious methods of scientific attack. Let me mention in closing one such question that has been attacked with great success in the Navy by the most modern of research methods,—I mean the question of the design of ships in order to decrease the resistance, increase the speed, and save the coal. For this purpose the great experimental model basin was constructed in Washington, where the remarkable experimental results in the towing of models obtained by Chief Naval Constructor D. W. Taylor have set a mark for high scientific value that constitutes one of the glories of our Navy. Let us hope that when proper facilities are offered many of the other problems of the Navy may be solved in an equally satisfactory way.

Finally I desire to call your attention to the fact that the terrible war now going on in Europe has forced the various nations involved to mobilize their scientific talent. In England a committee for the promotion of chemical industries has been constituted, headed by Lord Rayleigh, who is not only the Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, but the most distinguished physicist in England, and perhaps of the world. An inventions committee has also been constituted, upon which are such men as Sir Joseph Thomson, Sir Ernest Rutherford, and Sir Oliver Lodge, all leading physicists, and which has had the fate of being criticized as not containing enough practical men. At the same time France has, since the constitution of our board, created not a board, but a ministry of inventions, having at its head the distinguished mathematician Professor Paul Painlevé. It is

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to be seen that in these older civilizations there is no doubt felt as to the utilization of brains devoted to abstract science when the existence of the country is at stake.

THE POISON OF PREPAREDNESS

BY WARREN WORTH BAILEY

IT seems to me that I cannot better begin what I have to say before this distinguished body to-day than by recalling the observation of Blackstone to the effect that in a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession of arms.

In absolute monarchies [said the great commentator], this is necessary for the safety of the prince imperial; and armies form the main principle of their constitution, which is that of governing by fear; but in free states the profession of a soldier taken singly and merely as a profession is justly an object of jealousy. In these no man should take up arms but with a view to defend his country and its laws.

There is now a serious proposal in this country that we shall very greatly enlarge the profession of arms. Coupled with the demand that we shall have an army of 400,000 continentals is the other demand that the output of West Point shall be doubled or perhaps quadrupled. And what is true in regard to the land forces of the Republic is equally true of maritime forces. If our army is to be augmented by hundreds of thousands, so is the navy to be expanded in line with an ambitious and really imperial program involving the expenditure of a thousand millions of dollars within the

next five years and a consequent increase in the burden of taxation.

Advocates of this program tell us that its adoption is absolutely necessary to the safety of the Republic. They tell us that our country is utterly defenseless. They insist that we are despised among the nations on account of our physical weakness. Yet naval experts have testified within a year that our navy is second only to that of Great Britain. They tell us that it is superior to that of Germany or of any other country in the world save Britain. This was the testimony of Admiral Fletcher before the Committee on Naval Affairs when the naval appropriation bill was before it a year ago. And Admiral Fletcher was corroborated by other naval experts. It was left to the Navy League of the United States and its collaborators to discover that a fighting machine upon which we have spent nearly a thousand millions within the last decade is worthless.

For one I do not agree with the Navy League of the United States. I do not agree with those who insist that we are unprepared for possible emergencies. I am profoundly convinced that we are very adequately prepared, over-prepared, if anything. Our navy, built and building, is the strongest navy in the world, bar that of England. Our navy is stronger than that of Germany; it is far superior to that of France; more than twice as strong as that of Japan or of any other nation with the exception noted. Then why should it be pretended that we are unprepared and incapable of self-defense in the event of trouble?

At this point let me ask whence the demand has so suddenly and so insistently come for a tremendous increase in our fighting outfit. Has it come from the

toilers of the land? What labor organization has manifested fear? What organization of farmers has uttered an appeal for more battleships and submarines? What body representing the smaller business interests of the country has taken ground in favor of adding to the tax burdens of a tax-ridden people for war purposes in a time of profound peace? Is there any evidence anywhere of a popular demand for this wide departure from the traditional policy of the Republic?

I think not. But we find on examination that the patriotic societies which have been so much in evidence during the recent months in cultivating sentiment in favor of military and naval expansion and in working upon the fears of the timid and the credulity of the uninformed are curiously and suggestively related in their distinguished personnel to certain great industrial concerns which in the event of increased appropriations for war purposes would almost necessarily profit therefrom. It is not my wish to be personal. It is not my purpose to question the patriotism or the good faith of any man. But self-interest is one of the most powerful of all human motives. It influences men without their knowledge. It tends in many cases to obliquity of vision. It sways men even when they honestly believe themselves superior to its suggestions. And so we may fairly assume that self-interest has played a very great and commanding part in this remarkable propaganda which those who have been busiest in promoting it have professed to be inspired alone by love of country and undertaken solely with the high purpose of safeguarding our liberties against some unidentified enemy.

It would doubtless be impertinent for me in this presence to pursue this phase of the matter further.

Yet right here I am sure we should find traces of the poison of preparedness were the test applied. As I have said, there has been no popular clamor for increased armament. The great body of the people have been quietly engaged in their accustomed pursuits. They have been sowing and reaping without suspicion or apprehension. They took President Wilson at his word when he assured them through Congress a year ago that we were at peace with all the world and that no one who spoke counsel based on fact or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities could say that our independence or the integrity of our territory was threatened from any quarter. It has therefore been a surprise and a shock to be told in more recent utterances that the "whole nation is convinced that we ought to be prepared and very adequately prepared for defense"—the word defense implying danger of attack. Yet in the message delivered to Congress December 7th the country was again assured that we have nothing to fear. We are still at peace with all the world. Our independence and the integrity of our territory are still unmenaced. Our liberties and our institutions are still unthreatened.

Yet here we are face to face with a program of staggering proportions. It is a program so far-reaching in its possibilities that it should give every thoughtful American most serious pause.

A standing military force [said James Madison], with an overgrown executive, will not be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger have always been the instrument of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite war whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe the armies kept up under pretext of defending, have enslaved

the people. It is perhaps questionable whether the best concerted system of absolute power in Europe could maintain itself in a situation where no alarms of external danger could tame the people to the domestic yoke.

Has a revolt been apprehended in this country and are we hearing much about defense against foreign danger because a fear has possessed the kings and potentates of our day of what the people may do if not diverted from the study of the conditions which privilege and monopoly have brought about in this free Republic? Madison was no alarmist himself. He was not among the unrestful. He wrote in the serenity of age and out of the vision gained through long experience. He understood that a standing military force is not a fit companion to liberty. He knew the two to be mutually antagonistic. He knew that all the republics which had risen before our own had gone down at last under the iron heel of militarism. And so he warned his countrymen against what is now being so vehemently and so persistently urged by those who would fill us with fear of some unidentified foreign aggressor.

Ought we not to ask the alarmists to tell us whence and from whom they expect the danger which they say lies close at hand? Is it asking too much of them that they should be specific in pointing out the foe against whom we are proposing to arm? Thus far they have been tantalizingly vague. Of course we have had hints and implications and titillating suggestions. The Yellow Peril was the ready resource of Mr. Hobson for several lurid years. The German ghost has haunted the visions of the New York editorial fraternity for months. But when the cold fact that Japan is out-

classed by us on the sea and infinitely outclassed by us in resources and in men, the Yellow Peril shrinks into insignificance. And when it is remembered that naval experts rank our navy as superior to that of Germany, it becomes difficult for men of sober mind to become excited over the thought that the Kaiser may have designs upon us following the small diversion in which he is now more or less engaged.

But the thing that alarms me is the spirit which runs through this inflammatory propaganda. It is not the spirit of our free institutions. It is not the spirit upon which we have relied during all our previous history. No. It is the spirit which has culminated in the fearful tragedy now enacting in Europe, the spirit of force, the spirit of empire, the spirit of aggression and conquest. For let no one believe that the program which has been outlined is the end. It is merely the beginning. It is perhaps a trifle bolder than any previous program with which the country has been confronted, but it is in line with militaristic purposes as they have found expression from year to year since Whitney began the rehabilitation of the navy back in the days of Grover Cleveland. That the end of the journey has now been reached, who is so simple as to believe? All history tells the story of similar beginnings and of how the course has run from the little to the great, from the negligible to the dominant, from the army that no one paused to consider to the army which seized the reins of power and with the bayonet pinioned liberty to the earth.

If it were only a matter of money I should feel it scarcely worth while to protest against proposals which go no further than that of placing a per capita burden of ten dollars on the people of the United States.

But something immeasurably more important than any question of money and taxes and debts lies back of all this clamor for a great armament. What I see before us is a military system, a military caste, a military autocracy. The poison of preparedness is spreading through the seats of learning; it is corroding the sanctuary itself; it is coloring the language and the thought of our daily lives; it is stirring strange dreams in the minds of men which take shapes so menacing that we may well recoil when they project themselves upon the screen that hides the future. Empire beyond the seas. Entangling alliances with kingdoms and concerts upheld by the sword. An America no longer resting on the secure base of reason and justice, but supported by the bayonet and buttressed round about by forces that will grow and grow until within their grasp all powers will be held and all authority centered. Is this vision a welcome one? Is it one we would have reduced to reality? Can Americans look upon it with complacency or refrain from offering it a fervent and determined challenge?

Some of us in this crisis of the Republic find ourselves most unhappily out of touch with leaders we had hitherto followed unfalteringly and with glad steps. It is a grief to us that a difference of opinion has resulted in a divergence of our paths. But here I am reminded of something written by Thomas Jefferson a long time ago. It seems to fit the situation which faces us to-day as it fitted the situation which he had in mind.

During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world [he wrote], during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows

should reach even this distant shore; that this should be more felt and feared by some and less by others; and should divide opinion as to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. Error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left to combat it.

And it is to reason that we who stand for peace are appealing to-day. We are not questioning the patriotism of those who differ with us in this hour of stress. We believe them or most of them actuated by motives as high and as unselfish as our own. But we honestly and most sincerely question the wisdom of the method they have chosen in dealing with a great and momentous occasion. The United States has been mightily stirred by the awful conflict raging across the Atlantic. Nearly all of us have kin over there. No home is bereft there without a shadow falling across the threshold of a home in this haven of the oppressed. The agitation of the billows of the Baltic and the North Sea has reached even this distant and peaceful shore and many emotions in American breasts have been the response,—emotions of fear, emotions of sympathy, emotions of hatred, emotions of suspicion, emotions of sheer selfishness and greed. And out of these emotions have come many and varied differences of opinion. Some of us have been concerned with respect to our own safety. These have feared that out of the blood and fury of the mighty conflict in which Europe is weltering may come a fearful danger to our own land and our own institutions. And this fear has been played upon magically by some who nurse ambitions and by others who harbor sordid desires and by still others who cherish race prejudices or national bigotries

—all together conspiring, perhaps unconsciously, to bring about a state of the public mind which tends to find expression in terms of force, in battleships and air craft, in submarines and long-range guns, in shrapnel and men in khaki.

But happily reason is left to combat errors of opinion which may have obtained in connection with the great conflagration which has touched us with its searing tongues. We are not bound to accept the word of authority. Each of us is free to exercise his own judgment, to follow his own conscience, to consult his own convictions. Are we in danger? If so, there is no American unready to meet it, none who would pause to count the cost involved in meeting it. We have been told and repeatedly told that we are not threatened from without. But are we threatened from within? If so will continentals and war ships avert the danger? May they not enhance it? Revolutions are not stopped by armed men. But a thousand revolutions might have been averted by turning soldiers into husbandmen and artisans. If we are endangered from within, the situation is to be met, not by building battle fleets and planting our harbors with mines; it is not to be averted by turning the Republic into a military camp; it is not to be disposed of by levying fresh taxes on the toilers of the land; it is to be dealt with successfully only by removing the causes which produce unrest and removing the injustices which provoke resentment and incite bitterness of class feeling.

May I not in conclusion appeal to reason and to common sense in the consideration of this vital issue? The poison of preparedness has undeniably crept subtly through our whole system of thought and national effort. It has brought a sort of madness upon many

minds. It has obsessed thousands with the dread of some awful consequence to ourselves of the European struggle. Yet what I contend, to paraphrase the language of the great Richard Cobden, is that America is to-day so situated in every particular of her domestic and foreign circumstances that, by leaving other governments to settle their own business and fight out their own quarrels, and by attending to the vast and difficult affairs of her own enormous realm and the conditions of her own people, she will not only be setting the world an example of noble morality—which no other nation is so happily free to set—but she will be following the very course which the maintenance of her own greatness most imperatively demands. It is precisely because America is so strong in resources, in courage, in institutions, in geographical position, that she can, before all other powers, afford to be moral and to set the example of a mighty nation walking the paths of justice and of peace.

PREPAREDNESS: THE AMERICAN PROGRAM¹

BY WILLIAM I. HULL

RESULTS OF PREPAREDNESS

THERE must be no misunderstanding of the full significance and certain results of getting down to business on the military program. If we give ourselves whole-heartedly to it, we must bid farewell forever to those American ideals of peaceful industry, of genuine education, of real democracy, and of international relations dominated by law and justice. The military powers of the Old World and of all history have shown us but too plainly by precept and example the necessary consequences to industry, education, democracy, and international morality of a whole-souled devotion to a consistently "adequate" military program.

Both reason and recent experience have burned in upon us the lesson that adequate preparedness includes the preparation of plans for making war. The "campaign" must necessarily be mapped out beforehand, and its strategy and tactics decided upon in advance. The German officers' clubs, with their debates on "the best plan" and prizes for its author; with their incessant construction and criticism of "projects of attack and defense," and their habitual and enthusiastic toast to "The Day" when these projects might be tested, have taught this lesson beyond the shadow of a doubt.

¹This address will appear later as a chapter in Professor Hull's volume, *Preparedness: The Military and the American Programmes*, Revell & Co.

The "agreements" and "arrangements" between Great Britain and France have taught this same lesson, with the further one of the futility of anything short of absolute adequacy in military preparedness. Even Germany, with its phenomenal, *apparent* military success, is learning anew that Kant's dictum, "We cannot grasp the absolute by the wool," is true in the military and material world as well as in the intellectual.

Many events have proven the truth of reason's prophecy that on the occasion of every international dispute the country "prepared" with big armaments rattles the saber in its sheath, or draws the sword from its scabbard, in its effort to back up its diplomacy and incline "justice" to its side. In this era when the whole world is a neighborhood, such preparedness on the part of one nation is emulated by the others who regard the iron fist as a necessary concomitant of their own diplomacy.

But "preparedness" instills the poison of militarism not only into international relations: it militarizes national and individual life and character as well: "The Earth rests not more securely on the shoulders of Atlas than Germany on her Army and Navy": so said one of the prime supporters of military preparedness, the Crown Prince of Prussia.

After all [said the editor of a great London journal], the British Empire is built up by good fighting by its Army and Navy. The spirit of war is native to the British race.—Only by militarism can we guard against the abuses of militarism.

Such are the natural fruits of military preparedness; and their counterparts are already pressing upon public attention in our own Republic.

Military preparedness, which, to be adequate, must necessarily be based on despotism in the army, has caused despotism to be retained in the monarchies of Continental Europe, and to be revived in many open and insidious ways in its republics. In practice, the rights of freemen have been ruthlessly disregarded in Germany and in Great Britain alike, under the stress of providing a greater preparedness; in theory, the Germans insist that efficiency in military preparedness is possible only when power is strictly concentrated, and the English have grown doubtful as to the possibility of its achievement in a democracy. In Germany, a member of the Reichstag voted against the military budget; his fellow members shouted to him, "We won't permit the supreme military authorities to be criticized"; and the government promptly ordered him to the trenches. In England, an unprecedented campaign for enlistment has come to the verge of conscription; the state church has been ordered to "preach more patriotic sermons"; and the workmen in fuel and munitions plants have been made to feel that they are the wards of the government.

One of the prime characteristics of the progress of civilization is a growing respect for law and for the sanctity of human life; and yet *our Republic* is summoned to prepare to engage in international anarchy and in the wholesale destruction of human life. One of our leading prepareders, in a public debate in Boston, pictured Uncle Sam with a chip on each shoulder (the Monroe Doctrine and Mongolian Exclusion), and with both arms (the army and navy) in a sling. To such an ideal of our Republic does the demand for "preparedness" logically lead. Shall it be permitted to eclipse the traditional ideal of Uncle Sam with

international rights on one shoulder and international duties on the other, with one hand bearing the torch of liberty, education, and industry enlightening the world, and the other pressing upon the nations the scales of international justice?

Is it possible that we are going to permit our own beloved Republic to enter upon that foolish, fatal, bloody, brutal path of militarism which has led the nations of to-day into the abyss,—which inevitably has led and must lead always to the abyss? We are standing to-day at the parting of the ways. Which shall we take? The irrational, anarchistic, inadequate, uncivilized, un-Christian, un-American path of so-called adequate armaments? Or the rational, legal, adequate, civilized, Christian, and American path of adequate justice?

The United States has to-day an opportunity unparalleled in its history,—in all history,—of answering this question aright, and of leading the world along the better way.

THE GREAT EXPERIMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

The American people have not yet become a blood-thirsty, a militaristic nation. They will assuredly reject with scorn and contempt the irrational, anarchistic, inadequate, uncivilized, un-Christian, and un-American program of the militarists, and accept gladly and eagerly the rational, legal, adequate, civilized, Christian, and American program of the Madisons, Hamiltons, and Washingtons of our time. We have, once before in our history, faced the same great question and answered it aright.

In the gloomy "critical period" of our history, from

1783 to 1789, the burning question arose: Shall each of the thirteen States build up its armaments on land and sea, to the utmost of its power, and by means of them defend its soil from invasion by the other jealous, rival, hostile States? Or, shall the great experiment of the Constitution be tried, by means of which inter-State disputes may be settled by judicial process, and the armaments of each State be reduced to a minimum?

The answer was not so simple and easy and matter-of-course as it appears to-day after a century and a quarter of successful operation on the part of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, as the Founders themselves acknowledge, the Constitution was "wrung from the grinding necessities of a reluctant people." There were many men, then, in the various States, as there are in the various nations to-day, who declared that they would not entrust the safety of their State and homes to a "mere scrap of paper"; and insisted that the "good old plan" of adequate armaments and preparedness should be adhered to, and the new-fangled follies of the molly-coddle pacifists and poltroon legalists should be rejected. Fortunately for America and the world, the Founders of the Republic triumphed, and an end was put forever within the States of the Union to that policy of adequate armaments and preparedness which would inevitably, if allowed to continue, have made of the Constitution a mere scrap of paper, just as the adequate armaments and preparedness of to-day have made mere scraps of paper of treaties between the nations.

Of course, it is wholly undesirable and impossible for the world to-day to establish a national union such as was established in 1789 between the States. The day for a world-empire, or even a world-republic, has

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probably passed away forever. But it *is* possible, practicable, and mandatory for the world to adopt unreservedly and adhere to unwaveringly the national, legal, adequate, civilized, Christian, and American program which it entered upon at the two Hague Conferences.

THE PARTS OF THE PROGRAM

This program is not vaguely indefinite and purely theoretical, as is that of the militarists. On the contrary, every part of it is clear-cut and every part of it has been put into successful operation. Thus back of it is the convincing force of sound reason, and the overwhelming proof of successful practice. Let us examine it briefly, and at the same time consider the relation of adequate armaments and preparedness to the program as a whole and to each of its parts.

Its parts are four in number, namely, the limitation of armaments, the exclusive use of mediation and good offices, of international commissions of inquiry, and of international arbitration.

I. THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

The limitation of armaments has been tried for a century with preëminent success between the United States and the British Empire, and for a quarter-century between Chile and Argentina. Its adoption in some form—preferably the conversion of all national armaments into an international police force—is absolutely essential to prevent the other parts of the program from being torn into scraps of paper. The whole world of civilization, both within the bel-

ligerent and the neutral nations as well, is looking forward to the time when, after the demolition of adequate armaments in the present great war, an end shall be put forever to the persistent and frightful competition between the nations in the building up of adequate armaments, of preparedness, on land and sea. And even the terrible evils of this frightful war are borne with some equanimity in the prime hope of humanity that God may bring out of these evils the total destruction of the nations' means of mutual destruction.

Here, then, will be the first great opportunity of America to lead the world; but this opportunity will belong only to an America with clean hands and pure heart. In that future conference of the nations which is to put an end forever to competition in the building up of armaments, what possible influence for good can the American delegates exert if their country should have itself adopted in earnest the military program? Would not the other delegates say, with entire justice and finality: "While we were destroying each other's armaments, you seized the opportunity of building up your own; go to, we will go and do likewise"? So far from influencing a world conference to limit armaments, the United States would give such an impulse to competition in the building up of armaments as the world has never known before! And it would thus become its own chief opponent in leading the world to adopt the rest of the truly American program. It would be as if Virginia, the home of Madison and Washington, or New York, the home of Hamilton, had said to the other States: "Let us adopt a judicial means of settling all disputes between us"; and had, at the same time, persisted in building up armaments on land and sea.

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At the first Hague Conference in 1899, Russia earnestly advocated the limitation of armaments; but at the second Conference in 1907, after Russia's war with Japan had impelled it to undertake an enormous increase in its armaments, it refused not only to advocate limitation of armaments but even to place the subject upon the program for discussion.

It will take the United States *years*, according to our military and naval experts, to reach even the standard of preparedness set by this present war. Meanwhile, immediately on the close of the war, the third Hague Conference must be held, and the delegation from the United States should be prepared, and enabled by their country's attitude on armaments, to accomplish that limitation of armaments which was defeated at the first two conferences by a reliance upon "adequate armaments," and which a bleeding and panting world will demand with a thousand-fold more imperiousness after Armageddon that has followed the "preparedness" of past years.

II. MEDIATION AND GOOD OFFICES

Mediation and good offices were placed in the program by the Hague Conferences. They have been tried by the United States scores of times, both before and since the Conferences, and with conspicuous success. On many occasions, Latin-American wars have been prevented or ended by American mediation. Through the good offices of the United States, the Russo-Japanese War—up to that time the most terrible of modern wars—was brought to an end.

This means of preventing war is obviously capable of far greater use and success; and it was not only

endorsed by the Hague Conferences as useful and desirable, but it was unanimously declared not to be an "unfriendly" act on the part of the mediator either before or after the outbreak of hostilities.

Why has it not been successful in preventing or ending the present great war? Because of adequate armaments. It was pressed repeatedly before the war began, but was rejected because of the belief on the part of the respective disputants that they could gain more by means of their adequate armaments. Our own President was prompt and urgent in the extension of good offices and mediation on the part of the United States. His offer was rejected. Why? Because of adequate armaments. Our country and humanity is watchfully and hopefully waiting for a repetition of that offer. When will the opportunity to offer them again and with success occur? When, and only when, the adequate armaments of one side or the other shall have been smashed into smithereens.

The unanswerable logic of this proposition is fortified by the mediation at Portsmouth when it was found possible to mediate only after the Russian and Japanese armaments had been greatly reduced and when the financial resources of the belligerents prevented them from speedily renewing those armaments. As a man must sow what he reaps, a country will assuredly get what it prepares for, whether it be a peaceful adjustment of disputes or war.

A conference of the neutral nations to offer continuous mediation in the present war has been repeatedly urged in and upon the United States, and there is no doubt that it could be summoned and could act with success were it not for "adequate" armaments,—armaments adequate, so their respective possessors

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believe, to secure "justice" by means of them. Indeed, we have the testimony of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that even a conference of the belligerent nations themselves could have prevented this war. He places the blame, of course, upon Germany for not agreeing to this conference; but the impartial observer sees behind Germany's refusal the specter of preparedness on both sides. Sir Edward Grey's words, spoken in Parliament nearly nine months after the war began, were as follows:

The expenditure of hundreds of millions of money and the loss of millions of lives might have been avoided by a conference of the European powers held in London or at The Hague, or wherever and in whatever form Germany would have consented to hold it. It would have been far easier to have settled the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia, which Germany made the occasion of the war, than it was to get successfully through the Balkan crisis of two years ago.

Precisely so. The Serbian, or Balkan, or Moroccan, or almost any other "incident" is liable to be made the occasion of war, when athwart such incidents lies the shadow of "preparedness."

III. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

International commissions of inquiry were also endorsed by the Hague Conferences, and they too have been put into successful practice. Founded upon the principle of ordinary common sense that we should investigate before we fight, it has been found that, in nine cases out of ten, if we investigate we will not fight at all. Among the applications of this rational means

of settling international disputes may be mentioned the famous incident of the Dogger Bank. On this occasion, Great Britain, Japan's ally and Russia's suspicious rival, was prevented from going into the Russo-Japanese war, by an impartial, international investigation of an occurrence which had destroyed British lives and touched closely British honor.

How eminently suitable would have been the resort to an international commission of inquiry for the prevention of the present war. This war—it has almost been forgotten—was precipitated by the assassination of an Austrian archduke and duchess. Austria accused the Servian government of complicity in the crime. Here was a question of fact, which an impartial, international commission of inquiry could have readily sifted and reported upon to the satisfaction of the world's public opinion. This rational course was repeatedly urged before the war began. Why was it not resorted to? Because of "adequate armaments." Because Austria and her allies, and Servia and her allies, believed that they had invincible or irresistible armaments, adequate to secure "justice" for their respective contentions.

IV. ARBITRATION

This is another preëminently American and rational means of settling disputes between nations, and it is one which has been applied with success many scores of times. One of the proudest pages in American history is that which records the success of scores of arbitrations of international disputes to which the United States has been a party. The Founder of Pennsylvania advocated two centuries ago the creation of an interna-

tional court of arbitration whose counterpart was established by the first Hague Conference, largely under American initiative and support. The Jay Treaty of 1794 provided for the arbitrations which ushered in the modern history of arbitration; and on the roll of such arbitrations, that at Geneva, which settled the Anglo-American dispute over the *Alabama* claims, stands out conspicuous because of the magnitude of the claims, the bitterness of feeling, and the national honor and vital interests involved in the case.

More than two hundred disputes between sundry nations had been settled by arbitration before the first Hague Conference assembled. At that Conference a resort to arbitration was unanimously approved; and at that Conference the very Prime Minister of England who had condemned and derided arbitration as "a quack nostrum of our time," just a quarter-century before, instructed the British delegates to move the adoption of a *court* of arbitration and a regular code of arbitral procedure.

This court—the "Permanent Court of Arbitration," and the first truly international court in history—was unanimously agreed upon by the delegates and ratified by their governments. Four years later, on the initiative of the government of the United States, it was assigned its first case. A dozen years have passed since then,—only a tiny span in history,—and yet already that court has settled *sixteen* disputes between the nations. Some of these disputes have involved grave issues of national honor and vital interests; and before this greatest of earthly tribunals have bowed not only the "little fellows" in the family of nations, like Venezuela and Belgium, but every one of the eight "great powers," with the single excep-

tion of Austria-Hungary. The United States repeatedly, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Italy, France, Germany,—each and all of them have recognized the jurisdiction of the court and yielded to its decision. One of these disputes was between the bitter enemies of a generation, Germany and France; and yet this dispute like all the others was settled by the court and settled so thoroughly that the world has well-nigh forgotten that it ever existed. In fact, of all the two hundred and forty-odd cases of arbitration in history, there has not been a single one in which the award of the arbitral tribunal was resisted! Thus potent is the rule of reason and an enlightened public opinion.

Now why is it that arbitration did not prevent the present war? Because it did not do so, the work of the Hague Conferences has been condemned and derided, and their conventions called “mere scraps of paper.” But here again, as in the case of the other measures adopted at The Hague, the existence of “adequate armaments” has been responsible for its rejection. Of course it could not be successful in preventing or ending the war, unless it were resorted to; and a resort to it, though repeatedly urged, was rejected by the belligerents concerned because of Germany’s and of Russia’s armies and of Britain’s fleet.

Experience as well as reason proves conclusively that “adequate armaments” are inevitably and insuperably opposed to arbitration. At the first Hague Conference, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration was proposed, a German military delegate declared: “Germany will have none of arbitration. It has an army ready to fight at the drop of the hat, and by means of that it will settle its quarrels.” A British naval

delegate said practically the same thing: "Great Britain has a navy that rules the sea: by means of that it will secure justice. Arbitration is merely a device to enable the other fellow to get ready."

Fortunately, the military and naval delegates were brushed aside, in this matter, at The Hague; the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established; and it has proved its efficacy, in preventing war and enforcing justice, by the unanswerable logic of accomplished facts.

The doors of the Temple of Justice at The Hague were open at the beginning of the present war. The famous Twenty-seventh Article of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes had made it, not merely the right, but the *duty* of the governments, separately or together, to call the attention of the disputants to the fact that these doors stood hospitably open for the rational adjudication of the dispute between them. This duty was fulfilled by various governments, our own included. *But* the Temple of Janus still held the faith and worship of the leaders of the peoples, and that temple was filled with Dogs of War whose braying drowned the voice of reason. So it has always been, so it must ever be until those Dogs of War are converted into the genuine watchdogs of civilization.

AN "AMERICAN" ARMY AND NAVY

But, in the adoption of the true American program, shall we have *no* army and navy, or keep them inadequate, inefficient, unprepared? No. Whatever we have, we want to be adequate, efficient, prepared. But adequate for what? For the legitimate needs of a twenti-

eth-century republic. For whatever police service may be required of them to enforce national law on land and to suppress pirates or other criminals within the three-mile limit of our shores; for such magnificent sanitary and medical service as has been rendered in the Canal Zone and the Philippines; for such splendid engineering work as has been done at Panama. These are the legitimate tasks of a twentieth-century army and navy; and for these they should be as adequate, efficient, and prepared as possible.

One of the great advantages of an army and navy used for such purposes is, that with the advance of progress and civilization, the size of the army and navy decreases proportionately to population, and its expense decreases proportionately to wealth.

But let us no longer load ourselves in times of peace with enormous and constantly increasing military burdens in order to prepare for the settlement of disputes between nations by means of war. National armies and navies are strictly national tools, and they should have no place nor function in international affairs.

THE TWO DIVERGENT PATHS

These, then, are the two paths that stretch fatefully before our country and the world to-day. Which shall we take, and lead the world to take? Let us make no mistake about it: *we cannot take them both*. We cannot gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles. If we sow the wind, we must reap the whirlwind: if we prepare for war, we cannot preserve the peace. No nation can serve *both* the God of Battle and the

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Prince of Peace. Reason and experience prove conclusively that the military program, if adopted in earnest, makes impossible the *desire* to adopt, as well as the adoption of, the American program. And a military program that is not adopted in earnest is mere foolishness and a criminal waste of money, brains, and men.

To lead the world along the American path is difficult? Yes; so have been all of the world's great reforms. But it is *not* impossible; and there are considerations which make it most promising. If our own great Republic keeps the faith, and reassures the world both by precept and example that it has definitely turned its face away from militarism and towards judicial settlement of international, as of State and individual, disputes, then indeed it will be in a position, not only to play a useful rôle in shortening the present war and influencing the terms of peace, but also in persuading the world to adopt the American program. A generation of groaning under the terrible, increasing, and apparently unending burden of competitive armaments; an unknown period of suffering and dying in the throes of the present war; and the prospect of a long future burdened to the earth by the economic, physical, and moral losses of this war, will assuredly incline the nations to the better way. The voice of democracy at home and of international law and equity abroad must infallibly and invincibly be heard. Let America prepare now and persist then in giving expression to that voice, which is its natural, its historic, and its destined rôle. Friendships, not battleships, statesmen, not men-of-war, must and can perform this great service to ourselves and to all mankind.

Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
 Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
 Humanity with all its fears,
 With all the hopes of future years,
 Is hanging breathless on thy fate!

The triumph of the American program will be difficult of achievement? Yes. But consider the alternative. Even the *Prussianization* of our Republic will not suffice to achieve victory over a first-class power in twentieth-century war. Shall our America be made a twentieth-century Sparta? *No!* Life under such circumstances would no longer be dear to any true American. Give us liberty,—freedom from tyranny of *any* militarism,—or, for ourselves and our Republic, give us *death!*

THE PRESENT CRISIS

These, then, are the two paths that have opened up before us. Which shall we choose? In this great national and international crisis, let us recall and act rightly upon those appealing and prophetic words which one of our own great poets uttered in another crisis of world-history:

Once to every man and nation comes
 the moment to decide,
 In the strife of Truth and Falsehood,
 for the good or evil side.

Hast thou chosen, O my people, on
 whose party thou shalt stand,
 Ere the Doom from its worn sandals shakes
 the dust against our land?

New occasions teach new duties;
Time makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still, and onward,
who would keep abreast of Truth;
Lo, before us gleam her camp-fires!
we ourselves must Pilgrims be,
Launch our *Mayflower*, and steer boldly
through the desperate winter sea,
*Nor attempt the Future's portal with the
Past's blood-rusted key.*

ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE WAR

BY GEORGE E. ROBERTS

THE war in Europe has reacted violently upon the United States, and not in all respects as was expected. The man in the street who judged by superficial reasoning and what tradition said of the effects of past wars seems to have been nearer right up-to-date in his forecasts as to the effects in the United States than the financiers and students of economics. It is a tradition that war makes good times, but the idea is so paradoxical, so evidently superficial in its broad application, that thoughtful men hesitate to accept it in even a limited or temporary sense. Anyone who is convinced of the essential harmony of all human interests, and that the prosperity of every people is best promoted by the prosperity of all other peoples, is bound to be suspicious of any prosperity that is promised as an outcome of war. It is, however, evident that in the United States to-day business is better and the productive forces of the country are more fully employed than when the war broke out, or at any time within several years.

It was believed that the enormous demand for capital by the warring governments would raise the price of capital all over the world, that the holdings of American securities in Great Britain and Europe

would be returned here for sale, and that their purchase would absorb the free capital of this country to such an extent that enterprise and improvements at home would be restricted, and that this would result in unemployment and poor trade.

But the credit resources of the warring countries have proved to be greater than anybody would have ventured to estimate; foreign holders of our securities have been less eager to sell them than we anticipated, and the enormous purchases of goods made in the United States have thrown the balance of payments heavily in favor of this country.

The aggregate of American securities returned to this country is very considerable, and the movement tends to increase as our markets rise and the pressure on the other side increases. Moreover, the United States has taken during the year approximately \$1,000,000,000 of foreign loans, and has received on balance over \$400,000,000 in gold, a movement of the standard metal that is without a precedent in history.

Industry is exceedingly active in the country to-day. While the initial impetus to recovery came from the war business, and the foreign orders are still an important factor, the country has developed a spirit of confidence and ambition which has not been apparent for some years. The country is accumulating capital and enlarging its productive equipment faster than ever before in its history.

At the end of the war we shall owe very much less abroad than we did at its beginning, and as an offset to the remaining debts will hold an important amount of foreign obligations. If this position is maintained, less of our earnings in the future will be sent abroad as interest and dividends, and we will have more for

investments on our own account. In some lines of manufacture we have been thrown upon our own resources, and new industries are being established here. During the war a considerable amount of trade has been diverted to this country and our manufacturers are having an opportunity to introduce their goods in new markets. Foreign dealers in some instances have found it advisable to open branches here both for manufacture and sale in international trade. An important amount of shipping has been brought under the American flag, and our shipyards are crowded with ships under construction. The large additions of gold to our bank reserves have made the New York money market at the present time the lowest discount market in the world, and practically the only international market for any kind of financing. If we may accept the figures of our Census Bureau, the United States now has more wealth and productive power than any other two nations in the world.

In some of the most important lines of production, particularly in steel products, machinery, and all the appliances for the most effective equipment of industry, our facilities are just now being largely increased. This is the age of the engineer, of electricity, of steel and mechanical agencies, and the United States is prepared for leadership in these things. In the year of greatest steel production ever known, that of 1913, the world's output was 71,000,000 tons, and our production is now at the rate of 38,000,000 tons, with an important amount of new capacity under construction.

All of this is positive strength. Moreover, as a country's relative position in world affairs is determined not only by its own strength but by the strength or weakness of other countries, the losses which the

countries at war are suffering must have the effect of making the United States a relatively more important factor in world affairs.

Undoubtedly general opinion, and that includes very intelligent and expert opinion, the world over now holds that the United States is profiting by the war, and that it is destined as a result of the war to occupy a much more important position in world affairs than in the past. Naturally that view is shared in this country, and some people are sanguine enough to predict that the dollar is about to supplant the pound sterling in the international exchanges, and that New York will take the place of London as the financial center and clearing house of the world.

There is apparently much in the situation to support this view, but men who are familiar with the conditions that determine the flow of trade, the location of industries, and the concentration of financial power are skeptical about the permanency of sudden changes effected by temporary causes. They know that there is a strong tendency to reaction from such changes, and that the final outcome will depend upon whether the center of gravity has been permanently moved.

What makes the center of gravity in industry and finance? Summed up, it is the net result of the various influences which make for economical production and distribution. Heretofore the center of gravity confessedly has not been in the United States. We have grown, prospered, and built up great wealth, out of the natural resources of this continent, but there has been a steady flow of raw materials from this country to Great Britain and Western Europe, to be there manufactured and distributed around the world. We have held, by means of a protective tariff, some of these

materials for manufacture here, mainly for our own consumption. I mention the protective tariff not as a subject of controversy but as practical evidence that in the judgment of our people the center of gravity for manufacture and distribution has not been here. The sum of the influences for cheap production and distribution has been against us.

These influences have been labor supply, capital supply, experience in industry and world trade, and the prestige, good-will, and facilities of an established business. The "experience and facilities" count for more than you may think. The superabundance of capital has caused an overflow from Great Britain around the world, and developed in that country a large body of investors accustomed to employ their capital in other countries, and those investments have been channels of outlet for the products of British industry.

Great Britain led the world in the application of steam-power and machinery to industry, and she has had a great career, supplying capital in the form of equipment, machinery, supplies for industry, and goods for consumption to countries that were behind her in development. She has not only sold machinery and equipment, but she has sent out the skilled laborers to install and operate it, and the managers to direct it, and to a great extent she has retained proprietary control, so that the head offices of enterprises operating in all parts of the world are kept in London. These companies, managers, and workmen are resident representatives of British industry and enterprise. They introduce and advertise British goods. British railways in the Argentine lay British rails, build British bridges, use British cars and locomotives, burn British coal under the boilers, use British tools in the machine

shops, British pumps for pumping water, and so on. They accustom domestic mechanics to the use of British tools, and in a hundred ways serve as connecting links between the community of their residence and the home country.

Here you will see is a stupendous combination: A great industrial organization backed by a world's market for securities and a world's market for goods, served by shipping lines radiating to all countries, and branch banks, branch mercantile houses, and tributary investments everywhere. There has been a great, free, readily accessible market in London for all the commodities of commerce—not simply a market for the country's own products and for what it consumes, but a world's distributing market. British ships have been in every port, British banks and traders in every market, British capital everywhere, ready to build a railway, buy a brewery, open a mine, or move the products of the country to market. It has been all of these conditions together that has made London the clearing center of the world, and the pound sterling the standard of value. London has advanced money for American cotton before the crop was picked, and for our wheat before it was threshed, and then financed our purchases of coffee in Brazil and hides in Argentina to the docks in New York.

Now this has all been natural, legitimate, and beneficial. With a superabundance of capital and labor in Great Britain, both have been forced out upon the sea and to other countries to find employment while the wonderful resources of this new continent have kept us busily employed at home. It has been an advantage to us, as it has been to other countries, to have Great Britain do this work for us while we were more profit-

ably employed. She, upon her tight little island, and we upon this continent, have each been doing our appropriate work.

The question is whether a radical change has taken place or is about to take place in the position of the United States. To what extent has the center of gravity been shifted?

It will be recognized that conditions with us have been changing for some time. This is no longer an undeveloped country as compared with many others; we have reached the stage where it is a fair question whether better results may not be had by diverting a part of the products of our industries to the development of more backward countries, following the example of Great Britain. In the great steel and equipment industries, and in numerous lines in which large-scale production has been developed, our advantages and efficiency have enabled us, notwithstanding higher wage rates, to compete successfully in the markets of the world. Our new banking system has now provided more efficient machinery than we have had before for financing commerce at low rates of interest. These conditions had evolved before the war. We were ready, we had begun, to reach out for world trade, and to take a share in world finance.

Now comes an accession of capital to us, while the resources of the countries which have heretofore led in world trade are being wasted in war. It is not pleasant to discuss the calamities of others as the source of gains to ourselves, and that is not the light in which I would present the subject. The United States will get in foreign trade in the long run about what it is entitled to have, based upon the service it is able to give to other peoples.

There is now great confusion in world trade. The peoples accustomed to deal with Germany and Great Britain turn to us for goods, for capital, for all the help and service they have received from those sources heretofore. We have the opportunity, looking at it from a purely business standpoint, to make closer acquaintance with these people, to introduce our goods, to demonstrate our ability and readiness to coöperate with them in the development of their countries, and to be not only of temporary but lasting service to them. Moreover, it is not only our privilege to do this, but there is a high obligation upon us to mitigate so far as lies in our power the effects of a world calamity, and to develop to the broadest possible usefulness our own powers of production. Whatever remains to us of these connections and new business after permanent conditions are restored will be what we are entitled to have on our merits.

There are certain inevitable limitations upon our activities, and there is a certain balance or equilibrium in affairs which in the nature of things must be maintained. You cannot eat your cake and have it too. You cannot be in this audience and in Boston at the same time. You cannot give your full energies to each of several tasks at the same time. There is a familiar saying that you cannot have it both ways, but people are always trying in theory to have it both ways.

If anything has been clearly demonstrated in recent months it is that you cannot have a permanently one-sided trade. You soon reach the point where you have to lend to your customer to enable him to continue his purchases, and evidently that policy cannot go on indefinitely.

If we should find ourselves after the war able to

exclude Great Britain and Germany from the South American trade, we would have to take the South American products that have been exported, in payment for South American purchases, or additional products from somewhere in lieu of them. That, however, would be possible because in order to supply the exports to South America we would have to bring more workmen into the country to make them, and that we might be able to do, provided we continue to elect Presidents who will veto measures restricting immigration.

We must recognize that after the war is over all the peoples now engaged in it will be factors in world affairs as before. If they are forced out of one market, they will appear in another; or if they are compelled to sell less they will be obliged to buy less, and all of them have been very good customers of ours. If Germany, for example, is not able to sell abroad she will be lost as a market to other countries. If all of the warring countries should exterminate each other, we would be relieved of a lot of competitors and lose the same economic quantity in customers.

I question whether the warring countries will be as badly crippled as we are disposed to think. They are expending an enormous amount of energy unproductively, and this is waste, but it does not all signify loss as compared with what they had before the war. Great Britain and Germany as yet have their productive equipment practically untouched. Even the property destroyed does not represent total loss, for property is being destroyed daily in normal times to be replaced with something better. The loss of life and of physical capacity in the maimed is appalling, but we do not know what psychological forces may be awakened by

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this experience. The inner resources of a people and the response that may come under the pressure of an emergency cannot be calculated. We know that a single invention may revolutionize an industry, and it is possible that these peoples may soon have greater powers of production than ever before.

As for the burdens placed upon the future, they, too, may be exaggerated. The past may fall short of its duty to the future, but it cannot draw on the future. All the production of the future will belong to the producing generation; none of it will go to the dead. The expenditures of the war are being made out of the labor and energy of the present; as soon as the war is over all labor will be turned to reconstruction and production. All of the food grown next year will be available to feed the population of that time; the armies of to-day are not being fed from next year's crops. The debts will be large and there will be controversies about taxation, but it is a mistake to consider capital collected and paid out as interest as capital lost to the community. It continues for the most part to be capital available for investment, for the employment of labor, and for the upbuilding of the community.

The waste and loss occurs during the war; all the world shares in it through failure to make normal progress. I am not among those who think that the competition of Europe will be more formidable after the war, but I believe it quite possible to overestimate its disabilities. There will be a trying period of confusion and readjustment, and I would expect industrial costs to be higher.

On the other hand, how will the United States be situated? It will have received a large amount of capital, and have the new opportunities in foreign trade.

How fast can we develop the trained organization to deal with these opportunities? The institution with which I am connected has had some experience with branches abroad. It has great difficulty in finding men fitted for the foreign work, who are willing to go abroad to make their homes. Those who have gone have usually left their families here; their children are in school and they prefer to have their children brought up and started in life in the United States. After these men have been away a year they become restless and want to be relieved. This matter of a trained organization is all-important, and it is a difficult problem. We can develop it in time, but it will take years.

There can be no general revival of trade in the countries where we hope for it most, no large opportunities, unless we take the place of Great Britain and Germany in providing capital for development purposes. We must enter into the industrial life of those countries, engage in enterprises with them, and create out of their resources the new wealth from which will come our pay. Habits of investment are acquired by experience, and conditions in this country have favored investments in land and local enterprises. We are practically without experience in investments outside of the country, and it is a problem how long it will take us to develop in this country a body of cosmopolitan investors such as there is in England. Our commercial banks cannot properly tie up their customers' deposits in stocks and bonds of foreign corporations, no matter how good they may be. Savings banks cannot do it. We must look to private investors.

This movement cannot develop without method and organization. The individual investor cannot go abroad to look up opportunities, nor would it be prudent

for him to participate unless ample guaranties are afforded as to the soundness of the enterprises offered. A responsible organization, headed by men of known experience in the enterprises which are undertaken, must investigate the opportunities, organize the properties, put them into successful operation and manage them. Already several corporations have been organized under capable leadership to operate in this manner in the foreign fields, and this is one of the most tangible steps of progress we have made.

So far we have not considered the direct effect of the war, or of this inflow of gold, or of the new activities which we are contemplating, upon conditions in this country, and this is the most interesting phase of all. I have said that there is a certain balance or equilibrium in affairs which when disturbed is bound to reestablish itself. If, as the result of favorable trade conditions, gold flows from one country to another, the effect will be to augment the bank reserves in the one case and deplete them in the other. An increase of bank reserves will encourage the expansion of credit, stimulate enterprise, create a demand for labor and goods, and cause prices generally to rise. In the country from which gold is flowing, the opposite phenomena are seen. A reduction of bank reserves results in a contraction of credit, a check upon enterprise, a relaxation of the demand for labor and goods, and falling prices. Now, with prices, interest rates, and securities rising in one country and falling in the other, and free movements between, the two countries will react upon each other, and all influences in both will work together to restore the equilibrium.

Through the automatic operations of these influences, the world's output of gold is distributed over

the earth. It does not stay in the countries where it is produced; they keep only so much as their share of the world's business will entitle them to hold; the rest finds its way to where it is needed just as water hunts out the low spots. At present, however, the influences which normally tend to maintain an equilibrium between this country and Europe are suspended. Gold has poured into this country in an unprecedented amount and is still coming. The rates of interest at the centers are phenomenally low, and there is every encouragement to credit expansion. Industry has now recovered and is under full headway. The labor force is fully employed; the productive agencies of the country are in full operation, and yet the stimulus of new supplies of gold continues to be applied. Under these conditions there is only one way in which additional supplies of money can find employment and that is by diluting the value of the existing stock, raising wages and prices, so that a larger amount of money will be required in order to handle the same volume of business.

Such a rise of wages and prices does not signify real prosperity, but we are so accustomed to regard it as a sign of prosperity that people are easily deceived. They are induced by these symptoms to act as though prosperity was assured. They spend money, and, worst of all, incur obligations, upon the strength of their belief, and the whole business situation becomes honeycombed and weakened by an extension of credit.

Since the flow of gold into this country is now unrestrained by the usual counter-influences which spring from international relations, its influence will naturally go far beyond what would be possible under normal conditions. Unless we are on our guard, the stimulus

of more and more gold, with a continuance of easy money and low interest rates, will continue to expand credits, and force prices and wages upward until the level of costs upon which business is done in this country will be far above that of the rest of the world.

When the war ends and Europe goes back to industry, the influences which normally work to restore the equilibrium of trade and of credit between countries will be released and come quickly into full operation. The United States will have more than its normal share of the world's gold, according to the distribution of capital, trade, and industry before the war. Can we hold it? Only so much as our share of the world's business will enable us to hold. What will our share be, if we are exalted upon a plane of costs far above the rest of the world? Can we immediately and voluntarily reduce wages and prices all along the line to meet the competition of Europe? Unless we do so, our exports will fall off, gold will flow out, credits must be contracted, and the readjustment will be forced in rude and unrelenting terms.

If money remains easy here, and interest rates are lower and security prices higher here than in Europe when the war ends, securities will come this way faster than they do now. European holders who have hesitated from timidity to part with their safe American investments will do so then, and there will be less timidity here about buying European securities. All of this will promote an outward gold movement. Every influence will tend to drain gold from us, if we have allowed ourselves to be lifted to an artificial basis.

Of course, if we have self-denial enough to simply receive the gold and hold it unused, until we have opportunity to exchange it for goods or securities

abroad, we shall escape these evil effects. In that event we shall have merely given our goods for something for which we have no present use, and which will be dead property while we hold it.

If we hold money idle under such conditions, we will show more self-restraint than any other people has ever exhibited. All in all, it will be safer to have this abnormal flow of gold into the country stopped. We do not need any more for the full employment of our people or to enable us to work our industries to the limit of their capacity. More will have in it great potentialities for mischief. It will be much better to use additional credits that accrue in our favor, first, in the purchase of our own securities now held abroad; second, in the purchase of securities representing good properties in other countries, preferably the countries of Latin-America, with whom we desire to establish more intimate relations; and, finally, by temporary investments in commercial bills or government obligations in the countries from which we are likely to experience a demand for gold after the war is over. None of these forms of investment will derange the home situation; they are all better than idle gold in vaults, and all can be resold in foreign markets after the war is over, if desirable to do so, as a means of offsetting claims against us for gold. This is the prudent policy. It avoids taking gold which we cannot hope to hold permanently, and the acceptance of which means in reality the creation of a dangerous liability; it enables us to stay down on a level of costs where we can make a hopeful contest for trade after the war is over, and it will afford us a favorable entry into countries where there is a possibility of building up permanent trade.

Concluding, I have the impression that I have not given a very hopeful or encouraging view of the position we are likely to occupy at the close of the war. I have thought it more important to dwell upon the perils of the situation than upon the opportunities. As already indicated, I have little faith in temporary gains from the crippling of Europe. Those injuries will be reflected upon us through all the countries with which we try to do business. We have a wonderful industrial equipment for the production of things that all the world, including Europe, will want, but we can build up no permanent business abroad except as we can stand the test of efficiency in comparison with others. We ought to welcome that test and prepare ourselves for it. We ought to embrace this opportunity to get out into the world. We will be broadened and stimulated, and do better work for ourselves, because of competition outside. Some of our people have already been winning at it, by the genius of genuine leadership.

We need to have all the facts, all of the perils and opportunities of this complicated situation understood by our people, from the captains of industry down to the humblest worker. They are all alike concerned. More than anything else in this country we need a better understanding between capital and labor. The wage-earner must come to see that the problem of increasing production and lowering costs is his problem as well as the employer's.

An appeal must somehow be made to his spirit, to his creative powers, which will draw out his latent capabilities. This is the problem of American industry. We have the highest wage scale in the world and we want it to be still higher, but you cannot make wages

higher by increasing production costs. Higher costs simply go around to the rear entrance and settle down on the same premises.

More scientific production, larger output, better service, these are the watchwords by which American industry can not only win a leading position in world trade, but point the way to more satisfactory social conditions at home.

THE ECONOMIC ROAD TO PERMANENT PEACE

BY WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING

THE question has been widely discussed of late, "Can economic pressure be used as a substitute for war?" It seems more probable that economic pressure will continue, for a few years more at least, to be used, as it has been in the past, as an *aid* to war. But economic pressure as an aid to war promises to put an end to war—and at an earlier date than would the use of economic pressure as a substitute for war.

The reason for this may be stated in general terms in a few words. War, waged as it is for economic objects, is hastening economic evolution: economic pressure developed for war purposes will still further hasten economic evolution, until the point has been reached when one vast combination of nations shall first dominate the other nations, and then pave the way for a world federation.

War has long since been internationalized. For centuries the great powers have been unable to wage decisive wars without the aid, or at least the consent, of other nations. The period of two great combinations corresponding to the stage of cut-throat competition in industry has been reached. We know that this stage of industrial war and of maximum waste and loss immediately precedes the stage of industrial

peace, economy, and efficiency represented by the formation of the trust.

Already a little less than two thirds of the military and productive power of the world is now involved—in the two groups of belligerents; and a careful computation would doubtless show that little more than one third of the world's producing power, measured by wealth and income, is held by the neutral nations. Already one of the groups of belligerents controls about forty per cent. of the world's wealth. If they were joined by one power alone, the greatest of the neutrals, the United States, the Allies would easily represent two thirds of the world's productive power. If, to make the picture complete, we assume the remaining neutrals—who altogether represent less than twenty per cent. of the world's wealth—were divided *equally* among the two belligerent groups, the larger one would represent an absolutely invincible and predominant "trust of nations."

This picture illustrates as a probability, not of the present, but of the future. Only a few months ago the United States was near enough to being drawn into the war, so that we were very close to the actual formation of this "trust of nations." But the entrance of America into the war is now improbable; and, moreover, the permanence of the alliance known as the Entente is highly doubtful. I use this illustration merely to indicate a tendency, the goal toward which economic evolution is carrying the nations, the economic road to permanent peace.

The steps along this road are made not necessarily by means of the formation of larger and larger military alliances, but, rather, by the increasing importance of the economic bonds which tie the nations of each of the

two groups of present belligerents together, and at the same time by the increasing importance of the economic bonds that connect the larger of these two groups with the more important neutrals. For it is to the economic interest of neutrals (1) to trade chiefly with the wealthier of the two groups at war,—especially the group with the larger trading interests; and (2) they are forced now and always to trade with the group which dominates on the sea, as opposed to the group that dominates, or divides the control of, the land. This is true of course only of those neutral nations which are separated from the dominant land powers by the sea. It is not true of those neutrals which are geographically separated from the dominant land powers by intervening land powers—for they may be reached by indirect pressure on these intervening powers. However we may estimate the total wealth and productive force of the neutrals of the world, at least two thirds of it is separated from the leading land powers by the ocean. There can be no question that the United States alone is far wealthier than all the other neutrals put together.

Already this war has shown that military power depends far more upon industrial power than it does upon mere numbers or the organization of numbers. If Russia has fought as well as she has of late, this is admitted on all sides to be due to the tremendous supply of arms and munitions from Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. It is also clear that the process of attrition, by which the Allies announced they expected to win the war, is unlikely to have a decided effect unless the war lasts for a number of years—and then the blood cost on their side would probably be more than the Allies would be willing to pay. On the other hand a sufficient and continued superiority in the

supply of arms, such as the Germans enjoyed all throughout the first year of the war, it would be conceded by any military expert, might decide the issue within a comparatively short time, perhaps a few months, certainly within a year or two. It is perhaps safe to go a step further. The present war, and any future world wars, depend upon the power of belligerents to *import* arms. It is obvious that all of the Allies, not only Russia, but England and France, would be in a very serious position without the aid of the United States, but people are likely to forget that if Germany were separated from Austria by the ocean, or any impassable barrier, the latter nation would also be unable to supply herself with very many of the most indispensable of munitions.

The economic basis of war then, may be summed up under four heads:

- (1) Home production.
- (2) Production of allies.
- (3) Financial power for the purchase of arms and ammunitions from neutrals.
- (4) The power to secure them *during* war, which with the present conformation of world politics means practically—sea power.

Sea power, however, like land power, is no mere accidental force. It varies directly and almost proportionately with the amount of sea trade. The powers with the greatest sea trade are alone able to make of themselves great sea powers, and have the strongest motive for doing so, namely, the protection of that trade. The sea trade of England and her allies is more than three times as great as the sea trade of Germany and her allies. But this does not present the whole

story. Only a little more than one third of Germany's foreign trade is oversea; practically two thirds of that of France is oversea, and of course all of England's. But it will be said that the Entente is far wealthier than the Germanic powers. Even allowing for this fact, *twice as great a proportion* of wealth of the Entente depends upon the sea as of the wealth of the Germanic powers.

But we must return at this point to deal with the question as to the lasting character of the two great military alliances now in operation. They are lasting merely in proportion as they have an economic foundation. Can we doubt that the economic bonds between Austria and Germany are now such as to make any future war between them extremely improbable?

When we return to the Entente, we find at once a more doubtful situation. However, the financial relations between London and Paris have been growing more and more intimate every year, and the French and English seem to have evolved a colonial policy which eliminates the causes of future friction. While not impossible, a future war between France and England seems highly improbable. Russia, both in view of her situation and her present undeveloped condition, is the greatest enigma of the future. Japan, I shall refer to in discussing the sea power; and it seems evident now that Italy also is to be classed as a sea power, rather than a land power.

The differences between sea and land power are very poorly realized in this country. Indeed the whole situation has been greatly clouded by the efforts of the pro-Germans to make out that they are essentially of the same character, so as to reach the conclusion that England is as great a menace to world peace as

Germany. But the differences are of the utmost importance.

First, sea power cannot be divided, as land power can. The nation *or group of nations* which controls one part of the sea, controls it all. As the great sea power cannot be divided, there can be no neutral territory on the sea. On the other hand, no given part of it can be conquered. There is thus always a single dominant force on sea. The only question is whether this force is a single nation or a group of nations representing the majority of all sea-interests, and so establishing *majority rule* on the ocean—which is the nearest practicable approach to internationalization in world politics and gives promise of complete internationalization. Just as majority rule is the nearest practicable approach to socialization in home politics, so majority rule on the ocean offers the most promising road to a complete economic world organization in the future.

Second, sea power depends upon trade and shipping and these in turn depend largely upon producing power, and only to a small degree on mere numbers, or military organization. Hence the richest nations and those with the greatest international shipping and trade will dominate the sea. But the largest and richest nations are the most highly developed economically, and have the closest economic bonds tying them to other nations, and therefore give the greatest pledges of a peaceful policy.

Third, control of the land is control of *production itself and only incidentally of a highway*; this land highway, moreover, is a highway only with a handful of neighboring nations. The economic function of the sea, on the other hand, is almost exclusively that of

a highway; as a factor in production it amounts to almost nothing. Its control is therefore by its very nature international, and concerns all nations in proportion as they are dependent upon sea trade. A land power may develop a career of localized conquest without disturbing all the world. It is not to the interest of a sea power to attempt the conquest of any other developed and organized nation by sea, for this necessarily arouses the fears and hostility of *all* such nations—in proportion as they are dependent upon the sea. The fact that sea power is international by its very character, and tends to develop international trade rather than to tempt to conquest, is shown by the whole history of England with its free trade on the one hand, and its self-governing colonies on the other. The spread of a military land power necessarily means the spread of despotism. For, since its expansion is limited to neighboring territory, no such territory is free from attack. The sea powers have chiefly to do with economically and politically independent developed countries. So when South Africa was without industrial development, England's control maintained a number of despotic features which are rapidly disappearing with the growing industrialization of the country. Ninety per cent. of Great Britain's foreign investments are with such powers as the United States, the Argentine, and Canada, and nearly as large a proportion of her foreign trade.

Norman Angell says that to internationalize the sea means to internationalize the world. This would be true only if international relations by sea were more important than international relations by land. Undoubtedly the relative proportion of the world's international trade that goes by sea is increasing

rapidly. But international land trade is still of equal or greater importance and will remain in that position for many years. To internationalize sea power will be to internationalize the world only (1) when this internationalized sea power can be used to control or check land power, or (2) when land power is correspondingly internationalized. The moral is evident: *Let the rights of belligerents at sea be not diminished, but internationalized*, that is, used against any land power which attempts aggressive measures against the powers that control the sea.

To neutralize sea power without at the same time either neutralizing land power or securing the predominance of international sea power over the whole world would be to weaken the more progressive nations, as compared with the more militaristic. Sea power must not be neutralized until the necessity is over of using it as a balance against the domination of the world by land power. For this is the function of sea power at the present day. It is barely able to bring about a balance against the land power. *We must not have even a partial disarmament on sea until we have a partial disarmament on land.* It is evident that if Great Britain or America, or both of them, decided to stand merely for a policing of the seas and for a form of international sea law that aimed exclusively at the free use of the sea for international commerce, and refused to regard sea power as a weapon against the preponderance of land power, two things would result:

First, the land power would secure a dominating position in Europe, Asia, and Africa; and,

Second, this predominant land power would give the nations behind it such wealth and industrial development that they would soon be able to dominate the sea

also. In a word, if the sea policy of the leading sea powers demands the mere policing of the seas, it will ultimately fail even to police the seas. If sea law and sea power are developed purely in order to make international commerce free, in the long run they will not even succeed in keeping international commerce free.

But how is a sea power to exercise power on the land? In proportion as it has concentrated its attention on the development of its fleets it has limited its resources for land warfare; in proportion as it has developed economic relations by sea, it has limited its power to apply economic pressure by land. The problem seemed insoluble until the present war. But now appears the new and revolutionary fact, the overwhelming importance of arms and ammunition. Just as the invention of gunpowder is chiefly responsible for the overthrow of the feudal system, the establishment of modern nations, and the foundation of our industrial civilization, so the new importance of arms and ammunition probably means permanent peace and a federation of a *majority* of the nations. For it gives the relatively pacific and democratic sea powers an overwhelming advantage over the relatively militaristic and autocratic land powers.

I have been dealing with general tendencies. What now is the application of these principles to the present war, and especially to the position of the United States? It seems highly improbable that the present war will be fought to an altogether definite conclusion. How then will the struggle between the sea power and the land power continue to be carried on? Will it simply mean preparation for another armed conflict?

Or will the use of economic pressure give to one side such an overwhelming preponderance as to make an-

other war useless? Economic pressure is now an aid to the sea powers in war. Will it become a substitute? It seems highly probable that it may.

It has been said that if two groups of states form alliances for the purpose of waging war, then preparation for war, already so onerous, may become intolerable. In this case there will be strong grounds to substitute for such military preparations (as far as practicable), a tariff war against the common enemy.

But there is another motive for waging such a peaceful economic war. It is this: such a war may actually be made to pay if the high tariffs against the enemy countries are accompanied by a sufficiently effective lowering of the tariffs between the countries entering into the alliance; in other words, if the existing economic war between the allies is moderated more rapidly than the economic war with present military enemies is intensified.

Such economic unions have already played a tremendous political rôle. It is the German Zollverein of 1813 that created the present unity and greatness of Germany, and not the battle of Jena or the victories of 1870. The celebration of the hundredth anniversary of Jena, two years ago, indicated very strongly that the German nation has made the fatal error of attributing its unity and power rather to sheer force of arms than to the natural processes of economic evolution. But the natural processes will not be denied. Austria and Germany are now entering into a new Zollverein and this assures the future of this greater Germany, no matter what the outcome of the present war. Moreover the continued domination of Great Britain at sea and the participation of her colonies in the war fore-

shadows the victory of the land party over the sea party in Germany. For it is known that the German ruling classes have been divided into two or more less equal parts, one striving to put the greater emphasis on sea power, the other to place it on land power. The party which advocates a tariff union, not only of Germany and Austria, but of all central Europe, is certain to gain the upper hand, and the demonstrated military power of Germany—no matter what the later results of the war—is sure to have an effect on some of the smaller neighboring powers. With the new Zollverein between Austria and Germany apparently assured, the coming into the combination of some of the Balkan and Scandinavian powers and of Switzerland is highly probable.

A central European tariff union would represent a very great world power. But after all two thirds, if not three fourths, of the world's producing power lies outside of the control of such a union. The oversea powers, Great Britain and her colonies, the United States and the South American countries, would alone represent a considerably greater power.

The forces compelling the nations to such tariff unions are many. But the most important are undoubtedly the effort to secure economic independence in war time and the hope at the same time to circumscribe the economic development of the enemy. That the Germans and the Austrians already fear that their move will lead to a dangerous counter-move on the part of the enemy is indicated by the demand for "economic guarantees." Even David, the new leader of the Social-Democrats, expresses himself as willing to prolong the war to prevent such an economic isolation of Germany. But a prolongation of the war for

such a purpose would be fruitless unless it should result in the complete defeat of the Allied powers.

No doubt the evolution of a complete series of trade treaties directed against the Germanic Powers will take place very gradually. But in view of the tremendous emergency that confronts the Entente, there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the obstacles will prove insuperable. The British colonies alone can deliver an extremely costly blow to Austria and Germany.

What now is the relation of the neutral powers to this situation, and especially that of the United States, which controls perhaps three fifths of the neutrals' productive power? Either one of two general policies could be adopted. America, acting alone, or as the head of a league of neutrals, could intervene in order to hasten peace, and reestablish the *status quo* occupied by the neutrals before the war, or she could interfere in behalf of international principles which might establish permanent peace, and therefore put the neutrals in a far *better* position than they occupied before the war. To express the same thing in terms of international law, America could use her power in favor of the present *inter-nation* law, or in order to take the first steps towards the establishment of a *world* law. She could stand for the existing *morality* between the nations, or she could stand for the *organization* of the nations on a solid economic basis.

This country's power in world affairs is enormous. America probably controls nearly one fourth of the world's wealth and producing power. This is almost as much as England and Germany put together, as much as the whole British Empire together with France, and undoubtedly more than the whole combination of the Germanic Powers. That this is the case is indicated

not only by the figures of production but also by all the estimates of the wealth and income of the Great Powers—even if we allow liberally for the difference in prices and the cost of living. If this country continues its present relation with the Entente, it will doubtless secure for them the advantage at the close of the present war. If America should desire to increase the aid she is giving the Allies she could undoubtedly give them a still more decided victory at the end. On the other hand if she should withdraw her present supply of war materials it seems highly probable that the Central Powers might be able to keep the advantage they now hold.

These economic principles have not been clearly grasped by American business men and statesmen, only because the war created an entirely novel situation. There can be little question that the economic forces which control this country will shortly come to see, if they have not already done so, that the future of America, of world peace, and of the peaceful and democratic economic development of all nations, even of the present militaristic land powers, depends upon America, itself predominantly a sea power, throwing all the weight that may be necessary on the side of the sea power in its struggle against the land power. *This does not require a military alliance on the part of the United States; it does not require a naval alliance. It requires only that (1) the United States should be ready to supply arms and ammunition to the sea powers, not only at present, but in all future wars, and (2) that it should be ready to enter into reciprocal and preferential tariff arrangements with these powers after the present war.* A genuine reciprocity treaty with Canada would be an important step in this direction; other similar

treaties could follow. If Great Britain continues her present war tariffs, as seems probable, we shall have a special reason for entering into a trade treaty with her. And the fact that the total sea trade controlled by the Entente is more than three times as great as the total sea trade controlled by the Germanic Powers will be decisive in this direction. If we enter into a series of reciprocal tariff or trade treaties, there can be no question that we shall find it to our advantage to deal first with the more powerful economic group which at the same time is the leading trading group.

No further steps may be necessary. Already the wealth and income of the Entente is nearly twice as great as that of the Germanic Powers. And as natural trade conditions inevitably draw America economically to the Entente side, the economic and military power of this group will be so overwhelming that the peace of the world will be assured, and even the great trade war I have outlined will be but a passing, though costly, necessity.

The supply of arms in the present war and the certainty that we shall continue to supply arms—and far more efficiently—in case of future war, together with reciprocity treaties among the sea powers, will almost certainly be sufficient to prevent future wars. This is the economic road to permanent peace.

Germany's leading newspaper shows that the situation is clearly recognized in that country.

The whole war, says the *Berliner Tageblatt* in a recent editorial, is being waged to determine whether "land power" or "sea power" gives the dominance:

Moltkeism or Mahanism?—that is the question.

Are essentially land powers, like Germany, Austria, and

Bulgaria, impotently at the mercy of England—and Yankee-land, which stands behind her—simply because Great Britain at present still commands the seas, or are those land powers strong enough to enforce their liberty and room for their future development even against the tyrant of the sea—and his slavish menial—and if need be in spite of them? That is the question.

That, indeed, is the question—though it cannot be admitted that Great Britain has any advantage over the United States in this tacit economic alliance, or that the land powers are standing for any form of international liberty.

In closing I feel it my duty to present also the dark side of the picture. It has chiefly fallen to the lot of the sea powers to come into contact with the backward peoples and undeveloped parts of the earth. Thus there is developed not only among the ruling classes, but in all sections of the peoples without exception, the principle that one economic rule applies to the white races and another to the colored. This means that the whites reserve for themselves certain economic opportunities which they deny to the colored. Of course, we are not really dealing with a race question, but merely with a question of exploitation of backward races, facilitated by skin color. A crucial instance will prove the point. There is now little tendency to try to demonstrate scientifically the inferiority of the Japanese. Why is this? Because there is practically no hope of exploiting them as has been done with other colored peoples. The conclusion is unavoidable. The hundreds of millions of colored peoples in the world will either have to accept a semi-servile condition, or combine together against the two leading sea powers,

Great Britain and America, which are chiefly responsible for the effort to keep them in subjection.

There is some talk both in America and England of a future combination of the white races against the colored, but this talk is utterly baseless, since it is now confined entirely to these two nations. On the contrary, if in the near future there is a war on so-called race lines, it is evident that the Germanic Powers will throw their whole weight with the colored peoples, and there are excellent probabilities that some of the Slavic or Latin powers—among whom there is no race prejudice (or rather none of those national principles of economic exploitation known as race prejudice)—will be found in the same camp. Even South American countries, where the rights of colored peoples are fully recognized, that is, where they have become an important part of the economic structure, will be found against the Anglo-Saxon nations.

At present, it looks as though the situation I have been foreshadowing may bring on the next war; certainly there is as yet no sign whatever of the so-called Anglo-Saxon races taking up a more enlightened view on the race question. On the contrary we see the steady intensification of economic discrimination against the backward peoples. The only chance that this war will be avoided is that the Anglo-Saxons will see the hopelessness of this policy. But I shall not pursue this subject further. I have introduced it merely to indicate the possibility that the Germanic Powers may become an even more valuable factor for peace in the future than the sea powers are to-day. But in the meanwhile, the sea powers will have lived out *their* rôle, namely, that of demonstrating the value and necessity of forming the largest possible combination of

nations and of basing it upon a solid economic foundation—and the probability, if the combination is sufficiently inclusive, that it will pave the way to permanent peace.

ELIMINATING THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR

BY ROGER W. BABSON

ONE of the economic causes of war is the fact that it is possible for one nation to control the seas; another of the economic causes of war is that one nation is able to legislate against the growth of another nation. Discriminatory tariff laws and discriminatory immigration laws are economic causes of war. It is one of the economic causes of war that when a man and his money go to some foreign land his country feels that it has a right to go into that foreign country,—it may be Mexico, Brazil, China, or some other land—and dictate what shall or shall not be done to that man and his property.

In regard to the *Lusitania*, my sympathies are largely with President Wilson; but I fail to see any difference between his saying what shall and what shall not be done on the seas or our country alone saying what shall or shall not be done on the seas, and England or Germany attempting to dictate laws for the sea.

These seem to me to be economic causes of war that really exist. They are fundamental, and must be eliminated before there is anything but hypocrisy in most of our peace prayers.

We shall lack peace so long as our plans affect only the other fellow. The trouble with us is that things

are not right when they are not to our advantage or when they are to the advantage of some other nation. But are we willing to give up something ourselves? This is the whole matter in a nutshell. This is the real question we have to face. It seems to me nine tenths of the peace talk is avoiding the point. We fail to face the question. We want to hang onto all we have ourselves and at the same time ask others to give up something. This is hypocrisy.

The first step is to recognize that before there can be any such thing as permanent peace we have got to be willing to give up something; and, if necessary, to have the result work to the advantage of Germany, Japan, or any other country.

As is the case with many business men, I ally myself with neither the militaristic nor the peace group. Until nations are federated—at least commercially—and until some sort of an inter-nation is organized for control of the trade routes, each nation must continue to arm independently.

I recognize the tremendous waste of war and the waste in preparing therefor. I agree with the militarists, that it is useless to talk about disarmament until the economic causes of war are eliminated; as these are removed, the nations will of their own accord give less attention to armament.

I go further and say there should be no halfway position between peace and a strong military and naval policy. Either we should continue to arm or else insist upon the placing of inter-nation trade and like affairs under the general control and protection of all nations. Although opposed to forceful aggression, I just as violently object to holding the world *in statu quo*. I believe the fittest must

survive, whether it be American, Teuton, Latin, or Japanese.

Hence, although endorsing plans for a world organization, I feel that such an organization must embrace more than a court and a great police power. Before the growing nations can consent to the plan of the Carnegie pacifists, there must be a law-making body in which nations are represented according to their self-supporting literate population. In other words, the most any world organization can accomplish is to provide some means by which the fittest shall rule without resort to war. Furthermore, statistics show that an international organization can be devised which will do this. Such a plan was outlined by Dr. Nasmyth and is being urged to-day by all who realize that before an international court can be respected there must be an international parliament to determine fairly what that world policy shall be.

I suppose you think it queer that the secretary of a peace society should speak in favor of military preparedness. I am willing to speak in defense of this until there is such a commercial federation as will eliminate at least the economic causes of war. Certainly, under present chaotic conditions we should unite in asking Congress for land and naval defenses. Until at least the economic causes of war are eliminated, international conflicts are inevitable and we should be prepared to fight.

This is important at the present time, when so many pacifists are against preparedness, as I believe much of their talk is doing harm. Militarism can never be wiped out, any more than disease can be abolished, by passing resolutions. Until at least the economic causes of war are removed, we must be prepared for it.

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This can only be done by removing the temptations to war, and by providing the means whereby the nations can secure peacefully the ends which they could otherwise secure through war.

Although the world cannot remain *in statu quo*, there must be a more efficient means of bringing about changes than by war.

It is generally agreed that the causes of war in modern times are largely matters of commerce and other economic conditions. If a plan can be found by which international trade routes shall be neutralized and opportunity for industry and trade shall be more nearly equalized, and further legislation by one nation against another shall cease, a long step towards peace will have been taken.

A government appropriation to secure these *three* things I believe would be a step towards the elimination of these economic causes of war:—first, the adoption of an international trade flag, which shall serve commerce at all times as the Red Cross flag serves its purpose in times of war; second, the systematic teaching in the public schools that discrimination against any one nation, color, class, or sex results to the disadvantage of all; third, the organization of a representative international commission which shall have the supervision of rules or codes to protect persons outside their own country connected with or carrying on manufacture or trade in a foreign country. These three things would extend more equal opportunity and security to the peoples of all nations. Only by so doing can war be eliminated.

These methods would provide what perhaps no other plan does, a step toward the establishment of intimate commercial relations among states. Nations will

naturally coöperate to protect neutrality, once such neutrality and general regulations to support it have been secured, as the cheapest, easiest method of protection. Commercial alliances have seldom failed while political alliances have seldom been permanent.

Of course, this means the yielding of some of our so-called sovereign rights, but this is more than offset by the ultimate advantage which is of great value. Unless nations are willing to join in international co-operation, they must continue to compete for national defense. There cannot be any halfway ground.

I cannot share the hopes of many, for it is quite obvious—although they do not seem to realize it, that the world cannot remain *in statu quo*, nor can I sympathize with those who prepare for war. We should be willing to eliminate the economic causes of war or else prepare for war. To-day we are doing neither.

So much for the philosophy of this question. What does this all mean? It seems to me the real difficulty is that we refuse to face and answer the real questions which I mentioned in my introduction. The first question is: *Can there be any reasonable hope of peace between nations until we are fully agreed to be willing to give up something?* We talk about the "open door" and we send a note to other nations regarding the open door in China, for instance. Are we willing to extend the principle of the open door to the Philippines? If we are, that will be a step towards peace. If not, we are simply hypocrites. The same thing applies to our restriction against Japanese immigration.

I say we must be willing to give up something. Yes, even though it will not come back to us later, although I do believe it will come back. I believe giving up is the only real and lasting form of preparedness, and,

hence, my second question is: *Can any nation permanently prosper except through a policy which will permit other nations likewise to prosper with it?* I believe that no nation (and history clearly shows it) can permanently prosper until it is prepared to work on a basis by which other nations can prosper with it. Moreover, this does not apply simply to nations. It applies to classes, races, sexes, as well. Labor can never save itself until it devises a plan which will save capital as well; and capital can never be secure until it works out a plan which will secure labor also. That may be applied to the color question, the sex question, and every other question.

It seems to me that the fundamental need to-day is that we fearlessly discuss these two questions. Until it is realized that we permanently prosper, as individuals, classes, or nations, only through methods which cause others to prosper with us, all hope of permanent progress is useless.

This means that, owing to the unchangeable law of action and reaction, when we harm others we ourselves ultimately suffer; while, when we help others, we ourselves get a beneficial reaction. This is a fundamental law but it is not believed. It is not recognized. Only, however, as it is recognized can we make real headway toward real peace of any kind.

This is the end of my talk, but before returning to the audience I want to show you a little illustration. Here are three glasses. They should be of different sizes, and we will assume they are of different sizes. We will also assume that they are connected with pipes at their bases. This [indicating] is the United States. This is Great Britain and her allies; and this, Germany and the central powers.

The present level of water shows the conditions before the war. Keep in mind the fact that the glasses were of different sizes and therefore there was a different amount of water in these glasses. But I believe, owing to the fact that foreign exchange was on a par between these countries before the war, that the water was at the same level in these different glasses even though there were different amounts of water in each owing to their difference in size. The water was at a level in the three as these glasses were connected by pipes at their bases. These pipes represent steamship lines, cables, foreign trade, etc.

What has happened during the war? I will say the water in the German glass has been dissipated so it is now like this [indicating]. But the Allies have been dissipating theirs, too, only they have been pouring their water into our glass so that the condition to-day is like this:—here, our glass representing the United States is full, while the glasses representing Germany and the central powers, and Great Britain and the Allies, are nearly empty.

I said those glasses were connected by a pipe which necessitated that the water should be at the same level. We take some out of one and the water in all will be lower in normal times. But now it is not a normal time. The pipe connecting our glass with the German glass has been cut—absolutely cut—so that the water in these two glasses cannot become level. The pipe connecting our glass with the English glass is so congested—from high freight rates, abnormal business, etc.,—that the water in these two glasses cannot be equalized.

And so, to-day we glory in our strength and think that we are the only people that are profiting from this

war, and we think that we are going to have a great boom after this war, because our glass is nearly full and these two others are nearly empty. So long as the majority of people believe that we can prosper by the misfortune of others, I believe there is no possibility of securing world peace.

What will happen after the war is over? These pipes are going to be connected again; the pipe connecting our glass with Germany is to be mended; the pipe connecting our glass with Great Britain is going to be cleaned out, and the water is going to flow freely again between them all. What is the result going to be? I can see but one result—the water in our glass is going to become lower, the water in these is going to rise. That, to my mind, is the thing that is going to happen. As it is recognized that a nation cannot prosper by the misfortunes of another; that the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth were simply economic truths—then, we are going to get busy and protect ourselves by working for the extension of more equal security and opportunity for the peoples of all nations. Then one of the great causes, or the great economic causes, of war will be eliminated.

THE WORLD-WIDE EXTENSION BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE, AS NECESSARY TO PEACE

BY REAR-ADMIRAL F. E. CHADWICK

THIS paper is a thesis in support of an extension of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to include the world and thereby lay the road to peace.

As a preliminary we must take stock of the chief ownership of the world, of the distribution of its 57,600,000 square miles of land and 1,732,000,000 of population. To avoid a strain upon memory I shall omit the smaller figures involved.

Great Britain is the largest landholder, controlling over 13,000,000 square miles, and 434,000,000 people. A fourth of this has been gathered in since 1881. All but 121,000 square miles are exterior to the United Kingdom. In other words the possessions of the British Islands are 108 times their size.

Russia has 2,100,000 square miles in Europe and more than three times that much in Asia, leaving aside part of Persia which she has lately taken under her wing. She has a population of 171,000,000.

France has 207,000 square miles in Europe and very nearly 5,000,000 square miles outside of Europe. Her home population is about 39,000,000, her exterior population about 70,000,000.

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Germany has 209,000 square miles in Europe with about 1,000,000 outside of Europe. At home she has a population approaching 70,000,000; abroad about 12,000,000.

The United States controls in its main portion 3,026,789 square miles, 591,000 in Alaska, 122,000 in the Philippines, 3600 in Puerto Rico, 6700 in Hawaii, 200 in Tutuila, and 54 in Guam, a total of 3,750,343 square miles. It controls 9,800,000 island population besides about 100,000,000 in continental America. Brazil, with an area larger than the main portion of the United States, has less than a fourth of the latter's population. China, exclusive of Thibet and Mongolia (the former with 463,000 square miles, the latter with 1,367,000) has an area of 2,169,000 square miles and a population of 325,000,000. In this are included Manchuria's 363,000 square miles of area (a third larger than Texas), and 22,000,000 people. It looks very much as if we shall have to call Manchuria part of Japan, and some express doubts as to the future of China itself.

Nor in considering this question of world ownership can we leave aside Holland and Belgium, the former with an area of but 12,600 square miles, and a population of but 6,200,000, controlling 990,000 square miles and about 45,000,000 of people; the latter, with 11,373 square miles of area and seven and a half million of population, owns the Congo State of 900,000 square miles and an indefinite number of people therein rated to-day at 9,000,000. It is estimated that there were 12,000,000 more before the ruthless collection of rubber was inaugurated under King Leopold. I would refer you to Lord Cromer's introduction to J. H. Harris's *Dawn in Darkest Africa* for this statement.

Analyzing the foregoing, Great Britain rules 22 per cent. of the earth's land and 25 per cent. of the population; Russia 15 per cent. of the land and 10 per cent. of the population; France 9 per. cent of the land and 5 per cent. of the population; the United States 6.4 per cent. of the land and 6.3 per cent. of the population; Brazil 5.6 per cent. of the land, and 1.4 per cent. of the population; China nearly 4 per cent. of the land and nearly 19 per cent. of the population. These six are the great land owners of the world, controlling 62 per cent. of its land area. They all, except China, which has suffered from land grabbing in more modern times, have been land grabbers. Brazil, which when discovered had but a very scattered population of Indians of a debased sort, has practically not expanded from the boundaries first set when it became a Portuguese possession. All the other South American states were seizures without any question of "by your leave" to the aborigines. The same with North America, Africa, Oceanica, Australia, etc.—all have been the result of conquest or unresisted occupation. But shall we say that the expansion of the white races, the Russian, Anglo-Saxon, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and their occupancy of the vast spaces thinly occupied by savage peoples has been wrong? We ourselves stretched our borders from 892,000 square miles in 1800 to over 3,000,000 square miles in 1880. No, there is a difference between the conditions of 1600 and those of three centuries later. The Americas and Australia were practically waste lands. The evil of their occupancy was in the treatment of the natives. Had all expanders of empire been William Penns we should have nothing to regret. But the time came when things had radically changed and ancient

and in their way highly civilized regions were thus invaded.

While the subject is a delicate one in the present posture of affairs, I trust I may deal with it without offending any susceptibilities, particularly as I shall only deal with history before the war and without any application of such history to the war. For the subject of imperialism is a general one having its beginnings centuries antecedent to the present, but having its worst and most injurious development in our own generation and the one just preceding, in what are known as "Spheres of Special Influence." Also I shall let an Englishman speak, a well-known publicist, Henry Noel Brailsford. He asks:

What then is the meaning of Imperialism? It is only when we turn from the figures of trade to the figures which measure the export of capital, that statistics begin to correspond with our expansion, and our bookkeeping to bear some relation to our aggressions. Mr. Mulhall calculated for the *Dictionary of Political Economy* that our foreign and colonial investments grew between 1882 and 1893 at the prodigious rate of 74 per cent. per annum. . . . Sir George Paish stated in a paper which he read to the Royal Statistical Society that our profits from foreign and colonial investments amounted to 140 millions (sterling).

Mr. Brailsford states in a note that: In his Budget speech (1915) Mr. Lloyd George estimated the total of British capital invested outside the British islands as £4,000,000,000. The annual interest is about £200,000,000. This amounts to about one twelfth of the whole national income, which is estimated at £2,400,000,000.

Mr. Brailsford continues:

One no longer enquires why the unaggressive, anti-militarist, anti-imperialist liberalism of the free-trading England which was content to take Cobden as its guide, has given place to the expansionist, militarist, financially minded Imperialism of to-day. Regarded as a national undertaking, Imperialism does not pay. Regarded as a means of assuring unearned incomes to the governing class, it emphatically does pay. It is not true that trade follows the flag. It is true that the flag follows investments.

I would here inject that one of the most marked examples of this statement was in the case of the gold mines of the Transvaal.

Mr. Brailsford continues:

The trader is in one sense a nomad. If one market begins to fail him, he turns to another. If a country to which he used to export goods is torn by civil war or threatened with bankruptcy, he does not call for intervention. He goes elsewhere or waits for better times. The investor on the other hand acquired a "stake" in some foreign country, and anchored his fortunes irrevocably upon it. Unless he is prepared to lose his stake, he must, if the country in question goes bankrupt or is threatened by civil war or revolution, call in the Imperial arm to defend him. It is sometimes said that our Navy is an "insurance" for our mercantile shipping, since it protects from piracy or from capture in time of war. It would be more accurate to say that both our Navy and our Army overseas are an insurance, provided and maintained by the nation at large, for the capital owned abroad by our leisured class.

Here at length we have discovered the stake which an armed Imperialism watches and seeks to enlarge. The fear of war, the struggle for balance of power, the competition in armaments . . . all this is seen to be a characteristic product of modern finance and modern capitalism. It

makes the slum and it makes the *Dreadnought*. One may go further. It makes the *Dreadnought* because it made the slum. Imperialism is simply the political manifestation of the growing tendency of capital accumulated in the more civilized industrial countries to export itself to the less civilized and less settled. To secure itself, it seeks to subdue or to "civilize" its new fields of investment—as it understands civilization . . . it is to diplomacy that it turns to protect it from risks.

I have to pass over much of Mr. Brailsford's most interesting argument, merely mentioning the much greater profits generally expected from English investments abroad over those usual in England, the greater profits arising mainly from long hours of labor and pitiable wages.

He mentions as another great inducement to foreign investment, the ease with which some countries can be robbed. Thus he cites a Turkish railway on which he traveled, which seemed:

as though the line had laid itself across the countryside in the track of some writhing serpent . . . it bent and doubled so that a passing train resembled nothing so much as a kitten pursuing its own tail. Yet the country was a vast level plain. There were neither mountains nor rivers to avoid.

The explanation is simple enough. There was a kilometric guarantee; the more miles, the more money.

Such, put into very small compass, is imperialism. Mr. Brailsford proceeds to a concrete example—Egypt—as a "perfect epitome of the tendencies" (using his own words), which he sketches through fifty pages. He thus says: "The origin of the Egyptian question in its present phase was financial." That is the opening

sentence of Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, and it spares us any historical controversy.

Our statesmen drifted, our agents schemed their way into the occupation of Egypt, at the bidding of high finance, and for no other reason. Capital had been exported from France and England to the Nile Valley at an extravagant rate and with consummate imprudence. There came a moment when both countries perceived that the Khedive was injuring the security on which their capital reposed. They stepped in, precisely as a bank may foreclose on a mortgaged estate, first through the Dual Control (France and England) and then through the British occupation . . . it was no chronic or deep-seated disorder which led to the foreign occupation . . . the beginning of this spoliation was that the money-lenders and contractors robbed the Khedive; European contractors engaged in his great works of building and irrigation were known to have overcharged him anything from 80 to 400 per cent. For floating loans he had latterly to pay as much as 25 per cent. in interest. Of the 68 millions (of pounds) which was raised as a national debt Egypt received only 44 millions, so that the nominal interest of 7 per cent. amounted in reality to 12 or 13 per cent. Of a loan of 32 millions (pounds) which he raised in 1873 only 20 millions ever reached the exchequer. Such were the transactions which British and French diplomacy covered with their support. . . . By delaying their consent to any satisfactory composition, the Powers kept their hold on Egypt. It was not until Lord Cromer was firmly in the chair that the debt was unified and the interest lowered to an equitable rate. . . . In 1877, a year of famine, to pay the coupon due to the clients of the Rothschilds, taxes were collected actually in advance from the ruined peasants.

Achmet Arabi Pacha appeared as a national leader. It was, says Mr. Brailsford, "because he had opposed

the unmeasured pretensions of the financial control, that Arabi was declared a rebel and crushed at Tel-el-Kebir." The British armed occupation, Lord Beaconsfield's "secret and in some respects perfidious purchase of the Suez Canal shares" (to use Mr. Brailsford's words), caused France to feel "herself cheated, outmaneuvered, and humiliated" and "France in due time became the ally of our traditional rival Russia." England, despite the many declarations that the occupation of Egypt was but temporary, remained. France was finally soothed by the arrangement with respect to Morocco, which was to become a Pandora's box to bring the crucifixion of Europe.

The action in Egypt taken in behalf of the Paris and London bankers was at the time regarded as only temporary. I was myself then in London stationed there officially. In calling toward the end of 1882—soon after the occupancy—at the Colonial office on some affairs, the official with whom I had my conversation asked, after our business was completed: "What do you think of Egypt? Do you think we shall stay there?" It makes no difference what my answer was, but my friend in reply said: "I have just seen Mr. Gladstone and know that he is most anxious to withdraw; he is morbidly anxious not to increase our foreign responsibilities." Notwithstanding the several times repeated statements of withdrawal, the British flag is finally hoisted over Egypt as a possession, along with adjacent territory equal in extent to the United States. I am but stating facts. I am impugning no one; we probably would in the situation and in the state of international morals have done the same.

Is the story of India, when analyzed, any better; or Madagascar, or French Indo-China, or Siam, or

Manchuria, or the Philippines? It is ever the same, seeking special commercial advantage, the furnishing of "out-door relief," as James Mill expressed it, "for the upper classes." Mr. J. Ellis Barker, a well-known English publicist, states very precisely in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, for May, 1907, our mother country's springs of action. He says:

Three centuries ago England was a backward and ignorant agricultural country without enterprise, without trade, without wealth, without colonies. But England, though poor, was ambitious. Her leading men wished her to become a World-Power. Sir Walter Raleigh wrote: "Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself," and Lord Bacon declared "The rule of the sea is the epitome of monarchy," and advised this country to conquer the wealth, and the colonies of Spain, because Spain's power was no longer sufficient to defend her vast and wealthy possessions. Following the advice of her greatest statesmen, England made war upon Spain, not for political or religious reasons, but because Spain owned the wealth of the New World. Spain declined and Holland became by war and by work the heir to the larger part of Spain's wealth. Then England transferred her hostility from Spain to Holland. Attacked by England, who was later joined by France, the Netherlands declined, England and France fell to fighting over the great Dutch inheritance, and had to decide whether the New World was to become French or English. Thus by three centuries of war, firstly against Spain, then against Holland, and lastly against France, was the British Empire won, and the struggle for empire ended only in 1815 when at last Great Britain had vanquished all her European rivals. British colonial and commercial supremacy is barely a century old.

We have here a very frank statement of the processes by which Special Spheres of Influence are obtained; processes which are still continuing and which have had their highest culmination in the great war now waging. We ourselves have taken part in the process. We were the receiver of stolen goods in accepting at the hands of Napoleon for about one and a half cents an acre the great estate west of the Mississippi which Napoleon had forced Spain to yield to France with a promise that it should never be alienated to another power. It came to us because Napoleon knew that the breaking of the peace of Amiens would mean its seizure by England. We have California and the extension to the present Mexican boundary by conquest; we have the Philippines by a purchase to which Spain had to accede by a threat of a continuance of war which could only mean Spain's further ruin; we have Puerto Rico and Guam by conquest pure and simple. The skirts of no country are clear. The vast colonial empire of the French is through seizure and by the sword. A few years ago China was, in the minds of the European diplomats, to be divided into special spheres, the great Yangtze Valley to be the special field of England, and indeed it was for a time so regarded. China's integrity to-day, which let us hope is not threatened as some think, is due to the stand taken by our Department of State, John Hay, of happy memory, being Secretary. It is his noblest monument; he could have none finer.

We cannot say that extension of power and commercial influence by individual states has been all wrong. Australia, New Zealand, New Guinea, the peopling of our own country by the whites, the occupancy of South America by Europeans, were necessities for the well-being of the world as a whole, but the time has come

to call a halt, and not only a halt, but a reconsideration of much that has gone on in our own and the just preceding generation.

Except for the treatment, in many cases, of the aboriginal races, colonization of the New World and Australia was pacific. There was no reason for ill-treatment or extinction of such races. This was the product of the simple rule of "man's inhumanity to man," which is ever in full vigor until the world can be induced to come under the Golden Rule. Shall we endeavor to apply it in some large degree at least. The means, it appears to me, is in an application of the Monroe Doctrine not only to America but to all the world. The Monroe Doctrine simply meant that there should not be set up in the Americas any more Special Spheres of Influence. These fifteen words epitomize the whole of the declaration. It meant that the Americas should develop on their own lines, let them be good or bad, and some, it must be admitted, have been very bad. All the same we took a stand that the peoples of the world had a right to their own soul, besides the right to live in such peace as they themselves could establish within their own borders. This phrase brings to mind, no doubt, Mexico, the great problem of these western continents. That Mexico must be assisted in establishing peace is but too evident, but it must only be assistance. This should be given with no interest or idea of a hegemony, which would be a danger to our political system. We want no imperialism; we want only justice in the world. We see too well, from Mr. Brailsford, what imperialism means; the exploitation of other lands for special benefit. Let us put forward therefore for adoption by the whole world the Monroe Doctrine as the doctrine of justice

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for all, viz., that there should nowhere be any Special Spheres of Influence. I think the time has come for such application.

And it must be retroactive. It must apply to all lands seized since 1880: to Egypt, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, Madagascar, Tunis, Morocco, the Congo, and all the other vast areas of partitioned Africa north of Cape Colony (and why not that also?), to Manchuria, Mongolia, Indo-China, Burma, and still others. If the several nations which now administer these countries desire to continue such administration, it should be under the clear understanding of the "Open Door"; that all nationals shall be admitted to trade or exploitation on terms of absolute equality. Such arrangement would at once remove desire for conquest; for, as remarked by Mr. Brailsford, "To attempt to conquer, where one can trade without conquest, is a sheer squandering of national resources" (p. 65.)

Germany's only demand regarding Morocco, though it was so abused in the Paris and London press, was but for the Open Door, for equal rights to all nations, and this was accomplished, so far as any treaty may be said to accomplish anything, by her convention with France in November, 1911. Her statesmanship in this was perfectly correct and such as the United States, when it comes to understand the matter, cannot but approve. In fact, so far as I can read into the meaning of things, Germany stands for the Open Door quite as fully if not more so than ourselves, for we have shown no great signs of opening it in the Philippines. In this connection I would advise the reading of *Dawn in Darkest Africa* by the English missionary John H. Harris. It is a wise and enlightening book.

But we must go still further. If we do not want wars, we must give freedom to the whole world; freedom for all ships upon the seas and upon all waterways wheresoever. In my younger days the Cattegat could be used only by paying toll to Denmark; the Scheldt was equally a closed waterway; they are now free to all ships. It must be made so with the Dardanelles. The same right of way on all rivers and arms of the sea must be made to exist as exists now in the Chesapeake, the Cattegat, the Thames, and the Scheldt. And I go still further. If we are to have world-peace, the custom house must be abolished wholly as a commerce preventer. I would have all men trade with all countries precisely as the man in Maine can trade freely with the man in California. The most beneficent provision of the Constitution of 1787 was that which prohibited the before-existing interstate customs-imposts. We cannot now imagine such a thing, say, between New York and Massachusetts. To quote from an article of my own in the *North American Review* of June, 1915:

In our own country, so typically protective, we have established a free trade in all races of Slav, Jew, Turk, Persian (whether) Christian or Mohammedan. In the nature of things the sons of these men will in time be the husbands of our daughters; their daughters the wives of our sons. Certainly such a free receptivity of people is much more drastic free-trade than the free receptivity of their manufactures. But whether so or not, the main thesis—that war is in a general sense always the result of unequal opportunity in trade—holds good, and also that this inequality must be removed as a first step, the only real step to anything like universal peace.

All logic is with the proposition. All will grant that trade

has always been and remains the great civilizer, the great missionary. For trade, all roads, steamships, and railways exist; without it nations would have remained in darkest ignorance and savagery. Thus being the great and beneficent thing it is, the greatest lever in the uplift of mankind, the spreader of light and Christianity, it stands to reason that it is the greatest of errors to put trammels in its way.

The logic of the proposition demands of our peace societies the support of this proposition. I am emphatically no believer in such things as the settlement of international disputes by judicial process, or by the prevention of war by an association of powers to whip a recalcitrant nation into peace. It is too much like the Holy Alliance against which Monroe made the famous declaration. Such things, as I see them, are, to use the phrase of the ancient preacher, but a "wrestling with the wind." You must remove the causes of dispute and you will have no disputes, and practically the only great cause is in trade restriction and in trade discrimination. To talk peace and encourage restriction and discrimination in trade are diametric propositions.

A final word to clinch what I believe should be the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to-day. It has served its purpose so far as the Americas are concerned. All nations know, as France recognized in 1866, that a real infraction would mean war with the United States. Our position is one of altruism, but it is a fine altruism, for it is going to spread the full meaning of the immortal Doctrine and teach all the world that it is immoral to appropriate others' lands for any nation's particular benefit; that if one governs, it must be for the benefit of the governed, and this of course carries the corollary that none should be excluded from participation in

trade on absolute equality. When we shall couple with this and shall arrive at the great desideratum, a world freedom of trade intercourse, imperialism will cease to have a meaning. It will at least cease to mean what it does to-day, an exploitation for the benefit of the few, of those who cannot defend themselves. We may then turn our warships into peaceful freighters and lay the Monroe Doctrine on the shelf; it will have accomplished its true purpose—not confined to the Americas, but extended to all the world—Peace. All this means a good deal more of the Golden Rule; a good deal more of Christian spirit whether in Christian, Jew, or Mohammedan, but I take it, or at least hope, that this is what we are striving toward. If not then all our talk here is vanity.

And now as to procedure. Let us for the moment drop these minor efforts which can never be effective and come to the real thing: the removal of causes. Let there be a World Congress, naturally at The Hague and bring before it the whole question of Spheres of Influence, and demand everywhere in the countries seized so immorally in the last and this generation the absolutely open door. Egypt, Madagascar, the Philippines, Indo-China, Morocco, the Congo, Tunis, Manchuria, and all the lately partitioned portions of Africa should be included. I do not pretend to give a full list. And why not India itself? All this would very well come within the work of world reconstruction which must follow this mighty war.

And to effect all this there should be a permanent international board to supervise the actual carrying out of this great step to freedom; to see that all play fair; that America give the Englishman as fair a chance in the Philippines as it itself may have; that France

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in Morocco shall put nothing in the way of absolute equal treatment to Englishman or German. With such rights, who will demand lands for expansion? If the German may go to the Congo and be treated as if it were German, he will be well content to leave the Congo to Belgium, or Morocco or Indo-China to France.

This may sound somewhat utopian, but what is Utopia? It is what we are striving for, and we must in the nature of things arrive. Think of the steps thitherward in the last hundred years. There is no use in talking Christianity, the brotherhood of man, the Golden Rule, unless you take actual steps toward such. You have got to construct a new order of things, the very beginning of which is to establish a democracy of states, a democracy as fully important as a democracy of men.

I believe what is here suggested will be a step—a great step. We have our choice: Special Trade Advantage and War; the absolutely Open Door and Peace. I beg you to think it over.

DOES NATIONALISM MEET PRESENT-DAY NEED?

BY EDWARD KREHBIEL

NATIONALISM is the present political system of a world consisting of nations. The thesis of this paper, put baldly for the sake of challenge, is that this system is out of date, that the nation is no longer the true cohesive unit of society.

What is a nation? Ask the man on your streets and he will glibly reply that his nation is the people to which he belongs, that it is the best people on earth, stands for what is finest in any field, leads in government, prosperity, science, art, in short everything, that it has uniformly been victorious in war partly because its generals are the greatest and its soldiers the bravest, partly too because God was on its side, since his nation has always been in the right; and he regards foreigners with contempt or at best with pity as an inferior, benighted and perhaps even a hopeless lot. And the foreigner has the same opinion of his nation.

Ask the publicist or lawyer what a nation is and he will guardedly describe it in terms of its external features or manifestations, but will say little of its composition, and less of what distinguishes one nation from another.

Whatever nationalism is, it has led to an awful catastrophe in Europe, for when all the befogging

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details and prejudices regarding the cause of the great war are summed up they leave the blame on the national spirit and the supposition that nations are fundamentally different and bound to get into conflict.

What is the truth about this supposed fundamental difference of nations?

A convenient method of attacking this question is to decide what a nation is not.

A nation is not a geographic unit, for rarely are nations bounded by natural features. For a thousand years France and Germany have fought over the question whether the Rhine River or the Vosges Mountains should be the boundary. There is no natural boundary between Germany and Russia to fight over. Great Britain, with her naval supremacy, does not regard the ocean as a boundary but holds possessions beyond the seas. The boundaries between the United States and Canada illustrate very well how national limits are often determined—that is, arbitrarily and even accidentally.

A nation is not a closed racial or ethnical unit. That a nation is not identical with a nationality is most conspicuously demonstrated by Austria-Hungary, and in a lesser degree by Germany and the United Kingdom. The United States notoriously consists of an amalgamation of nationalities. If a given nation contains different peoples, the converse, that different nations contain identical peoples, is also in some measure true. There are Poles in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The Walloons of Belgium are more like the French than like their countrymen the Flemings. Switzerland consists of Germans, French, and Italians, not distinguishable from those just across the border.

A nation is not a linguistic unit, though it should be

said at the start that language is a most significant national characteristic. Indeed if nations consisted of nationalities, language would practically decide national affiliations. However, as things are, this is not the case. Austria-Hungary is a nation, but it contains many languages. There are many mutually unintelligible dialects in Germany, Italy, and Russia, to mention but a few instances. If it be true that philologically these dialects belong together, it still remains true that the persons in a nation speaking different dialects do not understand each other and that for practical purposes they might as well be speaking to genuine foreigners.

Neither is a nation a religious unit, for national boundaries and the areas occupied by religious creeds are not at all identical. Persons holding different faiths are fighting side by side in the trenches in Europe against persons of their own faith in the opposing battle line. Nothing, indeed, is clearer in this war than that religious belief comes after loyalty to nation.

Again, a nation is not a closed economic unit. What could demonstrate more clearly the economic interdependence of nations than the derangement of the trade of neutrals—to say nothing of belligerents—by the present war? Everybody knows that the world is a market for any given commodity and that prices are everywhere fixed by world supply and demand. This, of course, means that capital, and therefore labor, are international; it means that all the facilities of transportation and communication are molded to accommodate this international traffic. And the various interests affected—the railroad men, freight handlers, insurance underwriters, capitalists, labor unions, farmers, news agents, and the like—have

international organizations or congresses in which they discuss ways and means to expedite their own success.

That a nation is not a social unit need not be amplified in view of what precedes and follows.

The nation is likewise not a watertight cultural unit. Though hardly necessary it may not be amiss to note that the word culture is not here used in the sense of *Kultur*. Culture means the fine arts, and the intellectual and professional interests of men. The fine arts, that is, painting, music, and literature, since they appeal chiefly to sentiment, may be said to be cultural elements of an *emotional* character. The intellectual and professional elements of culture, that is, the historic, economic, social, and natural sciences, as also theology, law, and the like, appeal chiefly to the intellect and are therefore *rational* in character.

Premising this distinction the thesis is that a given culture is not necessarily national.

It has been contended that all culture depends for its creation upon a national soil—for instance, that music is a peculiar product of the German in Germany, art of the Frenchman in France, and certain kinds of literature of the Russian living in Russia. In proof of this, it is pointed out that the Germans in Brazil or the United States, the French in Quebec or New Orleans, and the British in Australia or the other dominions, have not been culturally productive after the fashion of their native land. Lamprecht, indeed, contends that the Germans in the United States have retained only the externals of Germanism and have to a large degree lost the essentials of German culture and in any event have become entirely unproductive of it.

In rebuttal it is asserted that the Jewish people have

retained a distinct culture without any national existence whatever, and at first blush it would appear that this is good and sufficient proof that cultures are created without a nation to back them. To this it is however, rejoined that the Jewish people, though contributing relatively more than their neighbors, have not a *Jewish* culture, but that their product everywhere appears as an integral part of the culture of the nation in which they are. The question raised by this contention is not easy to decide, and must here go undecided.

But even if in its creation culture is national, it is not national in its consumption, for peoples can appreciate and adopt foreign cultures if they but choose to do so. The clearest illustration of this is the wholesale adoption by Japan of such features of Western civilization as were desired. The sciences are almost necessarily non-national because they rest upon the laws of nature, and these operate the same everywhere. It is so with all rational cultures. Theology and philosophy never were national. The legal and political institutions of Rome influenced all subsequent peoples, just as those of England and the Code Napoléon have gone far beyond the confines of the land of their origin. The emotional parts of culture have shown less ability to travel abroad, but they have not found it impossible. The music, art, and literature of a nation are often enough far more appreciated by "cultured" foreigners than by "uncultured" natives. It is the power of appreciation, not the nationality, that decides. Given cultured persons of different nations, it would be rash, and just as likely as not fallacious, to declare that the native possessed a deeper grasp or appreciation of his national culture than the foreigner.

Finally, it follows from the above, that a nation is not a personality. For convenience we may speak of China or Germany; only it cannot be said too often that these are but time-saving expressions which do not represent a real unity. Germany is not a single-minded body-politic, but a community of separate and very diverse interests and purposes. Witness Alsace-Lorraine. Witness also as further instances of the same kind England and Ireland, Austria and Hungary, Russia and Finland. A nation is not like a person, it is like a beehive. It contains many individuals; most of them are at home, but not a few are abroad. Not a few of those at home have their major interest abroad; quite enough others privately believe that some foreign nation is superior to their own. A few say so. Such common purpose and action as a nation knows is governmental. Practical unity in a nation will come only with absolute government. We must choose between absolutism and a unified nation or personal freedom and a nation at odds within. Nationalism favors absolutism.

Nations, then, are not like corrals within which citizens must stay. It is one of the most vital factors in present international relations that nations and their influence are not at all limited to those areas which form a nation, but that outside these limits nations claim and freely exercise great power. What are the methods by which modern nations extend their sway beyond their apparent confines?

Over its own territory the nation exercises political jurisdiction, and it may enlarge this jurisdiction by annexation of additional territory. This is the simplest form of expansion, and the only one known to many of the less informed. Yet it is only one form of expansion and not the most favored. Nations exercise

semi-sovereign powers over outside regions either by establishing protectorates, or by designating spheres of paramount influence. The Monroe Doctrine is an instance of the latter. We do not claim political sovereignty in Latin America, but we do assert the supremacy of our interests over those of non-American states. It is a form of political expansion beyond our actual boundaries. Russia has similar spheres in Persia, China, and Turkey; Germany in Asia Minor; Great Britain in Persia, parts of Turkey, and many places besides; Japan in Manchuria and other parts of the Far East.

Less understood but more important are the commercial spheres of nations secured by means of preferential tariffs, advantageous concessions, loans, or financial investments which mean economic control. The world too little knows the true inwardness of European control of Turkey, Persia, and China by means of loans and irksome commercial treaties, which enslave these states and prevent them from meeting the demands of civilization. Part of the alleged backwardness of these, and other peoples is caused by the hindrances to progress placed by the "civilized" exploiting nations of the West. They have, to be sure, insisted upon the Open Door, but this merely means that each demands a share in the exploitation and makes the position of the victim the more hopeless. For the latter it means domination through financial and commercial forces.

Finally, there is the cultural sphere of a nation, that region beyond its confines in which its ideals and institutions have found favor, perhaps been to some extent adopted. The cultural sphere of France was some centuries ago practically the whole of the Western

European continent; the United States is to-day as a whole in the British cultural sphere, as certain parts of the Balkans are in the Russian. Missionaries were formerly the advance agent of a national culture in a new country. This has changed since the middle of the last century and to-day the forerunner of national influences is the representative of trade. Nowadays national expansion is economic first, cultural afterwards.

Summarizing, it appears that nations are in fact not isolated, but that beyond their boundaries they have semi-political, commercial, or cultural spheres of dominion; they consist not merely of the actual nation, but comprise an ill-defined but very real surrounding nebula. It is in the latter that most modern wars are born, inasmuch as the undefined claims of one nation come into contact with equally vague claims of another, and have the reaction of causing each nation to declare that its vital interests, if not its honor, are at stake, and must be protected.

Now, if a nation is not a geographic, racial, linguistic, religious, economic, or cultural unit, and if it is not even a unified personality, what then is it? That it is none of these things does not mean that it is nothing. Surely there must be something real represented by the deep-seated feelings we call love of country and patriotism. Strip the nation of all non-essentials, and subject the essentials to rigid and demolishing logic, there still remains a real if not substantial something that the average man calls his country. He may not be able to tell what it is, but he swears that it exists. To him it is the embodiment of what he regards as the peculiar ideals, aspirations, institutions, and qualities of the political group to which he belongs. It is a sentiment, a faith. The nation is something spiritual,

may be called the spiritual state. And this is quite in keeping with that excellent definition not long since given by the London *Nation*. "A nation exists when its component units believe it to be a nation."

This belief had a basis. In the first place there was a time when nations were largely exclusive or isolated, the time of rival monarchs who possessed the several nations. The political institutions of that time expressed the facts of existence and became embodied in human notions where to this day they remain as influential traditions. Furthermore, the concept of a nation has an economic basis, for all the business interests of a country favor the nation as an institution which, by means of tariffs, subsidies, or diplomacy, may help to advance their own enterprises at the expense of foreign competitors. The heartiness of approval of nationalism by these interests cannot be overrated. Nationalism is also advocated by what may be called extra-national commercialism—that is, enterprises which lie outside of national bounds. Ventures of this kind find the nation very useful and therefore are among the foremost preachers of nationalism.

Whatever basis the concept of nationalism may have had originally, that basis has been altered. It has already been noted that a nation is to-day not a unit in language, race, religion, culture, or spirit. This is in its essentials a product of the nineteenth century which, along with a wide acceptance of democracy, or human equality, broke down national seclusion and caused national boundaries to pale away in many particulars. Even the economic interests, which, as has just appeared, are among the remaining backers of

nationalism, have in engaging in extra-national ventures set forces in motion which tend to weaken nationalism. It is not merely or chiefly that their business is no longer national, it is the use they make of the nation. Capital seeks foreign investments because they yield greater profits, not ordinarily because of economic necessity. It finds that it can earn larger percentages when it is free from the control and burdensome restrictions and taxes of the home-land—that is, when it is free to make money fast in any convenient way. Though it escapes the control of the nation, it does not for that reason divest itself of national protection. So long as the enterprise succeeds, control by the nation would be resisted; when it suffers, the nation is at once called upon for succor. The profits of success go to the enterprise,—the costs of making it successful go to the nation—that is, to the taxpayer, or ultimately to the man who, by conscription if necessary, gives his life to assure that success. It is all done in the name of patriotism and under the guise of protecting citizens and their enterprises.

Now, there is a world of difference between this international commercialism and national commercialism. The latter operates within the nation and accepts national jurisdiction and responsibility along with national protection. It can hardly approve of extra-national commercialism which takes the protection of the nation and evades its burdens and duties. But even if capital condones it, the average citizen will not long remain devoted to a nationalism which means profits for corporate interests, and taxes, conscription, and holocausts like that in Europe for him. He still conceives of the nation in traditional terms, but the great war has set everybody to thinking about national-

ism, and already the voices are numerous blaming nationalism for it.

There is also appearing a recognition of the circumstance that the belief or faith in the existence of a nation is far from being in agreement with the facts; that in his economic and cultural or intellectual existence man is largely international, and that only in his political being is he national. Nationalism does not represent the actual conditions under which individuals have to live. The result is an insidious conflict within the individual between his national and his non-national being. To illustrate—here is an American physician; his early training was in his native medical school with texts and under instructors familiarizing him with the best medical experience no matter what its source. He continued his studies abroad, in Vienna and Berlin, perhaps Paris or London, to secure the best, not a *national*, professional education. In his practice he keeps up with knowledge in his special field. To do so he becomes a member of medical societies, carries medical literature. Now if he is an up-to-date physician—the kind we prefer—his national existence professionally considered is insignificant. He belongs to the *medical world* which knows no boundaries. He has friends and acquaintances among so-called foreigners; he deals with them upon the common ground of mutual interest and understanding, quite unconscious of the accident that they are in other political units; he tests the fitness of their ideas, not by their nationality, but by their efficacy. In short, in this medical world there is none of the alleged inability of the individuals of one nation to get on with those of another, none of the inevitable and “irrepressible conflict” between them. And so it is in the artistic world, the literary

world, the religious world, the world of sport; in short, in each and every single line of human endeavor the individual understands the alien as well as his countryman and is conscious of no fundamental clash.

But when these are grouped politically there is a different story; there are said to be fundamental differences which inevitably lead the two groups to conflict. The dilemma of the individual, though not fully understood, is no less real. He is led by patriotism or compelled by law to place his allegiance to the political group to which he—often by accident—belongs, above the natural and professional affiliations through which he normally earns his livelihood; he is asked to believe—and apparently does—that, though he and his fellow-citizens and their professions taken severally are in time of peace in no vital conflict with foreigners, taken jointly there is a fundamental conflict between them, one which can be resolved only by the shedding of human blood.

There must be something wrong in the situation. To go straight to the heart of the matter, the difficulty is that the concept of a nation—the nation of imagination—is no longer in keeping with every-day facts. The last century has seen a steady and enormous development of internationalism, which is a convenient name for the above described extension of each nation beyond its boundaries, with a resultant interpenetration and interweaving of the nations; political conceptions, however, have stood about where they were and therefore represent conditions that are past forever. Thus the conception that there is a fundamental difference between nations still lives, though the conditions which gave it birth are no more.

The old nationalism is then no longer the true unit

of society, even if for the moment it is dominant. The true cohesive unity to-day is that represented by those human interests of every kind which draw individuals of any geographical area together into a bond of common understanding. This new unity is increasing. The time will come when it will be so patent, and will have so influenced public thought, that nationalism will be recognized as an old wine bottle not fit to hold the new wine, when some form of international organization and coöperation in harmony with life will be demanded.

The bearing of all this upon "preparedness," which is the topic of the hour and which is to figure largely in this Conference, is highly important. Shall we bolster up an anachronistic nationalism? Shall we, by arming, stimulate national conflicts? Merely to arm will be regarded as a threat by the rest of the world, may result in alliances abroad now deemed impossible, to counterbalance the sudden show of force of the giant of the Western Hemisphere. Alas, if this is all we achieve! Alas for the ideals we once held! For we were the forerunners in democracy and the equality of man, we are the amalgamator of peoples, we are the world's greatest federation. Should these principles now give way to a nationalism hostile to all others? For nationalism, militarism, and absolutism, are a sort of trinity that is ultimately inseparable.

We have another choice, one more in keeping with our traditions. We may prepare if that be necessary; but we must do it with the public announcement to the world that we do so only because compelled to by the national spirit elsewhere, and must declare, in a binding way, that it is not for the sole sake of reinvigorating our nationalism. In proof of our intention, we

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must accompany our preparedness program with a standing offer to other nations that we are ready to abate nationalism just as soon as others do, and to enter into any international federation which has the authority to decide what is right and the power to enforce it. In this way preparedness will be more than a mere menace, a mere resuscitating of nationalism. We shall be living up to our traditions as believers in democracy and federation. We shall have done something to advance the world in the course toward co-operative unity which, the foregoing has tried to show, is already so largely prepared for.

FEDERATION OR INTER-STATE ANARCHY:
THE WORLD CRISIS IN THE LIGHT OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-9

BY GEORGE W. NASMYTH

I. THE DEEPER ISSUES OF THE WAR

TWO years ago the immense majority of people thought that foreign relations had no connection with the interests and intimate factors of their own daily life. But since August, 1914, I will venture the assertion that every one of us has been affected in some way by the chain of events which followed the assassination of an Austrian Crown Prince in an obscure city of southeastern Europe. Without our knowledge or consent, we have all been elected citizens of the world, and each of us finds that he is being taxed without representation to carry on the great war in Europe. We find the man in the street reading long diplomatic documents, dealing with technical problems of international trade and the rights of neutrals. We find the great daily newspapers publishing, in response to the newly awakened demand, complete editions of the *White Book*, the *Red Book*, the *Blue Book*, the *Orange Book*, the *Green Book*, and all the other whitewash books. In New York City the discussions in Times Square became so heated that the publication of war bulletins had to be forbidden by the police. All of which witnesses to the fact that Americans are deeply

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and intimately concerned with the problems of the Great War and its underlying issues.

What are the underlying issues of the war? If you read the speeches of the statesmen and leaders of public opinion in all the belligerent nations, you get the same answer from each. The object for which they are fighting is security from the danger of militarism and aggression in the future, and a chance to develop their civilization in peace. The same underlying idea in varying forms is expressed by Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, Lloyd George and Winston Churchill in England; by the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser in Germany; by Delcassé and Viviani in France and by the Czar and the leaders of the Duma, in Russia. Various means are proposed for obtaining this object, from the crushing of the enemy and the parcelling out of his territories to the replacing of the Balance of Power by a concert of the powers. But no matter what the difference in method, they are all agreed that the object for which they are fighting is security and a more lasting peace for the future. As President Wilson said in his speech at Columbus, Ohio, the nations are determined that no patched-up peace shall be the result of the Great War.

In America the interest created by the issues of the Great War have been confused since last summer in the hysterical campaign for preparedness. Militarists and anti-militarists have both drawn a lesson from the war in Europe which fitted in with their preconceived ideas. A recent cartoon shows two men tugging at the coat-tails of Uncle Sam, one calling his attention to Europe, where preparedness and the increase of armaments have led to the breakdown of civilization, and the other calling his attention to Asia, where the lack

of preparedness and of armaments threatens to break up the Celestial Empire. Each side is greatly strengthened in its own convictions as the result of the experience of the war. Failing to convince each other by argument they have resorted to calling names. In a book written by the president of one of our large munitions corporations, called, felicitously enough, *Defenseless America*, and of which a professor of one of the American universities has said, "It has a moral as obvious as garlic," professional pacifists are called some score of names, and in parts it seems as though abuse were actually considered an adequate substitute for arguments. The anti-militarists, on the other hand, have not been slow in laying the blame for the war at the door of the militarists, even though they have not been quite so unrestrained in their language.

Now the point I wish to make is that this whole dispute between pacifists and militarists has led to a misconception of the essential nature of the underlying issues of the war. The fundamental issue is not between more armaments or less armaments. The question of militarism *vs.* democracy in the future is not a question which is capable of solution within the nation. It is a world question. Lincoln said a half century ago that the United States cannot exist half-slave and half-free and the issue that I want to present to you is that the world to-day cannot exist half-militaristic and half-democratic. Militarism, in other words, is merely a symptom of a deep-lying disease. That disease is international anarchy. It is of no avail to try and cure the disease by treating the symptoms. We shall only find the solution of the problem when we realize that the real contest is not between militarists and pacifists, but between world federalists and anti-

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federalists. The fundamental issue which the human race has to solve at the end of this war is not increased armament or disarmament, it is the question of whether we shall continue the old system of international anarchy or replace it with a system of world organization under justice and law.

One of the events which has made it clear that the underlying issue is that between world organization and international anarchy is the rising demand for a League of Peace, which has become prominent in neutral as well as belligerent countries. Since the beginning of the war, I have received more than thirty programs of constructive peace from important political groups in Europe and America. The remarkable thing about them is that they are in complete agreement upon this principle, that the solution of the problem of war is to be found only in some form of world government, with a world court, a world legislature, and the beginning, at least, of a world executive. For the first time in the history of the international movement we have militarists and pacifists, meeting together on common ground, in this demand for a League of Peace.

Now if this is the underlying issue of the war, if the fundamental question is that between federation and international anarchy, the experience of the thirteen original States in that critical period of American history from 1783-9 should throw a great deal of light upon the problems of the future.

2. THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY

If we go back to the years preceding the adoption of the Federal Constitution, we find a condition of inter-State anarchy, strikingly like that which ob-

tains in the world to-day. Up to 1783 the colonies had been held together by the fear of a common enemy, but with the treaty of peace that ended the Revolutionary War this external pressure ceased to hold them together and the internal forces of mutual interest and common sympathies had not yet become strong enough to overcome the drift toward anarchy. The old ideas of absolute sovereignty and independence were still very powerful between the States as they are between the nations to-day. The great mass of the people felt themselves to be Massachusetts men or Virginians before they were Americans. Each State feared aggression on the part of its neighbors. Boundary disputes between the States led to bloodshed and ever-increasing bitterness, while tariff wars, commercial boycotts, and retaliation measures between the States emphasized the weakness of the central government and the steady drift during this period towards war and disaster.

3. FEAR OF AGGRESSION

It is difficult for us to imagine the state of mind in which the people of each State looked upon those of the other States as people of a foreign nation. Fisher Ames gives us an insight into the popular feeling at the time when he wrote in 1782:

Instead of feeling as a nation, a State is our country. We look with indifference, often with hatred, fear, and aversion, to the other States.¹

In 1781, while Maryland was holding out for the cession of the Northwest Territory, we find threats and

¹ Fisher Ames, *Works*, vol. i., p. 113.

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language curiously foreshadowing the international sentiment in certain quarters at the present day when

hotheads were even heard to say that if Maryland should persist any longer in her refusal to join the Confederation, she ought to be summarily divided up between the neighboring States and her name erased from the map.¹

When Rhode Island refused to join the federation, Judge Dana even proposed to annihilate "abominable Rhode Island" and divide her territory between Massachusetts and Connecticut.²

North Carolina had laid the foundations of a navy during the Revolutionary War, and each State maintained its own military force, so that suspicions and fears of aggression on the part of other States were common. Some of the speeches in the State Assemblies give us an insight into the atmosphere of alarm and the nightmare of fear which was created by this condition of inter-State anarchy. For example, on May 12, 1787, General Huntington, who had served in the Continental Army, rose in the Assembly of Connecticut and addressed the Speaker as follows:

Some gentlemen were of the belief that the Confederation was sufficient unto itself, and others held that the country would be better without any. The Confederation had been framed while America was smarting under the hand of wilful power. It seemed to have been the leading object of the framers to set up an authority without bestowing upon it any power whatever. No penalty was fastened to a breach of the contract between the States. No means of enforcing obedience existed. The observance of the articles hung solely on the goodwill and pleasure of each

¹ Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 195.

² Austin, James T., *Life of Elbridge Gerry*, vol. ii., p. 67.

State. He was no prophet, but his calculations must indeed be wrong if diversity of sentiment and manners, if local circumstances, if the unjust distribution of the debt, and the jealousies that sprang from trade, did not bring forth heartburnings and strife of the most serious kind. God only knew where and when they would end. Was it wise to trust the event to chance and leave government to arise out of the distractions of the mob? Surely it was far better, in a cool and dispassionate hour, to consult with the sister States on the fitness of making needed changes in the Confederation. A man removed from scenes of danger, blessed with plenty, and compassed by kind neighbors, was apt to hug himself in his ease, and think the independent State of Connecticut a host unto herself. Was this so? Far from it. She was open to the insults and the depredations of a single ship-of-war. On all sides were treacherous neighbors. He remembered to have heard a gentleman say, in the debate upon another question, that Poland was cut up out of pity for her people. Who knew how long it would be ere Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York would join, and in the excess of their love part out Connecticut among them? What security had she against the turbulent strife of the one, the selfishness of the other, and the righteousness of the third? How long would it be before the rights of these States began to clash? In twenty years, nay, in ten, Massachusetts would awake to the fact that she had the sole right to the fisheries on her coast. Connecticut fishermen would be driven from Nantucket shoals. Complaints would come in to the Assembly, would be sent on to Congress, and a recommendation made by that body to Massachusetts to give indemnity for the outrage and the loss. Did any one for a moment suppose that she would do it? Alas, poor fool! Massachusetts would write a long letter of justification to Congress and close it with a reminder of the old Continental money and the renowned expedition to Penobscot Bay. Some might say these fears were visionary, and that his senti-

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ments on government came from a military way of thinking, or the baneful influence of the Cincinnati. Yet he would always speak the dictates of duty and of truth, and declare himself for the convention, the impost, and an efficient General Government.¹

4. BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Still more dangerous than these omnipresent fears of aggression were the boundary disputes which broke out at intervals between the States and led to considerable bloodshed. Of these the Wyoming Valley, which lies in the northern part of what is now Pennsylvania, and on a line drawn directly west from Connecticut, threatened for a time to become the Alsace-Lorraine of the New World. The region was populated by settlers from Connecticut but was claimed by Pennsylvania, and the chronic dispute between the two States was decided at last by the award of the prize to Pennsylvania, with the government of Connecticut submitting as gracefully as possible.

The Pennsylvania Legislature looked with no friendly feeling upon the Connecticut settlers, who were regarded as trespassers. After the terrible winter of 1784, which left the people starving from cold and hunger, a scheme was devised for driving out the settlers and partitioning their land among a company of speculators. Instead of answering the cry of misery which went up from the valley, for measures of relief, the Pennsylvania Legislature sent a force of militia to Wyoming, commanded by an unscrupulous captain

¹ McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, Chapter on "The Breaking up of the Confederation," vol. i., p. 395. From the proceedings of the General Assembly of Connecticut, American Museum, October, 1787.

named Patterson. The ostensible purpose was to assist in restoring order in the valley, but the behavior of the soldiers was such as would have disgraced a horde of barbarians. They stole what they could find, dealt out blows to the men and insults to the women, until their violence was met with violence in return. Then Patterson attacked the settlement, turned some five-hundred people out-of-doors, and burned their houses to the ground. The wretched victims, many of them tender women, infirm old men, or little children, were driven into the wilderness at the point of the bayonet and told to find their way to Connecticut without further delay. Heartrending scenes ensued. Many died of exhaustion, or furnished food for wolves. All the Connecticut men in the neighboring country flew to arms; men were killed on both sides and presently Patterson was besieged. A regiment of soldiers was then sent from Philadelphia under Colonel Armstrong, who held a parley with the Connecticut men and persuaded them to lay down their arms, assuring them on his honor that they would meet with no ill treatment and that their enemy Patterson should be disarmed also. Having thus fallen into the soldiers' clutches, they were forthwith treated as prisoners. Seventy-six of them were handcuffed and sent under guard, some to Easton and some to Northumberland, where they were thrown into jail.

Great was the indignation in New England when these deeds were heard of. The matter had become very serious. A war between Pennsylvania and Connecticut might easily have grown out of it and was averted by the merest accident. The board of censors, a singular institution provided for in the Pennsylvania Constitution, happened to meet just at that time and

condemned unreservedly the conduct of Patterson and Armstrong. A hot controversy ensued between the Legislature and the censors, and public sympathy was gradually awakened for these sufferers. The wickedness of the affair began to dawn upon the people's mind and they were ashamed of what had been done. Patterson and Armstrong were punished, the Pennsylvania Legislature disavowed their acts, and it was ordered that full reparation should be made to the persecuted settlers of Wyoming.¹

Another critical territorial dispute was that which raged about the Green Mountain district and the Upper Connecticut valley. This dispute had been smouldering between the States of New York and New Hampshire for many years, while the "Green Mountain boys" defended the claims of Vermont. For years the peace of "new Connecticut alias Vermont" was disturbed by the contentions of two parties among its population, one called Yorkers, and the other Vermonters. For seven years, from 1777 to 1784, the history of this region is an almost unbelievable record of wanton attacks and reprisals, of ambuscades laid in the dead of night, of murder, arson, and bloodshed between these two factions of the settlers.² Believing that the territory was about to be partitioned between New York and New Hampshire, Massachusetts began to go through her old charters to see if she could not put in a claim for a part of the spoils. Then Vermont became aggressive, annexed towns east of the Connecticut River, and asserted sovereignty over towns in New York as far as the Hudson. New York sent

¹ Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History*, pp. 147-150. See also McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, vol. i., pp. 210-216.

² McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, vol. i., p. 347.

troops to the threatened frontier. New Hampshire prepared to do likewise, and war seemed inevitable. Hostilities were only averted by the mediation of Washington, who appeared as peacemaker and prevailed upon Governor Chittenden of Vermont to use his influence in getting the dangerous claims withdrawn.¹

Following the example of Vermont in withdrawing from New York in 1777, several other States made organized attempts to set off outlying portions as independent governments. In 1782 the western colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia threatened to break off and form a new state. In 1785-1786 the so-called state of "Franklin," within the territory of what is now eastern Tennessee, had a constitution, a legislature, and governor, and carried on a border warfare with the government of North Carolina, to which its people owed allegiance. The people of Kentucky and Maine held conventions looking towards separations. Disorders in many other States in the year 1786, culminating in Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts, testified to the condition of anarchy resulting from the lack of a strong central government, and it was only by going beyond its constitutional powers that Congress was able to assist the Massachusetts authorities in restoring order.

5. TARIFF WARS

Another serious cause of dissension was the tariff wars which raged between the different States. Pennsylvania discriminated against New Jersey. In 1787 the New York Assembly passed an act designed to stop

¹ Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History*, pp. 151-152.

the trade coming from New Jersey and from Connecticut, decreeing that every ship from these States of more than twelve tons burden should henceforth be entered and cleared at the customs house in the same manner as produce that came from London or any other foreign port. New Jersey retaliated by laying a tax of thirty pounds a month upon a lighthouse which New York had built upon a plot of land on Sandy Hook. No official action was taken by the Connecticut Assembly, but the business men in New London, whose trade had been ruined by the New York tariff law, formed a league which bound all who signed its agreement, under a penalty of fifty pounds to be collected by a civil process in any court of law, not to send into the State of New York any article whatever, or to furnish any craft bound for that State with any kind of lading for one year from the 20th of July, 1787. The agreement was faithfully kept. Connecticut opened her ports to British shipping as soon as the other three New England States, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, closed their ports. Then Connecticut followed this up by laying duties upon imports from Massachusetts. Discrimination everywhere led to retaliation, and meetings were held, resolutions passed, which testified to the growing spirit of bitterness and hostility. As Fiske says:

these meetings, resolves, and retaliations bore an ominous likeness to the meetings and resolves which in the years before 1775 had heralded a state of war, and but for the good work done by the federal convention another five years would certainly not have elapsed before shots would have been fired and seeds of perennial hatred sown on the shores that look toward Manhattan Island.¹

¹ Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History*, p. 47.

6. WEAKNESS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The chief obstacle in the way of world federation is the doctrine of State sovereignty, and this was the chief obstacle which had to be overcome in the federation of the Thirteen States. This was made clear by the Articles of Confederation of 1786, which said:

Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation especially delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.

As Hayne said in his famous debate with Webster in 1830:

Before the Constitution each State was an independent sovereignty, possessing all the rights and powers appertaining to independent nations. . . . After the Constitution was formed they remained equally sovereign and independent as to powers not expressly delegated to the Federal Government. The true nature of their Federal Constitution, therefore, is . . . a compact to which the States are parties.

The significant word here is "compact" which is equivalent to "treaty." The Articles of Confederation had been a compact, and it was Webster's contention that the Constitution adopted in 1789 was not of this nature.

It has often been objected that The Hague Conferences are not legislative bodies, but a diplomatic assembly of sovereign states. This contention is opposed by one of the eminent German professors of international law, Prof. Walter Schücking, of Marburg University, who maintains that The Hague marks the

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beginning of a real union of the nations.¹ The same question was hotly debated in the transition period of American history, and even John Adams said, "Congress is not a legislative, but a diplomatic assembly."² McLaughlin tells us that "Washington lamented the monster sovereignty which had taken fast hold on the States,"³ and unanimity of action was preserved only by the influence of a few great men. And G. D. Curtis tells us (*The Constitution*, Chapter IV):

The Confederation was formed on the principle of a league,—a compact between sovereign states for certain purposes.

The Hague Conferences may be compared to the Continental Congress in its educational effect upon public opinion towards unity and federation. As one historian said,

the Confederation had performed an indispensable service. It had educated the American people to the point where they were willing to accept a permanent federal union.

As the "Federalists" put it, "A nation without a national government is an awful spectacle." If the Federalist could have looked out upon the battlefields of Europe to-day, would he not have a right to say, "A world without a world government is an awful spectacle"?

Looking back from this distance we are apt to underestimate the difficulties in the way of federation, as

¹ Schücking, *Das Werk vom Haag*.

² *Defense of the Constitution of Government of the United States of America*, 1786 (p. 362).

³ Von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, vol. i., p. 38.

compared with the difficulties in the way of world federation at the present time. The diversities of language, race, nationality, religion, economic interests, and social and political conditions, were infinitely less among the Thirteen Original States than they are among the forty-eight nations of the world, we are apt to think. But a study of the facts of the period reveal deep-lying differences between English-speaking Connecticut and Dutch New York, between free Massachusetts and slave-holding North Carolina. On account of the lack of means of communication, the States were widely separated in thought and diverse in interests. The best post-road in America was that between Boston and New York, yet it required a longer time to traverse the distance between these two cities, starting each morning at three o'clock and traveling until far into the night, than it now requires to go from America to Europe. It would have required longer to go from Massachusetts to Georgia than it now takes to travel around the world. In 1786 Madison wrote to Jefferson:

Of affairs in Georgia I know as little as of those in Kamskatka.

Governor Clinton in the New York debates on the Constitution repeatedly emphasized the enormous distances and the diversity of interests as an obstacle which would make real federation impossible. In one of his speeches he said:

When we take a view of the United States, we find them embracing interests as various as their territory is extensive. Their habits, their productions, their resources, and their political and commercial regulations are as different as

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those of any nation upon earth. A general law, therefore, which might be well calculated for Georgia, might operate most disadvantageously and cruelly upon New York.¹

7. THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION

One of the difficult problems which looms up ahead in the task of world federation is that of determining the proper basis of representation. Shall the principle of equality between states be maintained, or should representation be based upon the population, taking into account the factors of education, economic resources, and the general standard of civilization? This is the problem which almost wrecked the Constitutional Convention, and its solution as found in the Connecticut Compromise, which established the principle of equality in the Senate and of representation on the basis of population in the House of Representatives, may help in the solution of the world problem. For the solution of the problem of the representation of backward and uneducated populations, the transition device adopted for the slave States whereby three-fifths of the negro population was added to the white population in determining the total representation in the House of Representatives, may suggest a possible compromise measure.

8. ECONOMIC PRESSURE TOWARDS FEDERATION

What are the forces making for world federation? Can they be counted upon in the absence of any common enemy, to hold the nations together and to overcome the centrifugal forces of disintegration? Here again the critical period in American history throws light

¹ Elliott, *Debate on the Adoption of the Constitution*, vol. ii., p. 262.

upon the world problem. The economic paralysis which followed the Revolutionary War, the confusion caused by embargoes and retaliatory tariff acts, and, most important of all, the issuance of paper money and the consequent depreciation of the currency, produced such disorders in the States that conditions became intolerable and even conservative men felt the urgent need of inter-State organization. In Rhode Island the revolutionists got control of the government and began the issuing of the "Know Ye" measures, which soon made the State long thereafter known as Rogue's Island and its citizens a by-word among the other states. In Massachusetts Shays's Rebellion in 1786 was a significant warning of economic distress, and armed mobs arose at Exeter, New Hampshire, and at Windsor and Rutland, Vermont. With these ominous warnings, it is not surprising that the more sober-minded people of the States soon realized the imperative need for a strong central government with power to create a stable currency, to regulate inter-State trade, and to save them from the anarchy toward which they were steadily drifting.

Europe has been following the direct road to anarchy which the states followed in that critical period. Economic exhaustion, the piling up of an unbearable burden of war debts, and the inflation of the currency are going on in each of the belligerent countries. If in addition to these tremendous burdens an attempt should be made after the war to maintain the old conditions of international anarchy, with its inevitable renewal of the armament competition, we shall have one breakdown after another, with bankruptcy, attempted repudiation of debt, and revolution, until it is realized that the deep-lying cause of all these disturbances is the

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system of international anarchy, and that the only cure is to be found in world organization, beginning with a League to Enforce Peace.

9. INTER-STATE CONTROL OF UNDEVELOPED REGIONS

One of the most important factors in the establishment of a strong central government was its control of the great unorganized Northwest Territory. Parts of it were claimed by Massachusetts and Connecticut, whose charters did not specify any western boundary. New York laid claim to it because it had belonged to the five nations of the Indians over whom New York State had assumed a protectorate, and Virginia claimed it because she was the "Old Dominion" to whom the whole continent had originally belonged, and whose claim was reënforced by actual possession, which makes nine points of the law. Here seemed the seeds of innumerable conflicts between the States in the future, and it is not surprising that the people in all the colonies were filled with a vague dread of the development of the Northwest Territory, somewhat akin to that which the people of Europe felt toward Turkey and its impending break-up on the one hand, and China and the Yellow Peril on the other. It was the realization of this imminent danger which led the far-sighted statesmen of Maryland to refuse to ratify the Constitution until Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Virginia should surrender to the United States their claims to the Northwest Territory, and thus create a domain which should be owned by the Confederation in common. This acquisition of common territory led to the exercise of eminent domain, and attached to the central government the interests of increasingly important economic groups.

Walter Lippman¹ has pointed out that the chief task of world diplomacy to-day is the organization of undeveloped territory and backward peoples. If it is true that no government has any chance of survival unless it serves the interests of powerful economic groups, one of the plain teachings of the success of the federal government is that the control of backward and undeveloped territories of the earth should be made international. Territories like the sultanates of northern Africa, some of the nations of Latin America, Persia, and Turkey should be gradually transferred to the control of a world central government. The necessary precedents and rudimentary instruments can be found in existing permanent international commissions such as the Pan-American Union, the International Commission for the Control of the Danube, and the International Commission for the Turkish Debt. The result of this increasing international control would be to transfer the responsibility for the protection of, and therefore the allegiance of, concessionaires, financiers, missionaries, and merchants from their own national government to this international government.

10. WORLD FEDERALISTS VS. ANTI-FEDERALISTS

Those who know intimately the complexities of European international problems would be the last to assert that the problem of world federation is not more difficult than was the problem of federating the Thirteen Original States of America. But the point I want to make is that *federation is the problem*, that the critical issue is not between militarists and anti-militarists, or between more armaments or less arma-

¹ Lippman, *The Stakes of Diplomacy*.

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ments. The real division comes between those who stand for world organization and those who stand for the present system of international anarchy.

Suppose that Massachusetts had its own army and navy and retained its sovereignty and complete independence, and that all the other States of America were in the same condition. Would we not have boundary disputes, tariff wars, trade rivalry and suspicion, hatred and fear? And would not these smouldering embers frequently break out into open hostilities? What is the reason for the contrast between the peace that has been maintained, with the single exception of the Civil War, on the North American continent within the territory bounded by the United States, while the countries of Latin America, many of them as like each other as two peas, in language, civilization, and race, bound together by ties of mutual interest, have had an almost continuous period of wars during the past century and a quarter? Does not the critical difference consist in this, that in the forty-eight States of the United States we have built up certain inter-State machinery, a Supreme Court, a Legislature, an Inter-State Trade Commission, that we have established a central government, to which the interests of powerful economic groups have been attached, and most important of all that we have built up, on the basis of these solid facts of political machinery and economic interests, a common loyalty to a higher ideal than that of our State, the ideal of America, while in the dis-united States of Latin America this has not been done? And is not the clear lesson of the critical period of American history this, that if civilization is to be preserved from a similar breakdown in the future, if democracy is to be triumphant over militarism, if we

are to have an opportunity to carry out our plans for social reform and national progress, we must place ourselves squarely on the side of world organization? Must we not recognize that the most immediate interest of each of us individually is to aid in the establishment of a certain minimum of international machinery, such as the World Court, the International Council of Investigation and Conciliation, and the Conferences for the development of international law proposed by the League to Enforce Peace; that we must seek to attach to this embryonic world government the interest of powerful economic groups, by transferring to it the responsibility for the protection and the policing of backward nations; and that on the solid foundation of these political and economic measures we must strive to build up that higher patriotism, that international mind, that loyalty to the ideal of the great community of all mankind which will do for the world what the slow growth of a larger American patriotism did for the provincial patriotism of the States at the end of the eighteenth century?

The pioneer work which has been done by Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, and the other founders of the American Republic is of invaluable assistance in the world task which faces us, and we world federalists will gain new confidence from the conviction that we are engaged in the great constructive movement of modern history.

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

BY SAMUEL J. ELDER

I AM to speak on the League to Enforce Peace, which deals with questions after this war is over. It does not set for itself any consideration of means for bringing this war to a close. It recognizes the impossibility of our people or of organizations here having even a feather's weight of power to close the terrific conflict on the other side. But it hopes to be instrumental in helping to secure some safeguards of future peace. It is the League to ENFORCE Peace, and from that title you see that it is not a pacifist movement; it is not a pallid peace movement; it is not a disarmament movement. It makes an appeal to force as a means of future peace in the world. It does not say to you or to the country that it has found an absolute way to safeguard peace in the future, but it expresses the hope that the discussion which has been brought about may hammer out some safeguards against a future cataclysm of the kind which makes us numb, night and morning, as we read of it in the papers. Well, what is it?

It was organized in Philadelphia, not at the mint, of which Mr. Roberts speaks, but at Independence Hall, on the 17th day of June last, and many have been so hopeful as to say that they believe that the guaranties of peace between the sovereign States of this country which were secured a century and a quarter ago at

Independence Hall may be in some measure secured by the sovereign states of the world.

I want in the first place to call your attention to the names of some of the men now prominent in the movement. William Howard Taft is the President of the League. A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard is Chairman of the Executive Committee, Alton B. Parker of the Committee on Home Organization, and Theodore Marburg of the Committee on Foreign Organization. Among the Vice-Presidents are: Lyman Abbott, Alexander Graham Bell, Mabel T. Boardman, Ex-Governor William D. Fort of New Jersey, Foulke of Indiana, James Cardinal Gibbons of Maryland, Washington Gladden, Judge George Gray, Myron T. Herrick, President Hibben of Princeton, President Wheeler, Andrew D. White, Shailer Mathews, Governor-Elect McCall, John Bassett Moore, Judge Prouty, Harry St. George Tucker of Virginia, Oscar S. Straus, John Hays Hammond, and Frank S. Streeter. The membership is country-wide and of national distinction.

So much for the personnel; and now for the proposals. I think you will agree that there is great force in their simplicity. Compared to the proposals of some peace organizations, you will agree that their brevity is the soul of wit.

We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

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Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

I trust you will pardon me for saying that I have been the President of the Massachusetts Peace Society, and am still one of its directors. I have the honor to be a director of the American Peace Society, and I am also a trustee of the World Peace Foundation. With that in mind, I shall be pardoned for saying that the difficulty with the peace movement heretofore has been that it had no definite, no single, no positive proposal to make to the nations of the world which they were likely to accept. The Peace Societies have long urged the arbitration of international disputes and have educated the nations toward world-wide observance of the golden rule, but definite conventions, agreements that could be put into terms and adopted, have not been in evidence. I should be the last person to raise the slightest question as to the great serviceability of the peace movement during the last wellnigh one hundred years. The work that the Peace Societies here and abroad have done is what makes possible to-

day the proposals of the League of Peace. Nations have been educated and brought to the point where we hope they are prepared for an agreement for compulsory arbitration before bloodshed.

During the period from 1820 down to 1900, there were one hundred and seventy-two great arbitrations between the nations of the world. Many of them prevented war which was imminent. Others solved questions between nations that would have been itching sores liable at any time to be torn open at some new disagreement between the parties. Take a single illustration—the Geneva arbitration. At the end of our Civil War we had a million and more veteran soldiers. We believed here that our Civil War had been protracted by England's carelessness in permitting blockade running and the sending of munitions to the Southern States, and by permitting the escape of privateers. Our people were insistent upon reparation, and Great Britain, through its Prime Minister, replied that that question concerned the honor of Great Britain, and of that honor Great Britain must be the only judge; and it seemed as if there was nothing for it but the stern arbitrament of war. But not long afterwards it turned out to be entirely possible to arbitrate those questions, and they were arbitrated at Geneva, with an award of fifteen million dollars to the United States or its citizens for the losses which they had sustained. There was another part of the treaty—let it not be charged that I speak only of a case where the United States was successful—an arbitration at Halifax with regard to the North Atlantic fisheries was also provided for in the same treaty, and there the tribunal awarded five million dollars against us. Great Britain had been very indignant at the decision against her. The

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English judge stormed from the bench, and went back to London and thundered through the *Times* against the award, and against Great Britain paying it—but they paid it! Then, when the award was made against us we stormed. A more outrageous decision had never been perpetrated against any country, and we would not pay it! Mr. Evarts was Secretary of State, and in vehement terms (I had almost said unmeasured terms, except that Mr. Evarts always measured his terms) he indicated to Great Britain that it might become the duty of the United States to decline to make the payment, but almost on the last day of the six months within which the payment was to be made, it was made. In short, nations are very like individuals. They say there is one constitutional right of which no litigant can be deprived, and that is the right to go out back of the court house and swear at the Court! We did it, and Great Britain did it too.

And then, at the end of the last century, a court was established at The Hague. People say to you, why did not the court at The Hague prevent this war? I do not know why it is, but there seem to be some people who assume a kind of proprietorship in this war, and gloat over it as a triumph over the Peace Movement. Why did it not prevent this war? Why doesn't it stop it? What has become of the whole thing? The answer is that The Hague Convention was not drawn with any idea that it could certainly prevent such a war as this. The permanent court at The Hague was a court in name only. It had no power to compel nations to come before it. It consisted in a list of judges, not to exceed four judges from each of the signatory powers—forty-four countries in all—from which list the judges for any particular arbitration

were to be selected, but whether there should be an arbitration or not depended upon the nations in dispute. If they agreed upon an arbitration, it took place; otherwise not. When two nations decided to arbitrate, they made a treaty with each other fixing the exact terms of the questions to be discussed, the form of procedure, and determined what judges were to sit. That was as far as the nations of the earth in 1899 and 1907 were willing to go, and the question to-day is whether in the light of this calamity the nations will be ready to go further and create at last a court with some force back of it. When you have a disagreement with your neighbor, by your sheriff or marshal you can compel him to go to court and try the case. You can compel a corporation, no matter how great, to come to court. Our American States can bring each other before the courts. The point is to reach at last some jurisdiction whereby a nation having a grievance can bring another nation before a tribunal. Now, just how far does this go? The League to Enforce Peace says

Hasn't the time come for at least some of the nations to agree that they will not permit any of their own number to fight until after their dispute—whatever it is—has been heard in open court?

Let us take the proposals just as they stand. All that the League proposes, absolutely the whole thing, is that the nations that sign the agreement shall not go to war with each other or commit acts of hostility against each other until after the submission which is provided for; and that if one of them breaks its agreement all the others will use their economic and military force to chastise that nation. That is all

there is to it. Notice one thing: they do not agree that they will enforce the decision either of the court or of the council, and why not? Simply because you can not, even now, get the nations of the earth to agree that they will submit all questions to a tribunal and abide by the result. It is utterly useless to attempt the impossible. Stop and think about it yourself. Will you submit the Monroe Doctrine to a tribunal all but one of whom are foreigners, aliens, non-nationals of yours? You know you would not. Will the American people—will you—submit our title to the Panama Canal Zone to an alien tribunal, and agree to be bound by the decision? No! My friend here says: "We ought to." Very likely, but we must not waste time, or effort, in attempting to accomplish the impossible. Will you submit the question of the Philippine Islands, or Alaska, or the tariff, to such a tribunal and abide the result? You know that you cannot persuade the American people or Congress to do so. Every other nation has questions of vital interest—questions that it regards as questions of honor—and if we would not do it, if we could not induce our Senate to do it, why should we expect that we could persuade other nations to do it? No, the thing that it is proposed to agree upon, let me repeat, is that you shall submit your case to the Court of the Nations before fighting about it.

But, you say, what good will it do if you do not enforce the decision? It does this one thing: it makes bloodshed wait. It cuts off any forty-eight-hour ultimatum. You know how long these arbitrations take. I was concerned in one of them. We were a year in getting ready and then we talked for ten mortal weeks. I will bear some of the guilt myself,

for I talked a good deal. The opening for Great Britain took two weeks; then there were two weeks for the United States to open its case. It was a year and a half after the original agreement to arbitrate before the matter was settled. The League says you shall try a case before you go to war. That means a year or a year and a half before you can fight. The whole purpose of it is to interpose between the hot blood of excited nations or ambitious chancelleries, which may be determined upon aggrandizement, a long period of discussion. After that there will probably be no bloodshed. Men fight on the instant, on the drop of the hat. If they have to wait, and especially if they have to go to the court house and talk it over with the judge, or go around to the professor and talk it over with him, they do not fight at all.

Of course you cannot tell, humanly speaking, whether anything could have prevented this present war from coming, sooner or later, but it was a forty-eight-hour ultimatum that did bring it on. And that is the thing that it is hoped may be prevented in the future. It has this distinctive advantage: during the long hearings each nation is compelled to hear the story of the other, to hear the arguments of the other. The newspapers of all the countries are printing the proceedings day by day, showing where the truth of the matter lies and what its real importance is. During such a time the papers and the people, even of the two contending nations, may talk about it and discuss it freely and fully. When there has been, or is likely to be, a forty-eight-hour ultimatum, it is wellnigh treason for them to do so. They must know only their own side—their country—right or wrong. But during the long period of delay, the sane men, the sound men, the

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conservative³men² of each country and of the rest of the world, may discuss the question freely and reach their own conclusions.

My time has wellnigh expired and I realize that I have touched only the outskirts of the subject. The proposal does not include keeping the peace of the world, or the establishment of an international police by contributing America's quota to any permanent force subject to the direction of some international tribunal. It does not seek to fix the amount of armament which each nation shall maintain, but leaves to each to maintain such armament as it deems best. I have not dealt at all with the manner in which the economic forces of the nations can be brought into play against a recalcitrant power, and, in particular, I have not dealt with the question which very likely is present to your minds; namely, that this is a departure from the traditional policy of the country to avoid entangling alliances. The League does distinctly recognize that the period of our weakness and isolation is past, that we already have world-wide possessions and engagements liable at any moment to cause complications and war. In this situation it presents to you, to the country, and to the world the question whether we ought not to assist in safeguarding the world's peace for our own security as well as for the security of all mankind.

THE BRITISH UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

BY FRANCIS NEILSON

WHEN I was asked if I would come to Clark University and speak on the subject of the Union of Democratic Control, I considered that it was a very great honor and an opportunity that should not, under any circumstances, be lost.

Now, I have to plead guilty to being perhaps responsible for the Union of Democratic Control. It came about in rather a strange way. Many of the leading members of the Union of Democratic Control who are members of the House of Commons, and I, and indeed several other members of the House of Commons who are not allied with the Union of Democratic Control, have for years feared the foreign policy of Great Britain. Shortly after 1906, in the House of Commons was formed a body which was called the "foreign affairs group." Meetings were held in the House of Commons, and questions on Persia, Morocco, diplomatic negotiations and understandings were put down on the order paper without drawing much information from the Foreign Office. As time passed, it became clear to many interested in foreign affairs that there was a conspiracy afoot to check essential discussion on the question and reduce the authority of Parliament to the will and permission of the Cabinet.

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The old policy of splendid isolation in European affairs was gone. The Concert of European Powers was supplanted by the older system of the Balance of Power; and Britain entered into the disastrous byways of entangling alliances. The reply to questions: "It is not in the public interest to give the information that the Honorable Member asks for," became almost stereotyped. Every time I heard a question and answer of that nature, my mind went back to the terrible days of the Boer War. Shortly before the Boer War began, one of your great publishers came to a very dear friend of mine, the novelist, the late George Douglas Brown, who wrote *The House of the Green Shutters*, and asked if it were not time to write a life of Kruger. Brown came to me and asked me to collaborate with him. I was very busy, but I said, "If you will do the writing, I will get the documents." Had I known the difficulty I would have in getting the documents of British administration in South Africa, I would never have made that promise. To get the documents from the different departments was such a laborious task that I have never forgotten my difficulties, and I made up my mind then that if we ever went into another war, no such difficulties in obtaining documents and information should arise if in my humble way I could do anything to avert them. One of the reasons why governments can so easily rush peoples into war is because the people seldom know really what the war is about.

Now, when Sir Edward Grey made his speech, August 3, 1914, there were about thirty members who protested at once. We had been told for years that it was against the public interest to know what was going on. And when we learned that the Foreign Minister

had permitted conversations between the British and French naval and military experts to take place, and that these conversations had been going on over a period of eight years, that the General Staffs had been exchanging plans, we said, "That confession is sufficient for us." We had been told repeatedly that we were under no obligation to send troops to support any Continental Power. We had thought we were the responsible representatives of our constituents. I read to-day a sentence particularly pertinent to this question, where the writer in one of your reviews holds my friend, Mr. Charles Trevelyan, to a statement he made in 1913 to some German functionary, that Great Britain would not go to war. He had a perfect right to say it. The Government always led the House of Commons to believe we had no secret agreements. Had I been asked by any government functionary in 1913, would Great Britain go to war? I would have answered most emphatically, "No!" Britain had no entangling alliances. The Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey told us that we were under no obligations of war; and not only that, but in 1913, over and over again, in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith stated that our relations with all Powers were peaceful, and there was not a cloud in the sky to cause us any fear at all.

Now, when the members of the House of Commons protested against the speech of Sir Edward Grey, on August 3, 1914, I said to them, "Let us find out what it is all about, and let us keep a faithful record of events all through the war." I was remembering the difficulties that I had had at the time of the Boer War. I thought, how easy it is for a government to plunge a nation into war, when the people know nothing. That

is the way we were plunged into the Boer War, the Crimean War, and all our wars in Great Britain. Mr. Warren Worth Bailey said, a little while ago, it is the women who suffer more than the men who have to give their blood or foot the bill; and if you saw the women of Britain as I have seen them for over a year, now, mourning for the loved ones who will never come back, and do not even know where their bones are on the western battlefield, you would think it time for the members of Parliament, and the legislatures, and the people connected with the national life of the people, to set down those truths that you can tell to the people as warnings, so that when militarists come to you and say, "Prepare," you will think then—think harder, and deeper, than you ever thought before in your lives.

The trouble with us all is that we do our thinking when the war is over. But oh, what a task it is to go to the men and the women who have suffered, immediately after the war, and begin to recount the events that led up to that war!

Oh [they say], have we not had enough of it? Our Jack is gone; and our Will is gone; there is crippled Tom sitting by the fireside, and will sit there as long as he lives. There is Harry, who has to be carried upstairs and downstairs. Don't come to us and talk of what led up to it. See; here are the results.

You cannot get your story of how it began home after the event.

Now, I said to my dissentient friends:

You must form yourselves into a body. You must go back into the records as far as you can and see how this thing has been brought about, and you must do it in the true patriotic sense. Being loyal to the government: that

is not patriotism. Being loyal to a ruling class: that is not patriotism. Patriotism begins where John Bright said it begins—at the lowliest hearth in the land; and if your patriotism does not touch that, it is not worth the price of a candle.

So they set to work. I was taken very ill shortly afterwards, and sent away. I did not see my friends for something like three months, and in the meantime the Union of Democratic Control had been formed out of the group. When they started to plan the creation of the Union of Democratic Control, they called in men from the outside. Mr. Ramsey Macdonald and Mr. Jowett, members of the Independent Labor Party, joined the Union; Mr. Morel and Mr. Norman Angell and numbers of others, who had been concerned with peace and arbitration movements in Great Britain. You would have thought at that time by reading the Liberal and Tory British papers, that England was whole-heartedly belligerent. But that was not so. Far from it, indeed. From all parts of Britain came letters of sympathy, and numbers of well-known people saying they were ready to join the Union and work for its objects. Many who supported the Government in striving to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion joined the Union because of its objects. Branches were formed in the provinces. Interest in the work of the Union spread all over the country. Though the leading Liberal newspapers seldom referred to its crusade, *The Labor Leader*, the organ of the Independent Labor Party, gave space regularly every week to its operations. In the London area numbers of branches were formed. Meetings were held, in public and in private. Pamphlets were published and distributed broadcast. And so it went on. It seemed

like that proverbial snowball—the farther it went, the more it collected and the bigger it grew. For not only individuals of intellectual England became members of it, but people of America and different parts of the world that heard about its objects began to join the Union of Democratic Control. The women's guilds took it up, and many of them joined; then the trade councils began to discuss the matter, and a great many did join, and numerous other societies affiliated themselves with the Union and entered heartily into the spirit of the work. Spacious offices were taken and a large clerical force engaged. Public meetings were held. Don't forget that. I should like to emphasize that point, because during the Boer War we could not with safety hold public meetings. When we did, we were sometimes stoned. As you know, when Mr. Lloyd George, himself, went to Birmingham to speak against the conduct of the Boer War, the hall was stormed, and he had to escape in the clothes of a policeman who, like a good Samaritan, dropped him out of a back window! Things have changed a great deal. I, myself, really believe that were it not for the agitation of three papers in Britain against the Union, any of its well-known members could have held meetings at any time in the public parks without fear of molestation.

There have been certain interruptions in the work, and these I will refer to briefly before I get down to the objects of the work of the Union of Democratic Control. I have in my pocket here the documents in connection with the agitation of the London *Daily Express*, which has, I am sorry to say, an American editor, against the Union of Democratic Control. It may interest some of you to hear about this agitation. It might

prepare you for what is coming here, if you don't look out! Methods never differ. The actions of militarists and jingoes are the same in all countries. A Frenchman will come to us and say, "That is the way they do those things in France"; the Germans say, "That is the way they do it in Germany." You see, within a few months before the war we had municipal and sociological deputations from Germany, and deputations of a like nature went from Britain to Germany. The President of my association, one of the heads of Unitarianism in England, Mr. Enfield Dowson, of Hyde, came back two years before the war from a conference of Unitarians in Germany, where he spoke from the steps of the Wartburg, and he said to me, "Never have I had such great hopes of European peace as I have to-day." It is a wonderful world—the world of armament and diplomacy. You never know just where you are. I am going to read you a few lines which will show you the way they break up meetings over in England when they don't agree with you. Many of you here may not agree with me, and as I proceed, you may still less agree with me, but I think there is no one here who looks as if he would like to throw a brick at me, and I surely do not want to throw a brick at the most hostile person in this audience. I will read some extracts from a letter which came to me:

DEAR SIR:

I think you should be made acquainted with the under-noted events which culminated in a brutal and organized assault being delivered upon Mr. Arthur Ponsonby and two other speakers of the Union of Democratic Control in the Kingston railway station on the evening of Wednesday last.

For some time past, the *Morning Post*, the *Globe*, and

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John Bull have been publishing articles the general purpose of which has been to convey to their readers that the Union of Democratic Control (this is also hinted in the *Times* leader of to-day) is a traitorous organization in German pay. I understand, although I have no definite records to produce, that very violent attacks have been made upon the U.D.C. by civilian speakers at recruiting meetings held in London.

On July 16th, the *Daily Express* (whose editor, according to *Who's Who* for 1915, is a Mr. Ralph D. Blumenfeld, formerly editor of an American newspaper, and author of a work entitled *Exiled in England*) began to issue articles and statements which can only be construed as an incitement to violence upon the persons of members of the U. D. C.

The letter then goes on and gives extracts from the papers, and comes to a description of the meeting at Kingston, where Mr. Arthur Ponsonby was assaulted. I will read a part of this to you.

The third meeting on this list was a public meeting to be held in the Friends Hall, Kingston, on July 21st. A letter, signed with initials, published at the bottom of an item which appeared in the *Express*, spoke of the "Disgrace to Kingston . . . that loathsome Body of Pro-Germans, the U. D. C. . . . These people are spending money like water in what is really an attempt to get up a traitor party in this country."

At the conclusion of this article, it tells the patriots to look after their interests and be present and protest—and they did!

The assault was as follows:

The local Friends who had lent the use of their hall to the Kingston Group of the London Branch of the U. D. C

were informed on the Wednesday afternoon by the inspector of police that disturbances were expected at the meeting, and that the men employed in the aviation firm of Sopwith had stated their intention of preventing the meeting being held. Another hall was secured at the last moment. The meeting was violently broken up almost immediately after it commenced. Mr. Seymour Cocks, the Secretary of the London Branch of the U. D. C., was struck in the face and knocked down, and Mr. Arthur Ponsonby and Mr. Langdon Davies were driven out. They were followed to the railway station by an organized gang of about twenty-five to thirty, penned in the waiting room, and brutally assaulted, the odds being some ten to one.

They were well prepared. They go in for "preparedness," I can tell you, when it comes to the matter of smashing up a meeting.

They had to fight their way to the railway carriages when the train came up. Threats of murder were freely proffered. Mr. Ponsonby, Mr. Langdon Davies, and Mr. Seymour Cocks were badly bruised and battered.

I have also received a copy of a complaint made to the Chief Inspector of Police in connection with the agitation to attempt to break up the Union of Democratic Control. They failed in their attempt. Why did they fail? Because Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Trevelyan, and Mr. Seymour Cocks said, "They are not going to stop us, and when the people are willing to hear what we have to say, we are willing to talk to them." And they are carrying on their meetings all over the country, and even now they could use many more speakers to fill the applications that come in for meetings to be held.

There is one other point that I want to deal with, and it is this one that has been sedulously sown in the

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American press. When I left England in September we thought we would get facts over here, that we would be able to get some correct information. On arriving here, we found that you are not so well informed on the situation as we are in Great Britain, where we are almost censored out of existence. This is perfectly true. We have four papers in Great Britain which do defy the censor and publish the truth when they get it. The censor has tried to suppress the *Labour Leader*, and failed, so we can get that paper when we do want to know what is going on. It is the most astounding thing, how we read in the New York papers that such and such a thing has happened in Europe. Ten days afterwards, we get the London papers, and we read, according to our Tory sheets, what has really happened—usually something quite different. I really think you ought to make a protest against the British censor for it is a most astounding thing how misinformed the people are about this Union of Democratic Control.

One of my dear friends—a man I have known thirty years, in this land, came to me shortly after I arrived, and said: "It is something frightful, that organization you have in England, that Union of Democratic Control! Why don't they suppress it? Trying to stop the war, and throwing obstacles in the way of the Government!" I said: "My dear fellow, do you know we have martial law in the House, as well as in the country? How can any Britisher put an obstacle in the way of the Government, even if he wished? Who has tried to stop the war?" That is what is generally believed here. I have seen several articles since my friend spoke to me, and I gather that most of the publications in this country have spoken of the Union in the same way.

It will be interesting to you to know what the objects of the Union are:

1. No province shall be transferred from one Government to another without the consent by plebiscite of a population of such province.

2. No treaty, arrangement, or undertaking shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

3. The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating alliances for the purpose of maintaining the "Balance of Power"; but shall be directed to the establishment of a Concert of Europe, and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be made public, part of the labor of such council to be the creation of statutes and the establishment of courts for their interpretation and enforcement.

4. Great Britain shall propose, as part of the peace settlement, a plan for the drastic reduction, by consent, of the armaments of all the belligerent powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalization of the manufacture of armaments and the prohibition of the export of armaments by one country to another.

Those are the objects of the Union of Democratic Control, and they have not changed. There is nothing there about stopping the war. Now, to give you an idea of the development of the work, let me read to you, if you will bear with me a little more, some extracts from speeches which have taken place in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. First, I should like to deal with the speeches in the House of Lords. You will forgive me if I describe some of the men to you. Earl Loreburn was a great Radical and peace leader

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in England for years. He was a pro-Boer. Within the past few years he has been Lord Chancellor of England. He was the Lord Chancellor that was followed by Lord Haldane. On November 8th, in the House of Lords, he said:

The situation has no parallel in the whole record of history. Every great nation in the war has been led to believe that the war was forced upon them—I am speaking of the people of the nations, not of the rulers who have beguiled them. All of them believe that they are in the right, and that they have only to hold on in order to win.

It is no exaggeration to say that, if this conflict goes on indefinitely, revolution and anarchy may well follow; and unless the collective common sense of mankind prevents it before the worst comes, great portions of the continent of Europe will be little better than a wilderness, peopled by old men and women and children. I say that any man must be strangely constructed who does not grasp at any honorable opportunity to prevent what would be the most frightful calamity that has ever befallen the human race. This is what is meant by a war of attrition. These are thoughts from which there is no escape, whatever may be your nationality.

During the Boer War, it would have been an impossibility to have made a speech like that in the House of Lords; but there were no interruptions, so my friends tell me who were present when this speech was made.

Now I will quote from the speech of Lord Courtney, of Penwith, delivered on November 8th. You may remember he was plain Mr. Courtney, a Cornish member of the House of Commons, and then went to the House of Lords. I daresay that Lord Courtney has done as much in his time for the world's peace,

or did, before the war, as any man of any nation. When he spoke in the House of Lords, he said some very extraordinary things. He said:

Whether we look at home or abroad, our old civilization, which we built up through long generations with much effort, is not merely in danger, but is undermined and almost destroyed. Where are our boasted guarantees of personal liberty? Freedom of speech, freedom of writing, almost freedom of thought, have been struck at. Instead of the ancient trial by jury which we boasted was the privilege of every man, the gravest charges are examined, and the weightiest punishments inflicted, by single magistrates sitting in secret, without the advantage of publicity, and without it being known what is the character of the offense charged. Our municipal private law has suffered these terrible inroads; and in the domain of public law, international law, so slowly built up, in days gone by, we have witnessed retrogression.

It is just as well to consider, when you go into a war, what you are likely to lose in the conduct of the war. We have lost a great deal.

I do not speak of what the war has involved in the way of sacrifice of our young men. I say nothing of the demands it has made on our finances. I only wish to draw you to this conclusion, that the war has resulted in something like a deadlock of force, and has operated to diminish the standard of our civilization, to take away the guarantees of liberty, to diminish the trustworthiness of law, and to endanger the situation amongst nations, neutrals, as well as combatants. If that is so, surely it is not surprising that one should begin to ask: Is any escape possible from this rake's progress upon which we have entered? Must we go on to witness a continually extending panorama of war?

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Is there no alternative? I believe there is. The passion of national independence is glorious and well worthy of any sacrifice. I recognize all its claims; but the passion of national independence must in some way be reconciled, if civilization is to continue with the possibility of international friendship, and unless you can see out of this war something which will lead to international friendship coming into alliance with and being supported by national independence, you have nothing before you but a continued series of wars, hate after hate, extermination after extermination, from which, indeed, you may well recoil. Is it not possible that this reconciliation should be effected; that there should be, so to speak, dovetailed into one another the fact of national independence and the fact of international friendship? The consummation of the tragedy is that precisely what we believe and say, is believed and said in Germany, with the same sincerity and the same conviction as here; inexcusably, you may say, and I admit that to us it is very difficult to see sufficient reason on their part for that conviction and that belief. Some Germans find it extraordinarily difficult to realize what we believe and the possibility of the terror against which we are fighting. Well, if that is a common error on both sides, I am led again to the conclusion that there surely must be some way—I do not ask the Government now to point out the way—some way out of the *impasse* in which we are landed, and we ought at least to show ourselves ready to accept any suggestion that can be offered of relieving us from such an anxiety.

At the end of the speech, he quoted the words of Edith Cavell, and then said:

I beseech your Lordships to entertain them with all the feeling, with all the fullness and simplicity of her mind: "Standing before God and eternity, I realize that patriotism is not everything; I have no bitterness, no hate."

I will refer to Mr. Arthur Ponsonby's speech. Mr. Ponsonby spoke shortly after the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister had reviewed the whole progress of the war, in the longest speech that Mr. Asquith ever made. Mr. Ponsonby said:

Are you testing the powers of endurance of this country? You will find them illimitable. But woe betide the men who exploit these powers of endurance just for the sake of a passing triumph! I am tired of hearing the expression about "winning the war," "through terror to triumph," about "the last man and the last shilling, whatever the cost." Winning the war! There is something more important than that, and it is what you win by the war that really matters. Is anybody thinking about that? Winning the war! We have won wars in the past, and military victories have been thrown away in the council chamber by diplomatists, simply because the country did not realize what it went into the war for.

Then he said:

Militarism has never been crushed by force of arms. Force of arms has only created militarism. It is to be hoped that Europe will have learned a lesson from this war, and that militarism will be crushed everywhere. In Germany, it happens to be a very pernicious form of militarism, but Germany is not the only country where militarism exists. We are told that we are fighting for liberty and fighting for democracy against tyranny, but gradually we have seen the very system we abominate, whose very existence we detest, instituted in our midst, and in setting out to destroy the enemy we are creating it at home. Criticism is silenced, opinion is repressed; without any sort of excuse or adequate explanation, a Liberal Administration committed suicide before our eyes, Acts of Parliament have been rushed through without debate, and any criticism or opposition is condemned as

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unpatriotic; labor has been dragooned, newspaper offices have been raided, pamphlets have been burned, speakers imprisoned, protection instituted and conscription threatened—and all this in the name of liberty and democracy.

You quite see Mr. Ponsonby's point. You might go to war, and you might in the conduct and progress of that war have to institute in your own land the very things that you abominate in the enemy's land. War is an extraordinary thing. You never know how it will turn out. The only consolation I have, after talking to belligerents and jingoes—and many are jingoes—in New York, is to turn back to some great person who has been in the thick of it for years and years and read what he has to say of war. Read Lord Morley. Lord Morley, after all the wars that he saw conducted by Britain, had to say, when he was writing Gladstone's life, that statesmen, when they go into war, very soon forget the purpose of the war. You do not know what the other country will do. In this war they are asking that the Government restate its terms. Why? Because the events of the war have completely changed the ideas that were in the minds of the statesmen when the war broke out. Furthermore, the speech which Mr. Asquith made over a year ago, and which, according to Mr. Asquith, placed Britain in the position of a power that is fighting for a better Europe, does not now fit the military situation. Listen to the words of his speech. It was a speech made at Dublin, in September of last year, when he said that what we ought to keep in view in this war was the enthronement of the idea of public right, which meant,

by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for groupings and

alliances, and a precarious equipoise, of a real European partnership based on the recognition of equal rights, and established and enforced by a common will.

We all subscribe to that—everybody does; but is that what we are fighting for now? The position is entirely changed, and the longer we go on, the more the position will change, not from the mere fact of more belligerents entering the field, or from the numbers of powers that make up the Entente or the Central Powers—not that at all, but from the thousand and one violations that are going on in regard to international law, and will have to go on and multiply the longer the war goes on. Indeed, as a great general said the other day, what I would like to know is this, Is it going to be muddle and attrition?

You can see that the Union of Democratic Control in the House of Commons is really standing for a policy that means something to humanity. It may not be on all fours with what is required by the Government, but that is another thing. The Government is not humanity; it is not the people. I have a letter from one of my friends, who says:

As far as the U. D. C. is concerned, we are going ahead vigorously and having plenty of meetings. Perhaps the most marked thing is that Ponsonby and I were able to speak our minds in the House of Commons with perfect toleration. There was a large house when I spoke, and they listened attentively, and to some parts of my speech with a great deal of obvious agreement. At any rate, I am pretty sure that the mass of our fellow members already see that a "war of attrition" would be absolutely ruinous to ourselves as well as to Germany, and to any clear-sighted person it is obvious that if there is not going to be a war of attrition, there must be a statement of terms before long, and before

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there is any enormous change in the military situation. I do not feel as yet in the least inclined to prophesy. I only know that things are not in the least as they would seem to any one merely reading the newspapers.

Their work is efficacious; there is no doubt about it.

A friend told me, some time ago, that he had lost his third son. This father has been one of my greatest jingo opponents in England. He lived in the first constituency that I ever fought, where all my father's stock comes from, and so much of a jingo was he, and so much opposed to my sentiments, that he would follow me from village to village, even when I was doing educational work, to hamper me at question time. After two big political fights in the division, we became good friends. I did not convince him. He was still a jingo. When, however, he wrote to tell me that he had lost his third son in the war (the fourth son is a cripple, and will never be able to sit up), he said:

I do not know whether it is the loss of my lads that has made me think, or whether it has been the awful position of my wife through it all, who can speak to no one, who just goes about the grounds outside my house from almost early morning to late at night, to keep out of sight. I said to her one day that I had promised to read some of the literature that you had suggested to me so often. I took up Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, and it is the first big work I ever read in my life. I used to consider that I was doing a great deal of reading if I read a novel of three hundred and fifty pages, but to get through the fifteen hundred pages of *War and Peace* was a formidable task for me—but it has cured me! I see war now as the real soldier sees it. Tolstoy was a real soldier. He was not a jingo editor, sitting down here out of earshot of the guns, writing his

morning news in his safe, comfortable office. No; it is another thing, when you get the real soldier, the man who fought at Sebastopol and on the Danube; the man who wrote of Napoleon's campaigns like Tolstoy.

My friend has joined the Union of Democratic Control. So you see there is consolation even in Heaven for that sinner that has been reclaimed. It is through the experience of war that these things come home to the people. If you will only let them know what they are fighting for, and let them know the full cost. Think of the position now of the reformer in Great Britain. There was need of reform in Great Britain. I have helped the land movement in Great Britain, the English leagues for the taxation of land values. It was a long, bitter fight. You talk about your fight against vested interests in your country; you do not know what a fight is until you bump up against British landlordism. The budget spoken so much about in this country, called the "people's budget," the budget of 1909, to revalue the land of Great Britain, was not a particularly revolutionary measure, in one sense; it was not hasty, for the land of Great Britain, as a whole, had not been valued since the time of William and Mary. It was time that something was done. To-day some one quoted Richard Cobden. The quotation made me think of reform, and how slowly we move. In 1843, Richard Cobden said, "I am in favor of abolishing the whole of the 'breakfast-table duties.'" The burden then was enormous on the wage earners. How did he say he would find an alternative for the Treasury, for we could not abolish those duties and lose the money? If the duties were to be abolished and the money lost, there

must be another source of income provided. So he said, "Revalue the land of the country, and place taxes on it equal to the amount that you would lose." That was in 1843.

Now we will look at the 1914 budget. What was the topic? Just the same old topic that Cobden referred to in 1843! The same old topic that my grandfather, William Neilson, went to Dundee gaol in chains for. I have a copy of one of the Scottish chartists' manifestoes. Some of the topics mentioned in it were: the repeal of the corn laws, freedom of speech, freedom of meeting, and the abolition of the House of Lords. You cannot make much progress and have wars. You cannot do it. We have tried to, and we have failed ignominiously. Ladies and gentlemen, think. The Boer War came at a time when we were making a little progress. Then came the burst of imperialism from Mr. Chamberlain. Look what it cost us in South Africa, not to mention any other parts of the globe. Can you make progress with war? Think. Perhaps never in the history of any country was such an attempt made at progress with such enormous disabilities as was made by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Asquith. In 1906, they had this extra load of two hundred and fifty millions debt. Taxes were placed on sugar, which was not taxed before the Boer War. There was a tax of eight pence a pound on tea. Taxes were increased on tobacco, spirits, and beer, and the tax was also increased on dried fruits. During the Boer War they put a tax of two shillings on corn. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government set to work to carry out its pledges, to reform the land, to reform the House of Lords, to reform education, and to reform pretty nearly everything. Now, at the end

of eight years, what have they done? They had paid off one hundred millions of the war debt. They had reduced some of the taxes on sugar and tea. They had, however, to increase the taxes, of course, on beer, spirits, and tobacco, to pay for old-age pensions, and for the extra money required for the big sickness legislation introduced by Mr. Lloyd George, insurance for sickness, maternity, unemployment, and the building of sanatoria in the country to assist in wiping out the "white scourge." They got extra taxes from incomes. And all the time here is this big source, land values, eight thousand millions sterling, lying practically untouched. So we attempted in those eight years to do something, but oh, how little! Where is it now? Piff! it all went the first day we asked for a war credit. When you look back upon fifteen years of your life gone for nothing, and when you have been a Radical all your days and have made a study of the conditions of your country with the idea of making as much happiness as possible, it is a heartbreaking business. If there is one thing that I loathe, it is war. I loathe it, and I shall always fight against it. Now what is there for me to do? Just to work for peace, to go to those who give me an opportunity to speak to them, and try to put before you some of the experiences through which we have passed in Great Britain.

But, after all, you must do your own thinking. Do not be dictated to by editors or speakers. Do not accept what I say. Find out the truth of diplomacy, preparedness, and war for yourselves. The same sources are open to you that are open to me, so you can judge for yourselves. Exercise your own mind, and go in for calm, deliberate study and thought, and you will then have an enormous weapon against war.

"THE WISCONSIN PLAN": A CONFERENCE OF NEUTRALS FOR CONTINUOUS MEDIATION

BY EMILY G. BALCH

IN February, 1915, the Legislature of Wisconsin adopted a memorial to Congress endorsing the so-called plan for continuous mediation without armistice. It may be that the word "mediation" is not well chosen, but the proposal is quite clear-cut and definite, and has had an interesting history, and its backers still hope that it may yet help to make history in a wider sense.

As often happens, the idea occurred independently to more than one person, and unfortunately both these persons were women, and not women with any claim to the authority of the specialist.

The idea has made its way on its merits, and has been perhaps handicapped by its origin. For women stand to-day in a peculiar situation. Formerly, when a woman originated an idea, she acted as an Egeria. However generously Mill or another acknowledged indebtedness to a woman, the ideas went forth with the man's *imprimatur* and counted as his. Women's contributions to progress were all anonymous. To-day it is not so natural to have things take this course, and a woman's proposal is likely to carry her name. At the same time there is a considerable and perfectly intelligible *prima facie* prejudice against it as a woman's proposal, except in certain fields. I considered there-

fore whether or not to describe the origin of this idea, but decided to do so.

Madam Rosika Schwimmer, a Jewish-Hungarian journalist and suffragist, was in London when hostilities broke out. A woman of remarkable intellectual capacity, of wide international acquaintanceship, and of a power of high and deep feeling that I have never seen equaled, she was at first almost prostrated by the war. She decided to come to the United States to see what could be done on behalf of reuniting war-split Europe, and issued a now rare circular outlining a plan for a conference of neutral nations such as is about to be discussed.

In the autumn of the same year Miss Julia Grace Wales, a young Canadian, an instructor in English at the University of Wisconsin, was working, and overworking, on her doctoral thesis. To her, as to her technical enemy Rosika Schwimmer, the war was an intolerable horror.

At Christmas a vacation gave her some free time, and she labored night and day for several days at a first draft of a plan that had been working itself out in her mind for weeks past,—a plan that was in substance the same as that of Madam Schwimmer; a plan to the furtherance of which they have finely coöperated above all pride of authorship, much as they both believe in it, and much as they both hope from it.

Miss Wales talked over her plan with friends, and such an excitement and enthusiasm was aroused among them that they formed an informal committee to press it. She worked over her statement, profiting by criticism and suggestions, and in February it was brought before the State Legislature, where, as was said before, it was officially endorsed and called to the attention of Congress.

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It was also introduced in Congress by Senator La Follette, on February 8th, as Senate Joint Resolution 234, but died in committee after "highly significant discussions" attending its introduction.

The latter part of the same month the National Conference of the Emergency Peace Federation met in Chicago and adopted the proposal as its own.

At The Hague at the end of April and beginning of May an International Congress of Women came together with some 1500 delegates representing ten countries, including Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Belgium. This body also eagerly accepted this plan. Not content with this, it dispatched envoys to the governments of Europe and of the United States, to lay before them the Resolutions of the Congress, twenty-eight in number, of which this was one.

Miss Jane Addams and Dr. Aletta Jacobs of Amsterdam were received by the responsible ministers of Holland, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy (and also by the Pope), Switzerland, France, and Belgium. The second delegation, of which I had the honor to be one, were received by the King of Norway and by the responsible ministers of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Russia. In Petrograd we talked for the greater part of an hour with M. Sazonoff. Returning we had occasion for further interviews in the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Great Britain, and some of our number talked once more with Minister von Jagow, and yet a third time with the Scandinavian authorities. All these latter interviews related to the subject of a conference of neutral nations for purposes of continuous mediation. How would the belligerent nations regard the calling of such a conference? Would the neutral nations send delegates to such a conference,

and which nation or nations should or *would* take the initiative?

In this country interviews to talk over the subject were also held. President Wilson has received for this purpose Miss Addams, myself, Dr. Jacobs, Miss Macmillan, and Madam Schwimmer.

In October an International Peace Congress met at San Francisco, which not only endorsed this plan but sent President David Starr Jordan, accompanied by Mr. Louis Lochner, Secretary of the American Peace Federation, to urge it on the attention of President Wilson; this interview took place early in November.

Besides the backing so far spoken of, the plan has been endorsed by the following Government officials:

The Governors of Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming.

Members of Congress from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin.

United States Senators from California, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

A former Secretary of War and a former Assistant Secretary of War.

A former Secretary of State.

The United States Commissioner of Education.

The Chairman of the American Group of the Inter-parliamentary Union.

There has been besides a wide-spread agitation in its favor partially induced by the following list of endorsements:

Appeal of over two hundred university and college presidents and professors.

National Women's Peace Party—200 branches.

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The Board of Directors of the American Peace Society.
The Christian Endeavor Society.

Colorado State Federation of Women's Clubs—
10,400 members.

Chicago Commons (Settlement)—3000 members.

Central Howard Association, Chicago, Ill.—2500
members.

Woman's Peace Party, Grand Rapids, Mich.—2000
members; and many others.

Nor was this agitation, and this interest and belief
in this proposal, confined to this country.

In Sweden: On June 27th, nearly six hundred mass
meetings throughout the kingdom, with more than
one hundred thousand people attending, urged their
government to coöperate in a neutral conference.

In Holland: On August 3d, the Anti-Oorlog Raad
(Anti-War Council) convened a national meeting at The
Hague, at which hundreds of Dutch organizations were
represented. The convention went on record in favor
of a neutral conference, and petitioned the Dutch
government accordingly.

In Switzerland: Twenty-one organizations are now
circulating a petition to encourage their government to
act with other neutrals.

In England, the British Branch of the Women's
International Committee for Permanent Peace (the
organization of which latter was the outcome of The
Hague Conference) not only endorsed the plan but in
July were just getting out a third edition of Miss
Wales's pamphlet, bringing the total copies up to 8000.
The first two editions had been sold out.

This is a long introduction. What is this plan which
has found such curiously wide and diverse encourage-
ment? Does it appeal merely to those who, desiring

peace, are ready to accept any program which operates with that magic password? What are its merits, its difficulties, its outlook?

First as to its constitution and calling. What the plan called for was that the neutral governments should appoint delegates to sit together indefinitely while the war continued—"Continuous mediation without armistice." The reasons why a truce is impracticable are many and obvious.

I quote Miss Wales as to its function:

The members of the commission should have a scientific but no diplomatic function. . . . The commission should explore the issues involved in the present struggle, and in the light of this study begin making propositions to the belligerents in the spirit of constructive internationalism. If the first effort fail, they should consult and deliberate, revise their original propositions or offer new ones, coming back again and again if necessary, in the unalterable conviction that some proposal will ultimately be found that will afford a practical basis for actual peace negotiation. The commission should be established without delay, on neutral initiative.

I quote further from a statement sent out last month by the National Peace Federation, of which Mr. Hamilton Holt is President:

The work of the conference should be to formulate concerted proposals of possible terms of peace as a basis for suggestions and objections on the part of the belligerent governments and for public discussion. In other words, it should frame the outline of a possible treaty to be submitted to the belligerent governments and to be publicly discussed in the different countries.

Further, on the basis of the suggestions and objections

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received from the belligerent governments, the conference should modify the original proposals and submit them again to the belligerents in the modified form. It should in this way continuously develop the original proposals in the line of further suggestions and objections made by the belligerent governments, or arising out of the public discussion of the successive proposals in the different countries. It should continue in this way until the proposals have reached a point when the belligerents of both sides find in them sufficient common ground themselves to meet for the final settlement of the peace treaty.

The type of persons appointed should be of broad international outlook. They . . . should act on their own responsibility, as do the Judges of The Hague Court of Arbitration, who are appointed by their governments, but who, once appointed, act on their own responsibility. The work of the conference, however, would be different from that of The Hague Court of Arbitration, which deals only with justiciable questions. The proposed conference would more resemble an International Court of Conciliation, and its work would be analogous to that of a Board of Conciliation mediating between employers and employed.

Those with special information regarding the problems involved, whether from neutral or belligerent countries, would be willing to give it to such a conference of neutral governments.

Two important points are to be observed.

(1) The delegates, though officially appointed, should have no power to commit their own governments to anything. The government's responsibility is limited to the mere fact that it invites or is invited to designate members of the conference, and that it does designate and accredit such.

(2) The members of the conference should be free to act without referring back to their respective governments.

Some writers have proposed a conference not alone for purposes of mediation, but one in which at the same time the rights of non-belligerents in time of war should be defined, and the interests of non-belligerents be represented. This seems to most of those who advocate the continuous mediation idea a fatal policy, and for several reasons.

In the first place, too much time has already been spent, at Hague congresses and elsewhere, in arranging the ways in which war shall be carried on. The time that has been spent in haggling over dumdum bullets, and legislating that bombs solely for the dispersion of asphyxiating gases should be illegitimate, but that bombs for the diffusion of asphyxiating gases *plus* missiles should be legitimate, might have been better employed. One of the shocks of the present experience has been to find how easily we adjust our plastic human nature and plastic human institutions, even our highly artificial and sensitive credit systems, to the new conditions imposed by warfare, as a man with one lung or a leaky heart learns to get on in that way. Let us not call together a new conference to arrange how to make war tolerable and to adjust our institutions further to its continuance. Let us get rid of the idea that if war is only properly regulated and politely conducted it is all right.

In the second place, a conference of neutrals laying down and insisting on their own grievances and claims would be by that very fact spoiled for mediatory functions or for conciliation. If a man is trying to get two angry neighbors to listen to reason and see if it might not be possible to find some fair and reasonable plan on which they can agree, he does not begin by pointing out how, in their fighting, they have trampled on his own

garden, and by insisting that they shall quarrel without interfering with his business.

The two functions of a neutral conference are mutually incompatible and should be undertaken by separate bodies differently constituted.

We have seen how far the conference, once constituted, would be dissociated from the countries constituting it. Its relation to the belligerent governments would be in a sense still less. The belligerent governments would not need to take any official cognizance of the conference, and therefore not only need not ask to have it called, but need not be consulted as to whether it should be called.

The Hague Convention provides that it cannot be considered an unfriendly act to offer mediation. Nevertheless, in the actual world neutral governments will not take even so innocent a step as naming members of such a conference without assuring themselves through diplomatic channels that such a conference would not be resented.

Information on this point is at hand in the signed statement issued on October 15, 1915, by five of the women who enjoyed the interviews already described:

Jane Addams (United States).

Emily G. Balch (United States).

Aletta Jacobs (Holland).

Chrystal Macmillan (Great Britain).

Rosika Schwimmer (Austria-Hungary).

This says:

We heard much the same words spoken in Downing Street as those spoken in Wilhelmstrasse, in Vienna as in Petrograd, in Budapest as in Havre, where the Belgians have their temporary government.

Our visits to the war capitals convinced us that the belligerent governments would not be opposed to a conference of neutral nations; that while the belligerents have rejected offers of mediation by single neutral nations, and while no belligerent could ask for mediation, the creation of a continuous conference of neutral nations might provide the machinery which would lead to peace. We found that the neutrals on the other hand were concerned lest calling such a conference might be considered inopportune by one or other of the belligerents. Here our information from the belligerents themselves gave assurance that such initiative would not be resented. "My country would not find anything unfriendly in such action by the neutrals," was the assurance given us by the foreign Minister of one of the great belligerents. "My government would place no obstacle in the way of its institution," said the Minister of an opposing nation. "What are the neutrals waiting for?" said a third, whose name ranks high not only in his own country but all over the world. "Yours is the sanest proposal that has been brought to this office in the last six months," said the Prime Minister of one of the belligerent countries.

As to the functioning of the proposed conference, it would, among other things, do a great service in merely bringing concrete proposals forward for discussion. These would at once give a starting point to the moderate element in each country, and help them in their stand against their respective jingo opponents at home. The English Independent Labor Party says in a manifesto:

Each country believes itself to be fighting for "Liberty," "Freedom," and other terms which, used in this connection, are vague and insubstantial. In no case has a government stated in a practical and concrete way the terms on which

it would be willing to negotiate peace. . . . The Labor and Socialist forces in all the belligerent countries should press their governments to disclose, not in vague, meaningless generalities, but in clear and specific terms, what they are fighting for, and on this information it would be possible to take national and international action, with a view to reaching a settlement with the largest possible measure of equity, and the least possible loss of life. There are obligations to be met, not least in regard to Belgium, but the aim and purpose of the governments, the point at which they would be satisfied, should be frankly stated, for an open declaration might help to remove error and fear, and save hundreds and thousands of lives that otherwise would be needlessly slaughtered.

The case for such a conference is very well stated in the closing paragraph of an article in the October 23d number of *The New Republic*:

No one doubts that the nations of Europe are already weary of war. Nine tenths of the population of each of the belligerent states would gladly accept any peace terms consistent with national honor. Less and less is the national honor of the one party conceived of as implying the subjugation and humiliation of the other. The time will come—perhaps it is at hand—when each of the belligerents will realize that further fighting cannot possibly produce gains commensurate with its costs. Yet neither party will dare to make overtures for peace, lest it weaken its moral position and still be forced to fight on. The initiative must come from the neutrals, pressing their claims upon both parties with equal force. And if, when the time of compromise has come, the neutrals have not formed an organization appropriate to the work, the guilt for further bloodshed will at least partly rest upon them—most of all upon the United States, designated by its geographical position, its ethnical composition, its wealth, and its power for leadership in the enterprise.

There is danger, however, of the United States playing a dog in the manger part in this. In talking the project over, as I and my colleagues had the opportunity to do, with the responsible ministers of various countries and with other well-informed and statesmanlike persons interested, the plan took more and more definite shape. The six European countries that have any valid neutrality are Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, and Spain. Spain, for reasons merely of distance and time, we did not visit. In all the others there was conference, and generally reiterated conference. Our conclusions are stated in the manifesto already quoted, as follows:

We have been convinced that the governments of the belligerent nations would not be hostile to the institution of such a common channel for good offices; and that the governments of the European neutrals we visited stand ready to coöperate with others in mediation. Reviewing the situation, we believe that of the five European neutral nations visited, three are ready to join in such a conference, and that two are deliberating the calling of such a conference. Of the intention of the United States we have as yet no evidence.

We are but the conveyors of evidence which is a challenge to action by the neutral governments visited—by Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

We . . . bear evidence of a rising desire and intention of vast companies of people in the neutral countries to turn a barren disinterestedness into an active good-will. In Sweden, for example, more than four hundred meetings were held in one day in different parts of the country, calling on the government to act.

The excruciating burden of responsibility for the hopeless continuance of this war no longer rests on the will of the

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belligerent nations alone. It rests also on the will of those neutral governments and people who have been spared its shock but cannot, if they would, absolve themselves from their full share of responsibility for the continuance of war.

The statement on this, issued in November by the National Peace Federation, is as follows:

In order to make a start in forming such a conference some neutral state must issue the invitation to other neutral states to the conference. Certain European neutrals have already intimated a readiness to help and a wish to coöperate when effective action should be taken. Moreover, the governments of the Netherlands and of Sweden are seriously considering the question of taking the initiative. Our information leads to the belief that the conference could be more efficiently and quickly got together if one of the European neutrals were to convene a conference of the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and the United States of America.

The United States would probably find it difficult, if it took the initiative, to discriminate between the European neutrals and the South American republics, with which it has so many close ties. The United States, however, would not be in the same difficult position in accepting the invitation of one of the European neutrals to join in a conference with the European neutrals.

Were these European neutrals informed, officially or unofficially, that the United States would accept such an invitation, it would be possible to set up the conference in the near future. These smaller European neutrals would in this way be given the support which would make it possible for them to act.

In case it seems to our statesmen unwise for us to so far depart from our precedent of abstention from

European quarrels as to ourselves take the lead, can we not at least give our hearty moral support and good wishes to Spain, Sweden, Holland, the Pope, or any other neutral that will take the initiative in calling together such a conference? Since without such assurance from us the small neutrals, all in very difficult positions, are afraid to act, are we not indeed a dog in the manger, neither moving nor making it possible for others to do so?

I do not wish to imply that there are no difficulties. Naturally doubts and criticisms regarding this plan are plentiful.

The most common objections seem to be that such a conference would be completely ineffective and that it would force a premature peace. The two arguments are obviously inconsistent. But supposing that such a conference were not ineffective, but that, on the contrary, the governments found it an acceptable instrument, how could it force any one of them to a "premature peace," "an inconclusive peace," or any kind of peace but that which the nation under existing circumstances desired? The president of a great Peace Society told me he opposed the plan because he feared it would end the war too soon. I have puzzled much over how he supposed it could do it.

A second objection is that it is too early to begin any move for such a conference. As the manifesto already quoted says:

It has been argued that it is not the time at present to start such a process of negotiation, and that no step should be taken until one or the other party has a victory, or at least until some new military balance is struck. The answer we bring is that every delay makes more difficult the begin-

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ning of negotiations, more nations become involved, and the situation becomes more complicated; that when at times in the course of the war such a balance was struck, the neutrals were unprepared to act. The opportunity passed. For the forces of peace to be unprepared when the hour comes is as irretrievable as for a military leader to be unready.

As the statement of the National Peace Federation remarks :

Those who advocate the postponement of any action toward the application of those principles till the end of the war fail to realize that the terms of peace are being decided now in the secret bargains being made between one or the other belligerent side and the neutrals who are being urged to enter the conflict.

To suggest the postponing of action till after a problematic decisive victory, whether on one side or the other, is to go back to the exploded idea that peace must be dictated by the victor to the defeated.

Moreover great bodies move slowly and if there is a chance that proposals of such a conference might find people ready to discuss them months from now, then it is none too early for governments to take the first steps looking to the calling of such a conference.

Thirdly, it has been objected that for such a conference to be called at a time when one side has the military advantage would be to favor that side. The manifesto says:

The answer we bring is that the proposed conference would start mediation at a higher level than that of military advantage. As to the actual military situation, however, we quote a remark made to us by a foreign Minister of one of the belligerent powers: "Neither side is to-day strong

enough to dictate terms, and neither side is so weakened that it has to accept humiliating terms." Such a conference would consist of the ablest persons of the neutral countries, assigned not to problems of their own governments, but to the common service of a supreme crisis. The situation calls for a conference cast in a new and larger mold than those of conventional diplomacy, the governments sending to it persons drawn from social, economic, and scientific fields who have genuine international experience.

Their aim would be to find common ground of agreement, chosen with as little regard as practicable to temporary advantages, and as much as practicable to reasonable permanent adjustments making for international stability. Terms practically dictated by men flushed with military success and dominated by the shortsighted statesmanship of the soldier are not the most hopeful terms.

A fourth objection is that the whole neutral argument in general, and the propaganda for continuous mediation in particular, "*assumes that both sides are equally in the wrong—an assumption contrary to truth and hence fundamentally immoral.*" Miss Wales in a recently published statement, issued one may suppose especially with her fellow British subjects in mind, argues as follows:

In reply to this charge we emphatically assert that the neutral propaganda for Continuous Mediation without Armistice makes no such assumption. What it does assume is that in any case there are some right-thinking people on both sides. In an appeal for coöperation to right-thinking people in all countries neutral and belligerent, whatever their national prejudices in connection with the present war, we believe that it would be out of place to

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dogmatize as to which side, if either, represents the cause of international righteousness for which we desire to contend in working for the establishment of an international commission. We believe that any nation sincerely fighting for the right has nothing to fear from the plan and much to gain, that the plan is on the side of any country that is on the side of international righteousness. We believe that the plan of Continuous Mediation without Armistice will tend to assist and reward right motives in every country and to thwart wrong motives. We believe that the citizen of any country understanding our plan and believing that his own country is fighting for the right will feel that the plan is favorable to his own national cause. We believe that the plan, if carried out, would, while thwarting shortsighted national selfishness, tend to bring ultimate good to all lands—the genuine and permanent benefit which depends on the welfare of the family of nations as a whole. Among those working for the establishment of the international commission are people of various national sympathies. Probably there is no one working for the establishment of the international commission who has not a personal opinion as to which side on the whole represents the cause of right. We feel, however, that difference of opinion as to the sincerity of the belligerents, the responsibility of the war, and the attitude which the various nations will take in the settlement need not prevent us from working together provided that we are agreed in our desire for the establishment of a permanent peace based on principles of international righteousness.

A fifth objection is that such a conference is officious and unnecessary since the belligerent governments will ask for terms when they are ready, and that till they are ready, nothing can be done. The statement issued by the National Peace Federation in November says:

It is useless to wait until one belligerent side asks for mediation, because however sick both sides may be of the war, they are too proud to accept mediation as commonly understood. None of the governments can afford as yet to go before its people with a virtual confession of defeat, such as would be implied in its official acceptance of mediation. The censored press in each of the belligerent countries leads each people to believe that victory is certain. Imagine, then, the popular outcry against any government that suddenly announced that it had told Uncle Sam or any other neutral that it was ready for a settlement!

It is clear, then, that the first steps looking toward an approach to a settlement must come from some neutral agency. Every day's delay means loss, irreparable loss, not only to the belligerents but to the whole world. This method provides the machinery for taking the first step towards a settlement. It is for the neutrals to put it into motion.

To quote once more the National Peace Federation statement:

This war is in every way unparalleled, so that none of the methods applied to the settlement of previous wars are practicable. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to the future peace of the whole world that the method of bringing about the settlement of the present war should be adapted to its peculiar circumstances. Such a method is this impartial neutral conference, which would work towards a settlement without waiting to be officially asked by the belligerents.

A sixth objection is that a conference of neutrals would be a clumsy and slow moving body, and that a single neutral might better undertake the work of conciliation.

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The necessity of mediation by a group of governments, instead of by an individual government, is that, on the one hand, the group acting jointly would give confidence to the belligerents of both sides, and, on the other hand, would help to safeguard the neutrality of the individual governments coöperating.

This is necessary because the sensitiveness of the belligerents might lead them to suppose that some of the neutrals might lean to one side and some to the other, so that the coöperation of a group would assure the belligerents of the disinterestedness of all the parties.

A final objection is that the war must be "fought to a finish," and decided solely by force of arms. In some mysterious way it is considered more honorable and more effective to drive the Germans out of Belgium, for instance, than to secure her freedom and independence, without which any permanent peace is unthinkable, by negotiation. At least everyone may be sure that this is not the view of the Belgians themselves. To them the utmost and final horror would be the retreat of angry and defeated hordes, blowing up and burning as they went whatever remains of bridges, railroads, cathedrals, cities, homesteads, and followed by a rush of victorious soldiery. Talk this over with any Belgian you can get at and never more will you consider such a driving out of the enemy a tolerable proposition.

David Starr Jordan says:

No probability exists that military operations in any quarter, on land or sea, can of themselves bring the war to an end.

A sweeping victory on either side, even if attainable, would not contribute to the solution of the problems of Europe, being sure to leave an increasing legacy of hate with the seeds of future wars.

No possible gain, economic or political (the integrity of invaded territory being assured), can compensate any nation for the loss, distress, and misery involved in this war and aggravated by every day of its continuance.

This is in line with what one of the great European ministers said to our envoys: "You are right that it should be of the greatest importance to finish the fight by early negotiation rather than by further military efforts, which would result in more and more destruction and irreparable loss."

In conclusion, I will give the latest and most condensed restatement by Miss Wales:

Our argument for Continuous Mediation without Armistice rests on the following convictions:

(1) That humanity should be able to find some method of avoiding prolonged wholesale destruction;

(2) That on both sides there are people who believe themselves to be fighting in self-defense, who desire a right settlement, and who ought not to have to fight against each other; that it is an ultimate outrage against humanity that they have to do so;

(3) That the only way to straighten the tangle is to adopt and persistently employ the device of placing simultaneous conditional proposals ("Will you . . . if the rest will?") before the belligerents; that neither side can think correctly or effectively unless it has among the data of its thinking exact knowledge as to how the enemy (not merely the government but the various elements of the people) would react to every possible proposal for settlement;

(4) That truth tends to work on the mind, and that to place sane standing proposals before the nations would tend to ripen the time for peace;

(5) That delay is dangerous because bitterness and the desire for revenge are growing stronger, and the civil power

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in all warring countries is daily growing weaker in proportion to the military;

(6) That there ought to be a commission of experts sitting throughout the war and in some way holding the possibilities of settlement before the belligerents; that world consciousness is trying to break through; that a world thinking organ should be created and that the creation of such an organ at this juncture would concentrate and render effective the idealism of all nations and open the possibility of establishing, upon a deposed militarism, the beginnings of World Federation.

WAR'S TEST OF THE GERMAN THEORY OF MILITARISM

BY MORTON PRINCE

THE term "militarism" has different meanings for different people. With some its signification relates merely to the size of the army and navy maintained by a nation; with others to the motives, attitude of mind, and political policies which are behind the military establishments, and the purposes for which they are to be employed. So that in this view one nation might maintain a very small military force and yet its government rest upon and be actuated by "militarism"; while another, the United States, for example, or Great Britain, might maintain a very great military or naval establishment without exhibiting militarism. We must not confuse militarism, understood in this sense, with the American idea of "preparedness" against war—a policy of national defense which is now in the public mind in this country. The two have nothing in common excepting that they make use of military organization as a means to an end. It is the difference in the ends sought that distinguishes the two.

However militarism in general be defined, our thesis requires only that we deal with the German theory of militarism. There is a very general consensus of opinion throughout the world, outside, of course, of the

German Empire, as to the character of German militarism and the purposes which it has been meant to subserve. I believe I am right in saying that it is commonly agreed that the fundamental principle of German militarism is that the stability, power, and will of the nation rest on armed force; and therefore that it is to such armed force that the Imperial Government looks both to maintain itself within the Empire and to enforce its will and its policies upon other nations without the Empire.

More concretely, German militarism 'in its external relations may be defined as the idea of extending the nation's trade and system of government by force. It would be easy to cite from numerous authorities to support this interpretation of German militarism.

Militarism thus becomes something much more than a system of defense against encroachments from within and without—it is a mode of, and organization for, attack in the enforcement of progressive policies, of national growth, and of the will of the state, whatever direction these may take. It has been even the boast, not only of the German Emperor but of a host of German publicists, that by the potential power of its army Germany has itself maintained peace between the great powers of Europe during the past twenty-five years.

With the questionable validity of this claim I am not here concerned, any more than with the prophecy of the Emperor in 1902, when he said, "The powerful German army guarantees the peace of Europe." The irony of Aug. 1, 1914, makes such claims tragic. My only motive in citing them is to summarize the functions which militarism has undertaken to perform so that when we come to weigh its claims with its achievements we may indite it.

With militarism as a principle of government within the German Empire I have nothing to do. Though it may be a system for the enforcement of the will of the state against the will of the people, if the German people are satisfied with government resting on the principle of armed force, it is their own affair and concerns them alone. I will content myself with pointing out that that principle necessarily means autocracy based on armed force, and is utterly antagonistic and hostile to that other principle of government which rests upon the moral force of public opinion controlled and checked by constitutional guarantees to the individual of "natural" and "inherent" and "inalienable rights." And yet, if time permitted, the thesis would be an interesting one to defend that even within the German body politic, militarism like all other human forces acting upon human beings, is bound eventually to excite and bring into activity other forces antagonistic to itself and with which it sooner or later must come into conflict. And this has happened. The extraordinary growth of the German democracy, to say nothing of the numerous political parties that have sprung up in opposition to the government, must be looked upon as the necessary reaction of human wills to an autocratic will attempting to impose itself by force. However that may be, it is of the theory of militarism applied to international relations that the present war can alone be regarded as a test, and it is this aspect of the theory that I propose to consider.

We need not concern ourselves with the origin and historical evolution of German militarism. It is sufficient to accept it as it is found in its final form and as it has manifested itself during the last, say, twenty years—since 1899, the date of the Boer War.

The best exposition of German militarism is to be found in concrete applications of its principles, and no more excellent example of applied militarism is to be found than in the attitude of Germany in the Serbian crisis in July, 1914. I trust I may be permitted to cite that incident in spite of the danger of introducing into this discussion controversial matters outside the main thesis.

Serbia had been guilty, or had been charged with being guilty, of offenses against Austria. Germany accordingly gave Austria assurances, secretly, that the latter should have a "free hand" in dealing with Serbia as she saw fit, regardless of the interests of Russia or the sovereign rights of Serbia, and that Germany would back her up with her army, if necessary. To all expostulation on the part both of Serbia and the other powers Germany and Austria turned a deaf ear. A settlement of Austria's demands—all of which were yielded but two and Serbia offered to refer these to The Hague—by mediation, by conference of the powers, by conversations was refused. Militarism had the power, so it felt, to enforce its demands against Serbia, on the one hand, and against any outside interference by any power or combination of powers, on the other. Militarism desired, of course, to "localize" the conflict, for in that case its task would be easy; but if the conflict could not be localized, militarism had the power anyway, so it believed, and was going to gain its ends by force and would accept no other methods, no matter what the consequences. Its ulterior object, it is generally conceded, was to extend German trade as an appanage of empire through the Balkans to the Ægean Sea, Constantinople, and the Persian Gulf by force.

Militarism refused to take into consideration the

rights of a sovereign nation, the "natural" and "inherent rights" of mankind, the political interests of other European powers, racial sympathies and prejudices, the traits, instincts, passions, and aspirations of other peoples, and, above all, mutual international moral obligations by which one nation should respect the rights and interest of every other. Its sole function was to gain the ends of its own nation by force, and, relying upon a supposed fear of its own armed power, it refused until it was too late every other mode of settlement. That was the method of militarism. Necessarily militarism, to be efficient, requires a highly developed condition of preparedness for war. And this the German state has provided, first, in a scheme of offensive and defensive alliances; and, second, in a more efficiently organized military machine than the world has ever before seen and, for that matter, than the world ever dreamed of or thought possible. So that if militarism when tested shall be found not to have been a success, its failure cannot be laid to inefficiency of preparedness.

At this point the difference between the American idea of preparedness and the German idea becomes apparent. The American idea is preparedness for defense against attack.

The German idea includes this, but adds to it preparedness for defense of imperial intentions to extend German trade, German thought, and a system of government throughout the world by force—world empire or downfall, it has been called.

The underlying theory of militarism of course has been that, if all the resources of a nation are organized into a military system and that system is developed to its very highest efficiency in every one of its multiplicity

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of parts, it will be so powerful as to be irresistible against any combination of powers likely within human foresight to be brought against it; and that therefore no state or likely combination of states will dare to attack it on the one hand, and, on the other, it can enforce its will on the world.

As opposed to this we have the rival theory that under modern conditions of civilization, whatever may have been the case in the ancient Roman world, no one or two or three states can dominate the whole world by force; that any state that disregards the natural and inherent rights of sovereign states and fails to show "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" is bound to awaken into activity the latent moral and physical forces of the world; that aggressive actions threatening to obtain unjust advantage by force stimulate resistance, and that sooner or later, under the influence of public opinion, combinations of forces come into being which are too powerful to be overcome by any single power or possible alliance of powers.

A perfect analogy may be found in the great political conflict which of recent years agitated this country—the conflict between organized industries and organized capital on the one hand and public opinion on the other. Great aggregations of capital and industrial corporations, grown arrogant with power, undertook to extend their systems in disregard of the laws that protected the natural and inherent rights of individuals and lesser organizations, and to take what they wanted by the power which they wielded through their mighty militant organizations. In the pursuance of this policy there failed to be shown "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It was the principle of militarism adopted by industrialism and applied by industrial

force. Such overriding of the rights of others necessarily created an uprising of public opinion which gathered to itself the political powers of the nation and the States. These were more mighty than any that industrialism could mobilize. The result was such as might have been expected, and industrial militarism was overthrown.

As tested by the results of the conflict, industrial militarism proved itself a failure. Let us see how far German state militarism has proved successful as tested by this war. We are not concerned, of course, with the moral aspects of the question—with such questions as right and justice—but only with the pragmatic question of success or failure. If militarism can point to success, it can at least find one defense on the ground of necessity and expediency.

Has German state militarism been successful?

When one thinks of the great military successes achieved by the German armies thus far in this war, of the large regions of conquered territory in Belgium, France, Russia, and Serbia, one is prompted offhand to answer in the affirmative. But deeper consideration, I think, shows this view to be a superficial one. None of the armies of the great belligerents on either side has been destroyed. They all remain intact, and until the armies have been eliminated as effective forces, or their governments rendered incapable by exhaustion of using them for further effective offense or resistance, it is idle to talk of victory for one side or the other. Against the occupation of territory by the armies of the Central Empires may be set off:

1. The complete failure of their plan of campaign, designed years in advance, and to carry out which the German military organization had been perfected. So

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far from France being crushed and "bled white" by German preparedness, the German armies, after an early retreat, are held in their trenches, unable to move on the west, and on the east apparently are incapable of further advance.

2. The complete impotence of the German navy, the bottling up of her merchant marine, the destruction of her commerce and consequent impairment of her industries.

3. The loss of all Germany's colonies.

4. The encircling of Germany by an iron naval and military ring from which she cannot break out.

5. The indefinite isolation of Germany from commerce with oversea nations and the paralyzing of her industries by England's navy until England is satisfied with the terms of peace; thus probably enabling England to dictate terms.

6. The possible restriction, after the war, of Germany's commerce by preferential tariffs, mercantile port restrictions, and other measures on the part of England and her colonies, France, and Russia, against Germany and Austria.

These are offsets to the territories conquered by Germany and Austria. In view of them the final possession of the territories now held will be determined by considerations governing the urgency of necessities for peace and not by the fact of temporary occupancy by force. But however that may be, after giving the very maximum of weight to the initial territorial gains justly to be credited to militarism, including those in Serbia, let us look at the other side of the ledger and see what material and moral forces its very successes have called into being to threaten its supremacy.

By its own very example, the object lesson it has

given, it has not only taught other nations the possibilities of military efficiency but, as a necessary reaction, has directly excited them to imitate the methods which German militarism invented and to rival its standards. The results have been:

1. That France, at first half prepared, has in self-preservation developed and organized a military machine which, in proportion to its size, is the equal of Germany's. For this, time was the sole requisite and this was gained when the German war machine was checked and held immobile after the first six weeks of war.

2. That the English nation, hitherto pursuing a policy opposed to the maintenance of large military land forces, has been stimulated to create for the purposes of this war a great military, industrial, and fighting machine which soon will be equal in efficiency, and approximate in numbers of men, to that of Germany. But, more important of all from the point of view of the validity of the theory of militarism, there have been evoked, as a reaction to the threatening oppression of militarism, a solidified British public opinion and a national consciousness that not only accept military preparedness on land as a requisite for national security against force, but are inspired by a national will to destroy the militarism of German autocracy.

3. We are too far removed from Russia to judge the conditions there existing, but it is probably safe to assume that Russia, with her armies still intact, and taught by reverses, is reacting as England and France have done.

4. Even the United States has not remained quiescent. The thought of the nation has reacted to the object lesson of this war, and public opinion, as a coun-

terforce, is fast being mobilized into a national will to oppose the threatening aggressions of militarism by a preparedness to meet the attacks of organized force with organized force.

5. But beyond these reactions, resulting in the mobilization of moral and physical forces against militarism, there have been other moral reactions of great portent. Without undertaking to pass judgment in a discussion of this kind on the rights and wrongs of the cause for which the belligerents of each side are contending, the lamentable fact still remains that the hatred and animosities that have been created in one people for another will prove to be both moral and industrial losses comparable to the loss of provinces.

There is another world condition which can be justly attributed to German militarism and which should be taken into consideration in the test of its success or failure as a policy of government. I refer to the worldwide hostility to and dislike of Germany and her system of government which now, it must be acknowledged, permeates almost all nations. Here, again, I wish to emphasize that I am not concerned with the rightness or wrongness, the justice or injustice of this attitude of mind. I am dealing only with the psychological fact as determined by observation and of common acceptance.

Although this world attitude of mind has been brought to a culmination by the war and by contemporary studies of the German state forced into the focus of interest by the problems raised by the war, its origin can be traced to a succession of events, or better termed, perhaps, "crises," beginning at least twenty years ago. It has therefore been of gradual growth. Let me briefly sketch its history. We need not go further back than

1896, although it would be a serious omission to overlook the formation of the Dual Alliance in 1879, made into a Triple Alliance in 1883 by the union of Italy. For this alliance created a fear of Germany, and as a necessary reaction called forth the dual Franco-Russian alliance in 1891, to become the Triple Entente in 1904 and 1907 by "understandings" between England, France, and Russia. Potential force awakens distrust and creates preparations to use counterforce.

In 1896 the celebrated so-called Krüger telegram of the Kaiser stirred the resentment of the English nation, even to the mobilization of her fleet, and set the people thinking. Suspicions of Germany's intentions became rife, and were kept alive during the next ten years by Germany's ambitions to wrest the supremacy of the seas from England; so that in 1908 the Emperor felt constrained to give out his famous London *Telegraph* interview in the hope to appease them. But the fear of German militarism had taken deep root in the national consciousness of England and haunted her statesmen. Thus the germs of hostility to Germany were planted in the English mind.

In 1897 the act of German militarism that seized Kiao-Chau by force, in disregard of the sovereignty of China, shocked the public opinion of the world.

In 1898, in Manila Bay, the German Admiral Diedrichs brought Germany to the brink of war with the United States, and the German government attempted to form a European coalition against the United States for the purpose of intervening in our war with Spain. Though Dewey, supported by British ships under Captain Chichester, thwarted the scheme of the German Admiral, and the British Cabinet blocked the designs of the German government, the seeds of a public opinion

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hostile to Germany were sown in the United States by these episodes, to germinate later in widespread suspicions of a German design to test the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1905 a diplomatic controversy with Germany over Morocco left France humiliated after the capture of Algeciras with the resignation of Delcassé forced under the threat of war by Germany: Germany gained a point by militarism, but strengthened the entente of France with England against a common foe. Thus in France new seeds of hostility were sown by militarism.

In 1908 it was Russia's turn, when Germany, in disregard of both the Treaty of Berlin and the Treaty of London in 1871, compelled Russia by the threat of the sword to back down and assent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. And Russia announced, "Never again!"

Then in 1911 came the crisis of Agadir, when Germany sent the *Panther* to that port and threatened to interfere for the second time by force with France in Morocco, and nearly brought on a European war. Though German militarism backed down before the power of the combined fleets of France and England, it left increased feelings of hostility to Germany behind.

And so, whatever be the rights and the wrongs of the successive controversies in these crises, there has gradually been incubating for years in the world-consciousness an attitude of mind hostile to German militarism, and this has burst into full ripeness under the heat of resentment for wrongs committed against humanity and civilization during the present war. I have passed over, of course, a large number of co-operating happenings, such as the German Emperor's appeal to Mohammedanism in 1898 and 1905, the militant naval program of 1897, the Casablanca affair in

1908, etc. I have selected only the more critical energizing causes of world hostility.

In view of these critical events, so far from Germany having kept the peace of Europe by the power of its army during the past twenty-five years, as has so often been proclaimed, she has, besides robbing China of a province in 1897, nearly precipitated war by the aggressive actions of her militarism on five different occasions: once in 1896 with England, once in 1898 with the United States, twice with France, in 1905 and in 1911, and once with Russia in 1908. And finally, by common consent, German militarism incited the world cataclysm of 1914.

It is not given to anyone to prophesy the final outcome of this war, but we can at least say this, that, whatever it may be, it is not conceivable that the successes of German militarism can be a recompense for its moral and material losses, and that it will not be left in a relatively far weaker condition for offense than before the war. Whatever may be the final result as determined by the terms of peace, German militarism at the end of the war will not only not have succeeded in gaining its long planned for end of achieving its ambitions by force, but will have called into being a combination of opposing forces far more powerful than its own.

The Central Powers will find themselves surrounded by hostile powers not one of which will be more exhausted than Germany herself.

There will have been created in each of the greater allied nations—France, England, Russia, and Italy—a military organization, modeled after the German pattern, fully equipped and prepared and commanding all the mobilized industrial resources of the nation.

German militarism will have awakened in every nation, including the United States, a complete understanding of the forces with which it will have to deal in the future—an understanding that was previously lacking—and will have created a preparedness by the great powers against attack which will guarantee that none can be taken unawares; will make another invasion impossible, and military threats impotent.

In other words, it will have created a world condition, probably with groups of offensive and defensive alliances, in view of which no nation, and no alliance of nations, can hope to aggressively enforce its policies against a great power by military force.

In other words, German militarism, by its potential power and aggressive tactics, has called into being, as it was bound in time to do, forces more powerful than itself.

By the test of this war, then, as I view the case, German militarism has failed as a theory of empire. In this failure have we not the most powerful motive for an international court to enforce peace?

THE WAR—A TEST OF THE GERMAN THEORY OF STATE

BY KUNO FRANCKE

IN the present war Germany is undergoing the greatest test of national stamina to which any nation ever has been put. For more than a year all Germany has been one vast beleaguered fortress. For more than a year she has been cut off from nearly the whole world. Her merchant marine has been swept off the ocean. Her export trade has been completely stopped and her import trade nearly so. For more than a year she has had to rely upon her own resources, in men, in food, in equipment, in armament; while nearly all the great military powers of the earth have been together pressing against her and the greatest of the neutral nations—the republics of North and South America—have been furnishing her foes with vast quantities of war material, money, foodstuffs, and other supplies.

In the face of all this, Germany has not only freed her own soil from hostile invasion. She has transferred the war into the enemy's country. East and west of her own frontiers she holds large territories in firm grip. And now, together with her Austrian ally, she is gathering her forces for a great thrust in the south, which, if successful, will burst the iron ring forged by her enemies around her.

What accounts for this extraordinary manifestation

of national will power? To put it briefly: the impetus given to the whole of German life by the German theory of state.

The German theory of government rests upon the fundamental conviction that the state is not only a protector of vested rights, not only a guardian of public safety and of social conditions that make for individual happiness, but that it is preëminently a moral agency superior to society, and that its principal mission is to raise the individuals that make up society to a higher level of public consciousness and energy.

No doubt there never was a conception of the state among any people from which this moral and disciplinary view was entirely absent. But not since Plato's time has this view anywhere been a national force as truly vital and all-embracing as it has come to be in modern Prussia and Germany. It has imbued the whole German people, as no other people is imbued, with the spirit of national service and national achievement. The modern German mind instinctively refuses to accept any of the thousand and one private activities that constitute the daily life of a people as something really private and isolated. The farmer and the miner, the factory hand and the sailor, the business man and the preacher, the scholar and the artist—they are all soldiers, soldiers for German greatness and progress; and their spheres of activity, far apart as they seem from each other, are in reality on one and the same level, the level of the fight for making Germany in every way—politically, economically, intellectually, and morally—a self-supporting, self-relying, conspicuously healthy and conspicuously productive national organism.

To call such views of the state a disguise of despotism is doing violence to the English language. For how can

there be despotism in a state where all classes acknowledge public service as the highest law? Besides, it is a well-known fact that, owing to the multiplicity of sovereign German states within the Empire, each one with its own executive and legislature, and owing to the exceptionally high development of municipal self-government in Germany, there is more of habitual, organized popular scrutiny of governmental acts in Germany than in either England, France, or Italy—quite apart from the Reichstag's being based upon an absolutely universal manhood suffrage. But on the other hand, it is clear that a state concentrating all the energies of the people upon the one aim of national achievement is bound to make continuity of administrative policy the very corner-stone of its governmental system. Hence the importance attached in the German theory of state to an executive standing above parties, an executive body consisting of the most highly trained experts in their several departments, representing the most enlightened and most objective opinion upon public conditions and needs, working now with this, now with that combination of parliamentary groups, but not pledged to any one of them, and subject in its tenure of office only to the crown, and not to changing parliamentary majorities.

This, in brief, is the German conception of the state. How has it stood the tremendous test of the present war? How has it succeeded during this supreme crisis in lifting the whole nation to that higher level of public consciousness and zeal which is its foremost aim?

In the first place, the executive has maintained unbroken the continuity of administration. The war has brought Germany no parliamentary sensations and no ministerial crises. While dissensions in the English

Cabinet have been carried almost to the point of rupture, while the Russian Duma has openly attributed the Russian defeats to governmental corruption, while the two foremost anti-German leaders on the Continent, Delcassé in France and Sazanoff in Russia, have been forced to resign, the German policy is to-day in the same hands in which it was at the beginning of the war; and although there has been open criticism of the expediency or effectiveness of some governmental measures, no distrust in the ability of the present government to carry through the war to a successful issue has been uttered in the German Parliament. What the Emperor said on Aug. 4, 1914, in the Reichstag: "From to-day on, I know no parties, I know only Germans," has in the main become true of the people also, and is now a reality throughout the length and the breadth of the land.

In the next place, the economic and industrial adaptation of Germany to the needs of the war has been something marvelous, by far exceeding even the boldest expectations.

The most trenchant and far-reaching economic measures—such as the sequestration by the government of the whole wheat crop, the regulation of the bread consumption of the whole population by an elaborate card system, the limitation of meat consumption and even of the use of fats for cooking purposes to certain days of the week, the establishment of maximum prices for a variety of foodstuffs—all these measures, affecting deeply the daily life and the fundamental needs of sixty-eight million people, have been carried out with an ease and a lack of friction as though they concerned only the superfluities and luxuries of a handful of privileged individuals. And with equal readiness and un-

hesitating decision have the majority of German industries placed themselves at the service of the one great national demand, the upkeep of the army. It is fanciful and false to see in the abundance of munitions and all the other army equipments in Germany, even after a year of isolation from the rest of the world, a proof of Germany's having stored up before the war a fabulous amount of war material. Indeed, in September, 1914, and again in February, 1915, Germany had a decided shortage of munitions. Their present abundance is a proof of the extraordinary ability and willingness of the German people to adjust itself to the supreme need of the hour. Steam-engine factories now turn out shells, pianoforte factories furnish cartridge cases, leather chair factories make knapsacks, boiler factories make field kitchens, hat factories make helmets, roller coaster firms build field hospitals, chemical concerns produce coffee and beef-tea tablets, and so forth *ad infinitum*. The dearth of raw materials has largely been taken care of through the use of substitutes, of potato flour for wheat flour, of tin for aluminum, of steel for brass, of iron electric wires for copper electric wires, and so on; or through the production of artificial materials, such as the production of rubber from oxidized linseed oil or the production of saltpeter—so necessary both as an explosive and as fertilizer—from the nitrogen of the air. And in addition to all this, the German sense of economy, ingrained in the people, generation after generation, by a long tradition of domestic and public schooling, has in this war revealed itself more impressively and finely than ever before. There is not a household now in all Germany where retrenchment in eating and drinking is not the unalterable law of daily conduct, where every waste in cooking and baking is

not scrupulously avoided, where every crumb and every refuse is not carefully preserved, and from where every particle of food and clothing that can possibly be spared does not go out week after week to the men who are fighting for the Fatherland in France, in Flanders, in Russia, in the Balkans, in the North Sea or the Baltic. And while this constant stream of loving gifts is going out to the front the men at the front send back to their families at home what they can spare of their pay. The fact that the German field postal service is handling upwards of ten million private pieces of mail and packages every day is sufficient illustration of what results this systematic and considerate economy is bringing both to the men in the field and their kindred at home. It also shows that the soul of Germany is in this fight, and that it is the people and not the militarist class that is waging it.

And how has the money, needed for this gigantic war, been raised? Let me quote some figures. The total of the third German war loan, raised two months ago, was 12,000,000,000 mark. It was subscribed by 3,551,746 persons or institutions. Of these 545 persons or institutions subscribed over 1,000,000 mark each; 849 persons or institutions subscribed from 500,000 to 1,000,000 mark each; 7274 persons or institutions subscribed from 100,000 to 500,000 mark each; 10,512 persons or institutions subscribed from 50,000 to 100,000 mark each—and so on until at the end of the list we reach the following figures: 881,923 persons (for here the institutions hardly count any longer) contributed from 600 to 1000 mark each; 812,011 contributed between 300 and 500 mark each; and 686,289 persons contributed less than 200 mark each. In other words, the 3,551,746 contributors to this war loan represent indeed the whole

German people from top to bottom, all degrees of income, all strata of society. The German people gave this money joyfully, unreservedly, and trustingly; and there is every reason to believe that they will continue to do so when other loans are called for.

The spirit of national service, of unconditional surrender to the needs of the state, has enabled Germany to mobilize and to sustain her economic forces in this war as none of her antagonists have been able to. It has also mobilized her emotional and moral forces in a manner unheard of before. With the exception of a few Socialist theorizers, not a German has lifted his voice during the last twelvemonth but to declare that this war is the decisive test of German nationality, of everything for which Germans have lived and died in the past. American observers have frequently expressed surprise that the intellectual and spiritual leaders of the Germany of to-day, scientists like Haeckel and Ostwald, philosophers like Eucken and Wundt, philologists like Wilmanowitz and Diels, historians like Eduard Meyer and Erich Marcks, economists like Schmoller and Wagner, theologians like Harnack and Troeltsch, musicians like Humperdinck and Strauss, poets like Dehmel and Gerhardt Hauptman—are all of one mind in this crisis, and that in their individual or collective utterances they lay much more stress upon conviction than argument. The reason, I think, is that these men, and with them the masses of the German people, feel that the German cause in this war *needs* no logical defense, that it is impossible to think that the most orderly, industrious, intelligent, law-abiding, sober, and spiritually minded of nations should suddenly have become insane, and from sheer madness of passion and lust of conquest have plunged into a war

of aggression against the majority of the world's military powers, in other words into what to all outward appearances would seem certain self-destruction. They believe that Germany has been the victim of a world-wide coalition to rob her of the legitimate fruits of her unremitting toil for national organization and to crush the spirit of national solidarity that has led to German ascendancy in nearly every field of higher activity. Whatever may be one's view as to the historical basis for this belief, there can be no doubt that it is this belief more than anything else which is giving Germany in this war an extraordinary heroic strength.

Some months ago, there took place at Namur, the Belgian fortress occupied by German troops since the autumn of last year, a memorable open-air performance. Goethe's *Iphigenie* was produced by German actors in the public square of that town, and the audience consisted of the rank and file of German regiments, with their officers. It would be interesting to know what was going on in the minds of these German soldiers listening in the enemy's country and within sound of cannon thunder to the most delicate and sublimated creation of German dramatic poetry, the triumphal song of the inner life and of purity of soul. Undoubtedly, there were many gradations of feeling, from sleepiness and ennui to æsthetic delight and patriotic rapture. But consciously or unconsciously, all these men must have felt with particular force that day what kind of a country and what kind of a state had sent them forth into war—a state assiduously cultivating every higher tendency, every refining influence; maintaining in its schools and universities the noble message of intellectual striving and moral freedom bequeathed by the classic epoch of German literature;

a state demanding much from every citizen, in taxes, in military service, in submission to all sorts of regulations and ordinances; but giving as much to every citizen, in unimpeachable cleanliness of administration, in the schooling of all classes for the true democracy of public obligations, in securing general respectability and comeliness of the outward conditions of life; a state conserving every one of its physical and intellectual resources, protecting the streams and the forests, safeguarding the workmen against the excesses of capitalism, and at the same time stimulating every activity, enterprise, and invention, and inspiring every one of its members with a feeling of pride of belonging to it. Is it a wonder that such a state has rallied the whole of Germany around itself, and that the German people is determined to uphold this state, at any sacrifice and against any assault?

Let me close with a brief answer to two questions which suggest themselves in connection with this whole subject.

First. The German system of government has often been compared to a huge soulless machine. Can a rational system such as I have been trying to describe be called a soulless machine? I think the war has proved that it cannot. Rather should it be called a living national body, every limb and every fiber full of alertness, teeming with health, quick in thought and quick in action, of infinite resourcefulness and adaptability to varying conditions; an embodied spirit; free energy controlled by a common aim. No unprejudiced observer of contemporary European affairs can get away from the fact that Germany during the last fifty years has excelled all other countries in eagerness and momentum of private initiative. The German school-

boy is more eager to learn, the German university student is more firmly set upon independent research, the German workman has a higher level of average intelligence, the German farmer is more scientific in the cultivation of his soil, the German manufacturer is more ready to introduce new methods of production, the German business man is more active in finding new outlets for his goods, the German city administrator is more keenly alive to civic improvements, the German army and navy officer is more fully abreast with every new experiment or device of military tactics, all Germans are keyed up to a more intense, a more swiftly pulsating manner of life than is the case in any one of the nations with which Germany is now at war. All this intensity of private initiative, I believe, is largely due to the impelling force exerted upon the individual by the exalted views instinctively held by all Germans regarding the mission and the functions of the state.

Secondly. The German system of government has often been called a danger to other less well organized nations. Does this danger really exist?

The history of all the leading nations of the past shows only too clearly that there is a real temptation for a people to use highly organized national power for aggressive purposes. During the last few centuries, France used her higher national organization for wars of aggrandizement under Louis XIV. and again under Napoleon. England used her higher national organization for wars of conquest on a colossal scale under Walpole and Pitt and Palmerston and Disraeli and Gladstone and Salisbury. Prussia used her higher national organization for wars of aggression under Frederick the Great and again under Bismarck. It can be said, I think, with good reason that Germany, since the founda-

tion of the new Empire in 1871, has been less aggressive and less territorially expansive than any one of the great European powers during the same period. Germany has acquired some colonies in Africa and in the Far East. But what are Kamerun and Dar-es-Salaam and Kiao-Chau compared with the British hold upon Egypt, the British subjugation of the South African republics, the Italian conquest of Tripoli, and the French colonial empire in Madagascar, Cochin China, Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco? Wherever Germany has made her influence felt on the globe, wherever she has engaged in colonial enterprises, she has been willing to make compromises with other nations and to accept their coöperation, notably so in the Bagdad railway undertaking. Over and over again, she has been blocked in these enterprises by the ill will of her more grasping rivals, and it is hard to resist the conclusion that the present war was entered upon by her enemies with the hope of shutting her out once for all from the great stakes of colonial expansion.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the present war itself, with its enormous sacrifices in men and money, has led in Germany to a strong and widely spread popular propaganda for territorial compensations, both on the western and the eastern frontier, to be exacted at the end of the war as presumable "guarantees of durable peace."

It is hard to understand how judicious people can believe that the forcible annexation of territories with hostile and racially unassimilated populations could possibly form guarantees of durable peace. It is hard to understand how people can fail to see that these annexed provinces would form a constant source of international irritation and domestic dissension, that

the necessity of holding them by force would inevitably tend to degrade and debase the whole tenor of German public life. Fortunately, the Socialists are not alone in resisting this martial annexation propaganda. Men of such weight and influence as Brentano, Delbrück, Dernburg, Harnack, Mendelsohn, Schmoller, Siemens, have openly attacked it. The German government, I trust, will find some way, at the coming peace conference, of restoring the independence both of Poland and of Belgium, while at the same time attaching these countries to the economic interests of the new Austro-German federation. The annexation of Poland and Belgium would be at variance with the German conception of the state as a moral agency whose mission it is to raise every one of its members to a higher level of public consciousness and activity. The German people, it seems to me, has a rare opportunity before it to demonstrate to the world in a striking manner that its highly developed national organization is not a danger to other less well organized nations, that its remarkable display of national will-power is backed up by an equally remarkable power of national self-restraint, and that Germany indeed took up arms for no other purpose than to uphold national achievements made possible by her superior sense of public obligation and solidarity. The only conquest which will add to Germany's greatness as a result of this war, is the recognition by the rest of the world of the moral strength imparted to a whole people by an exalted view of the mission of the state. Of this conquest Germany is assured, no matter what the final decision of the battlefield may be.

SOME OF THE RIGHTS AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP

BY GEORGE W. ANDERSON

I COME to preach platitudes, or what ought to be platitudes. My first platitude is that rights and obligations are correlative,—the enjoyment of the one connotes the recognition of the other. Recent events indicate that this platitude ought to be pressed home to a considerable part of our citizen population. We must never raise the cry “America for Americans”! but there is much to indicate that it is high time to raise the cry “Americanism for Americans”! It is time to assert anew our faith in the fundamentals of our American institutions; to renew and to voice our belief in, and love for “government of the people, for the people, by the people.”

For some years the Fourth of July oration and its spirit have been out of fashion. We have been analyzing and criticizing, not without cause, some of our achievements and failures to achieve, and thereby have been constrained to be less boastful as to the accomplishments of American democracy. This is well. Self-examination and self-criticism are good. But nations as well as persons must retain and assert a wholesome self-respect. Let there be no cringing spirit in our Americanism. It is time for American citizenship to reassert its rights to self-respect; and also its right to command

the loyalty and the regard of all those who would share its benefits, whether born citizens, naturalized citizens, or strangers within our gates.

My second platitude is that in these times of European war there is both a right and an obligation of neutrality. By this I do not mean merely the right of the American people to keep out of the European war; I mean the right and the corresponding obligation of both citizens and residents to keep the European war out of our political campaigns and elections. I do not say that the best of American citizens may not have and express the deepest sympathies with some of the warring nations. He would be poor stuff to make American or any other sort of citizen out of, who did not, in these frightful times of storm and stress, feel the ties of blood and kin. We all ought to think as well as we can of our ancestors. This is not merely a privilege, but at times it becomes a duty. For instance, when I reflect on some of the performances of my Scotch forbears in Scotland at the time of John Knox and the domination of the Presbyterian Church, it is only a strong sense of duty that makes me disposed to boast of the politico-religious achievements of my ancestry.

But it is one thing to have a sympathetic and tolerant regard for the sentiment growing out of blood and kin, and quite another thing for us to tolerate the attempted injection of European issues into American political campaigns and American elections. We must have it fully and plainly understood that American political campaigns and American elections exist solely for the discussion and determination of American issues, and only of American issues.

We have always suffered in this country from the presence of a considerable number of individuals, some

of them citizens born, some of them citizens naturalized, some bad-mannered guests, who have not yet conceived the dignity and worth of our American citizenship. They still labor under the delusion that the United States is nothing but a place—a piece of land,—an arena in which they may exploit European quarrels and intrigues.

The time is ripe to have it distinctly understood by all of our citizens and by all of our residents that the United States is not merely a place—a piece of land. There must be adequate and respectful realization of the fact that the United States is a body of institutions, a human organism,—of which all *good* citizens are a wholesome, vital, and vitalizing part. If, perchance, we have in our citizenship some who are not vital and cannot be vitalized, it may be necessary to find some method of freeing ourselves from the danger of gangrene.

It is another platitude to say that America has always welcomed to her citizenship men of all the European strains of blood. We expect that in the veins of American citizens will flow German, English, Irish, French, Italian, Swedish, and all the other European strains of blood. But one thing we may and do demand: and that is that all these strains shall run red American blood, else they are not entitled to receive and to retain the rights, the privileges, and the honors of American citizenship. If, after experiment, any amongst us find their blood not running red American, it would be well for them to return to the country whose loss by the emigration of themselves or of their progenitors is not our gain. We shall dote on their absence. We care not whether they came to us in 1700 or in 1900; if they find themselves not *of* us, they belong not with us.

When I state that the injection of European issues into American political campaigns and elections should "not be tolerated," I am far from meaning that I would restrain by law and the strong hand of the government such impudent disloyalty. I had rather lash the hyphenate with an American tongue and punish him by political oblivion, than prosecute him in an American court and confine him in an American prison. We do not need a law to crush out this sort of offensive impertinence. We do need—and in Massachusetts—men in politics who have the courage of utterance and profound belief in the Americanism of the American people. We must make political success impossible to all who lack such belief and the courage to utter it.

I would have no Alien and Sedition laws placed on our Statute books. I have recently read, not with pride, the history of some of the prosecutions instituted by the Federal government against blackguarding slanderers of their government and nation under the Alien and Sedition laws of 1797.

America stands to-day, as always, in an attitude of welcome toward *home-seeking* aliens showing any fair potentiality of fitness for American citizenship. I note with satisfaction that both Republican President Taft and Democratic President Wilson have vetoed legislation applying the literacy test to restrictive immigration legislation. Both of these great American citizens thus recognized and asserted, as the real American policy, that home-seeking aliens must not be kept from us and from those of their own blood and kin who have already joined us, by such unfair and artificial discrimination as the literacy test involved. There is no widespread or well-grounded feeling in

America against aliens as such, but there is an increasing and well-grounded feeling against the alien spirit.

Let me not be misunderstood. In my judgment, at least 95 per cent. of our citizens who, or whose parents, were born on foreign soil cherish the American ideals as resolutely and strongly as those of us whose ancestors came over hundreds of years ago. Indeed, I have often been struck by the fact that some of those who have recently felt the smart of European oppression appreciate the free atmosphere and opportunity of America far better than those whose remote ancestors only knew what the lack of liberty is.

One danger is that the very noise and clangor of the small minority of those who really have the alien spirit will create an unjust, ill-grounded, but widespread prejudice against a great mass of loyal citizens and thus tend to divide and to disintegrate our body civic and politic.

We must conserve, construct, concentrate. Divisive councils should be given no patient hearing. We must have accord, unity, solidarity in Americanism. We in America are all immigrants. No distinction should be made or tolerated, based merely upon the time of our immigration. The distinction should be whether having immigrated, we have adopted and made our own American institutions and American ideals. If "Yes,"—we are American. If "No," we are alien.

Unless threatening signs of disloyalty shall greatly multiply, my own hope and belief are that we shall never need to bar out any aliens because of their insistence on their retaining their alien spirit. But there must be no paltering with that issue. America must be and remain American in institution and spirit. We admit aliens to our American citizenship in order that

they may be Americanized, and not that American citizenship may be alienized.

Nor would I have any revival of the sedition law or the sedition spirit. The history of the attempt in 1797 so to deal with this sort of disloyalty shows that it is far more important that we should have freedom of speech and of the press, than that we should have only truthful and loyal speech and printing.

It would be a grave error for our citizens to say that it is for the government to deal with offensive attempted alien interference in American elections. The main reliance should rather be upon an enlightened and loyal public sentiment, upon creating and maintaining such a moral, social, and political atmosphere as to make un-American breathing impossible. If we are to continue a melting-pot, we must furnish heat enough to melt anything worth melting, and throw all insolubles into effectual discard.

No, the resort should not be to the law or to the courts. But political oblivion,—immediate, permanent, should be the fate of any candidate for office who toys for a moment with the question of permitting the injection of European issues into an American political campaign.

It should never be forgotten that the suppression of the preaching of false doctrines has always been infinitely more harmful to the cause of free government than the preaching of the doctrines themselves. Our just exasperation at the disloyal utterances of some of our citizens must never lead us to encroach to the slightest degree upon the great principle of freedom of speech and of the press. Indeed, there was never a time when we ought more carefully to cherish, conserve, and protect the fundamental principles of American liberty than

now. We must not talk loosely about "treason," "sedition," and "restraining disloyal utterances."

"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." (Constitution of the United States, Art. III, sec. 3.) "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." (First amendment to the Constitution of the United States.) "The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth." (Art. VI of the Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.)

Few recognize after what struggles and how recently real liberty of speech and of the press was secured. Not only the present appalling situation in Europe, with the censorship of the press, perhaps a necessity of the war, but much in our own recent history points to the necessity of guarding jealously all our muniments of freedom. It is enough to note that in Essex County, Massachusetts, in New Jersey, in West Virginia, in Colorado, and perhaps in other states, conflicts have within the past few years taken place, indicating the vital importance of preserving all the great guaranties of our liberty. The history of the struggle for liberty of speech and of the press as set forth in such books as Cooley's *Constitutional Limitations*, should be more commonly taught and understood.

The tendency of those who are armed with governmental powers to abuse them in order to restrain even fair and just criticism of their own conduct, has in experience been found almost irresistible. Even Parliament was formerly supposed to sit with closed doors and no official publication of its papers was provided for and

no other was allowed. In 1641 Sir Edward Deering was expelled and imprisoned for publishing a collection of his own speeches, and the book was ordered to be burned by the hangman. Nor does it appear, as a reading of parts of the *Congressional Record* might lead one to suspect, that the speeches were burned because they were bad. Even our own Constitutional Convention of 1787 sat with closed doors and debated in secret, to the great loss of future students of the Constitution. Under the common law which we inherited from England liberty of the press was neither well protected nor well defined. It was mentioned neither in the English Petition of Rights nor in the Bill of Rights. Yet nothing is plainer than that liberty of speech and of the press is fundamental to the continuance and development of democratic institutions. Nothing could be more utterly destructive, both of the efficiency of democratic government and of the rights of citizens under democratic government, than to give to those who for the time being exercise the powers of government, legal machinery to suppress discussion and criticism. Our constitutional restraints upon government must be jealously guarded. It is not merely the constitutional guaranty of liberty of speech and of the press that we should more fully understand and cherish,—it is the whole body of American liberties expressed in our Bill of Rights. Our whole citizenship should be educated to a fuller knowledge and a keener realization of what these guarantees mean in the daily life of the citizen. The Bill of Rights, if not the whole Constitution of the United States, Lincoln's Gettysburg address, and the essence of the Declaration of Independence ought to be a part of the mental furniture of every intelligent and decently educated

American citizen, either born or naturalized. We must take more seriously and soberly our civic duties and our civic rights. It must be held no light and trifling thing to be an American citizen.

It is, I think, no mere casual coincidence that I have just run across in the last book of the scholarly Senior Senator from Massachusetts an eloquent address on "The Constitution and the *Bill of Rights*," delivered in Boston not long ago; and that at least twice within the last few weeks the scholarly historian, now President of the United States, has in addresses referred to and quoted from the Bill of Rights.

Thoughtful citizens everywhere are re-examining the foundations and muniments of our American liberty. We must teach the rising generation that while both they and we, like Saul of Tarsus, were "born free," our fathers, like Agrippa, "with a great price obtained this freedom," enunciated and secured to us by the Bill of Rights.

The substance of what I have said concerning the importance of guarding jealously freedom of speech and of the press is equally applicable to most of the other fundamental rights secured by our Bill of Rights. We assume freedom of religion, the right of trial by jury, the inviolability of our homes, and forget that a large part of the world is yet a stranger to this sort of freedom. Indeed the entire thirty articles of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, their historic foundation, and their profound significance in the daily life of our people ought to be as well known and understood as the elementary rules of arithmetic. I cannot forbear quoting three of these articles, for in these days when the "subjects" of European monarchies are fighting each other to the death for they know not what, it is well to

contrast the foundation upon which our government rests and to remember that with us the State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State. Articles I, XVIII and XXVIII of our Massachusetts Bill of Rights are as follows:

All men are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.

A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the Constitution and a constant adherence to those of piety, justice, moderation, temperance, industry and frugality, are absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government. The people ought, consequently, to have a particular attention to all those principles, in the choice of their officers and representatives: and they have a right to require of their law-givers and magistrates an exact and constant observance of them, in the formation and execution of the laws necessary for the good administration of the Commonwealth.

No person can in any case be subject to law-martial, or to any penalties or pains, by virtue of that law, except those employed in the army or navy, and except the militia in actual service, but by authority of the legislature.

The obligation of thoroughbred American citizens to deal with the foreign policy of their country in a fair, intelligent, and non-partisan spirit is not limited to the complications which grow out of the European war. It is equally applicable to conditions which arise on this continent, and particularly with relation to Mexico. I am unable to think of the attitude of certain editorial

writers on some of our leading New England newspapers concerning what this country has done and has not done in Mexico, without intense indignation. The partisan bitterness of the hyphenate is arguably excusable, although not justifiable. Insistent as we all must be upon the paramount duty of loyalty to American institutions and ideals, we may yet sympathize with those who still feel too strongly the old ties of blood and kin tugging at their heartstrings. But the attacks upon the present Administration and its policy (and really upon that of the last administration) because disorder has not been suppressed in Mexico, has been of such a mean, carping, apparently mercenary character, as to call for the just indignation of every red-blooded American. The time may come when, in the cause of humanity or of human liberty, such as we thought we felt in 1898 when we went to war with Spain to free Cuba, it may be necessary for the United States to send its citizen soldiery into Mexico or some other Central or South American country. Conceivably the time may come when the 7000 picked Massachusetts youths who marched in our Massachusetts Militia in August may have to be sent, as European boys by the millions have been recently sent, to fight and to die "at their country's call" in a foreign land.

But so long as American ideals dominate in American politics and in our foreign policy, no such sacrifice will be made at the behest of newspapers representing speculative exploitations in foreign lands.

It is one thing to insist that the American flag shall protect American citizens. It is quite another thing to insist that the American flag, backed up by the American soldiery, should be unfurled in a foreign country to protect the roaming, speculative, exploiting

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American dollar that is unable to find sufficiently remunerative opportunities within our own domain.

Perhaps it will be thought that the implication of my subject involves some discussion of preparedness. I query whether preparedness is not being over-discussed. It is enough for me to say that I think the great weight of non-partisan, sound-thinking American sentiment is in favor of a military and naval preparedness substantially such as has been recommended by the National Administration. Force, as the sanction of law, national or international, cannot be ignored. Undoubtedly to-day there is much less just ground to rely upon an enlightened and justice-regarding public opinion as a guaranty of international rights and for the protection of treaties, than eighteen months ago.

But our "preparedness" must be for real and not for imaginary dangers. Nor may we overlook that military and naval preparedness is, as the European war has bitterly demonstrated, itself not infrequently a danger. The preparedness that is being preached by certain profit-seekers should be viewed with just suspicion. I do not share the nervous hysteria of those people who expect that within the next five or ten years we shall have an invasion from the East or the West, or from both at the same time. I suspect the motives and the patriotism of the most vociferous of these preachers of preparedness for profit.

But I do share the solicitude of those who think that the present standards of American citizenship are too low and not growing visibly higher. I do venture to say that we need economic, political, civic, and moral preparedness. It is the unarmed, not the armed, foreign invader that we have most cause to fear. Indeed,

some recent events lead us to question whether we have not already been successfully invaded and whether our present task is not the expulsion of invaders. At any rate, if we are not called upon to go to the extreme of expelling un-Americanized *persons*, we may and ought, by the moral and political methods I have discussed, forthwith to expel un-American ideas and ideals.

What I have said may well be thought to be somewhat heated and polemic. I concede it. These are war times. Calm, peaceful thought and measured expression, however desirable, seem almost inappropriate. I envy the assured confidence in his own mental processes of him who has not, during the last sixteen months, found many of his most cherished notions as to the course of history and the foundations of civilization shaken or utterly destroyed.

But there is a present obligation of American citizenship of which one may speak with more calmness: The obligation of studying world conditions and forming sane and intelligent views about world politics and the future relations of America to world organization.

However compelling the reasons for cherishing and valuing the past achievements of American democracy, we must as never before, recognize that no nation "liveth unto itself." The "policy of splendid isolation" taught by Washington and Hamilton in the Farewell Address is no longer possible. We must realize that to-day the world is smaller and more intimately associated than were the thirteen American Colonies one hundred and forty years ago. Our economic relations with nearly every people of the world are to-day more intimate and important than were the economic relations between Massachusetts and Georgia at

the time of the Revolutionary War. What our part in world politics will be, we know not. That we must take some part, we do know.

Even if otherwise we might persist in our detached and isolated policy, the control of the Philippines and the ownership of the Panama Canal are enough to make such a policy impossible.

Like it or not, we must become students of international law; we must take part in the future development of international law. Politics were never before so important a part of human life.

The great outstanding fact in the development of modern human society is nationalism. What the ultimate significance of this fact will be, no one can tell. That nationalism alone, unrestrained and uncoordinated by internationalism, is little better than a failure, present European conditions demonstrate. Yet we cannot overlook the fact that the United States is to-day in a broad sense an Americanized Europe, and that this furnishes a just ground for the hope, if not the belief, that in some way the essence of American principles may yet be extended until there is in truth "A Parliament of man—a Federation of the world." This at least we know, un-Americanized Europe is to-day submerged in chaos and misery, a veritable slaughterhouse. Americanized Europe is peaceful, orderly, progressive, and more prosperous than ever before in its history.

It is but another platitude to say that human capacity for organization has fallen behind the human need of organization. Economically the world is a unit, or nearly so. Politically, it is little better than chaos. The present world organization is painfully like the

feudal system as described in Cooley's *Constitutional Limitations*, p. 50:

A feudal kingdom was a confederacy of a numerous body, who lived in a state of war against each other, and of rapine towards all mankind; in which the king according to his ability and vigor, was either a cipher or a tyrant, and a great portion of the people were reduced to personal slavery.

Men's incapacity so to organize as to be able to live together on terms of toleration, amity, and coöperation, —the leading characteristic of the feudal system, is the leading characteristic of the nationalistic system of to-day.

From Plato to Franklin there were but three inventions changing radically men's relations to each other and to nature. These three were the mariner's compass, without which America would never have been discovered; gunpowder, which destroyed the feudal system and drove mankind into larger units for the business of quarreling; and printing, obviously the foundation of general intelligence and information, and so the basis of modern democracy.

From Franklin to our own time have come all the inventions and discoveries that make modern industry, —the spinning jenny, the steam engine, the steamboat, the railway, the telegraph, the telephone, the gasoline engine and its resultant automobile, wireless telegraphy, telephony, and the conquest of the air. In this period of one hundred and forty years have come more changes, affecting, on the physical side, the relations of human beings to each other and to the forces of nature, than in all anterior human history. The law,—the rules of the game of life,—politics, the struggle for law,—these are

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nearly as crude and as imperfect as they were one hundred and forty years ago. Never were lawyers, truly great, so needed as to-day.

We hope and believe that the principles of liberty and of individualism on which our American institutions are grounded, the federative principle under which local self-government is left all possible control, will yet prove the principles upon which shall be founded a world order. Whether or not this hope will prove well-grounded,—yet for our own America we say:

Our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our tears,
Our faith triumphant o'er our fears,
Are all with Thee, are all with Thee.

TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD AMERICA PROFIT
BY SUPPRESSING THE NATIONAL TRADI-
TIONS OF ITS HYPHENATED CITIZENS

BY CAMILLO VON KLENZE

THE early settlers of those parts of America which later became the Thirteen Colonies brought with them and established here the English view of life, art, and morals, and in that fashion from the very outset gave to this country a powerful English bias.

The American Revolution brought about political severance between the Thirteen Colonies and the mother country, but in every respect the spirit of the new commonwealth remained essentially English. Throughout the nineteenth century, nearly to its close, and in large measure even to-day, the United States may well be called a culture-colony of Great Britain.

Any foreign traveler in this country is struck by the close resemblance between America and England, not only in regard to the prevalent definition of political liberty, but even—at least in all essentials—in regard to art, literature, breeding, and conduct. Our agreement with British ideals appears most clearly perhaps in American literary criticism. The perusal of the critical works of Lowell, of the letters of Charles Eliot Norton, of the essays of Mr. Paul Elmer Moore, brings home the fact that in all important matters our evaluation of foreign literatures is essentially the English

evaluation. To take a concrete instance: of the whole wealth of German letters, English criticism has virtually deleted everything but the *Nibelungenlied*, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, and Heine, and of late Hauptmann and Sudermann. Similarly, American criticism has entirely overlooked the importance of the German drama between Schiller and Hauptmann; and its attitude toward German narrative prose has gone not one step beyond Carlyle. It would be easy to adduce other instances of agreement between English and American criticism of the art and literatures of foreign countries.

If English culture has been the cynosure of American thought and taste for many generations, it is of the last importance for us to understand the nature of the intellectual achievements of Great Britain. English culture, as we all agree, has preëminent qualities. It combines, as perhaps no other does, virility and mellowness. And since the Puritan Revolution it has been generally characterized by great sobriety and ethical seriousness. But like all other national cultures, it has its decided limitations. It has produced no philosophy of the first order, no great art, and virtually no music whatever. Even in letters, supreme at the time of Shakespeare, the very sobriety and self-control, for which we rightly have so much admiration, have somewhat clipped the wings of English daring and power. It is an open question whether, since the days of Milton, we must not—in spite of the great wealth of English prose and poetry—look to other countries than England for the very highest inspiration and originality. Rousseau, Voltaire, Goethe, Balzac, Zola, Ibsen, Nietzsche, and Tolstoi, have none of them been Englishmen.

Viewing this culture as a whole, with all its advan-

tages and natural limitations, we cannot but feel that America—that land of unlimited possibilities—should aim at something even deeper and broader.

Least of all should modern America—increasingly complex as it is growing to be—be satisfied with that reflex of English culture that has been handed down to it by Puritanism. For Puritanism and its exaggerated tendencies to suppress imagination and emotion is still a more potent force in the higher life of America than may appear at first blush. Our culture—as yet comparatively meager and unoriginal—is primarily in need of expression and emotional expansion.

Whence can these qualities be derived for the America of the future? Throughout the nineteenth century, millions of foreigners from all parts of the world have landed on these shores and have contributed—especially in the Middle West—towards the creation of a new national temperament. In the Mississippi Valley, a national psyche is rapidly evolving which, though powerfully influenced by Anglo-Saxon ideals, is something essentially new. The millions of Slavs, Celts, Teutons, Latins are beginning to color the national woof. Nor need we believe that such is the case merely in states like Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, or Kansas. Even in New England the strong influx of Italians, Poles, Portuguese is bound in course of time to modify the existing temperament. As a matter of fact, symptoms such as the rapid waning of the Puritan conception of Sunday, our increasing delight in color, etc., indicate that this change of temperament is already becoming manifest.

The question may pertinently be asked: have these foreigners so far contributed to the enrichment of American culture? The answer must, unfortunately,

be: they have done very little indeed. They have done so little, partly because the overwhelming majority of them came from classes which had neither the leisure nor the means to devote themselves to intellectual pursuits. But may we say that America has done anything to tap that subconscious wealth which every member of an old race—however lowly he may be—brings with him as a deposit of centuries of race experience? So far from encouraging the preservation of national acquirements, so far from absorbing them into our American life, we have by a subtle, indefinable and exceedingly effective process managed to make every foreigner feel that he is truly patriotic only by eliminating in himself, as quickly as possible, every point of divergence from the prevalent norm. And this norm, which we call "American," as a matter of fact, corresponds in all essentials as we saw, to the New England reflex of Anglo-Saxon ideals of life, and hardly any longer to the temperament of our nation as a whole.

This process of leveling out is the outcome of a thoroughly healthy instinct: the instinct to form out of our heterogeneous elements a closely knit nation. It would be most unfortunate for this country—and every American of foreign descent would heartily agree to this statement—to permit anything like anarchy or disintegration. This danger, if it ever existed in the early stages of our history, has long since ceased to be a reality. The definite Anglo-Saxon stamp has been profoundly impressed upon the national life. Perhaps no one who has not passed through the process of amalgamation can form any conception of the overwhelming force of the Anglo-Saxon influence upon the foreigner—especially the young foreigner. To begin with, English is the language of the public school. And a language,

as we are all aware, reflects a world-view. By adopting a language as your mother-tongue, you subconsciously adopt a vast number of ideas and traditions imbedded within it. Our conception of political life is essentially English and is daily impressed upon us through the newspapers, in the class room, and from the political platform. Moreover, the rise in the social scale, which consciously or unconsciously forms the goal of nearly every energetic man's ambition, implies an adaptation to the ideals prevalent in the ruling class. And these—it is hardly necessary to mention—are Anglo-Saxon.

Thus in various ways and without any coercion, such as has often been used in Europe, we manage in a remarkably short time to sandpaper our foreigner into almost absolute conformity. Politically speaking, this conformity may, to a large extent, be desirable. At least it simplifies the working of the machinery of government. But outside of politics certainly, divergence has again and again led to the creation of a rich and many-sided culture. Have English letters, for instance, not gained by the fact that not only the Anglo-Saxon but the Celtic temperament as well has found expression there? Who would care to eliminate Tom Moore, Robert Burns, or Keats—to name but a few out of many? Our own Edgar Allen Poe and our MacDowell—a greater musician than all of England has ever produced—have enriched our higher life precisely because they contributed essentially a non-Anglo-Saxon note. Yet are we not subconsciously pursuing a policy, which if consistently carried through, would tend to militate against such enrichment? Is it wise for us to influence our German boys, for instance, in such fashion as subtly to induce them to give up the songs which they learned at their mother's knee? It is

a well-known fact that while our German immigrants continue in their "Gesang-Vereine" to cultivate some of the best German music, their children, during the process of amalgamation, let this inestimable heritage slip through their fingers. Under the delusion that they thus grow more truly American, they become unmusical. In consequence, although we find in our colleges, especially in the Middle West, a large number of students of German descent, our American college music has not been improved during the last fifty years. We continue cheerfully to sing and enjoy songs of the caliber of *My Bonnie lies over the Ocean*. Would not our young Latins contribute to the grace and charm of American life more effectively than they do, if in the process of Americanization they did not feel induced to repress all too rigidly their natural vivacity? And would American life be injured by an injection of Slavic emotional spontaneity and force?

No nation ever had a more wonderful opportunity than we have of becoming rich and varied in the manifestations of its higher life. First of all we are, among the great nations, the last comer in history. We thus have fallen heir to the cultural experiences of the whole world. Further, we have among us millions of representatives of all the great nations of Europe; and lastly, our American temperament is rapidly growing more plastic to new suggestions.

As the Anglo-Saxon ideal, so powerfully working through the school, the pulpit, the press, and our political institutions, is sure always to furnish the necessary element of stability and cohesion, we can fully afford to be hospitable to many varieties of traditions and temperaments. An opposite course, so far from building up a better America, might easily lead to com-

parative impoverishment. Every American of foreign descent feels that his own interests and those of his children lie in America. His gaze is directed forward to the America of his future, not backward to the Europe of his past.

It is a mistake to mistrust him, to suppress him. He is sufficiently repressed by the forces of the life about him. Our duty towards America directs us rather to use him, to cultivate what gifts he brings, and to utilize them for the good of the America that is to be.

If the American people as a whole were to become musical as the Teutons or Slavs, sensitive to color and line as the Italians, if they were to develop a deference for language like that of the French, without losing the Anglo-Saxon straightforwardness, political sense and self-control, then the America of the future would correspond to that picture which consciously or unconsciously, even the severest Anglo-Saxon New Englander is cherishing in his heart.

THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON EUROPE

BY STANTON COIT

BEFORE submitting what seem to me the significant effects of the world-crisis, I wish to remove certain false preconceptions concerning the European war, which appear to be prevalent among the idealists of America.

First, its horrors do not constitute its essence, and we gain nothing by dwelling upon them. It is by concentrating attention upon them, that many Americans have come to look upon the European conflict as mere butchery. But when your Civil War was on, you did not so name the conflict into which Abraham Lincoln had precipitated this nation by the stand he took. Because he would not allow the Southern States to secede, he caused the shedding of the blood of a million men. You are right, however, in maintaining that their slaughter was not butchery; it was needful sacrifice, if the God of Righteousness was to reign in America. Now, in the present conflict, all Englishmen think that England is fighting to suppress an institution as hateful in its inhumanity as was Negro slavery. We mean to cut out the cancer of militarism from the heart of Europe or die in the attempt. What we are doing is surgery, not butchery.

Another false notion prevalent among American idealists is that the claim of the English is to be dis-

counted by the fact that a similar and equally sincere claim is put forward by the Prussians. But in all great struggles each side thinks itself right and the other wrong; that fact, however, does not excuse a third party from the responsibility of investigating the case and coming to an independent judgment as to which side is the more right and which of the two the more wrong. Why should Americans in this particular case be so impressed by the fact that each side thinks itself in the right? From this circumstance they seem to draw the conclusion that there is no more right on one side than on the other; or that a really gentle person would not presume to side against a nation which is convinced of the righteousness of its cause. But a similar clashing of moral judgment occurred in the Civil War. The slaveholders thought they were justified; yet this circumstance did not tempt the North to abate by one jot or tittle its conviction that the Union should not be broken in two nor slavery be allowed to spread. The sincerity of the South did not stay Mr. Lincoln's hands nor cause his divine intent to waver. Likewise, the other day, in Boston, the voters were deciding between license and no-license. Both sides believed they were in the right on this issue; nevertheless, this circumstance did not weaken the conviction of either side. And why should it have done so? Indeed it is precisely when both sides think their cause is just that no man who respects himself will suspend judgment and remain a neuter.

It must not be imagined that either side in any significant struggle asks that its own testimony or its sincerity of conviction should be taken as proof of its righteousness, but only that they should be respected, as an imperative call to outsiders to investigate and judge for themselves. Never until this war have I,

in a long lifetime, known educated persons who were not cynics to throw into the face of either party to a terrible massacre the fact that the other also believes that it is right. Of course it does! That is an essential element of tragedy in real life as it is upon the stage. The question is not concerning any one's goodness of motive. The problem before the tribunal of the world to-day is to decide which of the two parties in the struggle is right independently of what each thinks of himself or the other. In your Civil War—for I can find no better instance—the problem was not: does the North *think* it is right? But *is* it right? Is its moral judgment of itself true or erroneous? So with the European war, as between Alliance and Entente, the motives are equally high; but that fact has no bearing on the issue which confronts humanity. It is wholly a question of the objective rightness of conduct. America therefore should not allow herself to be staggered because Prussian and Briton are equally sincere, nor should she halt at that; as if she could be exempted from deciding between nations who are both well-meaning.

It must also be remembered that, in order to sketch in outline the terms of a just and enduring peace, it will not be necessary to settle who started the war, or who was the more to blame in precipitating it. To find out who started the war will throw no light upon how it can or ought to be ended. Nor is the starting of it the same as the being to blame for it. The blame often rests upon the side which wishes to preserve the *status quo* and which therefore does its utmost to maintain peace—a peace which may be a whitened sepulcher. But in any case it makes little difference who is to blame, for the settlement cannot be allowed to be

of the nature of a punishment. The arrangement to be made must be guided by the principle of social utility, which is wholly forward-looking and which cannot aim at reforming the culprit; it must only attempt to remove the outward occasion of any moral obliquity that may have been at work. And to do this it must be a constructive readjustment of all the interests. It can afford to ignore the guilt of every one, because it will remove the existing mal-adjustment which incited to evil designs.

The notion has also been widely published throughout America that it would be a misfortune to humanity if a decisive victory should be won by either side. The ground upon which this judgment is based is that the victor, if his triumph were absolute, would be so inflated with ambition and revenge that he would refuse to consider the just claims of the vanquished. Now I cannot speak as to the mental effects which unqualified victory would have upon Prussia, although we do know how she treated France in 1871; but on behalf of the rulers of the British Empire it is only fair to cite the use they made of the unconditional surrender of the Boers. Absolute victory in no wise made Great Britain oblivious of the human and even the political claims of the Dutch in South Africa. One may also cite the conquests of the Soudan. With these two recent cases before us as proof of the non-demoralizing effects of complete triumph upon the character of the British Government, how can any impartial witness hope for a "draw" between the Entente and the Alliance, on the score of fear lest England, as the dominant factor, would abuse the power which an overwhelming success would place in her hands? And—again concerning the Civil War,—

I would ask whether the complete surrender of the South would have tempted the North, had Abraham Lincoln lived, to cruel or brutal retaliation? The Southerners themselves do not so think.

There is, however, a still stronger ground for protesting against the notion of a "draw" as between Prussia and England. Such an outcome could be desired only on the ground that there was no moral issue at stake and that the right was just as much on one side as on the other. Against such an assumption, I would affirm that the burden of proving that there is no moral issue at stake rests with those who say so, inasmuch as all the belligerents interpret the case otherwise. Granting that there is now a contest between right and wrong, I ask: would it have been an advantage if after two years of war between the North and the South, the struggle had been closed with a "draw"? Indeed, it was only after that period of time that the deeper social issues of the struggle rose clearly into the self-consciousness, both of North and of South, and became the dominant motives. At least the North did not realize the deeper human meaning of the situation until after that length of time. Now, whether rightly or wrongly, throughout the British Empire in the last seventeen months, there has been a similar deepening of insight and elevation of purpose. The strife may have begun with no clear intelligence on the part of any one in England outside of an exclusive circle of international diplomatists. The motives, likewise, which first incited the enthusiasm of the populace may have well been superficial and sentimental. But now the British public knows what it is fighting for. Nor can there be any difference between what it *thinks* is its purpose and what its purpose really *is*. In its

judgment the cause of personal liberty and equality and of government responsible to the will of the people is bound up with the existence of the British Empire. The struggle is between military despotism and government throughout the world by the peoples thereof and for the peoples.

Nor in the minds of the British public is there any confusion as to what enemy they are fighting—that enemy is the Prussian Government as the incarnation of military despotism, and not the German people. No one in England wishes to wipe Germany off the map or to crush Germany. But unhappily Americans do not make this discrimination between Prussia and Germany. And when we speak bitterly against the former, they imagine that we wish to annihilate the latter, but our purpose is the opposite of this. More and more in the minds of the British the war assumes the nature of a crusade to free the politically oppressed people of Germany. England is as much opposed to Prussian autocracy as were the 4,250,000 Social Democrats who cast their votes against military despotism in 1912.

What the British fear is not military conquest by Prussia, but the kind of peace government which would follow in its wake. It is Prussia's domestic political system, with a Prime Minister responsible only to his autocratic master, that the English dread to see spread over the territory either of South America or South Africa, either of Egypt or India. Nobody can gainsay the statement that wherever England spreads she establishes, as rapidly as the self-conscious spirit of her subjects demands it and as their education and experience permit, individual liberty and equality, and government responsible to the common will.

Hence this seems to the people of England a moral issue. She is fighting now for the same end which has made her look askance at the aggression of Russia. She wishes to secure the foothold throughout the world which government-by-the-people has at last attained. She knows, it is true of the whole world that a house divided against itself cannot stand. As Lincoln said of the United States, it must become either all slave or all free, so the British Empire sees that the whole world must become either all military despotism or all government-by-the-people.

There still remain a number of false preconceptions in the minds of many Americans which must be removed before it is possible for them to understand and appreciate the effects of the European conflict. In the first place the question "Who will win?" need not be answered before deciding what the real outcome of the struggle will be. We may be certain that the ultimate issue will be victory for the cause of liberty, equality, and democratic government throughout Europe, although we know that the way towards that goal will be different, if Germany wins, from what it would be if the triumph were with the Allies. If Prussia conquers, popular government cannot be established in Germany, Austria, and Turkey except by way of social revolution. If the Allies overcome their enemy, the road to the triumph of democracy will be straight and immediate, not only in Central Europe but in Russia.

We must remember the striking historic fact that the vanquished country often is victor, and *vice versa*. In 1806 Prussia was bowed down to the dust, and the hoof of Napoleon the Great was placed upon her neck, but out of this humiliation the spirit of the Fatherland rose to a dignity, insight, and energy heretofore unparalleled.

Fichte in 1810 issued his *Speeches to the German Nation* in which he urged the people to concentrate all their powers upon their physical culture and upon the discipline and equipment of their intelligence. They were poor; they were without political unity; as an army they were disgraced; they had no navy. In this predicament the only line of deliverance was that of intellectual and physical culture. Thus out of the ashes of national grief rose like a sphinx the spirit of the New Germany, which was destined in the sixties of the last century to conquer Schleswig-Holstein and Austria, and in 1870 France. If one, then, has an eye to the real issues, 1806 was the beginning of real victory for Germany. So with France was the defeat of 1871. In the same way we are justified in believing that the cause of democratic government will triumph even though the immediate terms of peace may not be all that England, France, and Italy might desire.

In the second place, American idealists are far too prone to contrast peace and war. They think of peace as a heavenly thing, pure and innocent, come down straight from God, and of war as something alien and monstrous, which has been belched up from some region lower than humanity. Now of ideal peace, such as never was on land or sea, this contrast may hold good; but of the actual peace which had prevailed for forty-four years in Europe, it is utterly untrue. No two things in the world's history are more alike than the peace which prevailed from 1871 to 1914 and the war which has continued since then. That peace was big with all the potencies and purposes which have brought forth this war. That peace was a hatching season for this war. And you cannot say that a peace which is big with the ends that require the prepara-

tion for war is innocent of the bloodshed which ensues. One may contrast in the same way sobriety with drunkenness and maintain that temperance is an angelic virtue, while inebriety is a loathsome vice. But if a man while perfectly sober, deliberately drinks glass after glass of whiskey in order to make himself drunk, how can one laud such soberness as any nobler than the bestiality it fosters? If the present European war is inhuman, still more so was the precedent European peace; for the intellectual instigator to a crime is worse than the accessory who executes it.

If any one challenges my description of the forty-four years of peace, it can only be because he is less acquainted than I am with international diplomacy during that period. Possibly one reason why so many pacifists desire a "draw" in the present conflict is because they imagine that a return to the *status quo* would be a reestablishment of seraphic harmony among the States of Europe; but, if such is the basis of their desire, it is a proof that their idealism is not supplemented by a realistic and conscientious grip of the historic forces which have brought about this war.

Another illusion of visionary idealists in America is the identification of trade with peace and the belief that war is not the offspring of foreign commerce and international finance. This present world-conflict can never be understood unless it is realized that international finance in the hands of private capitalists and foreign commerce controlled by individual traders with an eye to personal gain have brought it about, as they have all the great wars between foreign countries during the last three hundred years. When to keep peace favors international financiers and traders,

they see that it is kept; but whenever it has been broken, the reason has been that war would serve their purpose better. Whether it is a case of hypocrisy or of the unconscious self-blinding of the mind to its own depravity we need not say; but there can be no doubt that Sir John Seeley in his *Expansion of England* is true to historic fact when he declares that during the last three centuries trade and war have been one and the same thing. The present world-conflict reveals to the eyes of all what some students of social dynamics already knew, that international finance in the hands of private capitalists has had and will always have the very opposite effect from that which Mr. Norman Angell has declared must be its result. When I said that the peace of the preceding decades caused the war, it was only another way of declaring that international finance and trade were pushing the ends which they meant to attain without bloodshed, if possible, but with it, if necessary. To return to the kind of peace, therefore, which prevailed before August, 1914, would simply be a going back to a pursuit of the same ends, but with intensified preparation of still more terrific means.

I now ask you to consider several unforeseen and unintended effects of the war upon Europe, for these seem to me to be the permanent and vital outcome, and they all in my judgment are fraught with blessings to the world. From my praise of them, however, it must not be inferred that I approve the conflict. Towards it I assume the attitude taken by the gentle American Quakeress, Lucretia Mott, when some one pointed out to her certain instances of the law that good comes out of evil. She assented that God used instrumentalities which she, Lucretia Mott, would not

touch with a ten-foot pole! We may regard the present European war as we must the Great Plague of the fourteenth century or the fire of London in the seventeenth or the earthquake at San Francisco in the twentieth; these were things which no human being would voluntarily have set going and yet they were things which in their total result were undoubtedly great gains to the populations which survived.

In order to know the most significant effects of the war upon Europe it is not necessary for us to be endowed with any special gift of prophecy. An acquaintance with the causes which induced the war made it possible for Professor Usher and Mr. Price Collier in America, and in England, Earl Roberts, Mr. Robert Blackfoot, and a score of others, to anticipate with startling foresight many terrible events which have since occurred. But I invite you to-day rather to attempt what might be called creative prophecy, prophecy in kind like that which Professor von Treitschke, Prince von Buelow and General Bernhardi practised in Germany but in another spirit and with another motive. These said: "Let there be war!" and there was war—because they had said so. Likewise it is possible for us to say: "Let there be justice that removes the causes of war!" and we shall have instituted peace everlasting. And yet, creative prophecy cannot create something out of nothing; it must seize upon certain factors, bye-products which the war has brought forth, and use them as a basis for peace.

I have asked you to prophesy; but now that the war has been producing effects for the last seventeen months, it is scarcely necessary that we should forecast the future. We need not so much foretell what will be, as tell what has already been the effect upon Europe. It is not so much prevision of what will

happen as vision of what is taking place before our very eyes, that we must exercise.

For Americans to understand what the supreme effect of the war upon Europe is and will be, it is only necessary for them to note what it is and will be within America herself upon the mind of all Americans. For the very same effect has taken place throughout the British Empire, Belgium, Germany, and every other country involved in the conflict. This present European war has already done spiritually for the United States of America what the Civil War after four years did for it politically. In July, 1914, America was dead to patriotism; her idealists, whether socialists or pacifists or feminists, were preaching that moral preference for one's own country was a provincialism and a vice, and that the broad spirit of American humanitarianism required the setting up in its place of the love of all individual men irrespective of nationality, and a moral regard and solicitude for other countries as great as that for one's own. A divided loyalty on the part of many immigrants was noticed without alarm and accepted as only natural. It seemed to go without saying that a recent comer to the United States should give legal and economic adherence to the life of America, while reserving inner loyalty to some government of Europe. But the European War has changed all that in the twinkling of an eye. It has ended forever the divided allegiance of hyphenated hearts. The European war has brought it about that, now, throughout America, patriotism is a virtue instead of a vice. It has re-defined patriotism so that it begins to mean and will henceforth forever signify loyalty to the country which one intends to die in, instead of loyalty to the country in which one had never intended to be born.

American capitalists had supposed that they were importing by the million or the million-and-a-half a year merely mechanical labor units; by the glare of the war-flames of Europe they have discovered that they had been importing human souls which had come bearing clouds of glorious memory from Servia, or Italy, or Prussia, or where-not, which had been their home. Or, if this were not the case, at least the immigrants were mentally sensitive to the suggestions of political agents from the lands of their birth. In any case America is now spiritually the most united people on the face of the earth. "America first" is the master-purpose of every foreign-born resident in the States, naturalized or not yet naturalized, as well as of the native-born. This spiritual bye-product of the war, manifest in America, is an incontrovertible fact of supreme importance and of abiding and vital power. But the same thing has happened in every nation that is participating in the conflict.

The British Empire has always been politically as compared with the United States after 1865 a mere rope of sand. Until two decades ago almost every one of her statesmen believed that each one of the self-governing Dominions in the Empire would in the fullness of time drop away as had the thirteen original colonies. Strenuous efforts were made by certain leaders like Mr. Chamberlain to offset the spiritual disintegration of the Empire by means of economic devices in the form of preferential tariffs between the mother-country and the colonies. But within a month after its beginning, the war had bound all the constituent parts of the Empire from within in such a manner and by manifestation of such deeds of heroic loyalty, that no foreign power on earth and no insidious domestic

vice can ever disrupt or disintegrate it. It had seemed to some lovers of the British Empire as if it would take five centuries of education and systematic propaganda to bring about so glorious a result. It is not a result which the Kaiser intended nor the Czar foresaw nor which furnished an added motive to Sir Edward Grey. It has, as it were, come down out of heaven, and has come to stay.

The like effect has been manifest in Belgium. She was the most mechanical and uninteresting state of Europe. She was a political device, a mere state, the body of a nation without the mind rather than a social group which had grown spontaneously into an independent selfhood. Belgium had been manufactured by Germany, France, and England, in 1839. But in 1914 she became not only a living soul within her own border, but a quickening spirit breathing redemptive courage into the heart of every other nation on earth.

I have no time in which to particularize the results of the war in awakening the spirit of nationality in France, Italy, and Greece, the Balkan States, Turkey, and Russia; but in each one of these nations, the historic genius of the people has been heightened and quickened into self-consciousness and into a strenuousness of self-sacrifice and a far-reaching purpose, such as has never been attained before. Some believers in peace at any price, who are unwilling to see benefits even in the by-products of war, affirm that this magnificent heightening of the spirit of solidarity in each nation is due only to the spasm of suffering. These wholesale and unseeing depreciators of international war declare that the heightening of national consciousness which swallows up petty and sordid self-interests is pathological, tran-

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sient, and certain to be followed by a reaction in the opposite direction. But a moment's reflection will show that it is not a common grief, nor hysterical fear which has drawn, for instance, the self-governing Dominions and the dependencies of the British Empire into unity of purpose and consciousness of identity. On the contrary, it is the far-sighted and cool anticipation of danger and the determination to stand together which has caused nine-tenths of the anguish and all the bitterness of grief, resentment, and hate. What was before real but unconscious—the spiritual unity of the British Empire—now has risen above the threshold of blind psychic life. That is all. The truth is that increasingly during the last forty years the affections, the memories, the personal pride, the commercial interests, and the sense of honor with its standards of manhood and duty have, in the breasts of all the subjects of the British Crown, been more and more closely knitting themselves about that great historic Being called the British Empire. The shock of the war only woke up these sleeping energies and attachments. But, by being awakened into self-directing principles, they have become a hundred-fold more potent than they ever could have been, had they remained unaware of themselves. The same is the case with Belgium and the other nations which I have mentioned.

As regards Austria-Hungary, there has been no evidence of any spiritual unification. But it must be remembered that Austria-Hungary is not one nation, and never has been. It is only an enforced political union of some eight social groups, two of which exercise brutal compulsion over the others. Such being the case, it is probable that the war has on the contrary stimulated the antagonisms between the various potential

nationalities of the country. It must be remembered that under the melting-pot process, to which Europe is now subjected, the things which lose their shape and are dissolved are the artificial and forced, the mechanical unions; while those spiritual realities which we call nations—those groups of human beings who find themselves spontaneously one in sympathy, reciprocal understanding, and moral interest, become only refined and solidified by the dangers and necessities of war. As regards nationality the result will probably be that one part of Austria will become merged into the German Empire, while several other constituent factors will find the fulfillment of that innate destiny in a self-governing federation with the Balkan States.

A notion is prevalent among the Allies and throughout the United States that before the war began Germany was already a nation unified in mind, purpose, and sentiment. But no statement could be further from the truth, as every one will testify who has been acquainted during the last twenty years with the domestic life, economic and political, of the German people. If there ever was a house divided against itself, that house was Germany, until the first of August, 1914. Let any one read the second part of Prince von Buelow's book, *Imperial Germany*, which treats of her domestic policy, and he will see to what an alarming degree had spread not only the class-war between the Social-Democrats and the rulers of Germany, but the feud between the Prussian government and such outlying parts as German Poland. I have time to instance only one fact—the social democratic vote of Germany had risen steadily from the middle of the eighties in the last century, when it was some 800,000, to the colossal number of 4,250,000 in the year 1912. Let it be

recalled to mind that the social democratic party stands enthusiastically and avowedly for a republican form of government and that its members have for twenty-five years hated the Kaiser, the Crown Prince's set, and all the works of Prussian military despotism, as much as the French and the British soldiers in the trenches have begun to do only since August, 1914. Then it will not be denied that Germany was far advanced towards civil strife and social disruption. The contention of some that the ultimate object of the Prussian government was to divert the attention of the German people from the political and economic revolution which they had organized themselves to bring about, is not without foundation. But whether the government foresaw the unifying effect which a war would have, as Bismarck had anticipated it in 1870, is of no importance. It cannot be questioned in face of the enduring effect of the Franco-German conflict in cementing the German Empire, that the present war has abolished forever what is called the class-war in Germany. In the breasts of the 4,250,000 Social-Democrats, loyalty to the Fatherland has overborne loyalty to the proletariat. No one, moreover, who has known the inner life of the social democratic party believes for a moment that the working classes of Germany who have been disciplined by Lassalle and Marx identify the Fatherland with the Kaiser. It is in spite of him that they have been moved to fight for their country. The history of no nation furnishes a more striking and dramatic proof of the irresistible force of patriotism. This war demonstrates in the case of every nation of Europe that in the minds of men patriotism, although a purely spiritual passion, is more powerful than the elementary cravings, such as hunger, thirst, and the

reproductive instinct. Patriotism is proved to be so deep in root and so vital, that no intellectual theory and no dogma and no force of public opinion created by any one class can damp its ardor or weaken its energy.

I count this conscious renaissance of patriotism throughout the Western world to be the supreme effect of the war. It is as startling in its dramatic surprise as it is ennobling in its redemptive efficacy! for the whole world seemed to have come to the conclusion, not only that patriotism was a petty provincialism of which one ought to be ashamed, but that it was in very fact practically dead. Now, nothing else is so alive and mighty. Nor in my judgment is any other factor in the moral universe of man so beneficent. The universality of patriotism, which the war has demonstrated, shows to the members of each nation that the supreme force upon which he must reckon and which he must respect in every other nation is the corresponding loyalty of its members to their own beloved community. Henceforth, to be a patriot, the first requirement will be that a man shall reverence and dread the patriotism in the hearts of foreign nations. It is hard to believe that men will ever again enter so ruthlessly into aggressive warfare, now that they have known what manner of devouring and passionate resentment their insult will arouse. It appears to men of all countries that the loyalty of Belgians to their nation and their state has been altogether right and reasonable.

The war has thus demonstrated for all time the compatibility of a man's moral preference for his own country with supreme respect for other men's preference for their countries. It has shown that a man's love for his country is analogous to his preference for his own mother. I have no doubt that the mother of each

man and woman present in my audience to-night is just as good and noble as my mother was; and yet I am sure that no sane person present will take offense if I presume to say that I love my own mother, whom I have known, better than the mothers of my auditors whom I have not seen. You would suspect me, I have no doubt, of intentional falsehood, or else of emotional insanity, if I attempted to make you believe that I entertained as great affection for the women who brought you into the world and nurtured you as for the one who mothered me. I accordingly maintain that a man would either be a criminal lunatic or a deceitful knave who professed that he cared just as much for a foreign nation and a foreign government under which he had never lived as for the one which was bound up with all the memories of his childhood, youth, and immediate present. In the same way, I confess my preference for my own children for whom I am responsible; but I am not for a moment deceived into thinking that my children are any more beautiful or graceful or intelligent than yours. I cite the relation of a man to his own mother and his own children because when the citizens of any nation look backward, they are filled with a sense that their nation stands to them in the benign intimacy of a mother, and the next instant when they look to its future, their country appears to be their own child. The war has taught us to have contempt for any man who does not feel thus towards his own country; and thus we have learned that the future Brotherhood of Man is not to be a cosmopolitan union of individuals without sentiment of nationality, but a Brotherhood of Nations. In other words, two practical corollaries are felt to be involved in the universal awakening of patriotism. One is the inviola-

bility of every nation on earth, as regards its territory and the inherent law of its moral genius. The other is the spiritual independence of nations, according to which no people has a right to remain absolutely in exclusive isolation while on the other hand foreign peoples have not the right to deprive it of local self-government, in so far as it does not violate other nations.

The second great effect of the war is to have revealed the necessity for the federal principle of government to various groups of nations throughout the world. We see now that the inevitable destiny of Central Europe is to become a United States with no one state among them in ascendancy over the others. The German Empire has known nothing, and was not willing to know anything, about the American principle illustrated in its coördination of forty-eight states, each a self-governing dominion under a central sovereignty in which each has equal power with every other. In Germany, Prussia has expanded her own territory within the German Empire by incorporating other states into herself; and in 1871 she, using her greater power, seized the lion's share of political authority in the newly founded empire. Many believe that Prussia would cease forever to be a menace to other German states and to the rest of the world, were the Empire to be reconstructed on the American principle of federal government. Certain pro-German Americans have maintained that the domestic organization of the German Empire is purely Germany's own affair and is no business whatever of the Allies and of neutral nations like the United States. But, as I have already pointed out, the supreme concern of neutral republics and of the Allies is this very method of domestic political organization which the present constitution of the German Empire illus-

trates. For, whatever territory is conquered by Prussia, or is ceded to her in the terms of peace, it is inevitable that she will extend to it her home principle of hegemony, whereby Prussia dominates the other principalities of the Empire. If, however, Germany becomes a United States with no one state in ascendancy over others, it will be very easy to incorporate into her domain all the neighboring peoples who are kindred in temper and speech.

The war has heightened the self-consciousness of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, but at the same time and even to a greater degree, it has reawakened a sense of the solidarity of all the Scandinavian peoples. The pointing of the Spirit which broods over the face of the European chaos is to a United States of Scandinavia—into which Finland might wish to enter. There is no occasion for me to outline an exact and mechanical regrouping of the peoples of Europe under several federal governments. More important is it to call attention to the way in which the war has forced the idea of federal government upon English statesmen as a necessity for the British Empire. If the war lasts for several years more, we should be quite safe in prophesying that before its end the British Empire would already be a United States with not only local government for all her great constituent parts, but also with the imperial sovereignty itself diffused throughout the Empire. It is now seen that a Conference of the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions every four years cannot be adequate. Nor is it possible that the King or the Prime Minister, acting in the name of the King, can be the executive and unifying head of the British Empire. Either the present House of Commons must be so reconstructed that the oversea's Dominions and even

India and Egypt send their fair share of representatives to it, or a new imperial parliament must be founded and the old House of Commons be restricted to the home affairs of Little England or of England, Ireland, and Wales. I have no time in which to give my grounds for asserting that the present war has turned British statesmanship in the direction of imperial federation, but Americans who are acquainted with the political thought of England during the last forty years are aware that this idea has long been growing. You may be sure that when Lord Bryce published and re-edited his book on *The American Commonwealth*, he did so not to flatter Americans nor with an eye to his appointment as Ambassador at Washington, but because he wished to prepare the minds of British voters for the ultimate adoption throughout the Empire of the American federal principle. Readers also of Sir John Seeley's book, *The Expansion of England* (which more than any other volume published during the last thirty years has molded imperial statesmanship) know well that Seeley's chief motive is to urge the adoption by the British Empire of the American idea of federation. In his judgment the notion of many coördinate states, each locally self-ruled but all equally sharing in the central sovereignty of the whole group, seems to be the greatest political invention upon which the mind of man has ever hit. The present European war has brought home its universal applicability to the liberals in almost every country of Europe. They see that federation is one of the chief ways of putting an end to war.

But before passing to the third great effect of the European conflict, I should like to call the attention of Americans to the incontrovertible and yet altogether

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overlooked fact that England is not a part of Europe and has not been since the sinking of the Spanish Armada. England belongs to the New World and the East. She is every bit as much in the New World and of it as is the United States of America. England is in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and in all these parts is in character as typically a New World product as this great republic itself. I cannot here argue this point, but it is most important, if America is to participate in determining the world peace, that she should not think of England as a part of Europe and imagine that the British Isles might become one state in a federation with France and other European countries. It must be remembered that, politically and historically, in sentiment and tradition, the remotest parts of the British Empire are nearer to one another than is Calais to Dover. If we take the point of view of kinship and solidarity of mind of the inhabitants, it is only twenty miles from Liverpool in England to Sidney in Australia but is twelve thousand miles from Dover to Calais. No *entente cordiale* between France and the British Empire, forced upon each by the menace of a common enemy, can deceive the people of either nation as to the fact that France belongs and must belong to Europe, while the British Islands are morally contiguous with Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa.

The third conspicuous effect of the war is its demonstration to the common people of every nation of the beneficent power of the State as an economic agent of the whole people of each nation. Since the war began the government in every nation has assumed the rôle as it were of Divine Providence, feeding the people, keeping down the price of all necessities,

and organizing the industrial as well as the military forces. Each state involved in the conflict has either taken over industrial functions that had hitherto been in the hands of private capitalists, or has regulated in the interest of the community the enterprises of individual employers. The State has claimed war profits and dictated the conditions of labor. In this way the people of England—to instance them only—have learned more concerning the power and the possible beneficence of the State as an industrial agent than it seemed likely that they would learn in five hundred years of private enterprise such as prevailed throughout the British Empire until August, 1914. Nor can previous wars be cited as instances in which during war times states similarly assumed extraordinary industrial functions and then relinquished them as soon as the war was over. For this is the first great war in which the peoples of Europe and of the British Empire have participated, since they have had general elementary education and have been subjected to socialistic propaganda. The war has demonstrated the feasibility of national collectivism. The people reason: if the State can be so effectual in war times, what might it not achieve in times of peace? The State is now seen by the masses of every country to be the one power that can step in between them and two sorts of enemies—profit-mongers at home and profit-mongers abroad. The war in this way has educated two distinct and opposing classes. The socialists despite their talk about the nationalization of land and capital have never looked to their own nation as an industrial unit of collectivism, but, following Karl Marx, have been cosmopolitan. Even in England the labor-leaders have not been freed from the strange aberration of

internationalism. As a result of the war, however, socialists will henceforth be patriots. Their patriotism will be not only a thing of sentiment, but the animating spirit of industrial reconstruction. The second class whom the war has educated consists of the private capitalist and the academic sociologists who have believed hitherto that the State should not itself enter into commerce and industry except upon occasion for the benefit of private capitalists. Now even economic individualists have been so benefited by state intervention that they are almost persuaded that this war has ended the era of private enterprise and inaugurated an epoch of national collectivism. Unless the lessons of the war are to be lost, the various nation-states of the world are now entering upon a new career. States themselves will become the importers and exporters of commodities, superseding private companies of individual traders. International finance will be handled more and more by governments, one nation as a whole dealing with another nation as a whole through their respective governments and thus eliminating private profits both from international finance and from foreign trade. In this way the war is introducing an era in which patriots will for the first time be socialistic and socialists will become patriotic.

The last great effect which I have time to mention is the awakening of democracy throughout Europe and the British Empire—not individualistic but collectivistic democracy. Each nation might have become intensified in its selfhood and the states might have assumed the rôle of industrial agent; and, still, paternal government in each country might have thereby intrenched itself the more securely. But the war in

every nation has lifted the masses up to the level of the ruling classes by heightening self-respect and bringing home to each individual the sense of his own importance as a factor in his nation's destiny. It is not easy for one who has not lived in Germany since the war began to cite proofs that the German people will assert themselves as soon as peace is declared, whether the Fatherland is defeated or not. But anyone who had known the Social Democratic Party of Germany during the twenty years preceding the war will have no doubt that the war discipline instead of increasing obedience and subserviency is generating an irresistible determination and will-to-power in the heart of the common people. In England already labor is on top and knows that it is. It has dictated the terms and conditions of recruiting. It will not oppose conscription provided the trades unions are consulted and heeded.

In closing, a word about America! This war, as I have said, has unified America spiritually. Her ideal is that of personal liberty and equality, of government by the whole people of a nation and of federal union among coördinate states. She also believes in the inviolability and the spiritual independence of all nations.

Thus far in her career she has remained aloof and practically in isolation. Now, however, the European War is forcing her both from humane and patriotic motives as well as from industrial interests and responsibilities to become a world-power. As a world-power, what will be her policy? If she is to remain true to the law of her own being, she will use her prestige, her organized intelligence, her wealth, and, if need be, her increasing military and naval force, to spread among the common people of all the other nation-states in the

world the principles she herself has found to be so beneficent within her own borders. If her working hypotheses have been of benefit to all the immigrants who have come to her shores, from some fifty-one different nations, she will reason that they will be equally beneficial to the kinsfolk whom these relatives have left behind in Russia, Prussia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. America herself will begin to do something for the oppressed in every country in the world analogous to that which the Irish Americans have done for Ireland. They subsidized the Home Rule Movement; they strengthened the hand of the Liberal government in its effort to bring political justice to Ireland. They thus backed the first great enterprise towards federal government within the United Kingdom. In the same way America as a nation-State can carry liberty and justice in a corresponding manner to the Jews and native peasants of Russia. She can back the crusade for ridding Germany of despotic militarism by strengthening the hands of the 4,250,000 Republican voters of Germany—one-third of all the electors of the Empire. If America means to flood the world with liberty, equality, government-by-the-will-of-the-people and the federal-idea, she will proclaim this as her policy and will forewarn all the other governments of the world that when the next war is declared, she will throw her whole prestige and power to the side of that party in the conflict which is battling for liberty, equality, popular government, and the federation of states. To that side only will she then furnish munitions; but on that occasion she will furnish them not by accident, but on principle. Not only munitions will she supply, but all the other necessities of life which she can spare. These she will furnish, not from a motive of private gain

on the part of her manufactures, nor from the motive of increasing the government's revenue, but because the fight for liberty, equality, popular government, and the federal principle is *her* fight.

When the United States built the Panama Canal, she committed herself to the responsibilities of a world-power, but a world-power of a new order. She repudiated the example of previous empires whose motive had been to serve private traders and financiers. She claimed to be protectress of the whole of the New World in the interest of New World ideas. It is an interesting coincidence that the Panama Canal and the World War opened almost at the same time. They are enterprises which confront each other. Perhaps I cannot, therefore, more fittingly bring my address to a close than with a few lines, expressive of the spirit and destiny of America as a world-power, taken from an ode on the Panama Canal written by a great American poet:

O lazy laughing Panama!
O flutter of ribbon 'twixt the seas!
Pirate and king your colors were
And stained with blood your golden keys.
Now what strange guest, on what mad quest,
Lifts up your trophy to the breeze!
O Panama, O ribbon-twist,
That ties the continents together,
Now East and West shall slip your tether
And keep their ancient tryst.

Our ships shall sail
West to the ancient East.
Once more the quest of the Grail,
And the greatest shall be the least.

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We shall circle the earth around
With peace like a garland fine;
The warring world shall be bound
With a girdle of love divine.
What build we from coast to coast?
It's a path for the Holy Ghost.

WHAT A GERMAN VICTORY WOULD MEAN TO THE WORLD

BY JOHN A. WALZ

THE present anti-German feeling in our country is to a considerable extent due to the fear of a German victory. The Germans, we are told, are aiming at world dominion and a German victory will establish a German overlordship in the world threatening the independence of all other nations, great and small. Is there any basis in fact for such a view? There are at the present time two world empires, the Russian Empire and the British Empire. The Russian Empire developed along its Eastern boundary because it had as neighbors only inferior Asiatic tribes, in the West it grew chiefly on account of the political disorganization of Central Europe. But the Russian Empire has a physical basis of power such as only the Asiatic empires of the past have had, the vast territory of Central and Northern Russia, an inexhaustible reservoir of soldiers. The expansion of Russia has been by massive force, through quantity, not through quality. In the eighteenth century, moreover, when Russia acquired most of her western non-Russian territory, the principle of nationality was dormant and the Russian government itself did not seriously interfere with the national life of the annexed provinces. It is only during the nineteenth century that Russia has systematically attempted to

force upon her foreign nationalities Russian institutions, language, and religion. The British Empire rests upon the command of the sea. Its physical basis is represented by the geographical position of England in the midst of the ocean. Command of the sea has enabled the English to conquer India, Egypt, and South Africa.

The German Empire has no large physical basis. Its area covers only 209,000 square miles, not quite four-fifths of the single state of Texas. Its population is 67,000,000, as against 330,000,000 in the rest of Europe, 160,000,000 in the Russian Empire, 110,000,000 on the North American continent, nearly 400,000,000 in the British Empire. How is it conceivable in our age of democracy and nationality that a nation of 67,000,000 should lord it over 330,000,000 of other Europeans, not to speak of the peoples of other continents? And though there are great differences in the culture and civilization of the countries of Europe, they belong in general to the same race and the same sphere of civilization as the Germans. They are not like the nomads of Siberia and the mountaineers of the Caucasus greatly inferior in civilization.

Can a victorious Germany ever hope to become mistress of the sea? Here, too, every physical and geographical basis is lacking. The German coast line is not made for sea monopoly, and even if a victorious Germany were to control the coast of Flanders, conditions would not be essentially changed. We are told that sea power is indivisible, and that one country must always dominate the sea, that if England is defeated, Germany will take her place as mistress of the sea. The teaching of history is very different. England acquired her absolute control of the sea during the Napoleonic wars, through her surprise attack on the Danish

fleet and through the battle of Trafalgar. Before that time she was the first naval power but she had no absolute control. A victorious Germany will break the British monopoly of sea power but she cannot replace it by a monopoly of her own. Germany cannot change her coast line and she cannot alter the work of history. Germany lacks the physical, material, and geographical basis for world dominion on land or on sea. The Germans with their clear sense of realities know that perfectly well. No German statesman and no reputable German publicist has ever spoken or thought of world dominion as the goal of German ambition. When they speak of the German idea in the world or of a place in the sun, they mean something very different. The charge that the Germans are aiming at world dominion is a part of that great campaign of slander against everything German which was launched in the press of their enemies sixteen months ago.

Do the neutral nations of Europe fear the consequences of a German victory? Five little nations are the next-door neighbors of the German Empire; Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. They are divided in their sympathies, but all five nations, whatever their sympathies, are determined to the last man to preserve their nationality and independence. For sixteen months they have maintained strict neutrality at great cost to themselves, though joining the Allies would mean to all of them considerable temporary advantages in trade and commerce. If they really feared that a German victory would threaten their independence, they would have joined the Allies long ago to make an end of the German danger. But these nations do not fear a German victory any more than

a victory of the Allies, and they do not propose to sacrifice blood and treasure in a cause which is not their own. They know the German government and the German people. Next-door neighbors know each other better than people living three thousand miles apart.

If any further proof were needed to show that a German victory will not endanger the small nations, it is the action of the Balkan states. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers not because her sympathies were pro-German or pro-Austrian but because she saw that her future as a nation depended upon the victory of the Central Powers. Greece is maintaining her neutrality under the greatest difficulties, but that means that Greece does not believe that a German-Austrian victory will endanger her independence. The same is substantially true of Rumania. What counts in the present crisis is the attitude of responsible governments and not the reports of a biased press.

Is the character of Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, such as to make a German victory a danger to the world? At the beginning of the war her enemies called her a ramshackle empire and were confident that she would fall apart at the first rude shock. To-day she stands before us a state organized and united, full of power and determination. Austria-Hungary developed at a time when the principle of nationality was unknown, when democracy was little potent, when the dynasty represented the interests of a country. When the principle of nationality became established in Europe, during the nineteenth century, it seemed as though that monarchy were bound to disappear. But in 1867 Austria gave full recognition to the principle of nationality. In Austria to-day all nationalities

enjoy the free use of their language which is guaranteed to them by the constitution and Austria guarantees to all her citizens freedom of religion. Austria has in principle solved the most difficult problem of statecraft, to unite on a just basis the interests of many nationalities differing in language and religion, to enable each one to follow the bent of its national genius and to make them all loyal to the common political organism. In practice, it is true, there will always be difficulties to overcome, but great principles are bound to suffer when applied in practice.

Russia is not a national state, it embraces even more nationalities than Austria-Hungary, but the Great Russians, the real bearers of the Empire, have adopted a policy the reverse of the Austrian. They have made the Orthodox Faith the only recognized religion, membership in which alone confers full citizenship; other religions are merely tolerated. And the Great Russians are trying hard to destroy the nationality of the non-Russian peoples within the Empire.

Austria has proven herself the protector of the small nationalities and of religious freedom. That has given to the Dual Monarchy its unexpected marvelous strength.

Does any sane man believe that the Poles, the Czecks, the Magyars, the Croatians are sacrificing the flower of their manhood in order to pass under German dominion in case of victory? No. These nationalities realize that their whole future as separate entities depends upon a German victory and that their common political organism, the Dual Monarchy, will cease to exist if Germany is defeated. They know that a victory of the Allies will make Russia supreme upon the Continent and England and France will count for little in Central

and Eastern Europe. It is to prevent national extinction that the peoples of Austria-Hungary are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the armies of Germany.

Austria-Hungary points the way to the future formation of Central and Eastern Europe, a union or confederacy of nations large and small, which will insure safety and freedom to all, with a sufficient guarantee that the rights of each one will be respected. In reading the numerous articles in German and Austrian periodicals dealing with the future condition of Central Europe you find invariably the idea of a union of some kind between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary based upon common defense and common economic interests, a union which might include Bulgaria and Turkey and other states willing to join it and which would leave to all partners the utmost freedom in internal affairs. It is the first sign, indistinct as yet, of a new Europe, of a confederacy of European states based not upon common nationality but upon common interests and mutual justice. It will be the federal principle of the German Empire applied very loosely combined with the principle of nationality of Austria. It will mean that war-ridden Europe will become the permanent home of peace.

Turkey does not sacrifice her men to help Germany or Austria. But Turkey, like Bulgaria, knows that her existence as a nation depends upon a German victory. We may not like the Turks, but we cannot deny to that virile people the right of self-government which we are ready to grant to all other nations. For over fifty years England was the protector of Turkey, not because she loved the Turks but because she feared Russia. Some ten years ago Great Britain made peace with Russia at the expense of Persia. Turkey saw what was

in store for her. But the Turks are not Persians and they preferred fighting to the fate of Persia.

When Great Britain lost her interest in Turkey Germany stepped in. It was the German policy to strengthen Turkey from within by military reorganization and by the development of the country's economic resources. A strong Turkey was in the interest of Germany, a weak Turkey in the interest of Russia and Great Britain. The Young Turks saw that as clearly as the old Sultan. A German victory will mean the regeneration and modernization of Turkey, not as a vassal state of Germany but as an independent country which may in some form be linked to Central Europe. The Young Turks have shown that their race is capable of assimilating modern ideas.

Japan has shown to the world that an Asiatic nation is able to govern and to defend itself. If Turkey, with the aid of Germany, can maintain her independence against the armies of the Allies, why should not Persia aspire to independence, why not the nations of Central Asia, why not India with her ancient civilization? Germany can never hope to rule Persia or India, but she may be able to help both countries to gain freedom and independence, and her organizing genius may assist both countries in establishing stable government. The longer the war lasts the more likely it is that the nations of Asia will achieve independence. It will mean a new era in the history of the world.

And here we come to the true significance of a German victory. Germany from necessity stands for the independence of nations and a German victory will mark the end of the great world empires based upon conquest. It will replace conquest by coöperation and will establish the democracy of nations.

In this Germany is not guided by altruistic motives but by enlightened self-interest. It is to the interest of Germany that the Balkan States enjoy peace and stable government, that Turkey develop her resources, that Persia be independent, that Egypt determine her own economic policy, that the door remain open in China, that the laws of the sea be made by all sea-faring nations in common. But all these things are also in the interest of the United States, and that is the reason why we German-Americans and a few other Americans have always maintained that the foreign interests of this country and of Germany are in all essentials identical. The time will come when this will be recognized.

The political effects of a German victory will affect Europe and Asia but hardly our own country. Other effects will be felt here. We are told, to be sure, that a victorious Germany will challenge the Monroe Doctrine and even contemplate an invasion of the United States. A tyro in naval matters may see that no modern fleet is able to engage in serious hostile operations 4000 miles from its base. We deny the good faith or the good sense of the men who are trying to arouse the American people by the boggy of a German invasion of North or South America. We have shown the impossibility of a German political world empire and a layman in military matters has seen that none of the belligerents has attempted to land an army on enemy shore with the exception of the Dardanelles. The Germans have not even attempted to land troops in England or north of Riga, the British have not attempted to land troops in Belgium to attack the Germans from the rear. The landing at the Dardanelles was attempted only after the Allies had seized a few neutral and undefended islands to serve as base.

The effects of a German victory upon our country will be quite different. We see to-day the armies of Germany on enemy soil though they have always been greatly outnumbered by their opponents. It looks very much like a victory of quality over quantity. It is no longer possible to speak of an autocracy or a military caste forcing an unwilling people into a war of aggression.

No despotic government and no caste government in history have ever accomplished what the Germans have accomplished during the last eighteen months. Democracy alone is capable of such efforts. But what is German democracy and how does it work? The progressive movement in this country is the attempt to apply German methods and principles of government to American conditions, to Germanize or, if you please, to Prussianize American institutions. Two thirds of the progressive platform of 1912 represent an American transliteration of German governmental principles and practices. There is a most interesting political document that contains the answer, the platform of the progressive party of 1912. The progressive platform demands the conservation of human resources through an enlightened measure of social and industrial justice, protection for the workingman through a system of social insurance, the lifting of the last load of illiteracy from American youth, national regulation of corporations and industrial organizations, a non-partisan tariff commission, conservation of natural resources, protection of agriculture, economy and efficiency of the government service. But all these things have been recognized in principle by the German government and people for the last thirty years and most of them have been fully carried out in practice.

A German victory will mean the victory of progressive legislation in this country whatever may become of the progressive party. Old age pensions, compulsory insurance, and other social measures may not be Anglo-Saxon, but we are Americans and our workmen will insist, as they have done, on obtaining the same rights and the same protection that German workingmen enjoy, and our business men will demand of the government the same intelligent impartial interest in the business of the whole country and the same protection against the exploitation of the few that German business men enjoy at the hands of their government. The common people in all industrial countries will be benefited by a German victory, for all these countries will be compelled to adopt progressive legislation, that is, German principles of government. In this sense it may truly be said that a German victory will benefit victors, vanquished, and neutrals. The German state has serious faults but Germany has been winning not through her faults but through her greater virtues, and England, France, and Russia have been losing, not through their virtues which are great, but through their faults, which are greater. Let me quote from a recent book, *Socialized Germany*, by the distinguished commissioner of immigration, Mr. Frederic C. Howe, p. 324:

Germany differs from other leading countries in the thought that has been given to the distribution as well as the production of wealth. And no other country has so greatly improved the well-being of so large a portion of the people. This is the real explanation of her power; this lies back of her military achievements; this explains her advance in trade and oversea commerce.

P. 321: "This emphasis on human welfare is one of the remarkable things about the German idea of the state." As to German city government Mr. Howe says, p. 85: "There is far less exploitation by privileged interests than in America, far less than in England." As to education:

Undoubtedly Germany is the most highly educated nation in the world. There is no illiteracy in Germany or practically none. Education is prized by all classes. It is looked upon as the one avenue of advancement. . . . The German educational system is, if not a model that can be copied by other countries, at least a suggestion of the commanding position which education will probably enjoy in the civilization of the future.

It is clear that a German victory must hasten the time when education will occupy the commanding position in the life of the civilized world of which at the present time Germany alone gives a suggestion.

The progressive platform contains the solemn pledge of the party to maintain the government of the people, by the people and for the people. Millions of citizens voted the progressive ticket because they believed that there was not enough government by the people and for the people. They wished to do away with the invisible and irresponsible government sitting enthroned behind the ostensible government. The German government is not a government *of* the people, its historical development has been quite different, but it has become more and more a government by the people and especially for the people. In many and important phases of public life the Germans have the substance of democracy while we have the shadow. Mr. Duncan-Clark has summed up the ideas under-

lying the progressive movement as follows: Human rights are superior to property rights, justice is a bigger word than charity, honesty is a bigger word than success, coöperation is more potent for human welfare and progress than competition, and the highest ideal of citizenship is service. But these are the principles underlying the German government in theory and in practice and these principles will become triumphant in the world through a German victory. There will be more government *by* the people and a great deal more *for* the people.

And here we come to the heart of the anti-German sentiment in our country. Capitalism throughout the world has an instinctive aversion to the German government, but the seat of capitalism is the city of London and its most important branch is Wall Street. Capitalism in England has succeeded, under the guise of parliamentary forms, in making itself supreme at the expense of the English masses. Capitalism means the government by the few and for the few. But German principles of government are inexorably opposed to the rule of capitalism at the expense of the common people. The Germans were the first to recognize that unrestrained capitalism means the subjection and exploitation of the masses whether the form of government be monarchical or republican.

A German victory will mean the curbing of the power of capitalism throughout the world and that means the beginning of a new era in the social and economic life of the nations. It is perfectly logical for the champions of capitalism to tell us that a German victory will mean the suppression of the individual in favor of the state. They scent the danger and they are trying to avert it by painting the results of a German victory in the most lurid colors. Capitalism is individ-

ualism raised to its highest power. It is for the benefit of the individual and its good or bad use depends solely upon the character of the individual. But human nature is weak and the temptations are strong. In restraining capitalism in the interest of the whole people and in compelling the strong individual to respect the rights of his weaker fellow individual, Germany does not crush individuality but makes it serve the common good. To the charge that German principles of government suppress individuality we reply with the question: Which one of the belligerent nations seems to have brought forward the largest number of individuals able to meet the crisis? Which nation has had the most competent leaders in military, financial, economic, and social matters? But leadership means strong individuality.

Coöperation is the basis of the German idea of the state. As a principle it had been accepted by the German people long before the war, during the war it has penetrated all phases of national life. Coöperation as an applied principle of government is without question a form of socialism, a collectivistic form of society. All the belligerent countries have been forced to adopt the principle of coöperation and they have introduced many measures which before the war would have been inconceivable in a capitalistic form of society, but nowhere have these measures been so successfully carried out as in Germany, for the whole trend of German development before the war was towards coöperation. England, too, in spite of her boasted individualism has adopted the German system of coöperation, but fundamental changes in governmental principles and practices cannot be carried out successfully upon short notice. England's failure in the

present crisis is due to her antiquated principles of government which are based upon the unrestrained individualism of former generations, upon competition. But Germany has shown that her government is based upon modern principles and she has demonstrated to the world that coöperation is more potent than competition.

A German victory will mean that the principle of coöperation will find a place in the national organization of all the countries that do not wish to lag behind in their internal development. It will mean the curbing of capitalism and the uplifting of the common people. It will in no way interfere with the development of strong individualities, but it will replace the English idea of citizenship which is individual liberty by the German ideal of citizenship which is service.

One word about German efficiency. Less than two years ago efficiency was the watchword of our statesmen, publicists, and educators. It was held up as the one thing needful for the American people. But when we suddenly saw the rising of a nation that was truly efficient, the word lost all its magic charm for our educators and moralists. It acquired a bad connotation and many hesitate to use it to-day. But in spite of that there has never been a man efficient in anything who did not possess certain valuable moral qualities, and no nation has ever been efficient without great moral strength. Efficiency presupposes honesty, love of work, and a strong sense of duty. These are the moral qualities at the bottom of German efficiency. A German victory will give to these qualities a higher value throughout the world than they have ever had before. And if the neutral nations have anything to fear from a German victory, they must fear German efficiency but not the German armies or men of war.

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON PAN-AMERICAN COÖPERATION

BY SENHOR MANOEL DE OLIVEIRA LIMA

EUROPE, whose age ought to have rendered her wiser, has foolishly made of America a true "continent of peace" amidst the universal delirium of the moment. The name had often been given to her in conference addresses and post-prandial speeches, but it was rather a usurped reputation. We have paid our contribution to warfare. History shows that in the last century, besides the innumerable civil wars—and in this field the primacy also belongs to the United States—your country fought against England, against Mexico, and against Spain; my country fought against Argentina, against Uruguay, and against Paraguay; Chile fought against Peru and against Bolivia; Peru fought against all her neighbors, and so forth, until we reach the toy battles of Central America.

Now we really deserve the title, although we have done nothing else for it than to keep quiet; but to keep quiet in these times of crazy activity and contagious folly, is indeed something, is even a great deal, and we must claim the credit that belongs to us for good behavior. The United States especially have several times seemed to be on the point of being drawn into the whirlpool, yet they have managed so far to keep safely away.

I am certainly not going to discuss the question of responsibility, whether this war was begun by one party or the other. The subject is fortunately and wisely left out of our program. Its discussion would, moreover, lead to no practical result. Arguments, reasons, facts, coincidences would be brought in by each side without convincing the other. Neutrality is the easiest thing on earth to profess and the most difficult to apply: it is particularly difficult to impart to others the conviction that it is being applied. Every neutrality is benevolent towards one of the sides in a larger or smaller degree, and to have such a feature suppressed, it would be necessary to abide by something called impartiality, in which I do not believe, although I claim to be impartial.

On Latin America the war has had generally detrimental effects, so far as the economic situation is concerned, but morally it has had a wholesome effect. It has drawn the Latin-American countries—the South-American countries at least—more closely together than anything else, for the very same and simple reason that the people of a far-away village would flock together, like sheep, if they saw at a distance a group of highwaymen fighting to decide who was the strongest and the richest in that region. They would justly dread to fall under the sway of the victor and have to pay him tribute, unless the fighters should all of them become so exhausted, that they would have no strength left for the task of exacting such tribute. But even so it would be but a matter of time, as one of the highwaymen would surely recover more quickly than the rest, and distance does not count nowadays. Everything goes fast in the air or under the water.

Coöperation may be thus considered the legitimate

child of fear,—and may be regarded as more natural and certain when there already exists an embryo of association—one of the famous *pan* in which the world is divided—for the benefit of races and the fostering of progress, so people say, but in fact, in most cases, to keep up their rivalry and their hatred. Pan-Americanism, I must say, is the most harmless of them so far, particularly when compared with pan-Slavism, pan-Germanism, pan-Islamism and a few others of the lot. It has not yet grown sufficiently to become aggressive: it just begins to show itself defiant, like a lion cub reared in the house and which all of a sudden makes use of its claws and its teeth.

With our *pan* in mind, many persons are persuaded that, should any attack occur with a view to subjugation of a Latin-American country by a European power, the sister-republics would stand united and protect the country so threatened. If, for instance, Germany ever attempted to establish a protectorate over South Brazil, or more accurately, the States of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catharina, then Argentina and Chile would hasten to help us. If Chile happened to be the intended victim of a Japanese raid, Argentina and Brazil would surely turn out to be her chief supporters in the struggle against the Asiatic enemy which is developing into the nightmare of the Pacific coast of America.

I am not so sure of that assistance. I firmly believe in American solidarity, but I believe still more in human selfishness. The war which is raging in Europe is of a nature to render anyone extremely pessimistic. Just look at the Balkans. Are they not all of the same race or very nearly so—Jugoslavs or simply Slavs, but anyhow Slavs—and those of a different race, do

they not profess the same creed and are they not supposed to be bound by the same ideals? Is not Bulgaria, however, anxious to suppress Serbia; Greece indifferent to the fate of her ally of yesterday; Roumania closely watching the game and its profits? Is there anything on the American continent so different from Europe, that all political wickedness should be magically changed into social altruism? It may be so, but personally I am not conscious of the fact.

Peru was deprived of two of her provinces—much more Peruvian, for instance, than Alsace is French—and Chile has not been compelled to give up her conquest, or even to fulfill the terms of the treaty of peace which provided for a plébiscite after ten years' occupation. Peru, by the way, has been trying to find a territorial compensation at the expense of Ecuador. A few years ago, Chile would have gladly welcomed any curtailment of Argentine power, and *vice versa*. The Christ of the Andes has perhaps worked the miracle of suppressing any uncharitable thoughts. Brazil and Argentina are very good friends now, but they have not yet settled to whom belongs the hegemony on the eastern coast of South America—because in our America, just as in wicked Europe, the word hegemony belongs to the international vocabulary and supremacy is equally found in such a lexicon.

Of one thing though I am pretty sure: that the United States would lose no time in assisting the victim instead of assisting the aggressor. The French Ambassador in London, Mr. Paul Cambon, an old, shrewd diplomat, sarcastically remarked at the beginning of the war that it was rather useless to try arguments in order to bring new partners to the Allies. Blows were all that were wanted, as not a few countries would gladly

fly to the victor. The United States know too well that they could not afford to have victors over here, other than themselves. It is the one question of hegemony and supremacy in the New World.

So there is hardly any chance that the Monroe Doctrine will disappear; it will continue either in its former unilateral feature, or in the multiple combined aspect that some (and I belong to the number) have been suggesting it should assume, not so much through fear of an external aggression, as for the sake of domestic coöperation favorable to a common development. This is one of the rare cases in which egoism serves altruism and exclusiveness aids association.

Certainly Latin-American countries have also a deep interest, all of them, in their eventual union against a common possible foe, if there is such a thing as a common foe to America; but it is quite natural that they should rely for the emergency on the proved strength of the Anglo-Saxon democracy of America. Sister republics as they are, what is the use of having a big brother, athletic and fearless? Some of them are of a more affectionate nature than the others and sincerely love the big brother. A few may have a grudge against him for some past quarrel and would not dislike to see him a trifle snubbed. Such a state of mind in a large sisterhood is very complicated and I will not venture into this psychology.

I should like to repeat to you the good saying of the Chief Executive of a tiny republic created under your auspices. He boasted one day before a high American official—who related the story to me—that his country was the third naval power in the world, and as this seemed to surprise the gentleman I am quoting, he added: "Why, we launched to-day the battleship

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Texas; isn't the fleet of the United States by chance intended to protect our independence, which has been guaranteed by your country?"

The war has had a remarkable influence in every department of the human realm. There is not one that has been unaffected by it. I can hardly conceive, for instance, priests of my Catholic faith fighting in soldiers' uniforms, pointing their rifles against human creatures, and shooting them dead without shuddering. I had been taught that priests only assisted the dying, that they never killed anybody unless they had repudiated their sacerdotal character. Am I to kneel at the feet of a man who has his hands tinged with blood, I, who never destroyed a bird? I cannot forget the humanitarian traditions of my country nor that our most glorious soldier, the Duke de Caxias, when invited by the bishop and chapter of Marianna to attend a service to commemorate his victory over the political rebels of 1842, replied that the duty of the clergy was to pray for the dead and not to celebrate fratricidal fights which only grieved the national soul. This subject is, however, alien to us. Let us consider the subject of the day, which is fortunately less painful in its gravity.

Latin-American business is suffering seriously through the obstacles put in the path of its commerce, and the losses sustained are already very important. Since the United States and the Argentine Republic do not suffer as much as do other countries, they cannot realize the situation to its whole extent. If you cannot export cotton to Germany, you may export, on an enormous scale, guns and ammunition to the Allies. Argentina feeds the Allies' troops with frozen beef, and sends horses and mules to the battle fields, and wheat

and corn to the belligerent populations which are unable to pursue the bucolic work of the land and are not allowed to starve. But poor Chile, that chiefly exported her nitrate to fertilize the German plains, and poor Brazil, that counted the Central Empires as her best customers for coffee and now is not allowed to ship more than a certain restricted quantity to Holland and to Scandinavia, so that it may not reach the German trenches and stimulate the nerves of the German soldiers! If the war is to last much longer and the crops are to be heaped in Brazilian warehouses, Brazil, which exports 226 million dollars' worth of coffee out of a total of 362 million dollars' worth produced, will be as ruined as England will be bankrupt, which is no consolation to us, who are not in the war and have kept a strict neutrality.

Meanwhile, Brazilian ships bound from Santos to Dutch ports, that is, neutral ships, bound from a neutral port to another neutral port, employed in the most legitimate commerce—since coffee is no article of war, not even of food—have been detained on the high seas and ordered to proceed to English harbors, to have their cargoes examined and their status defined by a British prize court, which means by the authorities of one of the belligerents. So the belligerents dictate to the neutrals the articles in which they may trade amongst themselves and to what extent, instead of the neutrals imposing on the belligerents rules and procedures of war that will not hurt their own interests.

In fact, this war as regards commerce has been as much waged against the neutrals as between the belligerents, and there has been none, I believe, in which neutrals have been exposed to so many prohibitions and subjected to so many vexations in their traffic.

It is not only in Germany that everything is *verboten*: England, as the power now predominant at sea, has practically done the same, although she is justly considered to be the nursery of liberal ideas. It is true that no government is so near despotism as democracy: monarchies belong to the autocratic family and they have learned by experience that the secret of success does not consist in suppressing freedom. It rather consists in organizing it.

I really think that coöperation among the neutrals would bring about a better state of things for all of them in time of war, and it would even result in the cessation of war, if such coöperation was what it should and ought to be—absolutely neutral as regards the belligerents, and decidedly opposed to war as a barbaric method unworthy of our civilization. I hear, however, people speaking of benevolent neutralities, which suppose malevolent neutralities: what distinguishes the first from alliances and the latter from hostility?

The concept of neutrality is the first thing to be settled and defined before neutrals start coöperating. Are the shipping of ammunition and the lending of the money for the prosecution of the war to be considered compatible with neutrality, or do such acts contradict neutrality? Why should it be a crime for the nationals of a belligerent country living in a foreign country to furnish coal to the men-of-war of their own nationality raiding on the ocean, while at the same time it is no crime for the nationals of that foreign neutral country to gorge themselves with the product of the lavishly paid engines of destruction manufactured and sold by them? I abstain from giving my personal opinion: I only suggest the queries.

What kind of moral authority can be claimed by a neutral who wants to mediate between belligerents and who appears before them charged with those breaches of neutrality, if they are to be so considered? Is preparedness, when it is avowedly undertaken against one side, to be reconciled with friendship towards both sides? All these questions are to be answered before any serious trial of coöperation can be made.

In his very recent lectures at the Lowell Institute, Professor Wilson, of Harvard College, a recognized authority on international law, when referring to unneutral service, illustrated his case with two instances. It would be an unneutral service, he said, for the Fore River Shipyard to build and equip a submarine and send it to sea under its own power to join the Allied fleet. But it would not be an unneutral service to manufacture the pieces for such a submarine and to send them to Canada to be put together and completed. Similarly, a completely equipped expedition could not be sent out from America to join the Allies or the Germans. But a number of friends might join together, sail informally on a ship, and have guns and ammunition in the hold: they would not constitute an armed expedition.

The line is narrow, as the eminent professor explained, but it has to be drawn somewhere. Why not simply draw it where no mistake, no confusion is possible, at the point where pure common sense indicates that neutrality and unneutrality part company? The line has to be drawn somewhere, certainly; but I venture to say, not *ad libitum*, according to every neutral preference or convenience. It must be drawn by justice, and it seems to me that justice would rather dictate that all those conflicting examples are of an

invariably unneutral character: it matters little whether the submarine is completed in the States or in Canada, whether the expeditions carry the guns on deck or in the hold. The contrary would savor too much of a comedy.

We, in South America, have been really and truly neutral throughout this war: I don't mean individuals, as it would be obviously impossible to regulate in the same way both the official attitude and the expression of the personal feelings of the officials themselves. No encouragement of any kind has been given to any partiality, and strict policing has been employed. In Brazil, a league was immediately formed for the Allies, comprising many intellectuals, fed on French culture, but another league was formed for the Central Powers, equally made up of intellectuals, fond of German scholarship. At charity festivals, on the same stage, although on different days and before different assemblies, the busts of King Albert and Emperor William were to be seen, the first praised as an heroic knight and the second exalted as a great sovereign.

Let me add that our German-Brazilians have not been considered foreigners by us, nothing indeed on their side justifying such treatment, so that we are all asking ourselves what has become of that famous German peril, which has been so strenuously pointed out by others? If not for other reasons, then just through our behavior, we Latin Americans are consequently entitled to help peace in an effective way; to ask for a lasting peace and, anyhow, to protect ourselves against the bad effects of future wars; contributing to define the rights of the neutrals, together with the responsibilities of the belligerents. That is the way in which we may

better coöperate for the harmony of the political world and the welfare of human society.

I think that nothing would better help the cause of the neutrals than the abolition of the right of seizure of private property on sea as on land in time of war. The freedom of the oceans would in this way be perfectly assured, and armaments, naval armaments at least, could surely be reduced. Is it not an American doctrine? Was it not presented as such by Secretary of State Marcy when the Congress of Paris established in 1856 the two famous rules of maritime commerce that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war, and that neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag? These rules though are not to be avoided by making of everything contraband of war.

They were contemptuously repudiated in the present war, together with many others framed in the conferences of peace. Sir Edward Carson said in a speech delivered but a few weeks ago on the "Duty of Neutrals," that conventions adopted in times of peace could be upheld only by neutrals, and he added that international law, the product of all the peace instincts of all nations with a view to preventing interruption to civilization, even in time of hostilities, had been entirely abolished or, at any rate, greatly encroached upon by the ineptitude and powerlessness shown by neutrals.

If it is so, and I am afraid it is; if war has gone back to its most brutal ways, to its most inhuman aspects—non-combatants immolated by airships' bombs and submarine torpedoes, populations threatened with starvation, etc.—only, as the ex-attorney general of Great Britain says, because of the impotence of the neutrals

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themselves, their responsibility is great. In fact they have in their hands—specially a powerful neutral of prestige like the United States—the ability to stop any war. Pan-American coöperation will not fail to back the leader of such a union, if it chooses to exercise its authority in the sense of conciliation. Neutrals indeed, which are supposed to be free from passion in the struggle, can and must begin by enforcing the respect for the rules of international jurisprudence through some kind of international injunction. Peace is to be organized as war has been organized.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE RED CROSS FOR PEACE

BY MABEL T. BOARDMAN

IT is a curious fact that the moral code of man, the individual, in his relations to his fellow men is far superior to the code that governs nations in their relationship to their fellow nations. Man, the individual, centuries ago left the Stone Age far behind him, but nations still cling to the primitive ethics of this early period. International law fails as yet to embody the principles of the ancient Decalogue in its provisions. "Thou shalt not steal," makes the man who breaks the law a criminal, but nations plunder each other without a seeming blot upon the escutcheon of their national honor. "Thou shalt not kill," makes the man who slays his fellow man a murderer, yet nations destroy their tens of thousands, chanting after every victory their triumphant *te deums* to the author of the old Mosaic law.

To speak of the present titanic conflict as a lapse into barbarism is hardly just. Within the last fifty years every one of the chief nations involved has been engaged in other wars. Three times during the life of the man not yet threescore years and ten our own nation has resorted to arms to settle foreign or domestic difficulties. Wars are not a return to barbarism, but a perpetuation of barbarism.

Amidst the horrors of death, desolation, and indescribable suffering are there no signs of better things? Must we stand helplessly appalled before the triumph of man's brutal nature, hopeless as to the ability of nations to rise above this bestial plane?

All evolution is so slow that at close range it becomes hardly visible, and only by the long perspective of history can any progress be discerned. I doubt myself if on the active field of battle any real advancement can be found. Warfare, like everything else with which man has to do, has reaped the benefits of scientific skill. The scope and the power of modern inventions for the destruction of human life have so increased within a few decades that a single battle of to-day would have wiped out of existence entire armies of a century ago. Man himself under the horrible excitement of strife becomes mad with blood lust and hardly a more responsible being than his ancestors of the caves. Picture a single scene of this modern warfare. An onslaught is to be made upon the enemy's lines. With the earliest dawn above the waiting men, begins the deafening roar of the huge guns of the artillery in the rear, pounding the enemy's trenches with a hail of shot and shell. Clutching their guns, the men lie side by side, with faces white and tense in the early dawn. One strokes another's arm. One turns to kiss his comrade's cheek. The sergeant clutches the foot of his commanding officer, who, bending towards him, hears the hoarse whisper, "With you, my Captain, with you." Not a man but knows that death may claim him as its own before the sun now rising sinks into the west. Not a man but knows if he falls, and his comrades retreat, he must be left to die without aid or succor where he lies. On the signal, out of their earth burrows dash the long lines of

nerve-strained and wildly excited men. Leaping into the enemy's trenches, a hand-to-hand conflict ensues. No quarter is given or taken. Above ground there is no protection for prisoners' convoys, and if the second trench is to be attacked no living man can be left behind to endanger those who must advance. Hand grenades put an end to any who may have hidden in the shelter of the caves they have constructed, and finally, as the forces spring forward to the next attack, a few detailed for trench-cleaning duty make an end of any wounded men who may prove dangerous. A thousand years ago men fought with no greater fury or barbarity. Prisoners are taken only when armies are cut off, or some of their detachments surrounded, or fortified places captured. For my part, I do not find any particular virtue or advancement in the efforts to make war humane by treaty prohibition of certain kinds of ammunition like *dumdum* bullets. War cannot and never will be a humane institution, and shrapnel wounds are quite as horrible as those caused by the prohibited missiles. It is well, however, that public opinion takes cognizance of the atrocities of war and burns with indignation over these horrors, for atrocities are a part and parcel of all wars, past and present, and will be such as long as wars occur. These minor atrocities go to make up the great sum of atrocity, WAR ITSELF.

Hopeful signs for humane progress are, therefore, not to be found in the midst of shot and shell, of bullet and bayonet, of *aéroplane* and submarine, but in the still, small voice of the people's conscience.

The fact that the nations involved in to-day's mighty conflict seek in books and pamphlets as many-hued as the rainbow to justify to the world their action for entering into the war, gives a note of promise that the

awful deluge of blood now flooding the battle fields of Europe will not occur again. The people of the world are becoming ashamed of war and, conscious of their shame, strive most diligently to find its justification.

There is to-day another sign of moral growth that not only stands as a milestone on the road of national progress towards a higher ethical plane, but which I believe possesses possibilities as yet undreamed of.

As a witness of the awful sufferings after the battle of Solferino, in 1859, a Swiss, Henri Dunant, issued a pamphlet graphically depicting the conditions and experiences of the wounded. This little pamphlet marked an era in history and led to the Treaty of Geneva, which provided for the mitigation of the sufferings of war. This is probably the only treaty in the world devoted wholly to humanitarian provisions. The Treaty of The Hague, which extends its obligations to naval warfare and embraces the question of the treatment of prisoners of war, embodies also other matters.

In opening the first Conference of Geneva, previous to the drafting of the Treaty, Monsieur Moynier, the presiding officer, said:

It has been stated that instead of seeking expedients to render war less murderous we should do better to attack the evil at its root and to work toward universal and perpetual pacification of the world. To hear our critics it would really seem that we are attempting to do nothing less than take part in legitimate warfare by regarding it as a necessary evil.

Is this criticism serious? I cannot believe so. We certainly desire as much as, and more than, anyone, that men shall cease to butcher one another and that they shall repudiate this remnant of barbarism which they have inherited from their forefathers. With the aid of Christianity, they will

succeed in doing this sooner or later, and we applaud the efforts of those who work to bring about better relations. However, we are convinced that it will be necessary for a long time yet to reckon with human passions and endure their baleful consequences. Why, then, if we cannot absolutely and immediately do away with them, should we not seek to lessen them? Charity commends this course, and it is because we have listened to the voice of charity that we are here. I cannot understand wherein our attempts would seem to be calculated to retard the dawn of the era of peace of which we see a glimpse. Moreover, I am convinced that in organizing assistance for the wounded, in addressing earnest appeals to the inhabitants in behalf of their misery, and in describing, for the needs of our cause, the lamentable spectacle of a battlefield, unveiling the terrible realities of war and proclaiming them in the name of charity, a thing which it is too often the interest of politics to keep hidden, we shall do more for the disarmament of peoples than those who resort to the economy arguments or declarations of sterile sentimentality.

There is an interesting fact connected with the adoption of the Treaty of Geneva not generally known. A large majority of the conferees were military men and humane men, but fearing from the professional point of view the privileges it sought to grant. Mr. Charles Bowles, one of the American delegates, when the Treaty's fate hung in the balance, arose in the Convention and explained the similar orders issued during our Civil War to the armies, their success, and the work of the Sanitary Commission. This practical illustration of the treaty provisions undoubtedly was a potent factor in bringing about its adoption. It was not ratified, however, by the United States Government until 1882.

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By means of the Treaty not only are the sick and wounded to be respected, and cared for, without distinction of nationality, by the belligerents in whose power they are; but another humanitarian measure worked for the alleviation of the mental suffering of the families of the sick and wounded prisoners by the provision that the belligerents shall keep each other mutually informed of the conditions of these men, for transmission to their families and friends.

Such provisions as these, together with the requirements for the humane treatment of prisoners of war embodied in the Treaty of The Hague, led to influences for peace little realized. Consider for a moment the long resentment felt in the North after the Civil War, because of the treatment of the Federal prisoners at Andersonville. Watch to-day the bitterness of reprisals when reports of the ill-treatment of wounded or prisoners arise. Look on the other side of the picture. During the Russo-Japanese war the devoted care given both by the Government and the Red Cross of Japan to the sick and wounded Russian prisoners, sent back to Russia, when the war was over, thousands of little centers that could not fail to radiate a subtle influence for peace and the reestablishment of friendly relationship between the two countries.

At the Eighth International Conference of the Red Cross, held in London in 1907, a well-known authority on international law, Professor Martens, head of the Russian Red Cross Prisoners' Bureau, reported:

As under the Red Cross flag there can be no bitterness, and that justice should be rendered to all, I feel it my duty to inform this conference that the states at war gave all necessary aid in furnishing the desired information; and

a fact extraordinary in the annals of international relations, in spite of the conflict the relations between the Red Cross of the two countries at enmity never ceased to be most correct and amiable during the entire war.

This work of mercy had alone made such relationship possible. War had broken every bond—that of diplomacy, of commerce, and of the postal service; but stronger than the force of war was the bond of the Red Cross. As the occupation in the destruction of human life drags man downward towards the brute, that of the merciful work of the Red Cross in the conservation of human life has its elevating influence. It lifts man above the condition of the savage onto the higher plane of human brotherhood.

That the spirit of the Red Cross is twice blessed is well known to those who have had much to do with our own share in the present European war. Wherever groups of persons have banded themselves together to aid one belligerent or one group of belligerents, their marked and intense sympathy with that particular side in the controversy becomes very evident, and they but reflect the spirit that makes war possible. Realizing that it is far wiser to recognize human nature as it is, the Red Cross has welcomed all within its sphere of helpfulness and opened wide its medium of usefulness to any who may desire to send their aid to the Allies only, or to the Central Powers; and by such recognition brings those whose hearts are really warm for human suffering into close contact with the broader spirit of universal humanity.

Turning back to the position of governments in war, we cannot fail to recognize the difficult position of the neutral state in maintaining its neutrality. The

present conflict is so vast, embracing eight powers on the one side and four on the other, and including, save the United States and China, the most important nations of the world,—that each of the countries involved dares not lose any advantage. As a consequence, the rights of neutral nations are frequently disregarded. Ever since the war began we, as a neutral nation, have been forced diplomatically to fight for our rights. Each time that these rights have been disregarded there has arisen a feeling of resentment among our own people; and each demand made upon a foreign power for the recognition of such abuse, its discontinuance, and reparation for the wrong committed, arouses resentment on the part of the people of the nation concerned. On the other hand, the neutrality of the Red Cross is of an entirely different nature, and produces an entirely different attitude. It is, if I may use the term, a *positive neutrality*. It makes no attacks, it demands no rights; it asks simply that it may give to those who suffer, and give its aid to all. It sits in judgment upon no cause, and by no criticism closes the open doors of opportunity before it. More blind than justice, it questions not the suffering that it aids, and finds a welcome everywhere.

Nearly four hundred of our Red Cross surgeons, nurses, and sanitary experts have cared for the sick and wounded in Europe. Hospital supplies and garments by millions of pounds have been sent. Hundreds of thousands of dollars have gone for the maintenance of hospitals, the health of refugees, the aid of prisoners, and many other humanitarian institutions—all pitiful needs the war has produced. Not a nation but has poured out its gratitude for our sympathy and our help for their suffering people.

As a group of our surgeons and nurses were leaving Vienna, one of the officers of the Austrian Red Cross, in his words of farewell, said to them:

Enormous material losses have befallen us. Towns have been destroyed and countries have been devastated. Precious human life has been slaughtered. But far greater than any material losses, those ideals—carefully guarded—of humanity, the fruit of centuries of civilization have been destroyed. In these terrible events we can see one ray of sunshine in the truly neutral love you bestowed upon your fellow creatures, not inquiring whether friend or enemy. The farmer, looking over his ravaged field after a terrible tempest, sees in the midst of the destruction a single flower, which means to him a happy outlook, and hope for the future. This flower is the true Samaritan whose apostolic messenger came to us in you. This true Samaritan work gives consolation and hope for a better future. Not only for this do we thank you—that you came over here to heal our wounded—but much more do we thank you that through your work of true Samaritan love, unconcerned whether friend or foe, you have kept alive the conviction that those ideals of neighborly love have not died out.

It is in such deeds of mercy that the Red Cross sows the seeds of brotherly sympathy that make for peace. When the day dawns wherein the nations shall learn, as men have learned, that there exists something more than international treaties of rights, and that that something is a positive command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," the foundations of lasting peace will have been laid.

In the meantime, we must deal with the results of hatred and strife and, unnecessary as it should be, must continue to occupy ourselves in mitigating the sufferings caused by "man's inhumanity to man."

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May I turn now, for a moment, to another field of Red Cross service, its labors for the relief of suffering after a disaster in foreign lands, and mention only one of the many cases that I might cite.

The central part of China, the Huai River basin, sometimes called the "granary of the Empire," from times before recorded history begins has suffered from great floods and their resulting famines whereby millions of people have been brought to greater misery than any other calamity can cause except that of war alone. For the relief of the starving people of this valley the American Red Cross has expended nearly \$600,000. Among the people of China some ten years ago, angered by the exclusion law, there had arisen a deep feeling of resentment against America. The help given to the starving population, together with the remission of the indemnity, Mr. Root, then Secretary of State, believed changed completely the attitude both of the Chinese Government and the people towards our country, from that of antagonism to one of friendly relations. To-day China looks to us as her best and most unselfish friend.

Not content with rendering relief after the famines had begun, our Red Cross, with the consent of the Chinese Government, sent a board of eminent engineers to study flood and famine prevention in the Huai valley. The report of this board of engineers shows that by modern and scientific drainage, at a reasonable cost, flood prevention is feasible, the land reclaimed and improved fully repaying the expense of the work. China turned to the American Red Cross to aid her in obtaining the necessary loan and to secure the engineer to be placed in charge of the construction by her Government. When a tentative draft for the loan was

submitted to the Chinese Minister in Washington, with the provision that in case of the disability of this engineer the Chinese Government and the contractors should select his successor, the Minister declared his Government would not be satisfied unless in such a case the successor was selected by the American Red Cross.

The Red Cross had represented to the people of China the disinterested, helpful friendship of the people of America, above suspicion and above reproach. Back of it lay no ulterior motive that threatened the integrity of their Empire, and no selfish purpose that endangered their welfare. Unfortunately, the financial world had been so seriously affected by the European war that the bankers were not willing to take up this loan at that time. I am glad to say that at present serious consideration is being given to the matter by our most important financiers.

Dr. Reinsch, the American Minister at Peking, writes of the proposed work:

I may state to you, as I have said to the Department of State and to the President, that there is no undertaking at present proposed in China which equals in importance and significance the Huai River improvement. It is not only that millions of acres of the most fertile agricultural land of China will be reclaimed to usefulness, affording assured means of livelihood to twenty million human beings but the character of the work itself is of such a nature that its execution would have a profound influence on the future of China. The work would be a model for scientific method and organization as applied throughout Chinese life. More especially, however, it would be the beginning of reclaiming the waste lands of China and utilizing the forces of nature, as represented in the rain-swollen streams, with

the result that, according to the computations of competent experts, the agricultural productivity of China could be increased by nearly one hundred per cent. This is the starting point of all reform, leading to the betterment of conditions of life in this country. That these opportunities exist is recognized by the leading representatives of all nations: the American project has therefore been given generous commendation and support in the press throughout the world, such as has never fallen to any other foreign enterprise in China, without exception.

I have written so fully to you about this matter because I realize that in this enterprise lies the finest opportunity which America has ever had of bringing a great liberating influence to bear in China—liberating millions of people, and eventually the entire population, from the dominance of unfavorable natural conditions. All Americans in China realize the importance of this work. Having put our hands to the improvement of famine conditions in central China, it has become a matter of justifiable national pride that this great work should be carried to the successful issue which is now in sight.

The Red Cross is new to China, but is there something of a vision in the powers some of her people attribute to it?

During the revolutionary wars men sought its protection, or brought their treasures to the hospitals to place them under the safety of its folds. In a certain inland city, where the fighting was severe, a teacher moved a little group of scholars from the school to the station to take them to a safer place, marching them forth under a Red Cross flag, both the fighting factions respecting the emblem which safeguarded the children.

The observance of its sanctity, the prevention of its abuse, cannot be too strongly emphasized. The

nation, the physician, or the nurse that utilizes its sacred privileges for any purpose whatsoever save that for which it was created, commits a crime against humanity. It has proven to the world that one flag may command the respect and the protection of all nations. This is not possible for any other emblem the world has ever known. No symbol of religion, no insignia of peace—even the flag of truth—ever possessed this world-wide recognition. What then is the secret of this Red Cross power? I believe it is because in its mission is found the best there is in man's nature. There is no room in its true service of humanity for selfishness, for hatred, or for strife. It disarms suspicion, and builds up confidence. I believe through the medium of the Red Cross a new era may dawn upon this war-weary world—an era not of national rights, but an era of international duties and international service. Leagues of peace and courts of arbitration will never do away with the arbitrament of arms until the foundations of international relationships are built upon the rock of international friendship and good will.



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